diff --git a/ROADMAP.md b/ROADMAP.md
index ac8ca18..35dd981 100644
--- a/ROADMAP.md
+++ b/ROADMAP.md
@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ Direction: stay the *safe, structured window into Tailscale* — dry-run default
 
 Informed by [docs/research/Tailscale MCP Landscape Research.md](docs/research/Tailscale%20MCP%20Landscape%20Research.md) (July 2026). Two findings anchor the plan: the competitive field splits into local-only CLI wrappers and Admin-API-only enterprise engines — **nobody bridges both**; and **no server offers stateful dry-run pre-flights** (ACL validate/preview) even though that's exactly what agents need. Both gaps are this project's identity.
 
+## Operating decisions
+
+- **Primary audience:** solo developers and homelab operators driving agents from Claude Code / Claude Desktop / Cursor against a personal tailnet. Local-first ordering follows from this; tailnet-wide (Admin API) features come after the local surface is deep, and enterprise ergonomics are welcome but never jump the queue.
+- **Release cadence:** incremental. Each feature ships as its own minor/patch release the moment it's green (publish is automated); milestones below are *release trains*, not big-bang drops. The first item in a train cuts `x.y.0`; the rest follow as `x.y.z`.
+- **Timeframes:** sequence and dependencies only, no dates.
+- **License:** stays CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0. Registry submissions (v1.0) get checked against each catalog's licensing requirements before effort is spent; contribution terms are covered in CONTRIBUTING.md.
+
 ## v0.1.x — Foundation (shipped)
 
 - [x] `TailscaleProvider` interface + `CliProvider` (injectable process runner, offline fixture-driven tests)
@@ -17,50 +24,57 @@ Informed by [docs/research/Tailscale MCP Landscape Research.md](docs/research/Ta
 - [x] CI/CD: build+test matrix (Node 20/22), tag-and-release, npm publish with provenance
 - [x] GitHub Pages documentation site, community files, issue/PR templates, security policy
 
-## v0.2.0 — Annotations + local surface expansion
+## v0.2.x — Annotations + local surface depth
 
-No new credentials, no new trust boundary. Highest value-per-effort items first.
+No new credentials, no new trust boundary. Ordered by value-per-effort.
 
-- [ ] **Tool annotations on every tool** (`readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`, `idempotentHint`, `openWorldHint`). The spec treats unannotated tools as destructive/non-idempotent, and Claude Code uses `readOnlyHint` as a concurrency signal — today our read-only tools are being serialized and over-confirmed for no reason. Cheap, immediate, ships first.
-- [ ] **LocalAPI provider — narrow scope**: `/localapi/v0/status` and `/localapi/v0/whois` only. These are the two high-stability endpoints (the CLI and GUIs depend on them); the LocalAPI as a whole is officially unstable, so `CliProvider` remains the default for everything else and the fallback for these. Platform IPC handled natively: Unix socket (Linux), ACL'd named pipe (Windows), sameuserproof (macOS).
-- [ ] **`whois` tool** — resolve a tailnet IP to node + user identity ("who is hitting my shared port"); also the building block for identity-gated tools in v0.4
-- [ ] **`exit_node` tools** — list advertised exit nodes; set/clear the active exit node (mutating: structured before/after state in the response)
-- [ ] **`netcheck`** — DERP region latency, preferred relay, NAT detail; complements `ping_all` for "why is this path relayed"
-- [ ] **`dns_status`** — MagicDNS config, resolvers, search domains
-- [ ] Serve improvements: TCP forwarding mode, multiple simultaneous shares, `share_port` idempotency (re-share same port updates instead of erroring)
-- [ ] Taildrop `send_file` via CLI (`tailscale file cp`); receive deferred — the `file-put` LocalAPI path is medium-stability and sandbox-entangled
+- [ ] **0.2.0 — Tool annotations on every tool** (`readOnlyHint`, `destructiveHint`, `idempotentHint`, `openWorldHint`).
+  The spec treats unannotated tools as destructive/non-idempotent, and Claude Code uses `readOnlyHint` as a concurrency signal — today our read-only tools are serialized and over-confirmed for no reason.
+  *Done when:* all tools annotated (`tailnet_status`/`share_status`/`ping_all` read-only; `stop_share` destructive+idempotent; `share_port` non-read-only+open-world when `public`); `mcp-tools.json` reflects annotations; README documents them.
+- [ ] **`exit_node` tools** — `list_exit_nodes` (advertised exit nodes with location/online), `set_exit_node` / `clear_exit_node` (mutating: response includes before/after state so the agent can show the diff).
+  *Done when:* CLI-driven, fixtures for the no-exit-nodes and multi-node cases, structured error when the chosen node doesn't advertise.
+- [ ] **`netcheck`** — DERP region latencies, preferred relay, NAT/port-mapping detail. Complements `ping_all`: "why is this path relayed."
+  *Done when:* parses `tailscale netcheck` (or LocalAPI equivalent) into a stable JSON shape; fixture-tested.
+- [ ] **`dns_status`** — MagicDNS on/off, resolvers, search domains, per-node overrides.
+- [ ] **Serve improvements** — TCP forwarding mode (`share_port {"proto": "tcp"}`), multiple simultaneous shares, idempotent re-share (same port updates instead of erroring). `share_status` grows to enumerate all active endpoints.
+- [ ] **Taildrop send** — `send_file(peer, path)` via `tailscale file cp`. Receive is deferred: the `file-put` LocalAPI path is medium-stability and sandbox-entangled per the research.
+- [ ] **LocalAPI provider — narrow scope**: `/localapi/v0/status` and `/localapi/v0/whois` only — the two high-stability endpoints (the CLI and GUIs depend on them). The LocalAPI as a whole is officially unstable, so `CliProvider` stays the default everywhere else and the automatic fallback for these. Platform IPC handled natively: Unix socket (Linux), ACL'd named pipe (Windows), sameuserproof (macOS).
+  *Done when:* `ProviderManager` selects per-capability with fallback on connection failure; integration paths covered by fixtures per platform.
+- [ ] **`whois` tool** — resolve a tailnet IP to node + user identity ("who is hitting my shared port"). Depends on the LocalAPI provider; also the building block for identity-gated execution in v0.4.
 
-## v0.3.0 — Admin API bridge (opt-in)
+## v0.3.x — Admin API bridge (opt-in)
 
-A new trust boundary: the Admin API needs OAuth client credentials. Everything here is **off unless credentials are provided via env** (`TS_API_CLIENT_ID`/`TS_API_CLIENT_SECRET`), scoped least-privilege, never logged or echoed. This is the "unified local + Admin API" gap no competitor fills.
+A new trust boundary: the Admin API needs OAuth client credentials. Everything here is **off unless credentials are provided via env** (`TS_API_CLIENT_ID`/`TS_API_CLIENT_SECRET`), scoped least-privilege, never logged or echoed. This is the "unified local + Admin API" gap no competitor fills — and for the homelab audience it means *one* server handles both "what's my tailnet doing" and "authorize my new raspi."
 
-- [ ] **`AdminApiProvider`** with documented least-privilege scope recipes per use case (read-only monitoring: `devices:core:read` + `dns:read`; GitOps validation: `policy_file:read`; provisioning: `auth_keys` with tag-locked OAuth client)
-- [ ] Rate-limit resilience: honor `429`/`Retry-After` with exponential backoff + jitter; `TAILSCALE_MAX_CONCURRENT` cap
-- [ ] Device management tools: list all tailnet devices (not just peers), authorize, rename, set tags, key-expiry status
-- [ ] **ACL dry-run pre-flight tools** — `acl_validate` / `acl_preview`: review a proposed policy change and see which connections it would affect, *before* any human applies it. No server in the landscape offers this; it is the flagship v0.3 feature. Still no blind ACL writes — ever.
-- [ ] Scoped auth-key creation (ephemeral, preauthorized, tag-inheriting via tag-locked OAuth client)
-- [ ] Permission tiers via env: `TAILSCALE_MCP_READONLY=1`, `TAILSCALE_MCP_ALLOW_FUNNEL=0`, risk-level gate checked before every mutating tool
+- [ ] **0.3.0 — `AdminApiProvider`** with documented least-privilege scope recipes per use case: read-only monitoring (`devices:core:read` + `dns:read`), GitOps validation (`policy_file:read`), provisioning (`auth_keys` on a tag-locked OAuth client).
+  *Done when:* provider registers only the tools its granted scopes can serve; missing-credential and insufficient-scope both return structured errors with the exact admin-console remedy.
+- [ ] **Rate-limit resilience** — honor `429`/`Retry-After` (integer and HTTP-date forms) with exponential backoff + jitter; `TAILSCALE_MAX_CONCURRENT` cap on concurrent Admin API calls.
+- [ ] **Device management tools** — list all tailnet devices (not just peers), authorize, rename, set tags, key-expiry status. Mutations return before/after state.
+- [ ] **ACL dry-run pre-flight tools** — `acl_validate` (syntax + semantic check of a proposed policy) and `acl_preview` (which connections a change would allow/deny), so a human reviews the effect *before* applying anything by hand. No server in the landscape offers this; it is the flagship v0.3 feature. Still no blind ACL writes — ever.
+- [ ] **Scoped auth-key creation** — ephemeral, preauthorized, tag-inheriting keys via a tag-locked OAuth client (the control plane guarantees generated keys inherit the client's tags). The homelab "provision a new node from chat" workflow.
+- [ ] **Permission tiers via env** — `TAILSCALE_MCP_READONLY=1` (mutating tools unregistered), `TAILSCALE_MCP_ALLOW_FUNNEL=0` (Funnel refused even with `public: true`), risk-level gate evaluated before every mutating tool.
 
-## v0.4.0 — Agentic ergonomics + identity-gated execution
+## v0.4.x — Agentic ergonomics + identity-gated execution
 
-- [ ] **Capability-grant authorization**: resolve the caller's identity via `whois` and check application capability grants in the tailnet ACL policy before executing privileged tools — the published mitigation for the confused-deputy problem (unprivileged user driving a privileged agent)
-- [ ] MCP **resources**: `tailnet://status`, `tailnet://peers/<hostname>` (Claude Desktop and Claude Code both render these fully)
-- [ ] MCP **prompts**: canned workflows ("diagnose connectivity to <node>", "share this dev server with the team")
-- [ ] Progress notifications for long ops (`ping_all` over large tailnets) — Claude Code renders text tickers; other clients ignore them, so this is progressive enhancement only
+- [ ] **Capability-grant authorization** — resolve the caller's identity via `whois` and check application capability grants in the tailnet ACL policy before executing privileged tools. The published mitigation for the confused-deputy problem (unprivileged user driving a privileged agent). Depends on: v0.2 `whois`, v0.3 `AdminApiProvider`.
+- [ ] **MCP resources** — `tailnet://status`, `tailnet://peers/<hostname>`: pollable state without tool calls. Claude Desktop and Claude Code both render resources fully.
+- [ ] **MCP prompts** — canned workflows: "diagnose connectivity to <node>" (status → ping → netcheck → interpretation), "share this dev server with the team" (share_port → whois-verify → URL handoff).
+- [ ] **Progress notifications** for long ops (`ping_all` over large tailnets, future transfers). Claude Code renders text tickers; other clients ignore them — progressive enhancement only, never load-bearing.
 
 ## v1.0.0 — Stable + distribution
 
-- [ ] Full test coverage incl. Windows + macOS CI runners (named pipe vs unix socket vs sameuserproof paths)
-- [ ] Integration-test harness: fixture capture tooling against a real tailnet, sanitizer included
-- [ ] Complete docs site: per-tool reference, security model page, provider architecture
-- [ ] Semver commitment; documented tool-schema stability policy
-- [ ] **Distribution beyond npm**: signed Docker image with SBOM (Docker MCP Catalog requirement), Smithery listing, mcp.so, standalone binaries for Windows/macOS/Linux, one-click configs for Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor
+- [ ] **Cross-platform CI** — Windows + macOS runners exercising the named-pipe / unix-socket / sameuserproof provider paths.
+- [ ] **Integration-test harness** — fixture capture tooling against a real tailnet with a sanitizer, so contributors can regenerate fixtures without leaking their tailnet.
+- [ ] **Docs site completeness** — per-tool reference (generated from `mcp-tools.json`), security model page (trust boundaries, env flags, what the server will never do), provider architecture page.
+- [ ] **Stability policy** — semver commitment; tool schemas are API: breaking schema changes only in majors, documented deprecation window.
+- [ ] **Distribution beyond npm** — signed Docker image with SBOM (Docker MCP Catalog requirement), Smithery listing (requires Streamable HTTP — see deferred), mcp.so, standalone binaries (Windows/macOS/Linux), one-click configs for Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor. Each channel gated on a license-compatibility check first (CC-BY-NC-ND).
 
 ## Deliberately skipped or deferred
 
-- **Streamable HTTP transport** — deferred. Claude Desktop and Cursor don't support it (stdio remains the universal transport); `jaxxstorm/tailscale-mcp-proxy` already bridges stdio→HTTP for those who need remote deployment. Revisit when client support lands (also a Smithery hosting prerequisite).
+- **Streamable HTTP transport** — deferred. Claude Desktop and Cursor don't support it (stdio remains the universal transport); `jaxxstorm/tailscale-mcp-proxy` already bridges stdio→HTTP for remote deployment. Revisit when client support lands; prerequisite for Smithery hosting.
 - **OAuth authorization-server metadata / PRM discovery** — wait; mainstream clients don't render these flows yet.
 - **Elicitation** — no meaningful client support.
+- **Taildrop receive** — deferred pending LocalAPI `file-put` stability; send-only ships in v0.2.
 - **Custom dashboards/visualization** — out of lane; effort belongs in the tool execution plane.
 
 ## Explicitly out of scope