From 176616d843c2ff876829217bf92071f69d2a30e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: s kalvin nathan Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2026 22:56:28 +0530 Subject: [PATCH] Add IMPROVEMENTS.md: prioritised list of remaining work --- IMPROVEMENTS.md | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 IMPROVEMENTS.md diff --git a/IMPROVEMENTS.md b/IMPROVEMENTS.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..afd221b --- /dev/null +++ b/IMPROVEMENTS.md @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +# cryptship — Improvements + +What still needs work, in priority order. Last reviewed: November 2026 (after the code review in #8). + +--- + +## P0 — Security + +### 1. The revocation check response is unsigned +- **What:** any HTTP 200 from `revocation_url` counts as "not revoked", even with `CRYPTSHIP_REVOCATION=closed`. An on-path attacker or a captive portal can answer for the server. The grace state file is plain text, so anyone who can write the state directory can extend grace. +- **How to fix:** have the revocation endpoint return a signed, nonce-bound response (reuse the online key server's response format and signing key). Seal the grace state with a key derived from the binding material, and reject future timestamps. + +### 2. Attested mode can be replayed — #3 +- **What:** the client chooses the nonce, and the released secret is not encrypted to a key held inside the TEE. A captured request with genuine evidence can be replayed. +- **How to fix:** make the server issue a challenge nonce, have the guest put `hash(nonce ‖ ephemeral public key)` into the report's REPORT_DATA, and encrypt the secret to that ephemeral key (the Trustee / KBS pattern). Then implement real SEV-SNP (`go-sev-guest`) and TDX (`go-tdx-guest`) verifiers. + +### 3. The server cannot tell attested licenses from online ones +- **What:** a server without a verifier, but sharing the same master key, will release attested-license secrets. +- **How to fix:** bind the binding policy into the server-side derivation (`HKDF(master, license_id ‖ policy)`), so an online server cannot produce attested secrets. Until then, use a separate master key for attested servers (documented in HOWTO.md). + +### 4. Decrypted payload exposure — #5 +`USER 65532` is done (#8). Still open: +- extract into a directory owned by a separate uid, readable only by the app's group; +- an option to exec single-binary payloads from `memfd_create` + `fexecve`, leaving no file on disk; +- small helpers for Go and Python apps to re-apply `PR_SET_DUMPABLE` after exec. + +--- + +## P1 — Correctness and robustness + +### 5. Offline expiry hardening — #2 +The clock-rollback record (#8) can be reset by deleting it. Seal it with the binding-derived key and keep a copy inside the extract-dir manifest. Add the optional server-signed time for the `online` provider. + +### 6. Online provider resilience — #4 +- **Grace cache:** after a successful fetch, seal the binding secret under a machine-derived key with an expiry, and use it during an outage when `CRYPTSHIP_ONLINE_GRACE=` is set. +- **Live denylist:** reload revocations from a file on change, or add an authenticated `POST /admin/revoke`. +- **Seats:** enforce `max` distinct machines per license (the `machine` field is sent but ignored). + +### 7. `--expires YYYY-MM-DD` ends at the start of the day +It expires at 00:00 UTC on the given date, which surprises people. Add `--expires-end-of-day`, or change the meaning in a major version with a clear release note. + +--- + +## P2 — Developer experience + +### 8. `scripts/check-mermaid.sh` docker fallback fails on Linux +Its `mktemp -d` directory is 0700, so the mermaid-cli container user cannot read it. `chmod 755` the temp dir, or run the container with `--user $(id -u)`. + +### 9. Publish the API changes from #8 +For anyone importing the packages, note in the release: +- the module path is now `github.com/AI2TH/cryptship`; +- `Claims.BindingContext()` returns `([]byte, error)`; +- `licenseserver.Server.Verify` is now `Verifier`; +- `keyprovider.MockAttester` is removed. + +Tag a release (v0.2.0) once #8 is merged. + +### 10. Stronger machine binding +Add TPM sealing and cloud instance-identity providers (both on the roadmap) so binding survives root-level fingerprint spoofing. + +--- + +## P3 — Process + +### 11. Security policy +Add `SECURITY.md` with a private reporting address and the threat-model summary, and enable GitHub private vulnerability reporting. + +### 12. Fuzzing +Add Go fuzz tests for license parsing, tar extraction (traversal and symlinks) and the online response decoder.