doc: clarify permission model scope for output paths

Flags such --trace-event-file or any other flag that specifies a
directory are subject to permission model rules, but a "bypass"
isn't considered a vulnerability while it doesn't pose a
risk to the user application

Signed-off-by: RafaelGSS <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
PR-URL: #66004
Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>

Author: RafaelGSS

SECURITY.md

@@ -500,7 +500,15 @@ The following are **not** vulnerabilities in Node.js:
 * **Operator-controlled flags**: Behavior unlocked by flags the operator
   explicitly passes (e.g., `--localstorage-file`) is the operator's
   responsibility. The permission model does not restrict how Node.js behaves
-  when the operator intentionally configures it.
+  when the operator intentionally configures it. This includes any file or
+  resource that Node.js itself creates, writes, or reads at a location the
+  operator selected through a flag, including every path derived from a
+  template or pattern in that flag. For example, trace files rotated by
+  `--trace-event-file-pattern` (`${rotation}`) being written without a
+  matching `--allow-fs-write` entry is not a permission model bypass. Such
+  paths are part of the operator's configuration, not application file-system
+  access. Inconsistent checks on these paths are treated as regular bugs and
+  should be reported through the public issue tracker.
 
 * **`node:sqlite` and the permission model**: `DatabaseSync` operates with the
   same file-system privileges as the process. Using SQL pragmas or built-in

doc/api/permissions.md

@@ -341,6 +341,14 @@ There are constraints you need to know before using this system:
   to read files before environment initialization. As a result, such flags are
   not subject to the rules of the Permission Model. The same applies for V8
   flags that can be set via runtime through `v8.setFlagsFromString`.
+* Files that Node.js itself creates, writes, or reads at a location selected
+  by an operator flag may not be consistently checked against the Permission
+  Model, in particular when the flag accepts a template or pattern that
+  expands to several paths. For example, trace files rotated by
+  `--trace-event-file-pattern` (`${rotation}`) can be written even when the
+  expanded path is not covered by `--allow-fs-write`. Because the location is
+  chosen by the operator, gaps like this are treated as regular bugs rather
+  than vulnerabilities. Please report them through the regular issue tracker.
 * OpenSSL engines cannot be requested at runtime when the Permission
   Model is enabled, affecting the built-in crypto, https, and tls modules.
 * Run-Time Loadable Extensions cannot be loaded when the Permission Model is