From 5e470998a23e4c3d89ed24e8172cb22747e61efa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Bonzini Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 13:23:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 001/607] KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected role commit 81ccda30b4e83d8f5cc4fd50503c44e3a33abfeb upstream. Commit 0cb2af2ea66ad ("KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN") fixed a shadow paging mismatch between stored and computed GFNs; the bug could be triggered by changing a PDE mapping from outside the guest, and then deleting a memslot. The rmap_remove() call would miss entries created after the PDE change because the GFN of the leaf SPTE does not match the GFN of the struct kvm_mmu_page. A similar hole however remains if the modified PDE points to a non-leaf page. In this case the gfn can be made to match, but the role does not match: the original large 2MB page creates a kvm_mmu_page with direct=1, while the new 4KB needs a kvm_mmu_page with direct=0. However, kvm_mmu_get_child_sp() does not compare the role, and therefore reuses the page. The next step is installing a leaf (4KB) SPTE on the new path which records an rmap entry under the gfn resolved by the walk. But when that child is zapped its parent kvm_mmu_page has direct=1 and kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn() computes the gfn for the 4KB page as sp->gfn + index instead of using sp->shadowed_translation[] (or sp->gfns[] in older kernels). It therefore fails to remove the recorded entry. When the memslot is dropped the shadow page is freed but the rmap entry survives, as in the scenario that was already fixed. Code that later walks that gfn (dirty logging, MMU notifier invalidation, and so on) dereferences an sptep that lies in the freed page, causing the use-after-free. Fixes: 2032a93d66fa ("KVM: MMU: Don't allocate gfns page for direct mmu pages") Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 0bd0cb8992c9f..541e199feb998 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -2453,13 +2453,15 @@ static struct kvm_mmu_page *kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep, gfn_t gfn, bool direct, unsigned int access) { - union kvm_mmu_page_role role; + union kvm_mmu_page_role role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access); - if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && !is_large_pte(*sptep) && - spte_to_child_sp(*sptep) && spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->gfn == gfn) + if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && + !is_large_pte(*sptep) && + spte_to_child_sp(*sptep) && + spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->gfn == gfn && + spte_to_child_sp(*sptep)->role.word == role.word) return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); - role = kvm_mmu_child_role(sptep, direct, access); return kvm_mmu_get_shadow_page(vcpu, gfn, role); } From 5dfcb15974e7d0f96aca278dd9f1b85df91523ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:50:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 002/607] lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks [ Upstream commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 ] Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following new LSM hooks are being created: security_backing_file_alloc() security_backing_file_free() security_mmap_backing_file() The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook. There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks: * Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the security_backing_file_alloc() hook. * Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c. * Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into the common LSM audit code. Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() and supplying a fixup. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [Mainline declares lsm_backing_file_cache in security/lsm.h. Linux 6.18.y does not have security/lsm_init.c or security/lsm.h; the cache variable is defined locally as static struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache in security/security.c.] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/backing-file.c | 17 ++++-- fs/file_table.c | 27 +++++++-- fs/fuse/passthrough.c | 2 +- fs/internal.h | 3 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 2 +- include/linux/backing-file.h | 4 +- include/linux/fs.h | 13 ++++ include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 5 ++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 22 +++++++ security/security.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 13 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/backing-file.c b/fs/backing-file.c index 15a7f80310848..e049a627d78fb 100644 --- a/fs/backing-file.c +++ b/fs/backing-file.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" @@ -29,14 +30,15 @@ * returned file into a container structure that also stores the stacked * file's path, which can be retrieved using backing_file_user_path(). */ -struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, +struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags, const struct path *real_path, const struct cred *cred) { + const struct path *user_path = &user_file->f_path; struct file *f; int error; - f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred); + f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file); if (IS_ERR(f)) return f; @@ -52,15 +54,16 @@ struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_open); -struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, +struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags, const struct path *real_parentpath, umode_t mode, const struct cred *cred) { struct mnt_idmap *real_idmap = mnt_idmap(real_parentpath->mnt); + const struct path *user_path = &user_file->f_path; struct file *f; int error; - f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred); + f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file); if (IS_ERR(f)) return f; @@ -339,6 +342,12 @@ int backing_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma, vma_set_file(vma, file); old_cred = override_creds(ctx->cred); + ret = security_mmap_backing_file(vma, file, user_file); + if (ret) { + revert_creds(old_cred); + return ret; + } + ret = vfs_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma); revert_creds(old_cred); diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 762f03dcbcd77..987e01da99389 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ struct backing_file { struct path user_path; freeptr_t bf_freeptr; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; +#endif }; #define backing_file(f) container_of(f, struct backing_file, file) @@ -66,8 +69,21 @@ void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_set_user_path); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f) +{ + return backing_file(f)->security; +} + +void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security) +{ + backing_file(f)->security = security; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + static inline void backing_file_free(struct backing_file *ff) { + security_backing_file_free(&ff->file); path_put(&ff->user_path); kmem_cache_free(bfilp_cachep, ff); } @@ -288,10 +304,12 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred) return f; } -static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff) +static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff, + const struct file *user_file) { memset(&ff->user_path, 0, sizeof(ff->user_path)); - return 0; + backing_file_set_security(&ff->file, NULL); + return security_backing_file_alloc(&ff->file, user_file); } /* @@ -301,7 +319,8 @@ static int init_backing_file(struct backing_file *ff) * This is only for kernel internal use, and the allocate file must not be * installed into file tables or such. */ -struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred) +struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred, + const struct file *user_file) { struct backing_file *ff; int error; @@ -318,7 +337,7 @@ struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred) /* The f_mode flags must be set before fput(). */ ff->file.f_mode |= FMODE_BACKING | FMODE_NOACCOUNT; - error = init_backing_file(ff); + error = init_backing_file(ff, user_file); if (unlikely(error)) { fput(&ff->file); return ERR_PTR(error); diff --git a/fs/fuse/passthrough.c b/fs/fuse/passthrough.c index 72de97c03d0ee..f2d08ac2459b7 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/passthrough.c +++ b/fs/fuse/passthrough.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ struct fuse_backing *fuse_passthrough_open(struct file *file, int backing_id) goto out; /* Allocate backing file per fuse file to store fuse path */ - backing_file = backing_file_open(&file->f_path, file->f_flags, + backing_file = backing_file_open(file, file->f_flags, &fb->file->f_path, fb->cred); err = PTR_ERR(backing_file); if (IS_ERR(backing_file)) { diff --git a/fs/internal.h b/fs/internal.h index 9b2b4d1168802..51107fd515145 100644 --- a/fs/internal.h +++ b/fs/internal.h @@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ extern void chroot_fs_refs(const struct path *, const struct path *); */ struct file *alloc_empty_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred); struct file *alloc_empty_file_noaccount(int flags, const struct cred *cred); -struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred); +struct file *alloc_empty_backing_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred, + const struct file *user_file); void backing_file_set_user_path(struct file *f, const struct path *path); static inline void file_put_write_access(struct file *file) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c index a5e9ddf3023b3..e924321b64025 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c @@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry, } ovl_path_upper(dentry->d_parent, &realparentpath); - realfile = backing_tmpfile_open(&file->f_path, flags, &realparentpath, + realfile = backing_tmpfile_open(file, flags, &realparentpath, mode, current_cred()); err = PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(realfile); pr_debug("tmpfile/open(%pd2, 0%o) = %i\n", realparentpath.dentry, mode, err); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c index 7ab2c9daffd01..3fedfdddfa758 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, if (!inode_owner_or_capable(real_idmap, realinode)) flags &= ~O_NOATIME; - realfile = backing_file_open(file_user_path(file), + realfile = backing_file_open(file, flags, realpath, current_cred()); } ovl_revert_creds(old_cred); diff --git a/include/linux/backing-file.h b/include/linux/backing-file.h index 1476a6ed1bfd7..c939cd222730c 100644 --- a/include/linux/backing-file.h +++ b/include/linux/backing-file.h @@ -18,10 +18,10 @@ struct backing_file_ctx { void (*end_write)(struct kiocb *iocb, ssize_t); }; -struct file *backing_file_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, +struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags, const struct path *real_path, const struct cred *cred); -struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct path *user_path, int flags, +struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags, const struct path *real_parentpath, umode_t mode, const struct cred *cred); ssize_t backing_file_read_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter, diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 014cb04eefbe6..f3e798184a58e 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2890,6 +2890,19 @@ struct file *dentry_create(const struct path *path, int flags, umode_t mode, const struct cred *cred); const struct path *backing_file_user_path(const struct file *f); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f); +void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security); +#else +static inline void *backing_file_security(const struct file *f) +{ + return NULL; +} +static inline void backing_file_set_security(struct file *f, void *security) +{ +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ + /* * When mmapping a file on a stackable filesystem (e.g., overlayfs), the file * stored in ->vm_file is a backing file whose f_inode is on the underlying diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 382c56a97bba1..584db296e43b2 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ struct common_audit_data { #endif char *kmod_name; struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op; - struct file *file; + const struct file *file; struct lsm_ibpkey_audit *ibpkey; struct lsm_ibendport_audit *ibendport; int reason; diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 8c42b4bde09c0..b4958167e3819 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_permission, struct file *file, int mask) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_alloc_security, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_release, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, file_free_security, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, backing_file_alloc, struct file *backing_file, + const struct file *user_file) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, backing_file_free, struct file *backing_file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl_compat, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, @@ -198,6 +201,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_ioctl_compat, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_addr, unsigned long addr) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_file, struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, mmap_backing_file, struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct file *backing_file, struct file *user_file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_mprotect, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_lock, struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 79ec5a2bdcca7..ea4b0f5ca7f0f 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ struct security_hook_list { struct lsm_blob_sizes { int lbs_cred; int lbs_file; + int lbs_backing_file; int lbs_ib; int lbs_inode; int lbs_sock; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index b64598e5d65d7..e540253624268 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -473,11 +473,17 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); void security_file_release(struct file *file); void security_file_free(struct file *file); +int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file, + const struct file *user_file); +void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file); int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); +int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct file *backing_file, + struct file *user_file); int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr); int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); @@ -1142,6 +1148,15 @@ static inline void security_file_release(struct file *file) static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file) { } +static inline int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file, + const struct file *user_file) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file) +{ } + static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { @@ -1161,6 +1176,13 @@ static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, return 0; } +static inline int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct file *backing_file, + struct file *user_file) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { return cap_mmap_addr(addr); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 603c3c6d5635d..9285909908ab8 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; +static struct kmem_cache *lsm_backing_file_cache; static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; char *lsm_names; @@ -265,6 +266,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_backing_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ib, &blob_sizes.lbs_ib); /* * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to @@ -470,6 +472,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); + init_debug("lsm_backing_file_cache = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file); init_debug("ib blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ib); init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); @@ -495,6 +498,11 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache", blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + if (blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file) + lsm_backing_file_cache = kmem_cache_create( + "lsm_backing_file_cache", + blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file, + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode) lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache", blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0, @@ -671,6 +679,30 @@ int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier); +/** + * lsm_backing_file_alloc - allocate a composite backing file blob + * @backing_file: the backing file + * + * Allocate the backing file blob for all the modules. + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file) +{ + void *blob; + + if (!lsm_backing_file_cache) { + backing_file_set_security(backing_file, NULL); + return 0; + } + + blob = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_backing_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL); + backing_file_set_security(backing_file, blob); + if (!blob) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + /** * lsm_blob_alloc - allocate a composite blob * @dest: the destination for the blob @@ -2965,6 +2997,57 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file) } } +/** + * security_backing_file_alloc() - Allocate and setup a backing file blob + * @backing_file: the backing file + * @user_file: the associated user visible file + * + * Allocate a backing file LSM blob and perform any necessary initialization of + * the LSM blob. There will be some operations where the LSM will not have + * access to @user_file after this point, so any important state associated + * with @user_file that is important to the LSM should be captured in the + * backing file's LSM blob. + * + * LSM's should avoid taking a reference to @user_file in this hook as it will + * result in problems later when the system attempts to drop/put the file + * references due to a circular dependency. + * + * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful, negative values otherwise. + */ +int security_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file, + const struct file *user_file) +{ + int rc; + + rc = lsm_backing_file_alloc(backing_file); + if (rc) + return rc; + rc = call_int_hook(backing_file_alloc, backing_file, user_file); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_backing_file_free(backing_file); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * security_backing_file_free() - Free a backing file blob + * @backing_file: the backing file + * + * Free any LSM state associate with a backing file's LSM blob, including the + * blob itself. + */ +void security_backing_file_free(struct file *backing_file) +{ + void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file); + + call_void_hook(backing_file_free, backing_file); + + if (blob) { + backing_file_set_security(backing_file, NULL); + kmem_cache_free(lsm_backing_file_cache, blob); + } +} + /** * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed * @file: associated file @@ -3053,6 +3136,32 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, flags); } +/** + * security_mmap_backing_file - Check if mmap'ing a backing file is allowed + * @vma: the vm_area_struct for the mmap'd region + * @backing_file: the backing file being mmap'd + * @user_file: the user file being mmap'd + * + * Check permissions for a mmap operation on a stacked filesystem. This hook + * is called after the security_mmap_file() and is responsible for authorizing + * the mmap on @backing_file. It is important to note that the mmap operation + * on @user_file has already been authorized and the @vma->vm_file has been + * set to @backing_file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct file *backing_file, + struct file *user_file) +{ + /* recommended by the stackable filesystem devs */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(backing_file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING))) + return -EIO; + + return call_int_hook(mmap_backing_file, vma, backing_file, user_file); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_mmap_backing_file); + /** * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed * @addr: address From d844702198395d3f80222777030f69db6be6b709 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:50:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 003/607] selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks [ Upstream commit 82544d36b1729153c8aeb179e84750f0c085d3b1 ] The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file) and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect() operations on overlayfs filesystems. This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file() LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap() operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect() access controls. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++ 2 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 3da3017ad2ca0..f96ee8f372e3b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1739,49 +1739,72 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid); #endif -/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to - access an inode in a given way. Check access to the - descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to - check a particular permission to the file. - Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it - has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then - access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases - where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ -static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, - struct file *file, - u32 av) +static int __file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct file *file, + u32 av, bool bf_user_file) + { - struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct common_audit_data ad; - u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); + struct inode *inode; + u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); + u32 tsid_fd; int rc; - ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; - ad.u.file = file; + if (bf_user_file) { + struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec; + const struct path *path; - if (sid != fsec->sid) { - rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, - SECCLASS_FD, - FD__USE, - &ad); + if (WARN_ON(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING))) + return -EIO; + + bfsec = selinux_backing_file(file); + path = backing_file_user_path(file); + tsid_fd = bfsec->uf_sid; + inode = d_inode(path->dentry); + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; + ad.u.path = *path; + } else { + struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file); + + tsid_fd = fsec->sid; + inode = file_inode(file); + + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; + ad.u.file = file; + } + + if (ssid != tsid_fd) { + rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, tsid_fd, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad); if (rc) - goto out; + return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL - rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); + /* regardless of backing vs user file, use the underlying file here */ + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, ssid); if (rc) return rc; #endif /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ - rc = 0; if (av) - rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); -out: - return rc; + return 0; +} + +/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to + access an inode in a given way. Check access to the + descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to + check a particular permission to the file. + Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it + has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then + access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases + where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ +static inline int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, + const struct file *file, u32 av) +{ + return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, false); } /* @@ -3799,6 +3822,17 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) return 0; } +static int selinux_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file, + const struct file *user_file) +{ + struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec; + + bfsec = selinux_backing_file(backing_file); + bfsec->uf_sid = selinux_file(user_file)->sid; + + return 0; +} + /* * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. @@ -3916,42 +3950,55 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; -static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) +static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, + const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool bf_user_file) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); - int rc = 0; + struct inode *inode = NULL; + bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC; + bool prot_write = prot & PROT_WRITE; + + if (file) { + if (bf_user_file) + inode = d_inode(backing_file_user_path(file)->dentry); + else + inode = file_inode(file); + } + + if (default_noexec && prot_exec && + (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) { + int rc; + u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); - if (default_noexec && - (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || - (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { /* - * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a - * private file mapping that will also be writable. - * This has an additional check. + * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private + * file mapping that will also be writable. */ - rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, - PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL); + rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, + NULL); if (rc) - goto error; + return rc; } if (file) { - /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ + /* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */ u32 av = FILE__READ; - - /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ - if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) + if (shared && prot_write) av |= FILE__WRITE; - - if (prot & PROT_EXEC) + if (prot_exec) av |= FILE__EXECUTE; - return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); + return __file_has_perm(cred, file, av, bf_user_file); } -error: - return rc; + return 0; +} + +static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, + const struct file *file, + unsigned long prot, bool shared) +{ + return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false); } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) @@ -3967,36 +4014,80 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) return rc; } -static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, - unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, + unsigned long prot, bool shared) { - struct common_audit_data ad; - int rc; - if (file) { + int rc; + struct common_audit_data ad; + ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; - rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file), - FILE__MAP, &ad); + rc = inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), FILE__MAP, &ad); if (rc) return rc; } - return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, - (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); + return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared); +} + +static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, + unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) +{ + return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot, + (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); +} + +/** + * selinux_mmap_backing_file - Check mmap permissions on a backing file + * @vma: memory region + * @backing_file: stacked filesystem backing file + * @user_file: user visible file + * + * This is called after selinux_mmap_file() on stacked filesystems, and it + * is this function's responsibility to verify access to @backing_file and + * setup the SELinux state for possible later use in the mprotect() code path. + * + * By the time this function is called, mmap() access to @user_file has already + * been authorized and @vma->vm_file has been set to point to @backing_file. + * + * Return zero on success, negative values otherwise. + */ +static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + struct file *backing_file, + struct file *user_file __always_unused) +{ + unsigned long prot = 0; + + /* translate vma->vm_flags perms into PROT perms */ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ) + prot |= PROT_READ; + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) + prot |= PROT_WRITE; + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) + prot |= PROT_EXEC; + + return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file, + prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, unsigned long prot) { + int rc; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); + const struct file *file = vma->vm_file; + bool backing_file; + bool shared = vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED; + + /* check if we need to trigger the "backing files are awful" mode */ + backing_file = file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING); if (default_noexec && (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { - int rc = 0; /* * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems @@ -4010,11 +4101,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL); - } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) || + if (rc) + return rc; + } else if (!file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) || vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL); - } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { + if (rc) + return rc; + } else if (file && vma->anon_vma) { /* * We are making executable a file mapping that has * had some COW done. Since pages might have been @@ -4022,13 +4117,29 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, * modified content. This typically should only * occur for text relocations. */ - rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); + rc = __file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__EXECMOD, + backing_file); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (backing_file) { + rc = file_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, + FILE__EXECMOD); + if (rc) + return rc; + } } + } + + rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (backing_file) { + rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared); if (rc) return rc; } - return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); + return 0; } static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) @@ -7140,6 +7251,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct cred_security_struct), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct task_security_struct), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), + .lbs_backing_file = sizeof(struct backing_file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct), @@ -7363,9 +7475,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(backing_file_alloc, selinux_backing_file_alloc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_backing_file, selinux_mmap_backing_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 816fde5a5896c..fcb46793898f5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ struct file_security_struct { u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */ }; +struct backing_file_security_struct { + u32 uf_sid; /* associated user file fsec->sid */ +}; + struct superblock_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */ u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */ @@ -190,6 +194,13 @@ static inline struct file_security_struct *selinux_file(const struct file *file) return file->f_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_file; } +static inline struct backing_file_security_struct * +selinux_backing_file(const struct file *backing_file) +{ + void *blob = backing_file_security(backing_file); + return blob + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_backing_file; +} + static inline struct inode_security_struct * selinux_inode(const struct inode *inode) { From 671ec2eabb874fcb593297c4dd885fc3dae54f32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sasha Levin Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 10:53:39 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 004/607] Revert "PCI: qcom: Advertise Hotplug Slot Capability with no Command Completion support" This reverts commit f176c47683bf6365e2f6d580d557fae49169a703. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c index 43555ad9e5dcf..789cc0e3c10da 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c @@ -341,20 +341,15 @@ static void qcom_pcie_clear_aspm_l0s(struct dw_pcie *pci) dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_dis(pci); } -static void qcom_pcie_set_slot_nccs(struct dw_pcie *pci) +static void qcom_pcie_clear_hpc(struct dw_pcie *pci) { u16 offset = dw_pcie_find_capability(pci, PCI_CAP_ID_EXP); u32 val; dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_en(pci); - /* - * Qcom PCIe Root Ports do not support generating command completion - * notifications for the Hot-Plug commands. So set the NCCS field to - * avoid waiting for the completions. - */ val = readl(pci->dbi_base + offset + PCI_EXP_SLTCAP); - val |= PCI_EXP_SLTCAP_NCCS; + val &= ~PCI_EXP_SLTCAP_HPC; writel(val, pci->dbi_base + offset + PCI_EXP_SLTCAP); dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_dis(pci); @@ -554,7 +549,7 @@ static int qcom_pcie_post_init_2_1_0(struct qcom_pcie *pcie) writel(CFG_BRIDGE_SB_INIT, pci->dbi_base + AXI_MSTR_RESP_COMP_CTRL1); - qcom_pcie_set_slot_nccs(pcie->pci); + qcom_pcie_clear_hpc(pcie->pci); return 0; } @@ -634,7 +629,7 @@ static int qcom_pcie_post_init_1_0_0(struct qcom_pcie *pcie) writel(val, pcie->parf + PARF_AXI_MSTR_WR_ADDR_HALT); } - qcom_pcie_set_slot_nccs(pcie->pci); + qcom_pcie_clear_hpc(pcie->pci); return 0; } @@ -727,7 +722,7 @@ static int qcom_pcie_post_init_2_3_2(struct qcom_pcie *pcie) val |= EN; writel(val, pcie->parf + PARF_AXI_MSTR_WR_ADDR_HALT_V2); - qcom_pcie_set_slot_nccs(pcie->pci); + qcom_pcie_clear_hpc(pcie->pci); return 0; } @@ -1033,7 +1028,7 @@ static int qcom_pcie_post_init_2_7_0(struct qcom_pcie *pcie) writel(WR_NO_SNOOP_OVERRIDE_EN | RD_NO_SNOOP_OVERRIDE_EN, pcie->parf + PARF_NO_SNOOP_OVERRIDE); - qcom_pcie_set_slot_nccs(pcie->pci); + qcom_pcie_clear_hpc(pcie->pci); return 0; } From e055e74b80eb8858f98c736aa565173a917dcab5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NeilBrown Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 10:31:22 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 005/607] lockd: fix TEST handling when not all permissions are available. [ Upstream commit 0b474240327cebeff08ad429e8ed3cfc6c8ee816 ] The F_GETLK fcntl can work with either read access or write access or both. It can query F_RDLCK and F_WRLCK locks in either case. However lockd currently treats F_GETLK similar to F_SETLK in that read access is required to query an F_RDLCK lock and write access is required to query a F_WRLCK lock. This is wrong and can cause problems - e.g. when qemu accesses a read-only (e.g. iso) filesystem image over NFS (though why it queries if it can get a write lock - I don't know. But it does, and this works with local filesystems). So we need TEST requests to be handled differently. To do this: - change nlm_do_fopen() to accept O_RDWR as a mode and in that case succeed if either a O_RDONLY or O_WRONLY file can be opened. - change nlm_lookup_file() to accept a mode argument from caller, instead of deducing base on lock time, and pass that on to nlm_do_fopen() - change nlm4svc_retrieve_args() and nlmsvc_retrieve_args() to detect TEST requests and pass O_RDWR as a mode to nlm_lookup_file, passing the same mode as before for other requests. Also set lock->fl.c.flc_file to whichever file is available for TEST requests. - change nlmsvc_testlock() to also not calculate the mode, but to use whatever was stored in lock->fl.c.flc_file. This behaviour of lockd - requesting O_WRONLY access to TEST for exclusive locks - has been present at least since git history began. However it was hidden until recently because knfsd ignored the access requested by lockd and required only READ access for all locking requests (unless the underlying filesystem provided an f_op->open function which checked access permissions). The commit mentioned in Fixes: below changed nfsd_permission() to NOT override the access request for LOCK requests and this exposed the bug that we are now fixing. Note that there is another issue that this patch does not address. The flock(.., LOCK_EX) call is permitted on a read-only file descriptor. Linux NFS maps this to NLM locking as whole-file byte-range locks. nfsd will see this as though it were fcntl( F_SETLK (F_WRLCK)) and will now require write access, which it might not be able to get. It is not clear if this is a problem in practice, or what the best solution might be. So no attempt is made to address it. Reported-by: Tj Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1128861 Fixes: 4cc9b9f2bf4d ("nfsd: refine and rename NFSD_MAY_LOCK") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/lockd/svc4proc.c | 13 ++++++++++--- fs/lockd/svclock.c | 4 +--- fs/lockd/svcproc.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/lockd/lockd.h | 2 +- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c b/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c index 4b6f18d977343..75e020a8bfd07 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svc4proc.c @@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ nlm4svc_retrieve_args(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_args *argp, struct nlm_host *host = NULL; struct nlm_file *file = NULL; struct nlm_lock *lock = &argp->lock; + bool is_test = (rqstp->rq_proc == NLMPROC_TEST || + rqstp->rq_proc == NLMPROC_TEST_MSG); __be32 error = 0; /* nfsd callbacks must have been installed for this procedure */ @@ -46,15 +48,20 @@ nlm4svc_retrieve_args(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_args *argp, if (filp != NULL) { int mode = lock_to_openmode(&lock->fl); + if (is_test) + mode = O_RDWR; + lock->fl.c.flc_flags = FL_POSIX; - error = nlm_lookup_file(rqstp, &file, lock); + error = nlm_lookup_file(rqstp, &file, lock, mode); if (error) goto no_locks; *filp = file; - /* Set up the missing parts of the file_lock structure */ - lock->fl.c.flc_file = file->f_file[mode]; + if (is_test) + lock->fl.c.flc_file = nlmsvc_file_file(file); + else + lock->fl.c.flc_file = file->f_file[mode]; lock->fl.c.flc_pid = current->tgid; lock->fl.fl_start = (loff_t)lock->lock_start; lock->fl.fl_end = lock->lock_len ? diff --git a/fs/lockd/svclock.c b/fs/lockd/svclock.c index d66e828515999..c35ffa1b4b89d 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svclock.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svclock.c @@ -611,7 +611,6 @@ nlmsvc_testlock(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_file *file, struct nlm_lock *conflock) { int error; - int mode; __be32 ret; dprintk("lockd: nlmsvc_testlock(%s/%ld, ty=%d, %Ld-%Ld)\n", @@ -626,14 +625,13 @@ nlmsvc_testlock(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_file *file, goto out; } - mode = lock_to_openmode(&lock->fl); locks_init_lock(&conflock->fl); /* vfs_test_lock only uses start, end, and owner, but tests flc_file */ conflock->fl.c.flc_file = lock->fl.c.flc_file; conflock->fl.fl_start = lock->fl.fl_start; conflock->fl.fl_end = lock->fl.fl_end; conflock->fl.c.flc_owner = lock->fl.c.flc_owner; - error = vfs_test_lock(file->f_file[mode], &conflock->fl); + error = vfs_test_lock(lock->fl.c.flc_file, &conflock->fl); if (error) { /* We can't currently deal with deferred test requests */ if (error == FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED) diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcproc.c b/fs/lockd/svcproc.c index 5817ef272332d..d98e8d684376b 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svcproc.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svcproc.c @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ nlmsvc_retrieve_args(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_args *argp, struct nlm_host *host = NULL; struct nlm_file *file = NULL; struct nlm_lock *lock = &argp->lock; + bool is_test = (rqstp->rq_proc == NLMPROC_TEST || + rqstp->rq_proc == NLMPROC_TEST_MSG); int mode; __be32 error = 0; @@ -70,15 +72,22 @@ nlmsvc_retrieve_args(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_args *argp, /* Obtain file pointer. Not used by FREE_ALL call. */ if (filp != NULL) { - error = cast_status(nlm_lookup_file(rqstp, &file, lock)); + mode = lock_to_openmode(&lock->fl); + + if (is_test) + mode = O_RDWR; + + error = cast_status(nlm_lookup_file(rqstp, &file, lock, mode)); if (error != 0) goto no_locks; *filp = file; /* Set up the missing parts of the file_lock structure */ - mode = lock_to_openmode(&lock->fl); lock->fl.c.flc_flags = FL_POSIX; - lock->fl.c.flc_file = file->f_file[mode]; + if (is_test) + lock->fl.c.flc_file = nlmsvc_file_file(file); + else + lock->fl.c.flc_file = file->f_file[mode]; lock->fl.c.flc_pid = current->tgid; lock->fl.fl_lmops = &nlmsvc_lock_operations; nlmsvc_locks_init_private(&lock->fl, host, (pid_t)lock->svid); diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c index 9103896164f68..7ea204eadfcac 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c @@ -82,18 +82,35 @@ int lock_to_openmode(struct file_lock *lock) * * We have to make sure we have the right credential to open * the file. + * + * mode can be O_RDONLY(0), O_WRONLY(1) or O_RDWR(2). The latter + * means success can be achieved with EITHER O_RDONLY or O_WRONLY. + * It does NOT mean both read and write are required. */ static __be32 nlm_do_fopen(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_file *file, int mode) { - struct file **fp = &file->f_file[mode]; - __be32 nfserr; + __be32 nfserr = nlm_lck_denied_nolocks; + __be32 deferred = 0; + struct file **fp; + int m; - if (*fp) - return 0; - nfserr = nlmsvc_ops->fopen(rqstp, &file->f_handle, fp, mode); - if (nfserr) - dprintk("lockd: open failed (error %d)\n", nfserr); + for (m = O_RDONLY ; m <= O_WRONLY ; m++) { + if (mode != O_RDWR && mode != m) + continue; + + fp = &file->f_file[m]; + if (*fp) + return 0; + nfserr = nlmsvc_ops->fopen(rqstp, &file->f_handle, fp, m); + if (!nfserr) + return 0; + if (nfserr == nlm_drop_reply) + deferred = nfserr; + } + if (deferred) + return deferred; + dprintk("lockd: open failed (error %d)\n", ntohl(nfserr)); return nfserr; } @@ -103,17 +120,15 @@ static __be32 nlm_do_fopen(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, */ __be32 nlm_lookup_file(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nlm_file **result, - struct nlm_lock *lock) + struct nlm_lock *lock, int mode) { struct nlm_file *file; unsigned int hash; __be32 nfserr; - int mode; nlm_debug_print_fh("nlm_lookup_file", &lock->fh); hash = file_hash(&lock->fh); - mode = lock_to_openmode(&lock->fl); /* Lock file table */ mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); diff --git a/include/linux/lockd/lockd.h b/include/linux/lockd/lockd.h index c8f0f9458f2cc..d9930fc43ca54 100644 --- a/include/linux/lockd/lockd.h +++ b/include/linux/lockd/lockd.h @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ void nlmsvc_locks_init_private(struct file_lock *, struct nlm_host *, pid_t); * File handling for the server personality */ __be32 nlm_lookup_file(struct svc_rqst *, struct nlm_file **, - struct nlm_lock *); + struct nlm_lock *, int); void nlm_release_file(struct nlm_file *); void nlmsvc_put_lockowner(struct nlm_lockowner *); void nlmsvc_release_lockowner(struct nlm_lock *); From 1c5a1268418e8a2e5ab652a3adafac6c1e5e96b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 006/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: keep unacked list in ascending ordered commit 5aa8651527ea0b610e7a09fb3b8204c1398b9525 upstream. When batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order inserts a new entry in the list of unacked (out of order) packets, it searches from the entry with the newest sequence number towards oldest sequence number. If an entry is found which is older than the newly entry, the new entry has to be added after the found one to keep the ascending order. But for this operation list_add_tail() was used. But this function adds an entry _before_ another one. As result, the list would contain a lot of swapped sequence numbers. The consumer of this list (batadv_tp_ack_unordered()) would then fail to correctly ack packets. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index b1629e0ac8268..f222c5093b647 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, * one is attached _after_ it. In this way the list is kept in * ascending order */ - list_add_tail(&new->list, &un->list); + list_add(&new->list, &un->list); added = true; break; } From 696c4cae872cca59f51b1b5a0f8888d22ccb47a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 007/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dup_acks explicitly commit b2b68b32a715e0328662801576974aa37b942b00 upstream. When an ack with a sequence number equal to the last_acked is received, the dup_acks counter is increased to decide whether fast retransmit should be performed. Only when the sequence numbers are not equal, the dup_acks is set to the initial value (0). But if the initial packet would have the sequence number BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ, dup_acks would not be initialized and atomic_inc would operate on an undefined starting value. It is therefore required to have it explicitly initialized during the start of the sender session. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index f222c5093b647..fe9a447643074 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1045,6 +1045,7 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst, tp_vars->icmp_uid = icmp_uid; tp_vars->last_sent = BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ; + atomic_set(&tp_vars->dup_acks, 0); atomic_set(&tp_vars->last_acked, BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ); tp_vars->fast_recovery = false; tp_vars->recover = BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ; From 7cb88d91d5f9f9a2842e0ec0622d01bdfaa0511a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 008/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dec_cwnd explicitly commit febfb1b86224489535312296ecfa3d4bf467f339 upstream. When batadv_tp_update_cwnd() is called, dec_cwnd is increased. But dec_cwnd is only initialixed (to 0) when a duplicate Ack was received or when cwnd is below the ss_threshold. Just initialize the cwnd during the initialization to avoid any potential access of uninitialized data. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index fe9a447643074..473641d32dc68 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1055,6 +1055,8 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst, * mesh_interface, hence its MTU */ tp_vars->cwnd = BATADV_TP_PLEN * 3; + tp_vars->dec_cwnd = 0; + /* at the beginning initialise the SS threshold to the biggest possible * window size, hence the AWND size */ From 8e77fe0414f5c7c956ea82615975d43eab018c25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 009/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid window underflow commit 765947b81fb54b6ebb0bc1cfe55c0fa399e002b8 upstream. In batadv_tp_avail(), win_left is calculated with 32-bit unsigned arithmetic: win_left = win_limit - tp_vars->last_sent; During Fast Recovery, cwnd is inflated and last_sent advances rapidly. When Fast Recovery ends, cwnd drops abruptly back to ss_threshold. If the newly shrunk win_limit is less than last_sent, the unsigned subtraction will underflow, wrapping to a massive positive value. Instead of returning that the window is full (unavailable), it returns that the sender can continue sending. To handle this situation, it must be checked whether the windows end sequence number (win_limit) has to be compared with the last sent sequence number. If it would be before the last sent sequence number, then more acks are needed before the transmission can be started again. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 473641d32dc68..71a4352cd78c7 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -817,10 +817,15 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, static bool batadv_tp_avail(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, size_t payload_len) { + u32 last_sent = READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_sent); u32 win_left, win_limit; win_limit = atomic_read(&tp_vars->last_acked) + tp_vars->cwnd; - win_left = win_limit - tp_vars->last_sent; + + if (batadv_seq_before(last_sent, win_limit)) + win_left = win_limit - last_sent; + else + win_left = 0; return win_left >= payload_len; } From 7d2a44bc6bbe39aed03c68864aa0e54e04a50278 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 010/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd commit 33ccd52f3cc9ed46ce395199f89aa3234dc83314 upstream. The cwnd is always MSS <= cwnd <= 0x20000000. But the calculation in batadv_tp_update_cwnd() assumes unsigned 32 bit arithmetics. ((mss * 8) ** 2) / (cwnd * 8) In case cwnd is actually 0x20000000, it will be shifted by 3 bit to the left end up at 0x100000000 or U32_MAX + 1. It will therefore wrap around and be 0 - resulting in: ((mss * 8) ** 2) / 0 This is of course invalid and cannot be calculated. The calculation should must be simplified to avoid this overflow: (mss ** 2) * 8 / cwnd It will keep the precision enhancement from the scaling (by 8) but avoid the overflow in the divisor. In theory, there could still be an overflow in the dividend. It is at the moment fixed to BATADV_TP_PLEN in batadv_tp_recv_ack() - so it is not an imminent problem. But allowing it to use the whole u32 bit range, would mean that it can still use up to 67 bits. To keep this calculation safe for 32 bit arithmetic, mss must never use more than floor((32 - 3) / 2) bits - or in other words: must never be larger than 16383. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 71a4352cd78c7..00d8bb01611f9 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -154,9 +154,12 @@ static void batadv_tp_update_cwnd(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, u32 mss) return; } + /* prevent overflow in (mss * mss) << 3 */ + mss = min_t(u32, mss, (1U << 14) - 1); + /* increment CWND at least of 1 (section 3.1 of RFC5681) */ tp_vars->dec_cwnd += max_t(u32, 1U << 3, - ((mss * mss) << 6) / (tp_vars->cwnd << 3)); + ((mss * mss) << 3) / tp_vars->cwnd); if (tp_vars->dec_cwnd < (mss << 3)) { spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->cwnd_lock); return; From 1db02f3e315da800720e2e14b4a9c8ffe14e8cbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 011/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: fix fast recovery precondition commit 2b0d08f08ed3b2174f05c43089ec65f3543a025b upstream. The fast recovery precondition checks if the recover (initialized to BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ) is bigger than the received ack. But since recover is only updated when this check is successful, it will never enter the fast recovery mode. According to RFC6582 Section 3.2 step 2, the check should actually be different: > When the third duplicate ACK is received, the TCP sender first > checks the value of recover to see if the Cumulative > Acknowledgment field covers more than recover The precondition must therefore check if recover is smaller than the received ack - basically swapping the operands of the current check. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 00d8bb01611f9..a85622267ba65 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, if (atomic_read(&tp_vars->dup_acks) != 3) goto out; - if (recv_ack >= tp_vars->recover) + if (tp_vars->recover >= recv_ack) goto out; /* if this is the third duplicate ACK do Fast Retransmit */ From b8bf8400e50cbab595843241f63be3355deb1ca8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 012/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle seqno wrap-around for fast recovery detection commit f54c85ed42a1b27a516cf2a4728f5a612b799e07 upstream. The recover variable and the last_sent sequence number are initialized on purpose as a really high value which will wrap-around after the first 2000 bytes. The fast recovery precondition must therefore not use simple integer comparisons but use helpers which are aware of the sequence number wrap-arounds. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index a85622267ba65..0ebfc4462b8f1 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, if (atomic_read(&tp_vars->dup_acks) != 3) goto out; - if (tp_vars->recover >= recv_ack) + if (!batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->recover, recv_ack)) goto out; /* if this is the third duplicate ACK do Fast Retransmit */ From 23d085bd63086457ae82ab92e9e2d8ec895e2774 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 013/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: add only finished tp_vars to lists commit 15ccbf685222274f5add1387af58c2a41a95f81e upstream. When the receiver variables (aka "session") are initialized, then they are added to the list of sessions before the timer is set up. A RCU protected reader could therefore find the entry and run mod_setup before batadv_tp_init_recv() finished the timer initialization. The same is true for batadv_tp_start(), which must first initialize the finish_work and the test_length to avoid a similar problem. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 0ebfc4462b8f1..0444aa46b95c2 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1096,21 +1096,21 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst, tp_vars->prerandom_offset = 0; spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->prerandom_lock); - kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); - hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list); - spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tp_list_lock); - tp_vars->test_length = test_length; if (!tp_vars->test_length) tp_vars->test_length = BATADV_TP_DEF_TEST_LENGTH; + /* init work item for finished tp tests */ + INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tp_vars->finish_work, batadv_tp_sender_finish); + + kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list); + spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tp_list_lock); + batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TP_METER, bat_priv, "Meter: starting throughput meter towards %pM (length=%ums)\n", dst, test_length); - /* init work item for finished tp tests */ - INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tp_vars->finish_work, batadv_tp_sender_finish); - /* start tp kthread. This way the write() call issued from userspace can * happily return and avoid to block */ @@ -1430,10 +1430,10 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list); kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); - hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list); + timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0); kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); - timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0); + hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list); batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars); From 43733e5b525fbee8e60903b57d1a8cf6498e762d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 014/607] batman-adv: bla: annotate lasttime access with READ/WRITE_ONCE commit 98b0fb191c878a64cbaebfe231d96d57576acf8c upstream. The lasttime field for claim, backbone_gw, and loopdetect tracks the jiffies value of the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts. These accesses are not consistently protected by a lock, so READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used to prevent data races caused by compiler optimizations. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 23721387c409 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 28 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c index 3072f94275ac6..2c6e2b0d1ded4 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c @@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ batadv_bla_get_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *orig, return NULL; entry->vid = vid; - entry->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(entry->lasttime, jiffies); entry->crc = BATADV_BLA_CRC_INIT; entry->bat_priv = bat_priv; spin_lock_init(&entry->crc_lock); @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ batadv_bla_update_own_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, if (unlikely(!backbone_gw)) return; - backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies); batadv_backbone_gw_put(backbone_gw); } @@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, ether_addr_copy(claim->addr, mac); spin_lock_init(&claim->backbone_lock); claim->vid = vid; - claim->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies); kref_get(&backbone_gw->refcount); claim->backbone_gw = backbone_gw; kref_init(&claim->refcount); @@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, return; } } else { - claim->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies); if (claim->backbone_gw == backbone_gw) /* no need to register a new backbone */ goto claim_free_ref; @@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock); backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN); spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock); - backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies); claim_free_ref: batadv_claim_put(claim); @@ -859,7 +859,7 @@ static bool batadv_handle_announce(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *an_addr, return true; /* handle as ANNOUNCE frame */ - backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies); crc = ntohs(*((__force __be16 *)(&an_addr[4]))); batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BLA, bat_priv, @@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, int now) head, hash_entry) { if (now) goto purge_now; - if (!batadv_has_timed_out(backbone_gw->lasttime, + if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime), BATADV_BLA_BACKBONE_TIMEOUT)) continue; @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_claims(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr)) goto skip; - if (!batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime, + if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(claim->lasttime), BATADV_BLA_CLAIM_TIMEOUT)) goto skip; @@ -1495,7 +1495,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_periodic_work(struct work_struct *work) eth_random_addr(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr); bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr[0] = 0xba; bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr[1] = 0xbe; - bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime, jiffies); atomic_set(&bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_next, BATADV_BLA_LOOPDETECT_PERIODS); @@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_periodic_work(struct work_struct *work) primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr)) continue; - backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies); batadv_bla_send_announce(bat_priv, backbone_gw); if (send_loopdetect) @@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ batadv_bla_loopdetect_check(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, /* If the packet came too late, don't forward it on the mesh * but don't consider that as loop. It might be a coincidence. */ - if (batadv_has_timed_out(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime, + if (batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime), BATADV_BLA_LOOPDETECT_TIMEOUT)) return true; @@ -2049,7 +2049,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, if (own_claim) { /* ... allow it in any case */ - claim->lasttime = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies); goto allow; } @@ -2151,7 +2151,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_tx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, /* if yes, the client has roamed and we have * to unclaim it. */ - if (batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime, 100)) { + if (batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(claim->lasttime), 100)) { /* only unclaim if the last claim entry is * older than 100 ms to make sure we really * have a roaming client here. @@ -2396,7 +2396,7 @@ batadv_bla_backbone_dump_entry(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 portid, backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc; spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock); - msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - backbone_gw->lasttime); + msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - READ_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime)); if (is_own) if (nla_put_flag(msg, BATADV_ATTR_BLA_OWN)) { From 75612c100a9e2fe9df718056b03f544ec5b0623e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 015/607] batman-adv: prevent ELP transmission interval underflow commit 5e50d4b8ae3ea622122d3c6a38d7f6fe68dfddca upstream. batadv_v_elp_start_timer() enqeues a delayed work. The time when it starts is randomly chosen between (elp_interval - BATADV_JITTER) and (elp_interval + BATADV_JITTER). The configured elp_interval must therefore be larger or equal to BATADV_JITTER to avoid that it causes an underflow of the unsigned integer. If this would happen, then a "fast" ELP interval would turn into a "day long" delay. At the same time, it must not be larger than the maximum value the variable can store. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: a10800829040 ("batman-adv: Add elp_interval hardif genl configuration") [ Context ] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/netlink.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/netlink.c b/net/batman-adv/netlink.c index 78c651f634cd3..1d144d8cc0928 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/netlink.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/netlink.c @@ -917,9 +917,15 @@ static int batadv_netlink_set_hardif(struct sk_buff *skb, #ifdef CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V if (info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_ELP_INTERVAL]) { + u32 elp_interval; + attr = info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_ELP_INTERVAL]; + elp_interval = nla_get_u32(attr); + + elp_interval = min_t(u32, elp_interval, INT_MAX); + elp_interval = max_t(u32, elp_interval, BATADV_JITTER); - atomic_set(&hard_iface->bat_v.elp_interval, nla_get_u32(attr)); + atomic_set(&hard_iface->bat_v.elp_interval, elp_interval); } if (info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_THROUGHPUT_OVERRIDE]) { From 95a061f587b76a519ee17e3d406a37bc4eb63a50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 016/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize last_recv_time during init commit 811cb00fa8cdc3f0a7f6eefc000a6888367c8c8f upstream. The last_recv_time is the most important indicator for a receiver session to figure out whether a session timed out or not. But this information was only initialized after the session was added to the tp_receiver_list and after the timer was started. In the worst case, the timer (function) could have tried to access this information before the actual initialization was reached. Like rest of the variables of the tp_meter receiver session, this field has to be filled out before any other (parallel running) context has the chance to access it. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") [ Context ] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 0444aa46b95c2..10b8daca3a615 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1403,8 +1403,10 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig, icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER); - if (tp_vars) + if (tp_vars) { + tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; goto out_unlock; + } if (!atomic_add_unless(&bat_priv->tp_num, 1, BATADV_TP_MAX_NUM)) { batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TP_METER, bat_priv, @@ -1432,6 +1434,8 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0); + tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; + kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list); @@ -1480,9 +1484,9 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, icmp->orig); goto out; } - } - tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; + tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; + } /* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been * lost. Resend the ACK From 646b68639c06bc44593216fd7e9433d48d5e96eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 017/607] batman-adv: gw: don't deselect gateway with active hardif commit df97a7107b16375a10a36d7a63e9b4291a8ac680 upstream. The batadv_hardif_cnt() was previously checking if there is an batadv_hard_iface->mesh_iface which is has the same mesh_iface. And since batadv_hardif_disable_interface() was resetting the batadv_hard_iface->mesh_iface after this check, it had to verify whether *1* interface was still part of the mesh_iface before it started the gateway deselection. But after batadv_hardif_cnt() is now checking the lower interfaces of mesh_iface and batadv_hardif_disable_interface() already removed the interface via netdev_upper_dev_unlink() earlier in this function, the check must now make sure that *0* interfaces can be found by batadv_hardif_cnt() before selected gateway must be deselected. Otherwise the deselection would already happen one batadv_hard_iface too early. Because a 0 hardif count from batadv_hardif_cnt() is equal to an empty list, it is possible to replace the counting with a simple list_empty(). Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 7dc284702bcd ("batman-adv: store hard_iface as iflink private data") Reviewed-by: Nora Schiffer Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c | 28 ++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c index 1c488049d5546..39b1ed813497d 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c @@ -786,30 +786,6 @@ int batadv_hardif_enable_interface(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface, return ret; } -/** - * batadv_hardif_cnt() - get number of interfaces enslaved to mesh interface - * @mesh_iface: mesh interface to check - * - * This function is only using RCU for locking - the result can therefore be - * off when another function is modifying the list at the same time. The - * caller can use the rtnl_lock to make sure that the count is accurate. - * - * Return: number of connected/enslaved hard interfaces - */ -static size_t batadv_hardif_cnt(struct net_device *mesh_iface) -{ - struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface; - struct list_head *iter; - size_t count = 0; - - rcu_read_lock(); - netdev_for_each_lower_private_rcu(mesh_iface, hard_iface, iter) - count++; - rcu_read_unlock(); - - return count; -} - /** * batadv_hardif_disable_interface() - Remove hard interface from mesh interface * @hard_iface: hard interface to be removed @@ -850,8 +826,8 @@ void batadv_hardif_disable_interface(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface) netdev_upper_dev_unlink(hard_iface->net_dev, hard_iface->mesh_iface); batadv_hardif_recalc_extra_skbroom(hard_iface->mesh_iface); - /* nobody uses this interface anymore */ - if (batadv_hardif_cnt(hard_iface->mesh_iface) <= 1) + /* nobody uses this mesh interface anymore */ + if (list_empty(&hard_iface->mesh_iface->adj_list.lower)) batadv_gw_check_client_stop(bat_priv); hard_iface->mesh_iface = NULL; From 49bf27fcd7ee4cf643d766fc91fffbf2b0134363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 018/607] batman-adv: ensure bcast is writable before modifying TTL commit 4cd6d3a4b96a8576f1fed8f9f9f17c2dc2978e0c upstream. Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its own copy of the skb or used skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not shared. The old implementation used a shared queue and created copies before attempting to write to it. But with the new implementation, the broadcast packet is already modified when it gets received. Potentially writing to shared buffers in this process. Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the same time prepare it for the modifications required to rebroadcast the packet. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 3f69339068f9 ("batman-adv: bcast: queue per interface, if needed") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/routing.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c index 12c16f81cc51d..0672dc30bed3b 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c @@ -1191,6 +1191,12 @@ int batadv_recv_bcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, if (batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, bcast_packet->orig)) goto free_skb; + /* create a copy of the skb, if needed, to modify it. */ + if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) + goto free_skb; + + bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data; + if (bcast_packet->ttl-- < 2) goto free_skb; From 0473ae882624ae309399c3fff10cedc6d0cffbfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 019/607] batman-adv: fix (m|b)cast csum after decrementing TTL commit e728bbdf32660c8f32b8f5e8d09427a2c131ad60 upstream. The broadcast and multicast packets can be received at the same time by the local system and forwarded to other nodes. Both are simply decrementing the TTL at the beginning of the receive path - independent of chosen paths (receive/forward). But such a modification of the data conflicts with the hw csum. This is not a problem when the packet is directly forwarded but can cause errors in the local receive path. Such a problem can then trigger a "hw csum failure". The receiver path must therefore ensure that the csum is fixed for each modification of the payload before batadv_interface_rx() is reached. Since all batman-adv packet types with a ttl have it as u8 at offset 2, a helper can be used for all of them. But it is only used at the moment for batadv_bcast_packet and batadv_mcast_packet because they are the only ones which deliver the packet locally but unconditionally modify the TTL. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 3f69339068f9 ("batman-adv: bcast: queue per interface, if needed") Fixes: 07afe1ba288c ("batman-adv: mcast: implement multicast packet reception and forwarding") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/routing.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c index 0672dc30bed3b..cdcea90db6123 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include "main.h" #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -204,6 +205,59 @@ bool batadv_check_management_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, return true; } +/** + * batadv_skb_decrement_ttl() - decrement ttl in a batman-adv header, csum-safe + * @skb: the received packet with @skb->data pointing to the batman-adv header + * + * Supports the following packet types, all of which carry the TTL at offset 2: + * + * - batadv_ogm_packet + * - batadv_ogm2_packet + * - batadv_icmp_header + * - batadv_icmp_packet + * - batadv_icmp_tp_packet + * - batadv_icmp_packet_rr + * - batadv_unicast_packet + * - batadv_frag_packet + * - batadv_bcast_packet + * - batadv_mcast_packet + * - batadv_coded_packet + * - batadv_unicast_tvlv_packet + * + * Return: true if the packet may be forwarded (ttl decremented), + * false if it must be dropped (ttl would expire) + */ +static bool batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + static const size_t ttl_offset = 2; + u8 *ttl_pos; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_ogm_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_ogm2_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_header, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_icmp_packet_rr, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_unicast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_frag_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_bcast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_mcast_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_coded_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct batadv_unicast_tvlv_packet, ttl) != ttl_offset); + + ttl_pos = skb->data + ttl_offset; + + /* would expire on this hop -> drop, leave header + csum untouched */ + if (*ttl_pos < 2) + return false; + + skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, ttl_pos, 1); + (*ttl_pos)--; + skb_postpush_rcsum(skb, ttl_pos, 1); + + return true; +} + /** * batadv_recv_my_icmp_packet() - receive an icmp packet locally * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the mesh interface information @@ -1197,7 +1251,7 @@ int batadv_recv_bcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data; - if (bcast_packet->ttl-- < 2) + if (!batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(skb)) goto free_skb; orig_node = batadv_orig_hash_find(bat_priv, bcast_packet->orig); @@ -1304,7 +1358,7 @@ int batadv_recv_mcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, goto free_skb; mcast_packet = (struct batadv_mcast_packet *)skb->data; - if (mcast_packet->ttl-- < 2) + if (!batadv_skb_decrement_ttl(skb)) goto free_skb; tvlv_buff = (unsigned char *)(skb->data + hdr_size); From 116e94025f0f48cbcfc167b6dc925551fad1b2bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:11:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 020/607] batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL commit b7293c6e8c15b2db77809b25cf8389e35331b27a upstream. Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its own copy of the skb or use skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not shared. But batadv_frag_skb_fwd() modifies the TTL even when it is shared. Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the same time prepare it for the modifications required to forward the fragment. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h | 3 ++- net/batman-adv/routing.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c index 31395281692cb..ffa5d4b074095 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c @@ -384,6 +384,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb, * @skb: skb to forward * @recv_if: interface that the skb is received on * @orig_node_src: originator that the skb is received from + * @rx_result: set to NET_RX_SUCCESS when the fragment was forwarded and + * NET_RX_DROP when it was dropped; only valid when true is returned * * Look up the next-hop of the fragments payload and check if the merged packet * will exceed the MTU towards the next-hop. If so, the fragment is forwarded @@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb, */ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if, - struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src) + struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src, + int *rx_result) { struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(recv_if->mesh_iface); struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node = NULL; @@ -412,12 +415,22 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb, */ total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size); if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) { + if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) { + kfree_skb(skb); + *rx_result = NET_RX_DROP; + ret = true; + goto out; + } + + packet = (struct batadv_frag_packet *)skb->data; + batadv_inc_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD); batadv_add_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD_BYTES, skb->len + ETH_HLEN); packet->ttl--; batadv_send_unicast_skb(skb, neigh_node); + *rx_result = NET_RX_SUCCESS; ret = true; } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h index dbf0871f87030..51e281027ab63 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h @@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ void batadv_frag_purge_orig(struct batadv_orig_node *orig, bool (*check_cb)(struct batadv_frag_table_entry *)); bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if, - struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src); + struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src, + int *rx_result); bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb, struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node); int batadv_frag_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c index cdcea90db6123..4483f8d9c7583 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c @@ -1168,10 +1168,9 @@ int batadv_recv_frag_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, /* Route the fragment if it is not for us and too big to be merged. */ if (!batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, frag_packet->dest) && - batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src)) { + batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src, &ret)) { /* skb was consumed */ skb = NULL; - ret = NET_RX_SUCCESS; goto put_orig_node; } From 44ae137a2aceff08cd226718ef077adca2638012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:00 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 021/607] batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL commit 493d9d2528e1a09b090e4b37f0f553def7bd5ce9 upstream. Packets with a TTL are using it to limit the amount of time this packet can be forwarded. But for batadv_frag_packet, the TTL was always only reduced but it was never evaluated. It could even underflow without any effect. Check the TTL in batadv_frag_skb_fwd() before attempting to prepare it for forwarding. This keeps it in sync with the not fragmented unicast packet. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c index ffa5d4b074095..4779741e7273e 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c @@ -415,6 +415,13 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb, */ total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size); if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) { + if (packet->ttl < 2) { + kfree_skb(skb); + *rx_result = NET_RX_DROP; + ret = true; + goto out; + } + if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) { kfree_skb(skb); *rx_result = NET_RX_DROP; From 3d4548c96d6f21ac1a9b06c5f82f3ef439c87023 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 022/607] batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif commit d11c00b95b2a3b3934007fc003dccc6fdcc061ad upstream. When an interface gets disabled, the worker is correctly disabled by batadv_hardif_disable_interface() -> ... -> batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(). In this process, the skb aggr_list is also freed. But batadv_v_ogm_send_meshif() can still queue new skbs (via batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if()) to the aggr_list. This will only stop after all cores can no longer find the RCU protected list of hard interfaces. These queued skbs will never be freed or consumed by batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work. The batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable() function must block batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if() to avoid leak of skbs. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: f89255a02f1d ("batman-adv: BATMAN_V: introduce per hard-iface OGMv2 queues") [ Context ] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/bat_v.c | 1 + net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ net/batman-adv/types.h | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c index de94447142642..17d2a1ccdce67 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c @@ -817,6 +817,7 @@ void batadv_v_hardif_init(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface) hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len = 0; skb_queue_head_init(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list); + hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false; INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq, batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work); } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c index d66ca77b1aaa3..6852bf5da8c55 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c @@ -252,11 +252,18 @@ static void batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, } spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock); + if (!hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled) { + kfree_skb(skb); + goto unlock; + } + if (!batadv_v_ogm_queue_left(skb, hard_iface)) batadv_v_ogm_aggr_send(bat_priv, hard_iface); hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len += batadv_v_ogm_len(skb); __skb_queue_tail(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list, skb); + +unlock: spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock); } @@ -417,6 +424,10 @@ int batadv_v_ogm_iface_enable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface) { struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(hard_iface->mesh_iface); + spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock); + hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = true; + spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock); + batadv_v_ogm_start_queue_timer(hard_iface); batadv_v_ogm_start_timer(bat_priv); @@ -432,6 +443,7 @@ void batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface) cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq); spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock); + hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false; batadv_v_ogm_aggr_list_free(hard_iface); spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock); } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h index c9bd49d23547e..417d653021c7a 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/types.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h @@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ struct batadv_hard_iface_bat_v { /** @aggr_list: queue for to be aggregated OGM packets */ struct sk_buff_head aggr_list; + /** + * @aggr_list_enabled: aggr_list is active and new skbs can be + * enqueued. Protected by aggr_list.lock after initialization + */ + bool aggr_list_enabled:1; + /** @aggr_len: size of the OGM aggregate (excluding ethernet header) */ unsigned int aggr_len; From 2233787658db859f0a9b83cb397cf783bb8be865 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 023/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries commit e7c775110e1858e5a7471a23a9c9658c0af9df89 upstream. When the unacked_list is unbound, an attacker could send messages with small lengths and appropriated seqno + gaps to force the receiver to allocate more and more unacked_list entries. And the end either causing an out-of-memory situation or increase the management overhead for the (large) list that significant portions of CPU cycles are wasted in searching through the list. When limiting the list to a specific number, it is important to still correctly add a new entry to the list. But if the list became larger than the limit, the last entry of the list (with the highest seqno) must be dropped to still allow the earlier seqnos to finish and therefore to continue the process. Otherwise, the process might get stuck with too high seqnos which are not handled by batadv_tp_ack_unordered(). Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") [ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- net/batman-adv/types.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 10b8daca3a615..e5387e8f33244 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ #define BATADV_TP_PLEN (BATADV_TP_PACKET_LEN - ETH_HLEN - \ sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet)) +/** + * BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED - maximum number of packets a receiver didn't yet ack + */ +#define BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED 100 + static u8 batadv_tp_prerandom[4096] __read_mostly; /** @@ -1195,6 +1200,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t) list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) { list_del(&un->list); kfree(un); + tp_vars->unacked_count--; } spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); @@ -1308,6 +1314,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, /* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */ if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) { list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list); + tp_vars->unacked_count++; goto out; } @@ -1338,12 +1345,24 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, */ list_add(&new->list, &un->list); added = true; + tp_vars->unacked_count++; break; } /* received packet with smallest seqno out of order; add it to front */ - if (!added) + if (!added) { list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list); + tp_vars->unacked_count++; + } + + /* remove the last (biggest) unacked seqno when list is too large */ + if (tp_vars->unacked_count > BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED) { + un = list_last_entry(&tp_vars->unacked_list, + struct batadv_tp_unacked, list); + list_del(&un->list); + kfree(un); + tp_vars->unacked_count--; + } out: spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); @@ -1380,6 +1399,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars) list_del(&un->list); kfree(un); + tp_vars->unacked_count--; } spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); } @@ -1430,6 +1450,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list); + tp_vars->unacked_count = 0; kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0); diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h index 417d653021c7a..8b180d8245b2a 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/types.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h @@ -1426,6 +1426,9 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars { /** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */ spinlock_t unacked_lock; + /** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */ + size_t unacked_count; + /** @last_recv_time: time (jiffies) a msg was received */ unsigned long last_recv_time; From 1dafdd0794be1a63d2c45f9a32e0a9cd89f68478 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 024/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE commit d67c728f07fca2ee6ffdc6dd4421cf2e8691f4d1 upstream. The last_recv_time field for batadv_tp_receiver tracks the jiffies value of the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts. These accesses are not consistently protected by a lock, so READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used to prevent data races caused by compiler optimizations. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index e5387e8f33244..e69bf10e66ac3 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1183,7 +1183,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t) bat_priv = tp_vars->bat_priv; /* if there is recent activity rearm the timer */ - if (!batadv_has_timed_out(tp_vars->last_recv_time, + if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time), BATADV_TP_RECV_TIMEOUT)) { /* reset the receiver shutdown timer */ batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars); @@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig, icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER); if (tp_vars) { - tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies); goto out_unlock; } @@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0); - tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies); kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount); hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list); @@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, goto out; } - tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies; + WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies); } /* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been From d511c72a83dd55adf90f318f4471285e605264f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 025/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv commit 6dde0cfcb36e4d5b3de35b75696937478441eed4 upstream. When last_recv is updated to store the last receive sequence number, it is assuming that nothing is modifying in parallel while: * check for outdated packets is done * out of order check is performed (and packets are stored in out-of-order queue) * the out-of-order queue was searched for closed gaps * sequence number for next ack is calculated Nothing of that was actually protected. It could therefore happen that the last_recv was updated multiple times in parallel and the final sequence number was calculated with deltas which had no connection to the sequence number they were added to. Lock this whole region with the same lock which was already used to protect the unacked (out-of-order) list. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") [ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- net/batman-adv/types.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index e69bf10e66ac3..629831ea9a58e 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst, */ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, const struct sk_buff *skb) + __must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock) { const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp; struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new; @@ -1310,12 +1311,11 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet); new->len = payload_len; - spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); /* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */ if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) { list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list); tp_vars->unacked_count++; - goto out; + return true; } /* otherwise loop over the list and either drop the packet because this @@ -1364,9 +1364,6 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, tp_vars->unacked_count--; } -out: - spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); - return true; } @@ -1376,6 +1373,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, * @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session */ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars) + __must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock) { struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *safe; u32 to_ack; @@ -1383,7 +1381,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars) /* go through the unacked packet list and possibly ACK them as * well */ - spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) { /* the list is ordered, therefore it is possible to stop as soon * there is a gap between the last acked seqno and the seqno of @@ -1401,7 +1398,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars) kfree(un); tp_vars->unacked_count--; } - spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); } /** @@ -1481,6 +1477,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp; struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars; size_t packet_size; + u32 to_ack; u32 seqno; icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data; @@ -1509,6 +1506,8 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies); } + spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); + /* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been * lost. Resend the ACK */ @@ -1520,8 +1519,10 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, /* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has * not been enqueued correctly */ - if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) + if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) { + spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); goto out; + } /* send a duplicate ACK */ goto send_ack; @@ -1535,11 +1536,14 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars); send_ack: + to_ack = tp_vars->last_recv; + spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); + /* send the ACK. If the received packet was out of order, the ACK that * is going to be sent is a duplicate (the sender will count them and * possibly enter Fast Retransmit as soon as it has reached 3) */ - batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, tp_vars->last_recv, + batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, to_ack, icmp->timestamp, icmp->session, icmp->uid); out: batadv_tp_vars_put(tp_vars); diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h index 8b180d8245b2a..84de2570eac3e 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/types.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars { /** @unacked_list: list of unacked packets (meta-info only) */ struct list_head unacked_list; - /** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */ + /** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list + &batadv_tp_receiver.last_recv */ spinlock_t unacked_lock; /** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */ From af5a069805f67957340cde27e349374be676e6d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 026/607] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets commit cbde75c38b21f022891525078622587ad557b7c1 upstream. If the size of the packets would change during the transmission, it could happen that some retries of packets are overlapping. In this case, precise comparisons of sequence numbers by the receiver would be wrong. It is then necessary to check if the start sequence number to the end sequence number ("seqno + length") would contain a new range. If this is the case then this is enough to accept this packet. In all other cases, the packet still has to be dropped (and not acked). Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation") [ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ] Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 25 +++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c index 629831ea9a58e..02af19aaaff29 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c @@ -1284,7 +1284,8 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst, /** * batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order() - store an out of order packet * @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session - * @skb: the buffer containing the received packet + * @seqno: sequence number of new received packet + * @payload_len: length of the received packet * * Store the out of order packet in the unacked list for late processing. This * packets are kept in this list so that they can be ACKed at once as soon as @@ -1293,22 +1294,17 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst, * Return: true if the packed has been successfully processed, false otherwise */ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, - const struct sk_buff *skb) + u32 seqno, u32 payload_len) __must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock) { - const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp; struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new; - u32 payload_len; bool added = false; new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!new)) return false; - icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data; - - new->seqno = ntohl(icmp->seqno); - payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet); + new->seqno = seqno; new->len = payload_len; /* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */ @@ -1476,7 +1472,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, { const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp; struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars; - size_t packet_size; + u32 payload_len; u32 to_ack; u32 seqno; @@ -1511,15 +1507,17 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, /* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been * lost. Resend the ACK */ - if (batadv_seq_before(seqno, tp_vars->last_recv)) + payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet); + to_ack = seqno + payload_len; + if (batadv_seq_before(to_ack, tp_vars->last_recv)) goto send_ack; /* if the packet is out of order enqueue it */ - if (ntohl(icmp->seqno) != tp_vars->last_recv) { + if (batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->last_recv, seqno)) { /* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has * not been enqueued correctly */ - if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) { + if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, seqno, payload_len)) { spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock); goto out; } @@ -1529,8 +1527,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, } /* if everything was fine count the ACKed bytes */ - packet_size = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet); - tp_vars->last_recv += packet_size; + tp_vars->last_recv = to_ack; /* check if this ordered message filled a gap.... */ batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars); From 3470d583fc652c40db2bfd350e981e0e4716e189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 027/607] batman-adv: tt: don't merge change entries with different VIDs commit f08e06c2d5c3e2434e7c773f2213f4a7dce6bc1e upstream. batadv_tt_local_event() merges/cancels events for the same client which would conflict or be duplicates. The matching of the queued events only compares the MAC address - the VLAN ID stored in each event is ignored. If a MAC would now appear on multiple VID, the two ADD change events (for VID 1 and VID 2) would be merged to a single vid event. The remote can therefore not calculate the correct TT table and desync. A full translation table exchange is required to recover from this state. A check of VID is therefore necessary to avoid such wrong merges/cancels. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c index 9f6e67771ffa8..acd8af4446671 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c @@ -446,6 +446,9 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_event(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, if (!batadv_compare_eth(entry->change.addr, common->addr)) continue; + if (entry->change.vid != tt_change_node->change.vid) + continue; + del_op_entry = entry->change.flags & BATADV_TT_CLIENT_DEL; if (del_op_requested != del_op_entry) { /* DEL+ADD in the same orig interval have no effect and From 3f82fc92cf523a007a423c21b04613acf32aeaa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 028/607] batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID commit 12407d5f61c2653a64f2ff4b22f3c267f8420ef1 upstream. batadv_tt_check_roam_count() is supposed to track roaming of a TT entry. But TT entries are for a MAC + VID. The VID was completely missed and thus leads to incorrect detection of ROAM counts when a client MAC exists in multiple VLANs. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 9 +++++++-- net/batman-adv/types.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c index acd8af4446671..83dfd804a143a 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c @@ -3442,6 +3442,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv) * batadv_tt_check_roam_count() - check if a client has roamed too frequently * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the mesh interface information * @client: mac address of the roaming client + * @vid: VLAN identifier * * This function checks whether the client already reached the * maximum number of possible roaming phases. In this case the ROAMING_ADV @@ -3449,7 +3450,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv) * * Return: true if the ROAMING_ADV can be sent, false otherwise */ -static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client) +static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client, u16 vid) { struct batadv_tt_roam_node *tt_roam_node; bool ret = false; @@ -3462,6 +3463,9 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client) if (!batadv_compare_eth(tt_roam_node->addr, client)) continue; + if (tt_roam_node->vid != vid) + continue; + if (batadv_has_timed_out(tt_roam_node->first_time, BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_TIME)) continue; @@ -3483,6 +3487,7 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client) atomic_set(&tt_roam_node->counter, BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_COUNT - 1); ether_addr_copy(tt_roam_node->addr, client); + tt_roam_node->vid = vid; list_add(&tt_roam_node->list, &bat_priv->tt.roam_list); ret = true; @@ -3519,7 +3524,7 @@ static void batadv_send_roam_adv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client, /* before going on we have to check whether the client has * already roamed to us too many times */ - if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client)) + if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client, vid)) goto out; batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TT, bat_priv, diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h index 84de2570eac3e..ef712ba4fff2c 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/types.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h @@ -1912,6 +1912,9 @@ struct batadv_tt_roam_node { /** @addr: mac address of the client in the roaming phase */ u8 addr[ETH_ALEN]; + /** @vid: VLAN identifier */ + u16 vid; + /** * @counter: number of allowed roaming events per client within a single * OGM interval (changes are committed with each OGM) From 04e1a6557fbf8ad9385563ae79c5437cb5bf94c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 029/607] batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs commit 20d7658b74169f86d4ac01b9185b3eadddf71f28 upstream. The local hash of DAT entries is supposed to be VLAN (VID) aware. But the adding to the hash and the search in the hash were not checking the VID information of the hash entries. The entries would therefore only be correctly separated when batadv_hash_dat() didn't select the same buckets for different VIDs. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: be1db4f6615b ("batman-adv: make the Distributed ARP Table vlan aware") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c index 031c295fff1b1..860db505e8697 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c @@ -214,10 +214,13 @@ static void batadv_dat_purge(struct work_struct *work) */ static bool batadv_compare_dat(const struct hlist_node *node, const void *data2) { - const void *data1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry, - hash_entry); + const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry1; + const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry2; - return memcmp(data1, data2, sizeof(__be32)) == 0; + entry1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry, hash_entry); + entry2 = data2; + + return entry1->ip == entry2->ip && entry1->vid == entry2->vid; } /** @@ -344,6 +347,9 @@ batadv_dat_entry_hash_find(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, __be32 ip, if (dat_entry->ip != ip) continue; + if (dat_entry->vid != vid) + continue; + if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&dat_entry->refcount)) continue; From 4cc9f7711bb898f7af34eef26f615e9465ae250c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 030/607] batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment commit 32a6799255525d6ea4da0f7e9e0e521ad9560a46 upstream. The fields of an aggregated OGM(v2) are accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset. As the header length is even, an odd tvlv_len would misalign it and trigger unaligned accesses on strict-alignment architectures. Such a misaligned TVLV/OGM/OGMv2 is not created by a normal participant in the mesh. Therefore, reject such malformed packets. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c | 11 ++++++++++- net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c | 11 ++++++++++- net/batman-adv/routing.c | 6 ++++++ net/batman-adv/tvlv.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c index b8b1b997960a9..6e79f69c2fede 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c @@ -311,14 +311,23 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len, const struct batadv_ogm_packet *ogm_packet) { int next_buff_pos = 0; + u16 tvlv_len; /* check if there is enough space for the header */ next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm_packet); if (next_buff_pos > packet_len) return false; + tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len); + + /* the fields of an aggregated OGM are accessed assuming (at least) + * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset. + */ + if (tvlv_len & 1) + return false; + /* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */ - next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len); + next_buff_pos += tvlv_len; return next_buff_pos <= packet_len; } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c index 6852bf5da8c55..1f9b2d2b4831c 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c @@ -849,14 +849,23 @@ batadv_v_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len, const struct batadv_ogm2_packet *ogm2_packet) { int next_buff_pos = 0; + u16 tvlv_len; /* check if there is enough space for the header */ next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm2_packet); if (next_buff_pos > packet_len) return false; + tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len); + + /* the fields of an aggregated OGMv2 are accessed assuming (at least) + * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGMv2 must start at an even offset. + */ + if (tvlv_len & 1) + return false; + /* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */ - next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len); + next_buff_pos += tvlv_len; return next_buff_pos <= packet_len; } diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c index 4483f8d9c7583..41951c7a1c50b 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c @@ -1366,6 +1366,12 @@ int batadv_recv_mcast_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, if (tvlv_buff_len > skb->len - hdr_size) goto free_skb; + /* the fields of an multicast payload are accessed assuming (at least) + * 2-byte alignment, so a following packet must start at an even offset. + */ + if (tvlv_buff_len & 1) + goto free_skb; + ret = batadv_tvlv_containers_process(bat_priv, BATADV_MCAST, NULL, skb, tvlv_buff, tvlv_buff_len); if (ret >= 0) { diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c index cde798c82dcf1..63fb54024d154 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c @@ -464,6 +464,12 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len) break; + /* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte + * alignment, so it must start at an even offset. + */ + if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1) + break; + tvlv_handler = batadv_tvlv_handler_get(bat_priv, tvlv_hdr->type, tvlv_hdr->version); From 565ab66005b14e4d40f2ef7d36cc6baaf9725fb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sven Eckelmann Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 18:12:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 031/607] batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state commit edb557b2ba38fea2c5eb710cf366c797e187218c upstream. TVLV handlers can have the flag BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND set to signal that the OGM handler should be called (with NULL for data) when the specific TVLV container was not found in the OGM. This is used by: * DAT * GW * Multicast (OGM + Tracker) The state whether the handler was executed was stored in the struct batadv_tvlv_handler. But the TVLV processing is started without any lock. Multiple parallel contexts processing TVLVs would therefore overwrite each others BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag in the shared batadv_tvlv_handler. Drop the shared BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag and instead determine, per TVLV buffer, whether a matching container was present by scanning the packet's buffer. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/batman-adv/tvlv.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/batman-adv/types.h | 7 ----- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c index 63fb54024d154..a91f1891747c0 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c +++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c @@ -398,7 +398,6 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node, BATADV_NO_FLAGS, tvlv_value, tvlv_value_len); - tvlv_handler->flags |= BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED; break; case BATADV_UNICAST_TVLV: if (!skb) @@ -430,6 +429,48 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, return NET_RX_SUCCESS; } +/** + * batadv_tvlv_containers_contain() - check if a tvlv buffer holds a container + * @tvlv_value: tvlv content + * @tvlv_value_len: tvlv content length + * @type: tvlv container type to look for + * @version: tvlv container version to look for + * + * Return: true if a container of the given type and version is present in the + * tvlv buffer, false otherwise. + */ +static bool batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(void *tvlv_value, + u16 tvlv_value_len, u8 type, + u8 version) +{ + struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr; + u16 tvlv_value_cont_len; + + while (tvlv_value_len >= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr)) { + tvlv_hdr = tvlv_value; + tvlv_value_cont_len = ntohs(tvlv_hdr->len); + tvlv_value = tvlv_hdr + 1; + tvlv_value_len -= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr); + + if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len) + break; + + /* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte + * alignment, so it must start at an even offset. + */ + if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1) + break; + + if (tvlv_hdr->type == type && tvlv_hdr->version == version) + return true; + + tvlv_value = (u8 *)tvlv_value + tvlv_value_cont_len; + tvlv_value_len -= tvlv_value_cont_len; + } + + return false; +} + /** * batadv_tvlv_containers_process() - parse the given tvlv buffer to call the * appropriate handlers @@ -449,7 +490,9 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb, void *tvlv_value, u16 tvlv_value_len) { + u16 tvlv_value_start_len = tvlv_value_len; struct batadv_tvlv_handler *tvlv_handler; + void *tvlv_value_start = tvlv_value; struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr; u16 tvlv_value_cont_len; u8 cifnotfound = BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND; @@ -493,12 +536,20 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, if (!tvlv_handler->ogm_handler) continue; - if ((tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND) && - !(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED)) - tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node, - cifnotfound, NULL, 0); + if (!(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND)) + continue; - tvlv_handler->flags &= ~BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED; + /* if the corresponding container was present then the handler + * was already called from the loop above + */ + if (batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(tvlv_value_start, + tvlv_value_start_len, + tvlv_handler->type, + tvlv_handler->version)) + continue; + + tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node, + cifnotfound, NULL, 0); } rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h index ef712ba4fff2c..ac4494f1b8e2a 100644 --- a/net/batman-adv/types.h +++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h @@ -2245,13 +2245,6 @@ enum batadv_tvlv_handler_flags { * will call this handler even if its type was not found (with no data) */ BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND = BIT(1), - - /** - * @BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED: interval tvlv handling flag - the - * API marks a handler as being called, so it won't be called if the - * BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND flag was set - */ - BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED = BIT(2), }; #endif /* _NET_BATMAN_ADV_TYPES_H_ */ From 6374fb9edf72c67a118a2c214a0dddd04c921e0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wongi Lee Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 22:46:17 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 032/607] ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path commit 736b380e28d0480c7bc3e022f1950f31fe53a7c5 upstream. In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken (MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero. The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing skb_shared_info. An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix __ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption triggerable. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check. Fixes: 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc") Signed-off-by: Jungwoo Lee Signed-off-by: Wongi Lee Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ajFTqRljatR17fFy@DESKTOP-19IMU7U.localdomain Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c index f5ca0267e7706..8f37c9cc868b0 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c @@ -1648,8 +1648,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, !(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_SG))) alloclen = fraglen; else { - alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; - pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; + alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + fraggap; + pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap; } alloclen += alloc_extra; @@ -1664,10 +1664,7 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen; copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen; - /* [!] NOTE: copy may be negative if pagedlen>0 - * because then the equation may reduces to -fraggap. - */ - if (copy < 0 && !(flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) { + if (copy < 0) { err = -EINVAL; goto error; } From 77798d7be6ef71e72fb6fc8a2901bf74ebc9706f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wongi Lee Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 22:38:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 033/607] ipv4: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path [ Upstream commit eca856950f7cb1a221e02b99d758409f2c5cec42 ] In __ip_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken, alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap, but the fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied into the new skb's linear area at offset transhdrlen by the subsequent skb_copy_and_csum_bits(). The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Fixes: 8eb77cc73977 ("ipv4: avoid partial copy for zc") Signed-off-by: Jungwoo Lee Signed-off-by: Wongi Lee Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ajFR1eLAIs42TN3g@DESKTOP-19IMU7U.localdomain Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c index 7c005263262ff..7eaf35a6e24ba 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c @@ -1117,8 +1117,8 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, !(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_SG))) alloclen = fraglen; else { - alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; - pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; + alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + fraggap; + pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap; } alloclen += alloc_extra; @@ -1165,9 +1165,6 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, } copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap - pagedlen; - /* [!] NOTE: copy will be negative if pagedlen>0 - * because then the equation reduces to -fraggap. - */ if (copy > 0 && INDIRECT_CALL_1(getfrag, ip_generic_getfrag, from, data + transhdrlen, offset, From 5e658b9245a52d838ef93729a7bc07de8e19deb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Komarov Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:31:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 034/607] ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs commit 5b08dccecf825cbf905f348bc6ccb497507e28e2 upstream. NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode from ntfs_get_wsl_perm(). Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own file and gain euid 0 after inode reload. Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm() writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly. Signed-off-by: Zhen Yan [almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: added an additional check for non privileged users] Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ntfs3/xattr.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c index 142ecb3847e59..d719e1073dbb1 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/xattr.c @@ -845,6 +845,12 @@ static int ntfs_getxattr(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *de, return err; } +static bool ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(const char *name) +{ + return !strcmp(name, "$LXUID") || !strcmp(name, "$LXGID") || + !strcmp(name, "$LXMOD") || !strcmp(name, "$LXDEV"); +} + /* * ntfs_setxattr - inode_operations::setxattr */ @@ -949,6 +955,12 @@ static noinline int ntfs_setxattr(const struct xattr_handler *handler, goto out; } + /* Do not allow non privileged users to change $LXUID/$LXGID... */ + if (ntfs_is_reserved_lxattr(name) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + /* Deal with NTFS extended attribute. */ err = ntfs_set_ea(inode, name, strlen(name), value, size, flags, 0, NULL); From 3c499851753a24d2e148d4e9ca51764c0c51554e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiajia Liu Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 11:38:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 035/607] wifi: mt76: add wcid publish check in mt76_sta_add commit 20b126920a259df4d7dcae19fcfe2c57a74d6b2e upstream. Since mt7925_mac_sta_add publishes wcid, add publish check in mt76_sta_add to avoid reinitializing the wcid->poll_list. Found dev->sta_poll_list corruption when using mt7925 and 7.1-rc4. According to the corruption information, prev->next was changed to itself. wlan0: disconnect from AP 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e3 for new auth to 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e2 wlan0: authenticate with 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e2 (local address=84:9e:56:9c:7e:6b) wlan0: send auth to 90:fb:5d:94:8b:e2 (try 1/3) slab kmalloc-8k start ffff8c80958a6000 pointer offset 4160 size 8192 list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff8c808a7488f8), but was ffff8c80958a7040. (prev=ffff8c80958a7040). mt76_wcid_add_poll+0x95/0xd0 [mt76] mt7925_mac_add_txs.part.0+0xa5/0xe0 [mt7925_common] mt7925_rx_check+0xa7/0xc0 [mt7925_common] mt76_dma_rx_poll+0x50d/0x790 [mt76] mt792x_poll_rx+0x52/0xe0 [mt792x_lib] Signed-off-by: Jiajia Liu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260528033814.46418-1-liujiajia@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mac80211.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mac80211.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mac80211.c index 76eb740428b8d..2d24f9fa51a50 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mac80211.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mac80211.c @@ -1568,6 +1568,7 @@ mt76_sta_add(struct mt76_phy *phy, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, { struct mt76_wcid *wcid = (struct mt76_wcid *)sta->drv_priv; struct mt76_dev *dev = phy->dev; + struct mt76_wcid *published; int ret; int i; @@ -1587,11 +1588,19 @@ mt76_sta_add(struct mt76_phy *phy, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, mtxq->wcid = wcid->idx; } - ewma_signal_init(&wcid->rssi); - rcu_assign_pointer(dev->wcid[wcid->idx], wcid); + published = rcu_dereference_protected(dev->wcid[wcid->idx], + lockdep_is_held(&dev->mutex)); + if (published != wcid) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(published); + ewma_signal_init(&wcid->rssi); + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->wcid[wcid->idx], wcid); + mt76_wcid_init(wcid, phy->band_idx); + } else { + wcid->phy_idx = phy->band_idx; + } + phy->num_sta++; - mt76_wcid_init(wcid, phy->band_idx); out: mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); From 0cfa78c050662784fc8e3ab26dbfd1dc632b2082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 09:53:06 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 036/607] af_unix: Set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc(). [ Upstream commit d82ba05263c69fa2437fe93e4e561cc40f4c03af ] Igor Ushakov reported that unix_gc() could run with gc_in_progress being false if the work is scheduled while running: Thread 1 Thread 2 Thread 3 -------- -------- -------- unix_schedule_gc() unix_schedule_gc() `- if (!gc_in_progress) `- if (!gc_in_progress) |- gc_in_progress = true | `- queue_work() | unix_gc() <----------------/ | | |- gc_in_progress = true ... `- queue_work() | | `- gc_in_progress = false | | unix_gc() <---------------------------------------------' | ... /* gc_in_progress == false */ | `- gc_in_progress = false unix_peek_fpl() relies on gc_in_progress not to confuse GC by MSG_PEEK. Let's set gc_in_progress to true in unix_gc(). Fixes: 8b90a9f819dc ("af_unix: Run GC on only one CPU.") Reported-by: Igor Ushakov Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501073945.1884564-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski [ Add setting gc_in_progress in __unix_gc(). Keep the existing set in unix_gc() for wait_for_unix_gc() over-limit throttling. ] Signed-off-by: Igor Ushakov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/unix/garbage.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c index 529b21d043d92..3986717090266 100644 --- a/net/unix/garbage.c +++ b/net/unix/garbage.c @@ -606,6 +606,8 @@ static void __unix_gc(struct work_struct *work) struct sk_buff_head hitlist; struct sk_buff *skb; + WRITE_ONCE(gc_in_progress, true); + spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock); if (unix_graph_state == UNIX_GRAPH_NOT_CYCLIC) { From bd968bdd568beacfdf98ec537a87527e85f1d0cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Doruk Tan Ozturk Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 20:37:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 037/607] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto commit 84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865 upstream. llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Fixes: 03556e4d0dbb ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/ Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Closes: Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac802154/llsec.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/mac802154/llsec.c b/net/mac802154/llsec.c index f13b07ebfb98a..09a47104b5772 100644 --- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c +++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c @@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac802154_llsec *sec, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct ieee802154_hdr hdr; int rc, authlen, hlen; + struct sk_buff *trailer; struct mac802154_llsec_key *key; u32 frame_ctr; @@ -769,6 +770,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac802154_llsec *sec, struct sk_buff *skb) skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr); skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); + if (rc < 0) { + llsec_key_put(key); + return rc; + } + rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key); llsec_key_put(key); @@ -908,6 +915,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct mac802154_llsec *sec, const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr, struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr) { + struct sk_buff *trailer; + int err; + + err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer); + if (err < 0) + return err; + if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC) return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr); else From 1acdd14c0990dd1cd4b6534f00366d2e6dfce05f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yiming Qian Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 06:21:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 038/607] net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms commit 406e8a651a7b854c41fecd5117bb282b3a6c2c6b upstream. The sk_msg sg.copy bitmap is part of the scatterlist entry ownership state. A set bit tells sk_msg_compute_data_pointers() not to expose the entry through writable BPF ctx->data. This protects entries backed by pages that are not private to the sk_msg, such as splice-backed file page-cache pages. Several sk_msg transform paths move, copy, split, or compact msg->sg.data[] entries without moving the matching sg.copy bit. This can make an externally backed entry arrive at a new slot with a clear copy bit. A later SK_MSG verdict can then expose sg_virt(sge) as writable ctx->data and BPF stores can modify the original page cache. Keep sg.copy synchronized with sg.data[] whenever entries are transferred, shifted, split, or copied into a new sk_msg. Clear the bit when an entry is replaced by a newly allocated private page or freed. This covers the BPF pull/push/pop helpers, sk_msg_shift_left/right(), sk_msg_xfer(), and tls_split_open_record(), including the partial tail entry created during TLS open-record splitting. Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yiming Qian Reported-by: Keenan Dong Signed-off-by: Yiming Qian Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610062137.49075-1-yimingqian591@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/skmsg.h | 15 +++++++++++---- net/core/filter.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/core/skmsg.c | 2 ++ net/tls/tls_sw.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h index 829b281d6c9c2..4ee7e4680a6e1 100644 --- a/include/linux/skmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_SKMSG_H #define _LINUX_SKMSG_H +#include #include #include #include @@ -199,11 +200,14 @@ static inline void sk_msg_xfer(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src, int which, u32 size) { dst->sg.data[which] = src->sg.data[which]; + __assign_bit(which, dst->sg.copy, test_bit(which, src->sg.copy)); dst->sg.data[which].length = size; dst->sg.size += size; src->sg.size -= size; src->sg.data[which].length -= size; src->sg.data[which].offset += size; + if (!src->sg.data[which].length) + __clear_bit(which, src->sg.copy); } static inline void sk_msg_xfer_full(struct sk_msg *dst, struct sk_msg *src) @@ -273,16 +277,19 @@ static inline void sk_msg_page_add(struct sk_msg *msg, struct page *page, static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, bool copy_state) { do { - if (copy_state) - __set_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); - else - __clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); + __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, copy_state); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); if (i == msg->sg.end) break; } while (1); } +static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(struct sk_msg *dst, u32 dst_i, + const struct sk_msg *src, u32 src_i) +{ + __assign_bit(dst_i, dst->sg.copy, test_bit(src_i, src->sg.copy)); +} + static inline void sk_msg_sg_copy_set(struct sk_msg *msg, u32 start) { sk_msg_sg_copy(msg, start, true); diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 0b61945491054..6dd9bdbef1996 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2732,11 +2732,13 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, poffset += len; sge->length = 0; put_page(sg_page(sge)); + __clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); } while (i != last_sge); sg_set_page(&msg->sg.data[first_sge], page, copy, 0); + __clear_bit(first_sge, msg->sg.copy); /* To repair sg ring we need to shift entries. If we only * had a single entry though we can just replace it and @@ -2762,9 +2764,11 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pull_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, break; msg->sg.data[i] = msg->sg.data[move_from]; + sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg, i, msg, move_from); msg->sg.data[move_from].length = 0; msg->sg.data[move_from].page_link = 0; msg->sg.data[move_from].offset = 0; + __clear_bit(move_from, msg->sg.copy); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); } while (1); @@ -2793,6 +2797,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, { struct scatterlist sge, nsge, nnsge, rsge = {0}, *psge; u32 new, i = 0, l = 0, space, copy = 0, offset = 0; + bool sge_copy, nsge_copy, nnsge_copy, rsge_copy = false; u8 *raw, *to, *from; struct page *page; @@ -2865,6 +2870,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i); psge = sk_msg_elem(msg, i); rsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + rsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); psge->length = start - offset; rsge.length -= psge->length; @@ -2889,24 +2895,32 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, /* Shift one or two slots as needed */ sge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, new); + sge_copy = test_bit(new, msg->sg.copy); sg_unmark_end(&sge); nsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + nsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); if (rsge.length) { sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); nnsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + nnsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end); } while (i != msg->sg.end) { msg->sg.data[i] = sge; + __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy); sge = nsge; + sge_copy = nsge_copy; sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); if (rsge.length) { nsge = nnsge; + nsge_copy = nnsge_copy; nnsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + nnsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); } else { nsge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + nsge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); } } @@ -2920,6 +2934,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_push_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, get_page(sg_page(&rsge)); sk_msg_iter_var_next(new); msg->sg.data[new] = rsge; + __assign_bit(new, msg->sg.copy, rsge_copy); } sk_msg_reset_curr(msg); @@ -2947,25 +2962,33 @@ static void sk_msg_shift_left(struct sk_msg *msg, int i) prev = i; sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); msg->sg.data[prev] = msg->sg.data[i]; + sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg, prev, msg, i); } while (i != msg->sg.end); sk_msg_iter_prev(msg, end); + __clear_bit(msg->sg.end, msg->sg.copy); } static void sk_msg_shift_right(struct sk_msg *msg, int i) { struct scatterlist tmp, sge; + bool tmp_copy, sge_copy; sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end); sge = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + sge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); tmp = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + tmp_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); while (i != msg->sg.end) { msg->sg.data[i] = sge; + __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); sge = tmp; + sge_copy = tmp_copy; tmp = sk_msg_elem_cpy(msg, i); + tmp_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); } } @@ -3025,6 +3048,8 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, struct scatterlist *nsge, *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg, i); int a = start - offset; int b = sge->length - pop - a; + u32 sge_i = i; + bool sge_copy = test_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); @@ -3037,6 +3062,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, sg_set_page(nsge, sg_page(sge), b, sge->offset + pop + a); + __assign_bit(i, msg->sg.copy, sge_copy); } else { struct page *page, *orig; u8 *to, *from; @@ -3053,6 +3079,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_msg_pop_data, struct sk_msg *, msg, u32, start, memcpy(to, from, a); memcpy(to + a, from + a + pop, b); sg_set_page(sge, page, a + b, 0); + __clear_bit(sge_i, msg->sg.copy); put_page(orig); } pop = 0; diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 75ea4fdb27642..c1c315ae2b22b 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int sk_msg_alloc(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, int len, sge = &msg->sg.data[msg->sg.end]; sg_unmark_end(sge); sg_set_page(sge, pfrag->page, use, orig_offset); + __clear_bit(msg->sg.end, msg->sg.copy); get_page(pfrag->page); sk_msg_iter_next(msg, end); } @@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ static int sk_msg_free_elem(struct sock *sk, struct sk_msg *msg, u32 i, sk_mem_uncharge(sk, len); put_page(sg_page(sge)); } + __clear_bit(i, msg->sg.copy); memset(sge, 0, sizeof(*sge)); return len; } diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 034f322054e53..9949ae0270811 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from, struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge; u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size; struct scatterlist tmp = { }; + u32 tmp_i = 0; struct sk_msg *msg_npl; struct tls_rec *new; int ret; @@ -644,6 +645,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from, if (sge->length > apply) { u32 len = sge->length - apply; + tmp_i = i; get_page(sg_page(sge)); sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len, sge->offset + apply); @@ -675,6 +677,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from, nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); if (tmp.length) { memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge)); + sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg_npl, j, msg_opl, tmp_i); sk_msg_iter_var_next(j); nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j); } @@ -682,6 +685,7 @@ static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from, osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i); while (osge->length) { memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge)); + sk_msg_sg_copy_assign(msg_npl, j, msg_opl, i); sg_unmark_end(nsge); sk_msg_iter_var_next(i); sk_msg_iter_var_next(j); From 1697957eb0971d420dde42862b88eb43506a1105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 16:59:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 039/607] net: ip_gre: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink commit 8165f7ff57d9667d2bb477ef6af83ede7fed4ad7 upstream. A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that lives in t->net. Add rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() next to rtnl_get_net_ns_capable() in net/core/rtnetlink.c. It requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the link netns and is skipped when the link netns is dev_net(dev), where the rtnl path already checked it. The other patches in this series use the same helper. Gate ipgre_changelink() and erspan_changelink() with it, at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, because the parsers update live tunnel fields first. ipgre_netlink_parms() sets t->collect_md before ip_tunnel_changelink() runs. Commit 8b484efd5cb4 ("ip6: vti: Use ip6_tnl.net in vti6_siocdevprivate().") added the same check on the ioctl path. This adds it on RTM_NEWLINK. Reported-by: Xiao Liang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CABAhCOSzP1vaThGV35_VnsRCb=87_CPjPVsTHbq905k8A+BuUg@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: b57708add314 ("gre: add x-netns support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612085941.3158249-2-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/rtnetlink.h | 2 ++ net/core/rtnetlink.c | 8 ++++++++ net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/rtnetlink.h b/include/net/rtnetlink.h index ec65a8cebb992..2bff41aacc987 100644 --- a/include/net/rtnetlink.h +++ b/include/net/rtnetlink.h @@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ int rtnl_configure_link(struct net_device *dev, const struct ifinfomsg *ifm, int rtnl_nla_parse_ifinfomsg(struct nlattr **tb, const struct nlattr *nla_peer, struct netlink_ext_ack *exterr); struct net *rtnl_get_net_ns_capable(struct sock *sk, int netnsid); +bool rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(const struct net_device *dev, + const struct net *link_net); #define MODULE_ALIAS_RTNL_LINK(kind) MODULE_ALIAS("rtnl-link-" kind) diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index 0a43c3881e3f8..4909f20ff4d63 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -2414,6 +2414,14 @@ struct net *rtnl_get_net_ns_capable(struct sock *sk, int netnsid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtnl_get_net_ns_capable); +bool rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(const struct net_device *dev, + const struct net *link_net) +{ + return net_eq(link_net, dev_net(dev)) || + ns_capable(link_net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rtnl_dev_link_net_capable); + static int rtnl_valid_dump_ifinfo_req(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh, bool strict_check, struct nlattr **tb, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index 35f0baa99d409..879d37c557faf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -1456,6 +1456,9 @@ static int ipgre_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], __u32 fwmark = t->fwmark; int err; + if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, t->net)) + return -EPERM; + err = ipgre_newlink_encap_setup(dev, data); if (err) return err; @@ -1485,6 +1488,9 @@ static int erspan_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], __u32 fwmark = t->fwmark; int err; + if (!rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(dev, t->net)) + return -EPERM; + err = ipgre_newlink_encap_setup(dev, data); if (err) return err; From 4a69b83045d3195d5b9a9b053ad840ddb2998b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 15:57:38 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 040/607] apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg commit 4d587cd8a72155089a627130bbd4716ec0856e21 upstream. sendmsg()/sendto() with MSG_FASTOPEN is a combination of connect(2) and write(2): it opens the connection in the SYN. apparmor_socket_sendmsg() only checks AA_MAY_SEND, so a profile that grants send but denies connect lets a confined task open an outbound TCP/MPTCP connection that connect(2) would have refused, bypassing connect mediation. Mediate the implicit connect when MSG_FASTOPEN is set and a destination is supplied. Add it to apparmor_socket_sendmsg() (not the shared aa_sock_msg_perm() helper, which recvmsg also uses) and call aa_sk_perm() directly, mirroring the selinux and tomoyo fixes. sk_is_tcp() does not cover MPTCP fast open, so the SOCK_STREAM/IPPROTO_MPTCP arm is explicit. Fixes: cf60af03ca4e ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 3a4ef7bd3b5d0..e47696a7eacf8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1423,7 +1423,21 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { - return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); + int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); + + if (error) + return error; + + /* TCP fast open carries connect() semantics in sendmsg(); mediate + * the implicit connect so it cannot bypass the connect permission. + */ + if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && msg->msg_name && + (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) || + (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && + sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP))) + error = aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); + + return error; } static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, From c3ca2631073b2cef06824fd2bfc452ff7a1023de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruslan Valiyev Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 00:04:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 041/607] apparmor: fix use-after-free in rawdata dedup loop commit 6f060496d03e4dc560a40f73770bd08335cb7a27 upstream. aa_replace_profiles() walks ns->rawdata_list to dedup the incoming policy blob against entries already attached to existing profiles. Per the kernel-doc on struct aa_loaddata, list membership does not hold a reference: profiles hold pcount, and when the last pcount drops, do_ploaddata_rmfs() is queued on a workqueue that takes ns->lock and removes the entry. Between dropping the last pcount and the workqueue running, an entry remains on the list with pcount == 0. aa_get_profile_loaddata() is an unconditional kref_get() on pcount, so when the dedup loop hits such an entry, refcount hardening reports refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. inside aa_replace_profiles(), and the poisoned counter then trips "saturated" and "underflow" warnings on the subsequent uses of the same loaddata. Before commit a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") the dedup path used a get_unless_zero-style helper on a single counter, so the existing "if (tmp)" guard was meaningful. The split-refcount refactor introduced aa_get_profile_loaddata(), which has plain kref_get() semantics, and the guard quietly became a no-op. Introduce aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(), matching the existing _not0 convention used by aa_get_profile_not0(), and use it for the rawdata_list dedup lookup so dying entries are skipped. Reproduced on x86_64 with v7.1-rc5 in QEMU+KVM running Ubuntu 24.04 + stress-ng 0.17.06: stress-ng --apparmor 1 --klog-check --timeout 60s Without this patch the three refcount_t warnings fire within a few seconds. With it the same 60 s run is clean. Coverage is a smoke-test only; a longer soak with CONFIG_KASAN, CONFIG_KCSAN and CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING would be welcome from anyone with the cycles. Fixes: a0b7091c4de4 ("apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference") Reported-by: Colin Ian King Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221513 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ security/apparmor/policy.c | 8 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h index e5a95dc4da1f7..b9de0fdf9ee52 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h @@ -163,6 +163,25 @@ aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data) return data; } +/** + * aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0 - get a profile reference count if not zero + * @data: reference to get a count on + * + * Like aa_get_profile_loaddata(), but safe to call on an entry that may + * be on a list (e.g. ns->rawdata_list) where the last pcount has already + * dropped and the deferred cleanup has not yet run. + * + * Returns: pointer to reference, or %NULL if @data is NULL or its + * profile refcount has already reached zero. + */ +static inline struct aa_loaddata * +aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(struct aa_loaddata *data) +{ + if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&data->pcount)) + return data; + return NULL; +} + void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision); bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r); void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index b92db1b2f26e2..c474a55fed22c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -1206,8 +1206,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) { struct aa_loaddata *tmp; - tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata(rawdata_ent); - /* check we didn't fail the race */ + /* + * Entries remain on rawdata_list with + * pcount == 0 until do_ploaddata_rmfs() + * runs; only take a live profile ref. + */ + tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(rawdata_ent); if (tmp) { aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata); udata = tmp; From 81371dbd23601f67f01372817fdbab42c5601e43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Koichiro Den Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 11:05:27 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 042/607] NTB: epf: Avoid pci_iounmap() with offset when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG share BAR commit d876153680e3d721d385e554def919bce3d18c74 upstream. When BAR_PEER_SPAD and BAR_CONFIG share one PCI BAR, the module teardown path ends up calling pci_iounmap() on the same iomem with some offset, which is unnecessary and triggers a kernel warning like the following: Trying to vunmap() nonexistent vm area (0000000069a5ffe8) WARNING: mm/vmalloc.c:3470 at vunmap+0x58/0x68, CPU#5: modprobe/2937 [...] Call trace: vunmap+0x58/0x68 (P) iounmap+0x34/0x48 pci_iounmap+0x2c/0x40 ntb_epf_pci_remove+0x44/0x80 [ntb_hw_epf] pci_device_remove+0x48/0xf8 device_remove+0x50/0x88 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c8/0x228 driver_detach+0x50/0xb0 bus_remove_driver+0x74/0x100 driver_unregister+0x34/0x68 pci_unregister_driver+0x34/0xa0 ntb_epf_pci_driver_exit+0x14/0xfe0 [ntb_hw_epf] [...] Fix it by unmapping only when PEER_SPAD and CONFIG use difference bars. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e75d5ae8ab88 ("NTB: epf: Allow more flexibility in the memory BAR map method") Reviewed-by: Frank Li Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Jon Mason Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c index d3ecf25a51625..9935da48a52ea 100644 --- a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c +++ b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c @@ -646,7 +646,8 @@ static void ntb_epf_deinit_pci(struct ntb_epf_dev *ndev) struct pci_dev *pdev = ndev->ntb.pdev; pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->ctrl_reg); - pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->peer_spad_reg); + if (ndev->barno_map[BAR_PEER_SPAD] != ndev->barno_map[BAR_CONFIG]) + pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->peer_spad_reg); pci_iounmap(pdev, ndev->db_reg); pci_release_regions(pdev); From 0d35f9f194a858567a21017d69318a51e3a822b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Bridges Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 23:50:48 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 043/607] fbdev: fix use-after-free in store_modes() commit 2c1c805c65fb7dc7524e20376d6987721e73a0b1 upstream. store_modes() replaces a framebuffer's modelist with modes from userspace. On success it frees the old modelist with fb_destroy_modelist(). Two fields still point into that freed list. One pointer is fb_display[i].mode, the mode a console is using. fbcon_new_modelist() moves these pointers to the new list. It only does so for consoles still mapped to the framebuffer. An unmapped console is skipped and keeps its stale pointer. Unbinding fbcon, for example, sets con2fb_map[i] to -1 but leaves fb_display[i].mode set. An FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO ioctl with FB_ACTIVATE_INV_MODE later reaches fbcon_mode_deleted(). That function reads the stale fb_display[i].mode through fb_mode_is_equal(). The read is a use-after-free. The other pointer is fb_info->mode, the current mode. It is set through the mode sysfs attribute. store_modes() does not update fb_info->mode, so it is left pointing into the freed list. show_mode(), the attribute's read handler, dereferences the stale fb_info->mode through mode_string(). The read is a use-after-free. Clear both pointers before freeing the list. Commit a1f305893074 ("fbcon: Set fb_display[i]->mode to NULL when the mode is released") added the helper fbcon_delete_modelist(). It clears every fb_display[i].mode that points into a given list. So far it is called only from the unregister path. Call it from store_modes() too, and set fb_info->mode to NULL. Reported-by: syzbot+81c7c6b52649fd07299d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=81c7c6b52649fd07299d Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ajjoDhAi2y4ArSlz@dev/ Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c index baa2bae0fb5b3..fe8bd33e64ab1 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbsysfs.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include "fb_internal.h" +#include "fbcon.h" static int activate(struct fb_info *fb_info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var) { @@ -111,8 +112,15 @@ static ssize_t store_modes(struct device *device, if (fb_new_modelist(fb_info)) { fb_destroy_modelist(&fb_info->modelist); list_splice(&old_list, &fb_info->modelist); - } else + } else { + /* + * fb_display[i].mode and fb_info->mode both point into the old + * list. Clear them before it is freed. + */ + fbcon_delete_modelist(&old_list); + fb_info->mode = NULL; fb_destroy_modelist(&old_list); + } unlock_fb_info(fb_info); console_unlock(); From 99e6c712cc300883b8cbf03347d5359ec1a4d6dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Usama Arif Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 07:15:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 044/607] kernel/fork: clear PF_BLOCK_TS in copy_process() commit fd38b75c4b43295b10d69772a46d1c74dbd6fc81 upstream. PF_BLOCK_TS is only set in blk_time_get_ns() when current->plug is non-NULL, and blk_finish_plug() clears it via __blk_flush_plug() before NULLing the plug pointer. copy_process() breaks the invariant by inheriting PF_BLOCK_TS from the parent while resetting the child's plug to NULL. Clear PF_BLOCK_TS alongside that assignment so callers can rely on "PF_BLOCK_TS set implies current->plug != NULL" and dereference current->plug unguarded. Fixes: 06b23f92af87 ("block: update cached timestamp post schedule/preemption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Usama Arif Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616141604.328820-2-usama.arif@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/fork.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 1215d3f52c6d2..8b1238d692916 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -2230,6 +2230,7 @@ __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK p->plug = NULL; + p->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS; #endif futex_init_task(p); From 97e1044e79c5d6bdbc435e33980f52e6e1f5d65f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Usama Arif Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 07:15:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 045/607] block: invalidate cached plug timestamp after task switch commit fad156c2af227f42ca796cbb20ddc354a6dd9932 upstream. blk_time_get_ns() caches ktime_get_ns() in current->plug->cur_ktime and marks the task with PF_BLOCK_TS. That cache is only valid while the task keeps running; if the task is switched out, wall-clock time advances and the cached value must not be reused when the task runs again. The existing invalidation covers explicit plug flushes through __blk_flush_plug(), and the schedule() / rtmutex paths through sched_update_worker(). It does not cover in-kernel preemption paths such as preempt_schedule(), preempt_schedule_notrace(), and preempt_schedule_irq(), which enter __schedule(SM_PREEMPT) directly and return without calling sched_update_worker(). As a result, a task preempted while holding a plug with PF_BLOCK_TS set can reuse a stale plug->cur_ktime after it is scheduled back in. blk-iocost then consumes that stale timestamp through ioc_now(), producing stale vnow values for throttle decisions, and through ioc_rqos_done(), inflating on-queue time and feeding false missed-QoS samples into vrate adjustment. Move the schedule-side invalidation to finish_task_switch(), which runs for the scheduled-in task after every actual context switch regardless of which schedule entry point was used. Keep __blk_flush_plug() as the explicit flush/finish-plug invalidation path, and remove only the PF_BLOCK_TS handling from sched_update_worker(). Fixes: 06b23f92af87 ("block: update cached timestamp post schedule/preemption") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Usama Arif Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616141604.328820-3-usama.arif@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/blkdev.h | 16 ++++++---------- kernel/sched/core.c | 12 ++++++++---- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h index 59e54550a053f..47b06e53fa2cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/blkdev.h +++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h @@ -1187,16 +1187,12 @@ static inline void blk_flush_plug(struct blk_plug *plug, bool async) __blk_flush_plug(plug, async); } -/* - * tsk == current here - */ -static inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(struct task_struct *tsk) +static __always_inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(void) { - struct blk_plug *plug = tsk->plug; - - if (plug) - plug->cur_ktime = 0; - current->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS; + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_BLOCK_TS)) { + current->plug->cur_ktime = 0; + current->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS; + } } int blkdev_issue_flush(struct block_device *bdev); @@ -1222,7 +1218,7 @@ static inline void blk_flush_plug(struct blk_plug *plug, bool async) { } -static inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(struct task_struct *tsk) +static inline void blk_plug_invalidate_ts(void) { } diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 46fc94f2338e8..d089b1f211556 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -5206,6 +5206,12 @@ static struct rq *finish_task_switch(struct task_struct *prev) */ kmap_local_sched_in(); + /* + * Any cached block-layer timestamp (plug->cur_ktime) is stale now, + * invalidate it. + */ + blk_plug_invalidate_ts(); + fire_sched_in_preempt_notifiers(current); /* * When switching through a kernel thread, the loop in @@ -7000,12 +7006,10 @@ static inline void sched_submit_work(struct task_struct *tsk) static void sched_update_worker(struct task_struct *tsk) { - if (tsk->flags & (PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IO_WORKER | PF_BLOCK_TS)) { - if (tsk->flags & PF_BLOCK_TS) - blk_plug_invalidate_ts(tsk); + if (tsk->flags & (PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IO_WORKER)) { if (tsk->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER) wq_worker_running(tsk); - else if (tsk->flags & PF_IO_WORKER) + else io_wq_worker_running(tsk); } } From 1fcca1260c6e74e2279661511cdaa0aa232e4f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 17:11:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 046/607] KVM: arm64: Omit tag sync on stage-2 mappings of the zero page commit 2986a625740599fe6e7635b0586fed2a95bcd1f7 upstream. Commit f620d66af316 ("arm64: mte: Do not flag the zero page as PG_mte_tagged") removed the PG_mte_tagged flag from the zero page, but missed a KVM code path that may set this flag on the zero page when it is used in a stage-2 CoW mapping of anonymous memory. So disregard the zero page explicitly in sanitise_mte_tags(). Fixes: f620d66af316 ("arm64: mte: Do not flag the zero page as PG_mte_tagged") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.x Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c index 0d38dc72dfc62..403a635483513 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c @@ -1444,6 +1444,11 @@ static void sanitise_mte_tags(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, if (!kvm_has_mte(kvm)) return; + if (is_zero_pfn(pfn)) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(nr_pages != 1); + return; + } + if (folio_test_hugetlb(folio)) { /* Hugetlb has MTE flags set on head page only */ if (folio_try_hugetlb_mte_tagging(folio)) { From 2b7ec72786094a4f4abd9bade1170021f026c5ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 12:18:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 047/607] err.h: use __always_inline on all error pointer helpers commit 94bfc7f3b0c7c33331ba4ff6cc64ff309dfcbce8 upstream. While testing randconfig builds on s390, I came across a link failure with CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER disabled: ERROR: modpost: "dma_buf_put" [drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd.ko] undefined! The problem here is that IS_ERR() is not inlined and dead code elimination fails as a consequence. The err.h helpers all turn into a trivial assignment of a bit mask and should never result in a function call, so force them to always be inline. This should generally result in better object code aside from avoiding the link failure above. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526101851.2495110-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor Tested-by: Tamir Duberstein Cc: Alexander Gordeev Cc: Andriy Shevchenko Cc: Ansuel Smith Cc: Bjorn Andersson Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/err.h | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/err.h b/include/linux/err.h index 1d60aa86db53b..281115ff04252 100644 --- a/include/linux/err.h +++ b/include/linux/err.h @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ * * Return: A pointer with @error encoded within its value. */ -static inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error) +static __always_inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error) { return (void *) error; } @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline void * __must_check ERR_PTR(long error) * @ptr: An error pointer. * Return: The error code within @ptr. */ -static inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr) +static __always_inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr) { return (long) ptr; } @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline long __must_check PTR_ERR(__force const void *ptr) * @ptr: The pointer to check. * Return: true if @ptr is an error pointer, false otherwise. */ -static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr) +static __always_inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr) { return IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr); } @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR(__force const void *ptr) * * Like IS_ERR(), but also returns true for a null pointer. */ -static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr) +static __always_inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr) { return unlikely(!ptr) || IS_ERR_VALUE((unsigned long)ptr); } @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check IS_ERR_OR_NULL(__force const void *ptr) * Explicitly cast an error-valued pointer to another pointer type in such a * way as to make it clear that's what's going on. */ -static inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr) +static __always_inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr) { /* cast away the const */ return (void *) ptr; @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline void * __must_check ERR_CAST(__force const void *ptr) * * Return: The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise. */ -static inline int __must_check PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(__force const void *ptr) +static __always_inline int __must_check PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(__force const void *ptr) { if (IS_ERR(ptr)) return PTR_ERR(ptr); From 49d893b9cbcfc5802a32e53a64c6c6956670d65b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Khorenko Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 12:50:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 048/607] gcov: use atomic counter updates to fix concurrent access crashes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 56cb9b7d96b28a1173a510ab25354b6599ad3a33 upstream. GCC's GCOV instrumentation can merge global branch counters with loop induction variables as an optimization. In inflate_fast(), the inner copy loops get transformed so that the GCOV counter value is loaded multiple times to compute the loop base address, start index, and end bound. Since GCOV counters are global (not per-CPU), concurrent execution on different CPUs causes the counter to change between loads, producing inconsistent values and out-of-bounds memory writes. The crash manifests during IPComp (IP Payload Compression) processing when inflate_fast() runs concurrently on multiple CPUs: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd0a3c0902ffa RIP: inflate_fast+1431 Call Trace: zlib_inflate __deflate_decompress crypto_comp_decompress ipcomp_decompress [xfrm_ipcomp] ipcomp_input [xfrm_ipcomp] xfrm_input At the crash point, the compiler generated three loads from the same global GCOV counter (__gcov0.inflate_fast+216) to compute base, start, and end for an indexed loop. Another CPU modified the counter between loads, making the values inconsistent - the write went 3.4 MB past a 65 KB buffer. Add -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic to CFLAGS_GCOV at the global level in the top-level Makefile, guarded by a try-run compile test. The test compiles a minimal program with and without -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic using the full KBUILD_CFLAGS, then compares undefined symbols in the resulting object files. If prefer-atomic introduces new undefined references (such as __atomic_fetch_add_8 on i386 or __aarch64_ldadd8_relax on arm64 with outline-atomics), the flag is not added -- the kernel does not link against libatomic. On architectures where GCC inlines 64-bit atomic counter updates (x86_64, s390, ...) the test passes and the flag is enabled, preventing the compiler from merging counters with loop induction variables and fixing the observed concurrent-access crash. On architectures where the flag would introduce libatomic dependencies, it is silently omitted and behaviour is no worse than before this patch. Move the CFLAGS_GCOV block from its original position (before the arch Makefile include) to after the core KBUILD_CFLAGS assignments but before the scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins include. This placement ensures the try-run test sees arch-specific flags (-m32, -march=, -mno-outline-atomics) while avoiding GCC plugin flags (-fplugin=) that would break the test on clean builds when plugin shared objects do not yet exist. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260511105052.417187-2-khorenko@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko Tested-by: Arnd Bergmann Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter Cc: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Miguel Ojeda Cc: Mikhail Zaslonko Cc: Nathan Chancellor Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov Cc: Thomas Weißschuh Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 9c16001ccdcd1..74cbca8abc6cb 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -806,12 +806,6 @@ endif # KBUILD_EXTMOD # Defaults to vmlinux, but the arch makefile usually adds further targets all: vmlinux -CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage -ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC -CFLAGS_GCOV += -fno-tree-loop-im -endif -export CFLAGS_GCOV - # The arch Makefiles can override CC_FLAGS_FTRACE. We may also append it later. ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -pg @@ -1082,6 +1076,27 @@ endif # Ensure compilers do not transform certain loops into calls to wcslen() KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-builtin-wcslen +CFLAGS_GCOV := -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage +ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC +CFLAGS_GCOV += -fno-tree-loop-im +# Use atomic counter updates to avoid concurrent-access crashes in GCOV. +# Only enable if -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic does not introduce new +# undefined symbols (e.g. libatomic calls that the kernel cannot link). +CFLAGS_GCOV += $(call try-run,\ + echo 'long long x; void f(void){x++;}' | \ + $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -w -fprofile-arcs \ + -ftest-coverage -x c - -c -o "$$TMP.base" && \ + echo 'long long x; void f(void){x++;}' | \ + $(CC) $(KBUILD_CPPFLAGS) $(KBUILD_CFLAGS) -w -fprofile-arcs \ + -ftest-coverage -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic \ + -x c - -c -o "$$TMP" && \ + $(NM) "$$TMP.base" | grep ' U ' > "$$TMP.ubase" || true ; \ + $(NM) "$$TMP" | grep ' U ' > "$$TMP.utest" || true ; \ + cmp -s "$$TMP.ubase" "$$TMP.utest",\ + -fprofile-update=prefer-atomic) +endif +export CFLAGS_GCOV + # change __FILE__ to the relative path to the source directory ifdef building_out_of_srctree KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-fmacro-prefix-map=$(srcroot)/=) From b11c1fa32667692a2c0566e10163758e786e430c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 23:11:54 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 049/607] KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() commit cb481e59ea6cae3b7796ac1d7a22b6b24c3f3c0b upstream. The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided. Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260531024914.3712130-1-jarkko@kernel.org/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]") Reported-by: Alessandro Groppo Tested-by: Alessandro Groppo Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c index 97bc27bbf0797..ba150ee2d4a37 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c @@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par if (uparams.in_len > info.max_dec_size || uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size) return -EINVAL; + + params->out_len = info.max_enc_size; break; case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT: if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size || uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size) return -EINVAL; + + params->out_len = info.max_dec_size; break; case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN: if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size || uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size) return -EINVAL; + + params->out_len = info.max_sig_size; break; case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY: if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size || uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) return -EINVAL; + + params->out_len = info.max_sig_size; break; default: BUG(); } params->in_len = uparams.in_len; - params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */ return 0; } From 7216ce8cb12fee44e309503955bb83806b106129 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shaomin Chen Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:10:05 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 050/607] keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths commit fd15b457a86939c38aa12116adabd8ff686c5e51 upstream. A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV ================ ========================= create auth key store rka in auth key wait for helper get auth key load rka from auth key copy user payload sleep on #PF helper completed detach and free rka destroy auth key wake up use rka->target_key **USE-AFTER-FREE** Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key owning reference from revoke and destroy. [jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual concurrency scenario.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys") Reported-by: Shaomin Chen Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519144403.436694-1-eeesssooo020@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Shaomin Chen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h | 2 ++ security/keys/internal.h | 2 ++ security/keys/keyctl.c | 24 +++++++++++++++----- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h index 36b89a933310f..01e42ee5f4099 100644 --- a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h +++ b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h @@ -9,12 +9,14 @@ #define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H #include +#include /* * Authorisation record for request_key(). */ struct request_key_auth { struct rcu_head rcu; + refcount_t usage; struct key *target_key; struct key *dest_keyring; const struct cred *cred; diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 2cffa6dc82557..b7b622bc36a13 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring); +struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey); +void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka); extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index ab927a142f515..11bedca4e1c6d 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1197,9 +1197,13 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, if (!instkey) goto error; - rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; - if (rka->target_key->serial != id) + rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey); + if (!rka) { + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; goto error; + } + if (rka->target_key->serial != id) + goto error_put_rka; /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ payload = NULL; @@ -1208,7 +1212,7 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, ret = -ENOMEM; payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!payload) - goto error; + goto error_put_rka; ret = -EFAULT; if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from)) @@ -1234,6 +1238,8 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, error2: kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen); +error_put_rka: + request_key_auth_put(rka); error: return ret; } @@ -1358,15 +1364,19 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, if (!instkey) goto error; - rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; - if (rka->target_key->serial != id) + rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey); + if (!rka) { + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; goto error; + } + if (rka->target_key->serial != id) + goto error_put_rka; /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be * writable) */ ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring); if (ret < 0) - goto error; + goto error_put_rka; /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */ ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error, @@ -1379,6 +1389,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, if (ret == 0) keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL); +error_put_rka: + request_key_auth_put(rka); error: return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 8f33cd170e421..bd34317b58cc8 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t); +static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *); /* * The request-key authorisation key type definition. @@ -115,6 +116,31 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka) kfree(rka); } +/* + * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can + * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep. + */ +struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey) +{ + struct request_key_auth *rka; + + down_read(&authkey->sem); + rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey); + if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) + refcount_inc(&rka->usage); + else + rka = NULL; + up_read(&authkey->sem); + + return rka; +} + +void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka) +{ + if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage)) + call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal); +} + /* * Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions */ @@ -136,8 +162,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); + if (!rka) + return; rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL); - call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal); + request_key_auth_put(rka); } /* @@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) kenter("{%d}", key->serial); if (rka) { rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL); - call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal); + request_key_auth_put(rka); } } @@ -174,6 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op, rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); if (!rka) goto error; + refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1); rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rka->callout_info) goto error_free_rka; From ec1c9e8962555b1766d059dc02760645c2ff62ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Mike Rapoport (Microsoft)" Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 11:14:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 051/607] userfaultfd: ensure mremap_userfaultfd_fail() releases mmap_changing commit 0496a59745b0723ea74274db16fd5c8b1379b9a9 upstream. Sashiko says: mremap_userfaultfd_prep() increments ctx->mmap_changing to stall concurrent operations, but mremap_userfaultfd_fail() does not decrement it before dropping the context reference. If an mremap operation fails, ctx->mmap_changing remains elevated. This will causes subsequent userfaultfd operations like a UFFDIO_COPY to fail with -EAGAIN. Decrement ctx->mmap_changing in mremap_userfaultfd_fail(). Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260430113512.115938-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260513081416.495963-1-rppt@kernel.org Fixes: df2cc96e7701 ("userfaultfd: prevent non-cooperative events vs mcopy_atomic races") Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Cc: Al Viro Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index df18fb4534037..a67afdbbf77af 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -767,6 +767,8 @@ void mremap_userfaultfd_fail(struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx *vm_ctx) if (!ctx) return; + atomic_dec(&ctx->mmap_changing); + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&ctx->mmap_changing) < 0); userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx); } From 7e25b5e22c1f43f0d47ff487360e6aebd55d033a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zenm Chen Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 23:44:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 052/607] wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S commit f4ce0664e9f0387873b181777891741c33e19465 upstream. Add the ID 056e:400a to the table to support an additional MT7612U adapter: ELECOM WDC-867SU3S. Compile tested only. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.x Signed-off-by: Zenm Chen Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407154430.9184-1-zenmchen@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c index 96cecc576a986..427b294423d3c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mt76x2u_device_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7612) }, /* Aukey USBAC1200 - Alfa AWUS036ACM */ { USB_DEVICE(0x057c, 0x8503) }, /* Avm FRITZ!WLAN AC860 */ { USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0xb711) }, /* Edimax EW 7722 UAC */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x056e, 0x400a) }, /* ELECOM WDC-867SU3S */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7632) }, /* HC-M7662BU1 */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x2126) }, /* LiteOn WN4516R module, nonstandard USB connector */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x7600) }, /* LiteOn WN4519R module, nonstandard USB connector */ From a7cdc384c9c57506df62e7ff04058eff61bd1d0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ElXreno Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 04:39:16 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 053/607] wifi: mt76: mt7925: don't disable AP BSS when removing TDLS peer commit 37d65384aa6f9cbe45f4052b13b378af1aab3e95 upstream. On a STATION vif, removing a TDLS peer takes the mt7925_mac_sta_remove -> mt7925_mac_sta_remove_links path. The first loop in that function calls mt7925_mcu_add_bss_info(..., enable=false) for every link of the station being removed. For a non-MLO STATION vif there is exactly one link, link 0, whose bss_conf is the AP's. TDLS peers do not have their own bss_conf - they share the AP's BSS. The result is that every TDLS peer teardown sends a BSS_INFO_UPDATE with enable=0 for the AP's BSS to the firmware, which wipes the AP-side rate-control context. The connection stays associated and TX from the host still works at the negotiated rate, but the AP's downlink to us collapses to the lowest mandatory OFDM rate (HE-MCS 0 / 6 Mbit/s OFDM) and only slowly recovers as rate adaptation re-learns under sustained traffic. With brief or bursty traffic the link can stay at 6-72 Mbit/s indefinitely, requiring a manual reconnect. mt7925_mac_link_sta_remove() already guards its own mt7925_mcu_add_bss_info(..., false) call with "vif->type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && !link_sta->sta->tdls". Add the equivalent guard at the top of the cleanup loop in mt7925_mac_sta_remove_links(), above the link_sta / link_conf / mlink / mconf lookups, so TDLS peer teardown skips the loop body entirely without doing the per-link work that would just be thrown away. Verified on mt7925e by triggering Samsung-S938B auto-TDLS via iperf3 and watching iw rx bitrate after teardown: Before: rx bitrate collapses to 6.0-72.0 Mbit/s, oscillates 17/72/ 137/288/432 Mbit/s for 30+ seconds, no full recovery without a manual reassoc. After: rx bitrate stays at 1200.9 Mbit/s HE-MCS 11 NSS 2 80 MHz across the entire TDLS lifecycle. bpftrace confirms a single mt7925_mcu_add_bss_info(enable=0) call per teardown before the fix; zero such calls after. Fixes: 3878b4333602 ("wifi: mt76: mt7925: update mt7925_mac_link_sta_[add, assoc, remove] for MLO") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: ElXreno Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 bpftrace Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260506-mt7925-tdls-fixes-v2-2-46aa826ba8bb@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c index 00126f563dfd9..9a8ef3449eea1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7925/main.c @@ -1144,6 +1144,9 @@ mt7925_mac_sta_remove_links(struct mt792x_dev *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, if (vif->type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) break; + if (vif->type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && sta->tdls) + continue; + link_sta = mt792x_sta_to_link_sta(vif, sta, link_id); if (!link_sta) continue; From 40aa3c2b0cb8e34e0576fc94cc70e4e33db03c0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 13:01:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 054/607] wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding commit 8b7a26b6681922a38cd5a7829ace61f8e54df9b7 upstream. If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware, the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released. However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath11k_pci), and we get: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6231 at mm/slub.c:4368 free_large_kmalloc+0x57/0x90 Call Trace: free_large_kmalloc ath11k_dp_free ath11k_core_deinit ath11k_pci_remove ... The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing. In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in order to avoid the double free. Fixes: d5c65159f289 ("ath11k: driver for Qualcomm IEEE 802.11ax devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez Reviewed-by: Baochen Qiang Reviewed-by: Rameshkumar Sundaram Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420110130.509670-1-jtornosm@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c index 56b1a657e0b0f..68c7ef190780a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c @@ -1042,6 +1042,7 @@ void ath11k_dp_free(struct ath11k_base *ab) idr_destroy(&dp->tx_ring[i].txbuf_idr); spin_unlock_bh(&dp->tx_ring[i].tx_idr_lock); kfree(dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status); + dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status = NULL; } /* Deinit any SOC level resource */ From 0aeb4d3ff6ced464b342bca5c772e7502f3cad32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bitterblue Smith Date: Sat, 25 Apr 2026 22:32:58 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 055/607] wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor commit 83d38df6929118c3f996b9e3351c2d5014073d87 upstream. Bit 28 of double word 2 in the RX descriptor indicates if the packet is a normal 802.11 frame, or a message from the wifi firmware to the driver (Card 2 Host). Commit f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation macros") mistakenly made the driver look for this bit in double word 1, causing packet loss and Bluetooth coexistence problems. Fixes: f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation macros") Cc: Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih Link: https://patch.msgid.link/04da7398-cedb-425a-a810-5772ab10139d@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h index 1155365348f32..d5de09d75f451 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline int get_rx_desc_paggr(__le32 *__pdesc) static inline int get_rx_status_desc_rpt_sel(__le32 *__pdesc) { - return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 1), BIT(28)); + return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 2), BIT(28)); } static inline int get_rx_desc_rxmcs(__le32 *__pdesc) From 73d427d271f7af6a738feab3368460331821ab6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luka Gejak Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 16:23:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 056/607] wifi: rtw88: increase TX report timeout to fix race condition commit c80788f7c5aed8d420366b821f867a8a353d83a5 upstream. The driver expects the firmware to report TX status within 500ms. However, a timeout can be triggered when the hardware performs background scans while under TX load. During these scans, the firmware stays off-channel for periods exceeding 500ms, delaying the delivery of TX reports back to the driver. When this occurs, the purge timer fires prematurely and drops the tracking skbs from the queue. This results in the host stack interpreting the missing status as packet loss, leading to TCP window collapse. In testing with iperf3, this causes throughput to drop from ~90 Mbps to near-zero for approximately 2 seconds until the connection recovers. Increase RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT to 2500ms for RTL8723DU. This duration is sufficient to accommodate off-channel dwell time during full background scans, ensuring the purge timer only trips during genuine firmware lockups and preventing unnecessary TCP retransmission cycles. Fixes: a82dfd33d123 ("wifi: rtw88: Add common USB chip support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih Tested-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518142311.10328-1-luka.gejak@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c index 2ab440cb2d67b..9e24741b2cb15 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/tx.c @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ void rtw_tx_report_purge_timer(struct timer_list *t) void rtw_tx_report_enqueue(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 sn) { struct rtw_tx_report *tx_report = &rtwdev->tx_report; + unsigned long timeout = RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT; unsigned long flags; u8 *drv_data; @@ -207,7 +208,11 @@ void rtw_tx_report_enqueue(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, struct sk_buff *skb, u8 sn) __skb_queue_tail(&tx_report->queue, skb); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tx_report->q_lock, flags); - mod_timer(&tx_report->purge_timer, jiffies + RTW_TX_PROBE_TIMEOUT); + if (rtwdev->chip->id == RTW_CHIP_TYPE_8723D && + rtwdev->hci.type == RTW_HCI_TYPE_USB) + timeout = msecs_to_jiffies(2500); + + mod_timer(&tx_report->purge_timer, jiffies + timeout); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtw_tx_report_enqueue); From 200d58c851b8f63f77a05570072dd20f79bc3681 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luka Gejak Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 16:23:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 057/607] wifi: rtw88: usb: fix memory leaks on USB write failures commit 6b964941bbfe6e0f18b1a5e008486dbb62df440a upstream. When rtw_usb_write_port() fails to submit a USB Request Block (URB) (e.g., due to device disconnect or ENOMEM), the completion callback is never executed. Currently, the driver ignores the return value of rtw_usb_write_port() in rtw_usb_write_data() and rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Because these functions rely on the completion callback to free the socket buffers (skbs) and the transaction control block (txcb), a submission failure results in: 1. A memory leak of the allocated skb in rtw_usb_write_data(). 2. A memory leak of the txcb structure and all aggregated skbs in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). Fix this by checking the return value of rtw_usb_write_port(). If it fails, explicitly free the skb in rtw_usb_write_data(), and properly purge the tx_ack_queue and free the txcb in rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(). The issue was discovered in practice during device disconnect/reconnect scenarios and memory pressure conditions. Tested by verifying normal TX operation continues after the fix without regressions. Fixes: a82dfd33d123 ("wifi: rtw88: Add common USB chip support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih Tested-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518142311.10328-2-luka.gejak@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c index 6e841a11c752b..c7f723c084338 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/usb.c @@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ static bool rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(struct rtw_usb *rtwusb, struct sk_buff_head *list int agg_num = 0; unsigned int align_next = 0; u8 qsel; + int ret; if (skb_queue_empty(list)) return false; @@ -456,7 +457,13 @@ static bool rtw_usb_tx_agg_skb(struct rtw_usb *rtwusb, struct sk_buff_head *list tx_desc = (struct rtw_tx_desc *)skb_head->data; qsel = le32_get_bits(tx_desc->w1, RTW_TX_DESC_W1_QSEL); - rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb_head, rtw_usb_write_port_tx_complete, txcb); + ret = rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb_head, + rtw_usb_write_port_tx_complete, txcb); + if (ret) { + ieee80211_purge_tx_queue(rtwdev->hw, &txcb->tx_ack_queue); + kfree(txcb); + return false; + } return true; } @@ -518,8 +525,10 @@ static int rtw_usb_write_data(struct rtw_dev *rtwdev, ret = rtw_usb_write_port(rtwdev, qsel, skb, rtw_usb_write_port_complete, skb); - if (unlikely(ret)) + if (unlikely(ret)) { rtw_err(rtwdev, "failed to do USB write, ret=%d\n", ret); + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + } return ret; } From df626f284cb90b2566bd296d04e134a55c8d3012 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junjie Cao Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2026 20:50:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 058/607] wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: fix race condition in PTP removal commit 65150c9cc3e06ab54bc4e8134a47f6f5d095a4e3 upstream. iwl_mvm_ptp_remove() calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() only after ptp_clock_unregister() and clearing ptp_data state (ptp_clock, ptp_clock_info, last_gp2). This creates a race where the delayed work iwl_mvm_ptp_work() can execute between ptp_clock_unregister() and cancel_delayed_work_sync(), observing partially cleared PTP state. Move cancel_delayed_work_sync() before ptp_clock_unregister() to ensure the delayed work is fully stopped before any PTP cleanup begins. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260212125035.1345718-1-junjie.cao@intel.com Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c index ad156b82eaa94..efb291ceb0e58 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/ptp.c @@ -323,11 +323,11 @@ void iwl_mvm_ptp_remove(struct iwl_mvm *mvm) mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info.name, ptp_clock_index(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock)); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mvm->ptp_data.dwork); ptp_clock_unregister(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock); mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock = NULL; memset(&mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info, 0, sizeof(mvm->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info)); mvm->ptp_data.last_gp2 = 0; - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mvm->ptp_data.dwork); } } From b0b07e04f0c7219bd1a3eb15e22bdf9109f0d393 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junjie Cao Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2026 20:50:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 059/607] wifi: iwlwifi: mld: fix race condition in PTP removal commit e1fc08598aa34b28359831e768076f56632720c1 upstream. iwl_mld_ptp_remove() calls cancel_delayed_work_sync() only after ptp_clock_unregister() and clearing ptp_data state (ptp_clock, last_gp2, wrap_counter). This creates a race where the delayed work iwl_mld_ptp_work() can execute between ptp_clock_unregister() and cancel_delayed_work_sync(), observing partially cleared PTP state. Move cancel_delayed_work_sync() before ptp_clock_unregister() to ensure the delayed work is fully stopped before any PTP cleanup begins. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Reviewed-by: Vadim Fedorenko Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260212125035.1345718-2-junjie.cao@intel.com Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/ptp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/ptp.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/ptp.c index 231920425c066..b40182320801d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/ptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/ptp.c @@ -319,10 +319,10 @@ void iwl_mld_ptp_remove(struct iwl_mld *mld) mld->ptp_data.ptp_clock_info.name, ptp_clock_index(mld->ptp_data.ptp_clock)); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mld->ptp_data.dwork); ptp_clock_unregister(mld->ptp_data.ptp_clock); mld->ptp_data.ptp_clock = NULL; mld->ptp_data.last_gp2 = 0; mld->ptp_data.wrap_counter = 0; - cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mld->ptp_data.dwork); } } From 1de92789ce31e46fa7e7d8e89c90b19cdb1c103b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junrui Luo Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2026 14:48:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 060/607] wifi: iwlwifi: mld: validate sta_mask before ffs() in BA session handlers commit f056fc2b927448d37eca6b6cacc3d1b0f67b20d2 upstream. Three BA session handlers use ffs(ba_data->sta_mask) - 1 to derive a station ID without checking that sta_mask is non-zero. When sta_mask is zero, ffs() returns 0 and the subtraction wraps to 0xFFFFFFFF, causing an out-of-bounds access on fw_id_to_link_sta[]. Add WARN_ON_ONCE(!ba_data->sta_mask) guards before each ffs() call, consistent with the existing check in iwl_mld_ampdu_rx_start(). Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo Link: https://patch.msgid.link/SYBPR01MB788115C6CE873271A9A15A25AF51A@SYBPR01MB7881.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/agg.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/agg.c b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/agg.c index 3bf36f8f68742..e3627ad0321c8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/agg.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/agg.c @@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ static void iwl_mld_release_frames_from_notif(struct iwl_mld *mld, } /* pick any STA ID to find the pointer */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ba_data->sta_mask)) + goto out_unlock; + sta_id = ffs(ba_data->sta_mask) - 1; link_sta = rcu_dereference(mld->fw_id_to_link_sta[sta_id]); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(link_sta) || !link_sta->sta)) @@ -166,6 +169,9 @@ void iwl_mld_del_ba(struct iwl_mld *mld, int queue, goto out_unlock; /* pick any STA ID to find the pointer */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ba_data->sta_mask)) + goto out_unlock; + sta_id = ffs(ba_data->sta_mask) - 1; link_sta = rcu_dereference(mld->fw_id_to_link_sta[sta_id]); if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR_OR_NULL(link_sta) || !link_sta->sta)) @@ -347,6 +353,9 @@ static void iwl_mld_rx_agg_session_expired(struct timer_list *t) } /* timer expired, pick any STA ID to find the pointer */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ba_data->sta_mask)) + goto unlock; + sta_id = ffs(ba_data->sta_mask) - 1; link_sta = rcu_dereference(ba_data->mld->fw_id_to_link_sta[sta_id]); From 1e48fefac682c5ee133add84d1f06d458fedf635 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenjie Qi Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 20:07:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 061/607] f2fs: pass correct iostat type for single node writes commit fcb05c26c2a67953b420739b85f49386efc9b6c0 upstream. f2fs_write_single_node_folio() takes an io_type argument, but still passes FS_GC_NODE_IO to __write_node_folio() unconditionally. This was harmless while the helper was only used by f2fs_move_node_folio(), whose caller passes FS_GC_NODE_IO. However, commit fe9b8b30b971 ("f2fs: fix inline data not being written to disk in writeback path") made f2fs_inline_data_fiemap() call the helper with FS_NODE_IO for FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC. Honor the caller supplied io_type so inline-data FIEMAP sync writeback is accounted as normal node IO instead of GC node IO, while the GC path continues to pass FS_GC_NODE_IO explicitly. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: fe9b8b30b971 ("f2fs: fix inline data not being written to disk in writeback path") Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/node.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c index ca3dad7418b26..feb152c21d2eb 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/node.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c @@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ int f2fs_write_single_node_folio(struct folio *node_folio, int sync_mode, } if (!__write_node_folio(node_folio, false, false, NULL, - &wbc, false, FS_GC_NODE_IO, NULL)) + &wbc, false, io_type, NULL)) err = -EAGAIN; goto release_folio; out_folio: From 8aad54746c251f2c2370118df766c0c82e2d2091 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenjie Qi Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 13:35:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 062/607] f2fs: validate orphan inode entry count commit 846c499a65816d13f1186e3090e825e8bb8bcb8b upstream. f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes() trusts the orphan block entry_count when replaying orphan inodes from the checkpoint pack. A corrupted entry_count larger than F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK makes the recovery loop read past the ino[] array and interpret footer or following data as inode numbers. On a crafted image, mounting an unpatched kernel can drive orphan recovery into f2fs_bug_on() and panic the kernel. Validate entry_count before consuming entries so corrupted checkpoint data fails the mount with -EFSCORRUPTED and requests fsck instead. Set ERROR_INCONSISTENT_ORPHAN as well, so the corruption reason can be recorded in the superblock s_errors[] field. This gives fsck a persistent hint even though mount-time orphan recovery failure may leave no chance to persist SBI_NEED_FSCK through a checkpoint. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 127e670abfa7 ("f2fs: add checkpoint operations") Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 14 +++++++++++++- include/linux/f2fs_fs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c index bbe07e3a6c75a..c27509d4b6ef4 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c @@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ int f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) for (i = 0; i < orphan_blocks; i++) { struct folio *folio; struct f2fs_orphan_block *orphan_blk; + unsigned int entry_count; folio = f2fs_get_meta_folio(sbi, start_blk + i); if (IS_ERR(folio)) { @@ -753,7 +754,18 @@ int f2fs_recover_orphan_inodes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) } orphan_blk = folio_address(folio); - for (j = 0; j < le32_to_cpu(orphan_blk->entry_count); j++) { + entry_count = le32_to_cpu(orphan_blk->entry_count); + if (entry_count > F2FS_ORPHANS_PER_BLOCK) { + f2fs_err(sbi, "invalid orphan inode entry count %u", + entry_count); + set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_FSCK); + f2fs_handle_error(sbi, ERROR_INCONSISTENT_ORPHAN); + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); + goto out; + } + + for (j = 0; j < entry_count; j++) { nid_t ino = le32_to_cpu(orphan_blk->ino[j]); err = recover_orphan_inode(sbi, ino); diff --git a/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h b/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h index dc41722fcc9dd..81c309b27467e 100644 --- a/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ enum f2fs_error { ERROR_CORRUPTED_XATTR, ERROR_INVALID_NODE_REFERENCE, ERROR_INCONSISTENT_NAT, + ERROR_INCONSISTENT_ORPHAN, ERROR_MAX, }; From 77f216ff9ce5cde8eed9f6d12707e906dffdc9f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenjie Qi Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 11:16:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 063/607] f2fs: validate compress cache inode only when enabled commit 5073c66a96a9c23c0c2533ed4ed06e42f9021208 upstream. F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() uses NM_I(sbi)->max_nid as the synthetic inode number for the compressed page cache inode. That inode only exists when the compress_cache mount option is enabled. When compress_cache is disabled, max_nid is outside the valid inode range. A corrupted directory entry that points to ino == max_nid should therefore be rejected by f2fs_check_nid_range(). However, is_meta_ino() currently treats F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() as a meta inode unconditionally, so f2fs_iget() bypasses do_read_inode() and its nid range check, and instantiates a fake internal inode instead. Gate the compressed cache inode case on COMPRESS_CACHE, matching f2fs_init_compress_inode(). With compress_cache disabled, ino == max_nid now follows the normal inode path and is rejected as an out-of-range nid. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 6ce19aff0b8c ("f2fs: compress: add compress_inode to cache compressed blocks") Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 49470f4c9362a..171cd4172025f 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -555,8 +555,13 @@ static int do_read_inode(struct inode *inode) static bool is_meta_ino(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned int ino) { - return ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi) || - ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi); + if (ino == F2FS_NODE_INO(sbi) || ino == F2FS_META_INO(sbi)) + return true; +#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION + if (test_opt(sbi, COMPRESS_CACHE) && ino == F2FS_COMPRESS_INO(sbi)) + return true; +#endif + return false; } struct inode *f2fs_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) From 888d94cc9afbf1b81b76be1c783c3d9f8f338904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sunmin Jeong Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 14:28:17 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 064/607] f2fs: fix to round down start offset of fallocate for pin file commit 4275b59673eb60b02eec3997816c83f1f4b909c4 upstream. Currently, the length of fallocate for pin file is section-aligned to keep allocated sections from being selected as victims of GC. However, for the case that the start offset of fallocate is not aligned in section, the allocated sections can't be fully utilized. It's because a new section is allocated by f2fs_allocate_pinning_section() after using blks_per_sec blocks regardless of the start offset. As a result, several unexpected dirty segments may be created, including blocks assigned to the pinned file. To address this issue, let's round down the start offset of fallocate to the length of section. The reproducing scenario is as below chunk=$(((2<<20)+4096)) # 2MB + 4KB touch test f2fs_io pinfile set test f2fs_io fallocate 0 0 $chunk test f2fs_io fallocate 0 $chunk $chunk test f2fs_io fallocate 0 $((chunk*2)) $chunk test f2fs_io fiemap 0 $((chunk*3)) test Fiemap: offset = 0 len = 12288 logical addr. physical addr. length flags 0 0000000000000000 000000068c600000 0000000000400000 00001088 1 0000000000400000 000000003d400000 0000000000001000 00001088 2 0000000000401000 00000003eb200000 0000000000200000 00001088 3 0000000000601000 00000005e4200000 0000000000001000 00001088 4 0000000000602000 0000000605400000 0000000000200000 00001089 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f5a53edcf01e ("f2fs: support aligned pinned file") Reviewed-by: Yunji Kang Reviewed-by: Yeongjin Gil Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo Signed-off-by: Sunmin Jeong Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/file.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c index 6d42e2d28861c..271221485d66a 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/file.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c @@ -1895,8 +1895,15 @@ static int f2fs_expand_inode_data(struct inode *inode, loff_t offset, if (f2fs_is_pinned_file(inode)) { block_t sec_blks = CAP_BLKS_PER_SEC(sbi); - block_t sec_len = roundup(map.m_len, sec_blks); + block_t sec_len; + if (map.m_lblk % sec_blks) { + map.m_lblk = rounddown(map.m_lblk, sec_blks); + map.m_len = pg_end - map.m_lblk; + if (off_end) + map.m_len++; + } + sec_len = roundup(map.m_len, sec_blks); map.m_len = sec_blks; next_alloc: f2fs_down_write(&sbi->pin_sem); From ff83de56882cb8466184d322abece2589258ca56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Cen Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 15:19:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 065/607] f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk() commit c4810ada31e80cbe4011467c4f3b1e93f94134f3 upstream. f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk() then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits. Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return -EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968) Read of size 4 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169) __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?) vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?) do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?) do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?) filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?) do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?) path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?) lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?) cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?) lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?) trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?) _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/acl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/acl.c b/fs/f2fs/acl.c index d4d7f329d23f4..4d735c2a7d0b7 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/acl.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/acl.c @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static inline int f2fs_acl_count(size_t size) static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) { int i, count; + int err = -EINVAL; struct posix_acl *acl; struct f2fs_acl_header *hdr = (struct f2fs_acl_header *)value; struct f2fs_acl_entry *entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)(hdr + 1); @@ -69,8 +70,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - if ((char *)entry > end) + if (unlikely((char *)entry + + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)) { + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; goto fail; + } acl->a_entries[i].e_tag = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag); acl->a_entries[i].e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm); @@ -85,6 +89,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) break; case ACL_USER: + if (unlikely((char *)entry + + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) { + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto fail; + } acl->a_entries[i].e_uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id)); @@ -92,6 +101,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry)); break; case ACL_GROUP: + if (unlikely((char *)entry + + sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) { + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto fail; + } acl->a_entries[i].e_gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id)); @@ -107,7 +121,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size) return acl; fail: posix_acl_release(acl); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + return ERR_PTR(err); } static void *f2fs_acl_to_disk(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, From 20190e498057997532c7f186d081011f18e0a462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yongpeng Yang Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 21:10:51 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 066/607] f2fs: fix incorrect FI_NO_EXTENT handling in __destroy_extent_node() commit 1f70ddb28a3c71df124da5fa4040c808116d6bb9 upstream. When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward, the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the following error in xfstests generic/388: F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache. This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero check of et->node_cnt. Fixes: ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chao Yu Suggested-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c index 87169fd29d897..129eed892a66f 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/extent_cache.c @@ -119,10 +119,9 @@ static bool __may_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, enum extent_type type) if (!__init_may_extent_tree(inode, type)) return false; - if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) - return false; - if (type == EX_READ) { + if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) + return false; if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_COMPRESSED_FILE) && !f2fs_sb_has_readonly(F2FS_I_SB(inode))) return false; @@ -645,14 +644,10 @@ static unsigned int __destroy_extent_node(struct inode *inode, while (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt)) { write_lock(&et->lock); - if (!is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) - set_inode_flag(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT); node_cnt += __free_extent_tree(sbi, et, nr_shrink); write_unlock(&et->lock); } - f2fs_bug_on(sbi, atomic_read(&et->node_cnt)); - return node_cnt; } @@ -691,12 +686,12 @@ static void __update_extent_tree_range(struct inode *inode, write_lock(&et->lock); - if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) { - write_unlock(&et->lock); - return; - } - if (type == EX_READ) { + if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_EXTENT)) { + write_unlock(&et->lock); + return; + } + prev = et->largest; dei.len = 0; From db2c5b9fb908715cab9976ee5966c8493ead34bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wenjie Qi Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:06:28 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 067/607] f2fs: keep atomic write retry from zeroing original data commit 6d874b65aadce56ac78f76129dbcfc2599b638f8 upstream. A partial atomic write reserves a block in the COW inode before reading the original data page for the untouched bytes in that page. If that read fails, write_begin returns an error but leaves the COW inode entry as NEW_ADDR. A retry of the same partial write then finds the COW entry, treats it as existing COW data, and f2fs_write_begin() zeroes the whole folio because blkaddr is NEW_ADDR. If the retry is committed, the bytes outside the retried write range are committed as zeroes instead of preserving the original file contents. Only use the COW inode as the read source when it already has a real data block. If the COW entry is still NEW_ADDR, treat it as a reservation to reuse: keep reading the old data from the original inode and avoid reserving or accounting the same atomic block again. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 3db1de0e582c ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way") Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/data.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index f468cba89f303..89105b22a0243 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -3537,6 +3537,7 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, pgoff_t index = folio->index; int err = 0; block_t ori_blk_addr = NULL_ADDR; + bool cow_has_reserved_block = false; /* If pos is beyond the end of file, reserve a new block in COW inode */ if ((pos & PAGE_MASK) >= i_size_read(inode)) @@ -3546,9 +3547,11 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, err = __find_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr); if (err) { return err; - } else if (*blk_addr != NULL_ADDR) { + } else if (__is_valid_data_blkaddr(*blk_addr)) { *use_cow = true; return 0; + } else if (*blk_addr == NEW_ADDR) { + cow_has_reserved_block = true; } if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_ATOMIC_REPLACE)) @@ -3561,10 +3564,13 @@ static int prepare_atomic_write_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, reserve_block: /* Finally, we should reserve a new block in COW inode for the update */ - err = __reserve_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr, node_changed); - if (err) - return err; - inc_atomic_write_cnt(inode); + if (!cow_has_reserved_block) { + err = __reserve_data_block(cow_inode, index, blk_addr, + node_changed); + if (err) + return err; + inc_atomic_write_cnt(inode); + } if (ori_blk_addr != NULL_ADDR) *blk_addr = ori_blk_addr; From 3804e6de30ae7b053d53341d9d6944356cf23b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Denis Arefev Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 10:28:56 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 068/607] block: Avoid mounting the bdev pseudo-filesystem in userspace commit f73aa66dffcb8e61e78f01b56163ec16a15d06d2 upstream. The bdev pseudo-filesystem is an internal kernel filesystem with which userspace should not interfere. Unregister it so that userspace cannot even attempt to mount it. This fixes a bug [1] that occurs when attempting to access files, because the system call move_mount() uses pointers declared in the inode_operations structure, which for the bdev pseudo-filesystem are always equal to 0. `inode->i_op = &empty_iops;` [1] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 23380067 P4D 23380067 PUD 23381067 PMD 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 17125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.155-syzkaller-00350-g84221fde2681 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: lookup_open.isra.0+0x700/0x1180 fs/namei.c:3460 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3550 [inline] path_openat+0x953/0x2700 fs/namei.c:3780 do_filp_open+0x1c5/0x410 fs/namei.c:3810 do_sys_openat2+0x171/0x4d0 fs/open.c:1318 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1334 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1350 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1f0 fs/open.c:1345 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20131010004732.GJ13318@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/T/# Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521072857.5078-1-arefev@swemel.ru Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bdev.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c index 638f0cd458ae4..57e78692084b1 100644 --- a/block/bdev.c +++ b/block/bdev.c @@ -438,15 +438,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blockdev_superblock); void __init bdev_cache_init(void) { - int err; - bdev_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bdev_cache", sizeof(struct bdev_inode), 0, (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT| SLAB_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC), init_once); - err = register_filesystem(&bd_type); - if (err) - panic("Cannot register bdev pseudo-fs"); blockdev_mnt = kern_mount(&bd_type); if (IS_ERR(blockdev_mnt)) panic("Cannot create bdev pseudo-fs"); From 65bd0c0afb0e1bf3287458e342429b069624f7d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dawei Feng Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 18:53:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 069/607] bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream. proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory. Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc allocations. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1-rc5. Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1 check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to /proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510 ... Call Trace: ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30 __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30 ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870 ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480 ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120 vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000 ... With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports. Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen Acked-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index 248f517d66d04..159e29e809362 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -1940,7 +1940,7 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(struct ctl_table_header *head, kfree(ctx.cur_val); if (ret == 1 && ctx.new_updated) { - kfree(*buf); + kvfree(*buf); *buf = ctx.new_val; *pcount = ctx.new_len; } else { From 6e61fc2e06e44b6d30248cc5bc47a58e75c2b43e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 23:42:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 070/607] MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS commit 7fb13fd35110ebe95eb053faf79d018f51144d85 upstream. In 64-bit configurations calling the initial console output handler from a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment and consequently so has been the buffer allocated there that is used as the argument corresponding to the `%s' output conversion specifier for the firmware's printf() entry point. This 64-bit address will then be truncated by 32-bit firmware, resulting in an attempt to access the wrong memory location, which in turn will cause all kinds of unpredictable behaviour, such as a kernel crash: Console: colour dummy device 160x64 Calibrating delay loop... 49.36 BogoMIPS (lpj=192512) pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301 CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000000203bd00, epc == ffffffffbfc08364, ra == ffffffffbfc08800 Oops[#1]: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00254-gfb649bda6f56-dirty #121 $ 0 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000023 ffffffff80684ba0 $ 4 : 000000000203bd00 ffffffffbfc0f3b4 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000073 $ 8 : 0a303d7469000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000073 ffffffffbfc0f473 $12 : 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffff80684c1c 0000000000000000 $16 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff80596dc9 0000000000000000 ffffffffbfc09240 $20 : ffffffff80684c40 ffffffffbfc0f400 000000000000002d 000000000000002b $24 : ffffffffffffffbf 000000000203bd00 $28 : ffffffff805f0000 ffffffff80684b58 0000000000000030 ffffffffbfc08800 Hi : 0000000000000000 Lo : 0000000000000aa8 epc : ffffffffbfc08364 0xffffffffbfc08364 ra : ffffffffbfc08800 0xffffffffbfc08800 Status: 140120e2 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02) BadVA : 000000000203bd00 PrId : 00000430 (R4000SC) Modules linked in: Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000) Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000004d0000004d 80684cc0806a2a40 80596dc80000004d 8061000000000000 bfc0850c80684c38 0000000000000000 000000000203bd00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000bfc0f3b4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000002500000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 802c1a7400000000 0203bd0080596dc8 0203bd4d69000000 6c61632000000018 5f746567646e6172 6c616320625f6d6f 5f736e5f6d6f7266 206361323778302b 303d74696e726320 806a0a38806b0000 806a0a38806b0000 00000000806b0000 80683c58806b0000 ... Call Trace: Code: a082ffff 03e00008 00601021 <80820000> 00001821 10400005 24840001 80820000 24630001 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt KN04 V2.1k (PC: 0xa0026768, SP: 0x806848e8) >> In this case the pointer in $4 was truncated from 0x980000000203bd00 to 0x000000000203bd00. This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used late into bootstrap or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been started. Fix the issue by making the buffer static and initdata, and therefore placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that the console output handler is called with the console lock held, implying no need for this code to be reentrant. Add an assertion to verify the buffer actually has been placed in a compatibility segment. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+ Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c b/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c index 31a8441d84314..b4f0dba3fa20e 100644 --- a/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c +++ b/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c @@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ /* * DECstation PROM-based early console support. * - * Copyright (C) 2004, 2007 Maciej W. Rozycki + * Copyright (C) 2004, 2007, 2026 Maciej W. Rozycki */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -14,9 +15,11 @@ static void __init prom_console_write(struct console *con, const char *s, unsigned int c) { - char buf[81]; + static char buf[81] __initdata = { 0 }; unsigned int chunk = sizeof(buf) - 1; + BUG_ON((long)buf != (int)(long)buf); + while (c > 0) { if (chunk > c) chunk = c; From adfacfbaeae2cb760f492357cc36b41f84ef7f86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Wed, 22 Apr 2026 11:58:44 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 071/607] exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry() commit 3f5f8ee9917cc2b9076ac533492d8a200edcabb8 upstream. In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points into bh->b_data): brelse(bh); if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) { ... len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); ... } After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in exfat_load_upcase_table()"). Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on each branch. Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y + CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image (long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path). With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the unpatched kernel faults: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0 With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim. Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/exfat/dir.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/exfat/dir.c b/fs/exfat/dir.c index 7229146fe2bf6..97f2ff87220fe 100644 --- a/fs/exfat/dir.c +++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c @@ -1081,12 +1081,12 @@ int exfat_find_dir_entry(struct super_block *sb, struct exfat_inode_info *ei, continue; } - brelse(bh); if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) { unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar; if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME || name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { + brelse(bh); step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE; continue; } @@ -1097,6 +1097,7 @@ int exfat_find_dir_entry(struct super_block *sb, struct exfat_inode_info *ei, uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); + brelse(bh); name_len += len; unichar = *(uniname+len); @@ -1115,6 +1116,7 @@ int exfat_find_dir_entry(struct super_block *sb, struct exfat_inode_info *ei, continue; } + brelse(bh); if (entry_type & (TYPE_CRITICAL_SEC | TYPE_BENIGN_SEC)) { if (step == DIRENT_STEP_SECD) { From 18587f9831612e24cd8f24be1ec15478feff7abc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 09:34:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 072/607] KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level commit ef057cbf825e03b63f6edf5980f96abf3c53089d upstream. When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before* querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot. When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct" shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case. When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page with a hugepage. But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm] Call Trace: kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm] kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full range would be a dubious micro-optimization. Fixes: 9eba50f8d7fc ("KVM: x86/mmu: Consult max mapping level when zapping collapsible SPTEs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Matlack Cc: James Houghton Cc: Alexander Bulekov Cc: Fred Griffoul Cc: Alexander Graf Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Filippo Sironi Cc: Ivan Orlov Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c index 541e199feb998..eadeca9786f6f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c @@ -7181,13 +7181,19 @@ static bool kvm_mmu_zap_collapsible_spte(struct kvm *kvm, sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep); /* - * We cannot do huge page mapping for indirect shadow pages, - * which are found on the last rmap (level = 1) when not using - * tdp; such shadow pages are synced with the page table in - * the guest, and the guest page table is using 4K page size - * mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1. + * Direct shadow page can be replaced by a hugepage if the host + * mapping level allows it and the memslot maps all of the host + * hugepage. Note! If the memslot maps only part of the + * hugepage, sp->gfn may be below slot->base_gfn, and querying + * the max mapping level would cause an out-of-bounds lpage_info + * access. So the gfn bounds check *must* be done first. + * + * Indirect shadow pages are created when the guest page tables + * are using 4K pages. Since the host mapping is always + * constrained by the page size in the guest, indirect shadow + * pages are never collapsible. */ - if (sp->role.direct && + if (sp->role.direct && is_gfn_in_memslot(slot, sp->gfn) && sp->role.level < kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, NULL, slot, sp->gfn)) { kvm_zap_one_rmap_spte(kvm, rmap_head, sptep); diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h index 398e5695dc076..3c4e2401de072 100644 --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h @@ -1793,6 +1793,11 @@ void kvm_unregister_irq_ack_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irq_ack_notifier *kian); bool kvm_arch_irqfd_allowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_irqfd *args); +static inline bool is_gfn_in_memslot(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) +{ + return gfn >= slot->base_gfn && gfn < slot->base_gfn + slot->npages; +} + /* * Returns a pointer to the memslot if it contains gfn. * Otherwise returns NULL. @@ -1803,7 +1808,7 @@ try_get_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn) if (!slot) return NULL; - if (gfn >= slot->base_gfn && gfn < slot->base_gfn + slot->npages) + if (is_gfn_in_memslot(slot, gfn)) return slot; else return NULL; From 5da9b1a87ec7cc3489c27016313524769f12d9e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 15:52:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 073/607] KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned() commit f1edbed787ba67988ed34e0132ca128b052b6ce8 upstream. Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned accesses. For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory, and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with appropriate offsets). If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the store as a potential ioeventfd signal. Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using &dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being 32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires. E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8, all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON() fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm] Call Trace: __kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm] kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm] vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm] emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm] x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0. Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice, dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C, e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y. Fixes: d34e6b175e61 ("KVM: add ioeventfd support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-ID: <20260612225241.678509-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- virt/kvm/eventfd.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/virt/kvm/eventfd.c b/virt/kvm/eventfd.c index 1a64266341b19..5bf90affcbb73 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/eventfd.c +++ b/virt/kvm/eventfd.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -780,21 +781,18 @@ ioeventfd_in_range(struct _ioeventfd *p, gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val) return true; /* otherwise, we have to actually compare the data */ - - BUG_ON(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)val, len)); - switch (len) { case 1: - _val = *(u8 *)val; + _val = get_unaligned((u8 *)val); break; case 2: - _val = *(u16 *)val; + _val = get_unaligned((u16 *)val); break; case 4: - _val = *(u32 *)val; + _val = get_unaligned((u32 *)val); break; case 8: - _val = *(u64 *)val; + _val = get_unaligned((u64 *)val); break; default: return false; From 8d8507a457667f23477a15496b91908a5b5b7cf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sam James Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 08:56:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 074/607] crypto: nx - fix nx_crypto_ctx_exit argument commit 4e67f504ee9ded15e256b64f4fde150e917381d7 upstream. nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit calls nx_crypto_ctx_exit with crypto_shash_ctx(...) but crypto_shash_ctx gives a nx_crypto_ctx *, not a crypto_tfm *. Fix the type in nx_crypto_ctx_exit and drop the bogus crypto_tfm_ctx call. This fixes the following oops: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc0403effffffffc8 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000396cb4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#15] Call Trace: nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit+0x24/0x60 crypto_shash_exit_tfm+0x28/0x40 crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140 crypto_exit_ahash_using_shash+0x20/0x40 crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140 hash_release+0x1c/0x30 alg_sock_destruct+0x38/0x60 __sk_destruct+0x48/0x2b0 af_alg_release+0x58/0xb0 __sock_release+0x68/0x150 sock_close+0x20/0x40 __fput+0x110/0x3a0 sys_close+0x48/0xa0 system_call_exception+0x140/0x2d0 system_call_common+0xf4/0x258 .. which came from hardlink(1) opportunistically using AF_ALG. The same problem exists with nx_crypto_ctx_skcipher_exit getting a context it wasn't expecting, but apparently nobody hit that for years. Cc: Eric Biggers Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bfd9efddf990 ("crypto: nx - convert AES-ECB to skcipher API") Fixes: 9420e628e7d8 ("crypto: nx - Use API partial block handling") Acked-by: Breno Leitao Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reported-by: Calvin Buckley Tested-by: Calvin Buckley Suggested-by: Brad Spengler Signed-off-by: Sam James Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c | 6 ++---- drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c index 78135fb13f5c2..1b7509e2ce443 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.c @@ -714,15 +714,13 @@ int nx_crypto_ctx_aes_xcbc_init(struct crypto_shash *tfm) /** * nx_crypto_ctx_exit - destroy a crypto api context * - * @tfm: the crypto transform pointer for the context + * @nx_ctx: the crypto api context * * As crypto API contexts are destroyed, this exit hook is called to free the * memory associated with it. */ -void nx_crypto_ctx_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +void nx_crypto_ctx_exit(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx) { - struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - kfree_sensitive(nx_ctx->kmem); nx_ctx->csbcpb = NULL; nx_ctx->csbcpb_aead = NULL; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h index 36974f08490a9..6dfabfbf8192c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx.h @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ int nx_crypto_ctx_aes_ctr_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm); int nx_crypto_ctx_aes_cbc_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm); int nx_crypto_ctx_aes_ecb_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm); int nx_crypto_ctx_sha_init(struct crypto_shash *tfm); -void nx_crypto_ctx_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm); +void nx_crypto_ctx_exit(struct nx_crypto_ctx *nx_ctx); void nx_crypto_ctx_skcipher_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm); void nx_crypto_ctx_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm); void nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit(struct crypto_shash *tfm); From b85ef03f726b15047a6fa6d11b639bdf6c0ee4f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tristan Madani Date: Fri, 1 May 2026 11:02:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 075/607] gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc commit f9c9ec2c319f843b70ecdf939d48b52d189bc081 upstream. gfs2_qd_dealloc(), called as an RCU callback from gfs2_qd_dispose(), accesses the superblock object sdp through qd->qd_sbd after freeing qd. It does so to decrement sd_quota_count and wake up sd_kill_wait. However, by the time the RCU callback runs, gfs2_put_super() may have already freed sdp via free_sbd(). This can happen when gfs2_quota_cleanup() is called during unmount: it disposes of quota objects via call_rcu() and then waits on sd_kill_wait with a 60-second timeout. If the timeout expires, or if gfs2_gl_hash_clear() triggers additional qd_put() calls that schedule more RCU callbacks after the wait completes, gfs2_put_super() will proceed to free the superblock while RCU callbacks referencing it are still pending. Add an rcu_barrier() before free_sbd() in gfs2_put_super() to ensure all pending RCU callbacks (including gfs2_qd_dealloc) have completed before the superblock is freed. Fixes: a475c5dd16e5 ("gfs2: Free quota data objects synchronously") Reported-by: syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a37bf8045847d8f9d2 Tested-by: syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/gfs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/gfs2/super.c b/fs/gfs2/super.c index 54c6f2098f01e..7b5fcd78a3a1a 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/super.c @@ -640,6 +640,7 @@ static void gfs2_put_super(struct super_block *sb) gfs2_delete_debugfs_file(sdp); gfs2_sys_fs_del(sdp); + rcu_barrier(); free_sbd(sdp); } From e91df6d273445c03f5aa302bfe147eda33d45794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 15:10:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 076/607] pwrseq: core: fix use-after-free in pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next() commit 257595adf9dac15ae1edd9d07753fbc576a7583d upstream. pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next() declares 'next' with __free(put_device), which causes put_device() to be called on the returned pointer when the variable goes out of scope. This results in a use-after-free since the seq_file framework receives a pointer whose reference has already been dropped. Simply removing __free(put_device) would fix the UAF but would leak the reference acquired by bus_find_next_device(), as stop() only calls up_read(&pwrseq_sem) and never releases the device reference. Fix this by making the reference counting consistent across all seq_file callbacks, matching the standard pattern used by PCI and SCSI: - start(): use get_device() so it returns a referenced pointer. - next(): explicitly put_device(curr) to release the previous device's reference (no NULL check needed - the seq_file framework only calls next() while the previous return was non-NULL). - stop(): put_device(data) to release the last iterated device's reference, with a NULL guard since stop() may be called with NULL when start() returned NULL or next() reached end-of-sequence. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 249ebf3f65f8 ("power: sequencing: implement the pwrseq core") Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616151049.1705503-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/power/sequencing/core.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/power/sequencing/core.c b/drivers/power/sequencing/core.c index 1fcf0af7cc0bb..d5da006e1ee85 100644 --- a/drivers/power/sequencing/core.c +++ b/drivers/power/sequencing/core.c @@ -990,8 +990,9 @@ static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) ctx.index = *pos; /* - * We're holding the lock for the entire printout so no need to fiddle - * with device reference count. + * Hold the lock for the entire printout to prevent device removal. + * Reference counts are managed by start()/next()/stop() as required + * by the seq_file contract. */ down_read(&pwrseq_sem); @@ -999,7 +1000,7 @@ static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) if (!ctx.index) return NULL; - return ctx.dev; + return get_device(ctx.dev); } static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *data, @@ -1009,8 +1010,9 @@ static void *pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *data, ++*pos; - struct device *next __free(put_device) = - bus_find_next_device(&pwrseq_bus, curr); + struct device *next = bus_find_next_device(&pwrseq_bus, curr); + + put_device(curr); return next; } @@ -1059,6 +1061,8 @@ static int pwrseq_debugfs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *data) static void pwrseq_debugfs_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *data) { + if (data) + put_device(data); up_read(&pwrseq_sem); } From 5a84398101bf9f11e84b176343e4e3ba83e668c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fan Wu Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 02:05:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 077/607] hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state commit c78a4e41ab5ead6193ad8a2dd92e8906bae659fa upstream. Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree() in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside attach_hdlc_protocol(). The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(), is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the ->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory, leading to a use-after-free. Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev) before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync() now runs on both free paths. timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown. Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync() operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list twice. This bug was found by static analysis. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617020518.116319-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c b/drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c index 7496a2e9a2820..22affdcb4ceae 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c +++ b/drivers/net/wan/hdlc_ppp.c @@ -621,7 +621,6 @@ static void ppp_start(struct net_device *dev) struct proto *proto = &ppp->protos[i]; proto->dev = dev; - timer_setup(&proto->timer, ppp_timer, 0); proto->state = CLOSED; } ppp->protos[IDX_LCP].pid = PID_LCP; @@ -641,6 +640,15 @@ static void ppp_close(struct net_device *dev) ppp_tx_flush(); } +static void ppp_timer_release(struct net_device *dev) +{ + struct ppp *ppp = get_ppp(dev); + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < IDX_COUNT; i++) + timer_shutdown_sync(&ppp->protos[i].timer); +} + static struct hdlc_proto proto = { .start = ppp_start, .stop = ppp_stop, @@ -649,6 +657,7 @@ static struct hdlc_proto proto = { .ioctl = ppp_ioctl, .netif_rx = ppp_rx, .module = THIS_MODULE, + .detach = ppp_timer_release, }; static const struct header_ops ppp_header_ops = { @@ -659,7 +668,7 @@ static int ppp_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct if_settings *ifs) { hdlc_device *hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(dev); struct ppp *ppp; - int result; + int i, result; switch (ifs->type) { case IF_GET_PROTO: @@ -687,6 +696,8 @@ static int ppp_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct if_settings *ifs) return result; ppp = get_ppp(dev); + for (i = 0; i < IDX_COUNT; i++) + timer_setup(&ppp->protos[i].timer, ppp_timer, 0); spin_lock_init(&ppp->lock); ppp->req_timeout = 2; ppp->cr_retries = 10; From 5e5b7f2ef854936e95dceb6a2fdfefcb7152d2c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Koutn=C3=BD?= Date: Thu, 5 Feb 2026 23:54:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 078/607] blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush() commit 0ab5ee5a1badb58cbb2242617cb01a4972b1f2a2 upstream. When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently, a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's __blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries. Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release() (before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jay Shin Cc: Tejun Heo Cc: Waiman Long Fixes: 20cb1c2fb756 ("blk-cgroup: Flush stats before releasing blkcg_gq") Reported-by: coregee2000@gmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/CAHPqNmwT9oRpem3J3erS_W0uSQND47LGGSBsNxP8E6uSUish1w@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Ming Lei Tested-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205155425.342084-1-ming.lei@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/blk-cgroup.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-cgroup.c b/block/blk-cgroup.c index f1ea69743c544..a2347b5795874 100644 --- a/block/blk-cgroup.c +++ b/block/blk-cgroup.c @@ -164,20 +164,10 @@ static void blkg_free(struct blkcg_gq *blkg) static void __blkg_release(struct rcu_head *rcu) { struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(rcu, struct blkcg_gq, rcu_head); - struct blkcg *blkcg = blkg->blkcg; - int cpu; #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP_PUNT_BIO WARN_ON(!bio_list_empty(&blkg->async_bios)); #endif - /* - * Flush all the non-empty percpu lockless lists before releasing - * us, given these stat belongs to us. - * - * blkg_stat_lock is for serializing blkg stat update - */ - for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) - __blkcg_rstat_flush(blkcg, cpu); /* release the blkcg and parent blkg refs this blkg has been holding */ css_put(&blkg->blkcg->css); @@ -195,6 +185,17 @@ static void __blkg_release(struct rcu_head *rcu) static void blkg_release(struct percpu_ref *ref) { struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(ref, struct blkcg_gq, refcnt); + struct blkcg *blkcg = blkg->blkcg; + int cpu; + + /* + * Flush all the non-empty percpu lockless lists before releasing + * us, given these stat belongs to us. + * + * blkg_stat_lock is for serializing blkg stat update + */ + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) + __blkcg_rstat_flush(blkcg, cpu); call_rcu(&blkg->rcu_head, __blkg_release); } From e18769616fd5a90ec1e12aabbba544c488284292 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Doruk Tan Ozturk Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 09:58:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 079/607] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream. tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously (e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it: tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory. Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51 Workqueue: events_unbound Call Trace: tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 169: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502) tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72) ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137) setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446) copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579) create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132) __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Freed by task 8: kfree (mm/slub.c:6566) tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119) cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt path was left without the equivalent guard. Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the synchronous success/error return and at the end of tipc_aead_decrypt_done(). Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617075818.37431-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/tipc/crypto.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c index a3f9ca28c3d53..d388fe8e477e2 100644 --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c @@ -950,12 +950,20 @@ static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead, goto exit; } + /* Get net to avoid freed tipc_crypto when delete namespace */ + if (!maybe_get_net(net)) { + tipc_bearer_put(b); + rc = -ENODEV; + goto exit; + } + /* Now, do decrypt */ rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY) return rc; tipc_bearer_put(b); + put_net(net); exit: kfree(ctx); @@ -993,6 +1001,7 @@ static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(void *data, int err) } tipc_bearer_put(b); + put_net(net); } static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr) From 90e254f18b8c224460082329dd5c42fd30995c2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huacai Chen Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 13:03:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 080/607] LoongArch: Report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() commit f2539c56c74691e7a88af6372ba2b48c06ed2fe4 upstream. This is a port of MIPS commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1 ("MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()"). smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). And the function marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled. As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop() this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. However, since commit 91840be8f710370 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT"), irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns false. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown/halt path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on ... rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP. This issue needs some hacks to reproduce, and it was not noticed on LoongArch because arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() usually returns true. Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs and grace periods can still complete. LoongArch shuts down all CPUs here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not otherwise issued. Cc: Fixes: 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT") Reviewed-by: Guo Ren Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c index 46036d98da75b..5d6a60294fb2d 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/smp.c @@ -688,6 +688,7 @@ static void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false); calculate_cpu_foreign_map(); local_irq_disable(); + rcutree_report_cpu_dead(); while (true); } From 200e7637f4d6a1342987045eea72641524f909dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 13:10:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 081/607] pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout() commit 13e198a90ca4050f4bee8a3f23680389a6563ccc upstream. When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(), the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds, pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(), which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the tracepoint accesses lo's fields. Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo). Fixes: 2c8d5fc37fe2 ("pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c index b3cb5ee9d821e..d3c1f49f39242 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c @@ -2217,11 +2217,11 @@ pnfs_update_layout(struct inode *ino, dprintk("%s wait for layoutreturn\n", __func__); lseg = ERR_PTR(pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo)); if (!IS_ERR(lseg)) { - pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); dprintk("%s retrying\n", __func__); trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETRY); + pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo); goto lookup_again; } trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg, From b3a3831b2eb884641906fc5e46207b205b6aea13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qingshuang Fu Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 10:13:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 082/607] irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove commit 37738fdf2ab1e504d1c63ce5bc0aeb6452d8f057 upstream. The driver allocates domain generic chips using irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are not removed. The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and kernel crash. The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious interrupts accessing freed memory. Fix these issues by: - Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove() is called - Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove() Fixes: b6ef9161e43a ("irq-imgpdc: add ImgTec PDC irqchip driver") Signed-off-by: Qingshuang Fu Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618021352.661773-1-fffsqian@163.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c index e9ef2f5a7207e..4feef4ab5fecc 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c @@ -378,6 +378,7 @@ static int pdc_intc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot add IRQ domain\n"); return -ENOMEM; } + priv->domain->flags |= IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC; /* * Set up 2 generic irq chips with 2 chip types. @@ -465,6 +466,11 @@ static void pdc_intc_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct pdc_intc_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < priv->nr_perips; ++i) + irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->perip_irqs[i], NULL, NULL); + + irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->syswake_irq, NULL, NULL); + irq_domain_remove(priv->domain); } From 369496d885b4cf6e8647cf4dc5cf3ac68fdf37a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 15:45:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 083/607] fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware() commit 54f3c5643ec523a04b6ec0e7c19eb10f5ebebdd3 upstream. Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing freed memory when pr_err() references child_region. Fixes: 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang [ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ] Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154534.404327-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c index caa091224dc54..9107a5b461d35 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c @@ -168,11 +168,10 @@ static int child_regions_with_firmware(struct device_node *overlay) fpga_region_of_match); } - of_node_put(child_region); - if (ret) pr_err("firmware-name not allowed in child FPGA region: %pOF", child_region); + of_node_put(child_region); return ret; } From 104d100212396801f1d9d388282f746e23e2bfd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuho Choi Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 14:32:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 084/607] rpmsg: char: Fix use-after-free on probe error path commit 1ff3f528e67d20e2b1483dcaba899dc7832b2e6b upstream. rpmsg_chrdev_probe() stores the newly allocated eptdev in the default endpoint's priv pointer before calling rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(). If rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() then fails, its error path frees eptdev while the default endpoint may still dispatch callbacks with the stale priv pointer. Avoid publishing eptdev through the default endpoint until rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() succeeds. Messages received before the priv pointer is published should be ignored by rpmsg_ept_cb(). Flow-control updates can hit rpmsg_ept_flow_cb() in the same window, so make both callbacks return success when priv is NULL. Fixes: bc69d1066569 ("rpmsg: char: Introduce the "rpmsg-raw" channel") Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601183247.1962010-1-dbgh9129@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c index 96fcdd2d7093c..d918cb30db9b0 100644 --- a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c +++ b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_char.c @@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static int rpmsg_ept_cb(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev, void *buf, int len, struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = priv; struct sk_buff *skb; + if (!eptdev) + return 0; + skb = alloc_skb(len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!skb) return -ENOMEM; @@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ static int rpmsg_ept_flow_cb(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev, void *priv, bool enable { struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev = priv; + if (!eptdev) + return 0; + eptdev->remote_flow_restricted = enable; eptdev->remote_flow_updated = true; @@ -490,6 +496,7 @@ static int rpmsg_chrdev_probe(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev) struct rpmsg_channel_info chinfo; struct rpmsg_eptdev *eptdev; struct device *dev = &rpdev->dev; + int ret; memcpy(chinfo.name, rpdev->id.name, RPMSG_NAME_SIZE); chinfo.src = rpdev->src; @@ -502,13 +509,17 @@ static int rpmsg_chrdev_probe(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev) /* Set the default_ept to the rpmsg device endpoint */ eptdev->default_ept = rpdev->ept; + ret = rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(eptdev, chinfo); + + if (ret) + return ret; /* * The rpmsg_ept_cb uses *priv parameter to get its rpmsg_eptdev context. - * Storedit in default_ept *priv field. + * Stored it in default_ept *priv field. */ eptdev->default_ept->priv = eptdev; - return rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(eptdev, chinfo); + return 0; } static void rpmsg_chrdev_remove(struct rpmsg_device *rpdev) From 4cd57ebee395041099fcdfcabb00749ce38d8b27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Cen Date: Sun, 24 May 2026 19:12:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 085/607] ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream. ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run past bg_bitmap. Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor is used. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?) _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?) ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375) ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457) ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86) ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786) ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886) get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?) lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?) do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?) kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?) __bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?) get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?) ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96) sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?) check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?) __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497) check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?) rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?) check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?) ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?) ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?) ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043) ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?) ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) __mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?) inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?) balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?) generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?) mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?) file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?) ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?) lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?) ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?) apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?) read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?) lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Heming Zhao Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c index e93fc842bb203..a752ea59a1675 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c @@ -205,8 +205,16 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(struct super_block *sb, int resize) { unsigned int max_bits; + unsigned int max_bitmap_bits; + unsigned int max_bitmap_size; + int suballocator; struct ocfs2_group_desc *gd = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *)bh->b_data; + suballocator = le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno) != OCFS2_SB(sb)->bitmap_blkno; + max_bitmap_size = ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(sb, suballocator, + OCFS2_SB(sb)->s_feature_incompat); + max_bitmap_bits = max_bitmap_size * 8; + if (di->i_blkno != gd->bg_parent_dinode) { do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bad parent pointer (%llu, expected %llu)\n", (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, @@ -214,6 +222,20 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(struct super_block *sb, (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno)); } + if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size) > max_bitmap_size) { + do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bitmap size %u but physical max of %u\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size), + max_bitmap_size); + } + + if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bitmap_bits) { + do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count %u but physical max of %u\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits), + max_bitmap_bits); + } + max_bits = le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_cpg) * le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_bpc); if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bits) { do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count of %u\n", From 6dbe9443d9f5f7fb6d319a7b77108853ae6c6bea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yizhou Zhao Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 13:39:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 086/607] 9p: avoid putting oldfid in p9_client_walk() error path commit 1a3860d46e3eb47dbd60339783cdad7904486b9f upstream. When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent, the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid) unconditionally. This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow. Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below. This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer and refcount warning logs are available on request. Fixes: b48dbb998d70 ("9p fid refcount: add p9_fid_get/put wrappers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang Reported-by: Ao Wang Reported-by: Xuewei Feng Reported-by: Qi Li Reported-by: Ke Xu Assisted-by: GLM 5.1 Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao Message-ID: <20260528053918.53550-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/9p/client.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/9p/client.c b/net/9p/client.c index 5c1ca57ccd285..9c9d249dabaea 100644 --- a/net/9p/client.c +++ b/net/9p/client.c @@ -1215,7 +1215,8 @@ struct p9_fid *p9_client_walk(struct p9_fid *oldfid, uint16_t nwname, clunk_fid: kfree(wqids); - p9_fid_put(fid); + if (fid != oldfid) + p9_fid_put(fid); fid = NULL; error: From f9b57a0015c241274651f4b36627f56b1b5a8651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonas Jelonek Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 09:37:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 087/607] MIPS: smp: report dying CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu() commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1a5a8262ee7ad0f2ff1527a7e7 upstream. smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). The function marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled. As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop() this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. Since commit 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT") however, irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns false. That is the asm-generic default used by MIPS. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on ... rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP. rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP. This issue was noticed on several Realtek MIPS switch SoCs (MIPS interAptiv) and came up during kernel bump downstream in OpenWrt from 6.18.33 to 6.18.34, after the backport of the patch to the 6.18 stable branch. The patch also has been backported all the way back to 6.1. Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs and grace periods can still complete. MIPS shuts down all CPUs here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not otherwise issued. Reporting a dying CPU to RCU outside the regular hotplug offline path is not unprecedented: arm64 does the same in cpu_die_early(). There it is an exception for a CPU that was coming online and is aborting bringup, rather than the default shutdown action as on MIPS. Fixes: 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonas Jelonek Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/kernel/smp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c b/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c index 4868e79f3b30e..0f28b4a62e72e 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/smp.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -422,6 +423,7 @@ static void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy) set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false); calculate_cpu_foreign_map(); local_irq_disable(); + rcutree_report_cpu_dead(); while (1); } From e36095d8d922bb26ce860231aacf0cd14edea07c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunwoo Kim Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 23:44:52 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 088/607] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Bound the bank index when querying sparse banks commit 4721f8160f17554b003e8928bb61e6c9b2fe92a3 upstream. When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS, without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of 4096. Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802 CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60 print_report+0xcb/0x5d0 kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0 kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm] kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm] kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1) raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff >ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ^ ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed in mask. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c58a318f6090 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: L2 TLB flush") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aiQyZIJtO-2Aj_xN@v4bel [sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c index f279561154bc9..4ebb3c40c6bbc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c @@ -1839,6 +1839,11 @@ static bool hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set(u32 vp_id, u64 valid_bank_mask, u64 sparse_ba int valid_bit_nr = vp_id / HV_VCPUS_PER_SPARSE_BANK; unsigned long sbank; + BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(valid_bank_mask) != HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS); + + if (valid_bit_nr >= HV_MAX_SPARSE_VCPU_BANKS) + return false; + if (!test_bit(valid_bit_nr, (unsigned long *)&valid_bank_mask)) return false; From 720949ed666f34ff28ffdfe1471a5861d1e41fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ashutosh Desai Date: Fri, 1 May 2026 13:35:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 089/607] KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path commit 78ee2d50185a037b3d2452a97f3dad69c3f7f389 upstream. In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage): 1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16) before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE, the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation. 2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows by up to 15 bytes under the same condition. Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE - the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to a 4096-byte buffer. Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest region. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd] Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214 CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 print_report+0xbc/0x260 kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0 kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0 __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd] sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm] __se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100 do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb memcg:ff11000112827d82 flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1) raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Fixes: 24f41fb23a39 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command") Fixes: 7d1594f5d94b ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Desai [sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501203537.2120074-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 6d4574eb8a4ce..8b807f8eb0672 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1340,6 +1340,7 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec) s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK; d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK; len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size); + len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - d_off); if (dec) ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm, From 2205275be9be981e70ff29610b0117d8853fac70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 07:30:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 090/607] power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: fix use-after-free in the linkstation_poweroff_init() commit 8eec545cde69e46e9a1d2b7d915ce4f5df85b3bd upstream. Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use. Fixes: e2f471efe1d6 ("power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: prepare for new devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407073025.271865-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c b/drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c index 02f5fdb8ffc4c..e56d75bfcc43f 100644 --- a/drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c +++ b/drivers/power/reset/linkstation-poweroff.c @@ -163,10 +163,10 @@ static int __init linkstation_poweroff_init(void) dn = of_find_matching_node(NULL, ls_poweroff_of_match); if (!dn) return -ENODEV; - of_node_put(dn); match = of_match_node(ls_poweroff_of_match, dn); cfg = match->data; + of_node_put(dn); dn = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, cfg->mdio_node_name); if (!dn) From 3b33dbb43e21a8d1248dbe906d9e27f640a6001a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vivian Wang Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 13:29:45 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 091/607] riscv: mm: Extract helper mark_new_valid_map() commit 9ee25d0a70ff4494b4e1d266b962d0a574ef318a upstream. In preparation of a future patch using the same mechanism for non-vmalloc addresses, extract the mark_new_valid_map() helper from flush_cache_vmap(). No functional change intended. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303-handle-kfence-protect-spurious-fault-v2-1-f80d8354d79d@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h index 0092513c3376c..b1a2ac6657926 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h @@ -43,20 +43,23 @@ do { \ #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT extern u64 new_vmalloc[NR_CPUS / sizeof(u64) + 1]; extern char _end[]; +static inline void mark_new_valid_map(void) +{ + int i; + + /* + * We don't care if concurrently a cpu resets this value since + * the only place this can happen is in handle_exception() where + * an sfence.vma is emitted. + */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_vmalloc); ++i) + new_vmalloc[i] = -1ULL; +} #define flush_cache_vmap flush_cache_vmap static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { - if (is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)start)) { - int i; - - /* - * We don't care if concurrently a cpu resets this value since - * the only place this can happen is in handle_exception() where - * an sfence.vma is emitted. - */ - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(new_vmalloc); ++i) - new_vmalloc[i] = -1ULL; - } + if (is_vmalloc_or_module_addr((void *)start)) + mark_new_valid_map(); } #define flush_cache_vmap_early(start, end) local_flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end) #endif From 7643e5622994f9b207445f9cd89a02223ce6a99f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vivian Wang Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 13:29:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 092/607] riscv: kfence: Call mark_new_valid_map() for kfence_unprotect() commit 8d6c8c40e733b3fcaf92fed0a078bba2f6941a3b upstream. In kfence_protect_page(), which kfence_unprotect() calls, we cannot send IPIs to other CPUs to ask them to flush TLB. This may lead to those CPUs spuriously faulting on a recently allocated kfence object despite it being valid, leading to false positive use-after-free reports. Fix this by calling mark_new_valid_map() so that the page fault handling code path notices the spurious fault and flushes TLB then retries the access. Update the comment in handle_exception to indicate that new_valid_map_cpus_check also handles kfence_unprotect() spurious faults. Note that kfence_protect() has the same stale TLB entries problem, but that leads to false negatives, which is fine with kfence. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yanko Kaneti Fixes: b3431a8bb336 ("riscv: Fix IPIs usage in kfence_protect_page()") Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303-handle-kfence-protect-spurious-fault-v2-2-f80d8354d79d@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h | 7 +++++-- arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h index d08bf7fb3aee6..29cb3a6ee113d 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/kfence.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include static inline bool arch_kfence_init_pool(void) @@ -17,10 +18,12 @@ static inline bool kfence_protect_page(unsigned long addr, bool protect) { pte_t *pte = virt_to_kpte(addr); - if (protect) + if (protect) { set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(ptep_get(pte)) & ~_PAGE_PRESENT)); - else + } else { set_pte(pte, __pte(pte_val(ptep_get(pte)) | _PAGE_PRESENT)); + mark_new_valid_map(); + } preempt_disable(); local_flush_tlb_kernel_range(addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE); diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S index 9b9dec6893b81..e7bd03a9ced53 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S @@ -107,8 +107,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception) #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT /* - * The RISC-V kernel does not eagerly emit a sfence.vma after each - * new vmalloc mapping, which may result in exceptions: + * The RISC-V kernel does not flush TLBs on all CPUS after each new + * vmalloc mapping or kfence_unprotect(), which may result in + * exceptions: + * * - if the uarch caches invalid entries, the new mapping would not be * observed by the page table walker and an invalidation is needed. * - if the uarch does not cache invalid entries, a reordered access From eea16b6f805c0b1fb2f72f0f771088ea45356956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ian Bridges Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 23:13:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 093/607] fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var commit 7f08fc10fa3d3366dc3af723970bd03d7d6d10e3 upstream. info->var, a framebuffer's current mode, is expected to have a matching entry in info->modelist. var_to_display() relies on this and treats a failed fb_match_mode() as "This should not happen". fb_set_var() keeps it true by adding the mode to the list on every change, and do_register_framebuffer() does the same at registration. store_modes() replaces the modelist from userspace. fb_new_modelist() validates the new modes but does not check that info->var still has a match. It relies on fbcon_new_modelist() to re-point consoles, but that only handles consoles mapped to the framebuffer. With fbcon unbound there are none, so info->var is left describing a mode that is no longer in the list. A later console takeover runs var_to_display(), where fb_match_mode() returns NULL and leaves fb_display[i].mode NULL. fbcon_switch() passes it to display_to_var(), and fb_videomode_to_var() dereferences the NULL mode. Keep the current mode in the list in fb_new_modelist(), the same way fb_set_var() does. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index eff757ebbed14..30a2c0d47e5c8 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -734,6 +734,18 @@ int fb_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info) if (list_empty(&info->modelist)) return 1; + /* + * The new modelist may not contain the current mode (info->var), and + * fbcon_new_modelist() below only re-points consoles mapped to this + * framebuffer. Add the current mode here so info->var keeps a match + * even when fbcon is unbound. + */ + if (!fb_match_mode(&info->var, &info->modelist)) { + fb_var_to_videomode(&mode, &info->var); + if (fb_add_videomode(&mode, &info->modelist)) + return 1; + } + fbcon_new_modelist(info); return 0; From 4d418cf8daf57e454b4d855bf9b2419fd8e6a540 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tuo Li Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 10:50:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 094/607] fbdev: modedb: fix a possible UAF in fb_find_mode() commit 85b6256469cebdac395e7447147e06b2e151014f upstream. If mode_option is NULL, it is assigned from mode_option_buf: if (!mode_option) { fb_get_options(NULL, &mode_option_buf); mode_option = mode_option_buf; } Later, name is assigned from mode_option: const char *name = mode_option; However, mode_option_buf is freed before name is no longer used: kfree(mode_option_buf); while name is still accessed by: if ((name_matches(db[i], name, namelen) || Since name aliases mode_option_buf, this may result in a use-after-free. Fix this by extending the lifetime of mode_option_buf until the end of the function by using scope-based resource management for cleanup. Signed-off-by: Tuo Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c index 53a610948c4a5..25e8a83c571e1 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c @@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ int fb_find_mode(struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, const struct fb_videomode *default_mode, unsigned int default_bpp) { - char *mode_option_buf = NULL; + char *mode_option_buf __free(kfree) = NULL; int i; /* Set up defaults */ @@ -724,7 +724,6 @@ int fb_find_mode(struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, res_specified = 1; } done: - kfree(mode_option_buf); if (cvt) { struct fb_videomode cvt_mode; int ret; From fc6aa9bdbae60cdd8ae2358c7ee87c6fdb1132a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steffen Persvold Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 18:40:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 095/607] fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode commit d894c48a57d78206e4df9c90d4acfaf39394806a upstream. The 1920x1080@60 modedb entry has one too many initializers before its sync field: a stray "0" occupies the sync slot, which shifts the remaining values by one field. The entry therefore decodes as sync = 0, vmode = FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT (0x3, i.e. FB_VMODE_INTERLACED | FB_VMODE_DOUBLE), and flag = FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, instead of the intended sync = positive H/V, vmode = non-interlaced. fb_find_mode() then returns a 1920x1080 mode flagged as interlaced + doublescan with active-low syncs. Drivers that honour var->vmode and var->sync when programming display timing enable doublescan and the wrong sync polarity, corrupting the output. Drop the stray initializer so sync and vmode hold their intended values (positive H/V sync, non-interlaced), matching the adjacent 1920x1200 entry. Fixes: c8902258b2b8 ("fbdev: modedb: Add 1920x1080 at 60 Hz video mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steffen Persvold Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c index 25e8a83c571e1..0b1f3c5bbcdb3 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static const struct fb_videomode modedb[] = { FB_VMODE_DOUBLE }, /* 1920x1080 @ 60 Hz, 67.3 kHz hsync */ - { NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5, 0, + { NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5, FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT, FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED }, From 6a946038f2a5a8c29048c6af369d4e391448a5c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 096/607] i2c: core: fix adapter registration race commit ba14d7cf2fe7284610a29854bdff22b2537d3ce6 upstream. Adapters can be looked up based on their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Make sure that the adapter (including its struct device) has been initialised before adding it to the IDR to avoid accessing uninitialised data which could, for example, lead to NULL-pointer dereferences or use-after-free. Note that the i2c-dev chardev, which is registered from a bus notifier, currently uses i2c_get_adapter() so the adapter needs to be added to the IDR before registration. Fixes: 6e13e6418418 ("i2c: Add i2c_add_numbered_adapter()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.22 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index ae7e9c8b65a65..05b315405639b 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1570,6 +1570,10 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) pm_suspend_ignore_children(&adap->dev, true); pm_runtime_enable(&adap->dev); + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); + res = device_add(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); @@ -1628,7 +1632,7 @@ static int __i2c_add_numbered_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) int id; mutex_lock(&core_lock); - id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr, adap->nr + 1, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr")) return id == -ENOSPC ? -EBUSY : id; @@ -1662,7 +1666,7 @@ int i2c_add_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adapter) } mutex_lock(&core_lock); - id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, adapter, + id = idr_alloc(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, __i2c_first_dynamic_bus_num, 0, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (WARN(id < 0, "couldn't get idr")) From c8a24effd96d4779e2ad779654682304491c55a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guannan Wang Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 16:03:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 097/607] NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup commit 9e18e83b8846a5c3fe13fc8a464b4865d33996c6 upstream. nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized. Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation. The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(), which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp. Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching nfsd4_decode_secinfo(). Fixes: 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Guannan Wang Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c index b1b52c816ebdf..a96029c967e6b 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c @@ -1871,10 +1871,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, union nfsd4_op_u *u) { struct nfsd4_secinfo_no_name *sin = &u->secinfo_no_name; + + sin->sin_exp = NULL; if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(argp->xdr, &sin->sin_style) < 0) return nfserr_bad_xdr; - sin->sin_exp = NULL; return nfs_ok; } From 136b416593f1349cf6f72c8e3d18f0f204ee8545 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 13:51:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 098/607] nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure commit 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1 upstream. nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns false and argp->acl_access is left dangling. ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle. Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process() skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is unreachable on decode failure: svc_process_common() pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */ /* pc_func skipped */ pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */ The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server. Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(), which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by the sibling GETACL procedures. Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c index 0ac538c761800..76305b86c1a95 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c @@ -131,10 +131,7 @@ static __be32 nfsacld_proc_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) resp->status = fh_getattr(fh, &resp->stat); out: - /* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in - nfssvc_decode_setaclargs. */ - posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access); - posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default); + /* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfsaclsvc_release_setacl. */ return rpc_success; out_drop_lock: @@ -310,6 +307,16 @@ static void nfsaclsvc_release_access(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) fh_put(&resp->fh); } +static void nfsaclsvc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp; + struct nfsd_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp; + + fh_put(&resp->fh); + posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access); + posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default); +} + #define ST 1 /* status*/ #define AT 21 /* attributes */ #define pAT (1+AT) /* post attributes - conditional */ @@ -343,7 +350,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_acl_procedures2[5] = { .pc_func = nfsacld_proc_setacl, .pc_decode = nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs, .pc_encode = nfssvc_encode_attrstatres, - .pc_release = nfssvc_release_attrstat, + .pc_release = nfsaclsvc_release_setacl, .pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs), .pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs), .pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd_attrstat), diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c index 7b5433bd30197..e87731380be85 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c @@ -118,10 +118,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd3_proc_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) out_errno: resp->status = nfserrno(error); out: - /* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in - nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs. */ - posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access); - posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default); + /* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfs3svc_release_setacl. */ return rpc_success; } @@ -223,6 +220,16 @@ static void nfs3svc_release_getacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) posix_acl_release(resp->acl_default); } +static void nfs3svc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) +{ + struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp; + struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp; + + fh_put(&resp->fh); + posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access); + posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default); +} + #define ST 1 /* status*/ #define AT 21 /* attributes */ #define pAT (1+AT) /* post attributes - conditional */ @@ -256,7 +263,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_acl_procedures3[3] = { .pc_func = nfsd3_proc_setacl, .pc_decode = nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs, .pc_encode = nfs3svc_encode_setaclres, - .pc_release = nfs3svc_release_fhandle, + .pc_release = nfs3svc_release_setacl, .pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs), .pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs), .pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_attrstat), From dba7da4835de7b17259fa23797d7dbfd36304bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 09:25:40 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 099/607] nfsd: fix inverted cp_ttl check in async copy reaper commit 0150459b05490b88b7e7378a31550a9e07b5517c upstream. nfsd4_async_copy_reaper() is supposed to keep completed async copy state around for NFSD_COPY_INITIAL_TTL (10) laundromat ticks so that OFFLOAD_STATUS can report the result, then reap the state once the countdown expires. The TTL predicate is inverted: `if (--copy->cp_ttl)` is true while ticks remain and false when the counter reaches zero. This causes the copy to be reaped on the very first tick (cp_ttl goes from 10 to 9, which is non-zero) instead of after all 10 ticks elapse. Once reaped, OFFLOAD_STATUS returns NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID because the copy state has already been freed. Fix by negating the test so that cleanup runs when the TTL expires. Fixes: aa0ebd21df9c ("NFSD: Add nfsd4_copy time-to-live") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chris Mason Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 8dada7ef97cb1..9d876f9d98be2 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1404,7 +1404,7 @@ void nfsd4_async_copy_reaper(struct nfsd_net *nn) list_for_each_safe(pos, next, &clp->async_copies) { copy = list_entry(pos, struct nfsd4_copy, copies); if (test_bit(NFSD4_COPY_F_OFFLOAD_DONE, ©->cp_flags)) { - if (--copy->cp_ttl) { + if (!--copy->cp_ttl) { list_del_init(©->copies); list_add(©->copies, &reaplist); } From 0f28337f54cfb7f9777bbc2018be52b7c76c620e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Dominik=20Wo=C5=BAniak?= Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 17:46:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 100/607] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream. In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user() calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed, which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were introduced. Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen. namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up the already-allocated buffer automatically. Fixes: 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dominik Woźniak Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c index e2b9472e5c78c..3ea4b8a861631 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c @@ -800,7 +800,8 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const struct cld_msg_v2 __user *cmsg, if (IS_ERR(name.data)) return PTR_ERR(name.data); name.len = namelen; - get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len); + if (get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len)) + return -EFAULT; if (princhashlen > 0) { princhash.data = memdup_user( &ci->cc_princhash.cp_data, From 017a6150106b054cc84d1b0582d97bd3a74d4281 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 10:36:14 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 101/607] nfsd: avoid leaking pre-allocated openowner on unconfirmed retry race commit 57aee7a35bb12753057c5b65d72d1f46c0e95b07 upstream. When find_or_alloc_open_stateowner() encounters an unconfirmed owner, it calls release_openowner() and sets oo = NULL. Control then falls through past the `if (oo)` guard -- which would have freed any pre-allocated `new` -- and unconditionally executes `new = alloc_stateowner(...)`. If `new` was already allocated on a prior iteration, the pointer is silently overwritten and the previous allocation (slab object + owner name buffer) is leaked. This requires a race: two NFSv4.0 OPEN threads with the same owner string, where a concurrent thread inserts a new unconfirmed owner into the hash between retry iterations. The window is narrow but repeatable under adversarial conditions. Fix by adding `goto retry` after `oo = NULL` so the already-allocated `new` is reused on the next iteration rather than overwritten. Reported-by: Chris Mason Fixes: 23df17788c62 ("nfsd: perform all find_openstateowner_str calls in the one place.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index a9e95df2fdb68..b02fe9926b093 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -5176,6 +5176,7 @@ find_or_alloc_open_stateowner(unsigned int strhashval, struct nfsd4_open *open, /* Replace unconfirmed owners without checking for replay. */ release_openowner(oo); oo = NULL; + goto retry; } if (oo) { if (new) From 4367afc119c51e17a616f6908772b7e2c2c4013f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeff Layton Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 12:44:19 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 102/607] nfsd: reset write verifier on deferred writeback errors MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 2090b05803faab8a9fa62fbff871007862cac1b7 upstream. nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd_commit() both call filemap_check_wb_err() to detect deferred writeback errors, but neither rotates the server's write verifier (nn->writeverf) when this check fails. Every other durable-storage-failure path in these functions calls commit_reset_write_verifier() before returning an error. The missing rotation means clients holding UNSTABLE write data under the current verifier will COMMIT, receive the unchanged verifier back, and conclude their data is durable — silently dropping data that failed writeback. This violates the UNSTABLE+COMMIT durability contract (RFC 1813 §3.3.7, RFC 8881 §18.32). Add commit_reset_write_verifier() calls at both filemap_check_wb_err() error sites, matching the pattern used by adjacent error paths in the same functions. The helper already filters -EAGAIN and -ESTALE internally, so the calls are unconditionally safe. Reported-by: Chris Mason Fixes: 555dbf1a9aac ("nfsd: Replace use of rwsem with errseq_t") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index e32a5fcd6ac85..2033037238780 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -1264,8 +1264,10 @@ nfsd_vfs_write(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, nfsd_stats_io_write_add(nn, exp, *cnt); fsnotify_modify(file); host_err = filemap_check_wb_err(file->f_mapping, since); - if (host_err < 0) + if (host_err < 0) { + commit_reset_write_verifier(nn, rqstp, host_err); goto out_nfserr; + } if (stable && fhp->fh_use_wgather) { host_err = wait_for_concurrent_writes(file); @@ -1445,6 +1447,8 @@ nfsd_commit(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, struct nfsd_file *nf, nfsd_copy_write_verifier(verf, nn); err2 = filemap_check_wb_err(nf->nf_file->f_mapping, since); + if (err2 < 0) + commit_reset_write_verifier(nn, rqstp, err2); err = nfserrno(err2); break; case -EINVAL: From d8c90c7cc061265d5f2813a1f5c82ef2f4707e67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 12:26:56 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 103/607] NFSv4/flexfiles: reject zero filehandle version count commit 2c6bb3c40bc24f6aa8dfbe6fe98c3ad6389203f2 upstream. ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes the filehandle-version array count from the flexfiles layout body. The value is used as the count for kzalloc_objs(), and the current code only rejects NULL. A zero count yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which can be stored in dss_info->fh_versions even though later flexfiles paths assume that at least one filehandle version exists. Reject fh_count == 0 before the allocation, matching the existing zero version_count validation in the flexfiles GETDEVICEINFO parser. A QEMU/KASAN run with a malformed flexfiles layout hit: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate.isra.0+0x15f/0x750 ff_layout_encode_layoutreturn+0x683/0x970 nfs4_xdr_enc_layoutreturn+0x278/0x3a0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception The patched kernel rejects the malformed layout without KASAN/oops/panic, and a valid fh_count=1 regression still opens, reads, and unmounts cleanly. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c index 9056f05a67dc2..bb3f6c18630cb 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c +++ b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayout.c @@ -552,6 +552,10 @@ ff_layout_alloc_lseg(struct pnfs_layout_hdr *lh, if (!p) goto out_err_free; fh_count = be32_to_cpup(p); + if (fh_count == 0) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out_err_free; + } dss_info->fh_versions = kcalloc(fh_count, sizeof(struct nfs_fh), From 012d37a568bfbb2c9686f03ade75560bc7139956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 12:30:35 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 104/607] NFSv4/pNFS: reject zero-length r_addr in nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr commit 41fe0f7b84f0cb822ae10ab08592996a592b2a25 upstream. nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only "nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string. When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline() returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its "*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised metadata server. Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with -EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of panicking the client. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6b7f3cf96364 ("nfs41: pull decode_ds_addr from file layout to generic pnfs") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c index 9976cc16b6890..37cf4020f3d5d 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs_nfs.c @@ -1075,14 +1075,14 @@ nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr(struct net *net, struct xdr_stream *xdr, gfp_t gfp_flags) /* r_netid */ nlen = xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(xdr, &netid, XDR_MAX_NETOBJ, gfp_flags); - if (unlikely(nlen < 0)) + if (unlikely(nlen <= 0)) goto out_err; /* r_addr: ip/ip6addr with port in dec octets - see RFC 5665 */ /* port is ".ABC.DEF", 8 chars max */ rlen = xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(xdr, &buf, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + IPV6_SCOPE_ID_LEN + 8, gfp_flags); - if (unlikely(rlen < 0)) + if (unlikely(rlen <= 0)) goto out_free_netid; /* replace port '.' with '-' */ From 6919eb549e8f3caaef16d918749bf2b68d18532d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Igor Raits Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 12:49:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 105/607] NFSv4: clear exception state on successful mkdir retry MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 238e9b51aa29f48b6243212a3b75c8e48d6b96fd upstream. After a server returns NFS4ERR_DELAY for an NFSv4 CREATE issued by mkdir(2), the client correctly waits and retries. When the retry succeeds, however, mkdir(2) can still surface -EEXIST to userspace even though the directory was just created on the server. Reproducer (random 16-hex names so collisions are not the cause) against an in-kernel Linux nfsd; reproduces under both NFSv4.0 and NFSv4.2: N=2000000; base=/var/gdc/export for ((i=1; i<=N; i++)); do d=$base/$(openssl rand -hex 8) mkdir "$d" 2>/dev/null || echo "$(date +%T) failed loop=$i $d" rmdir "$d" 2>/dev/null done Failures cluster at the cadence at which the server-side auth/export cache refresh path causes nfsd to return NFS4ERR_DELAY for CREATE. A wire trace of one failure (the three CREATE RPCs all come from a single mkdir(2), generated by the do-while in nfs4_proc_mkdir()): client -> server CREATE name=... -> NFS4ERR_DELAY ~100 ms later client -> server CREATE name=... -> NFS4_OK (dir created) ~80 us later client -> server CREATE name=... -> NFS4ERR_EXIST (correct) Since commit dd862da61e91 ("nfs: fix incorrect handling of large-number NFS errors in nfs4_do_mkdir()"), nfs4_handle_exception() is called only when _nfs4_proc_mkdir() returned an error. That gate breaks retry-state hygiene: nfs4_do_handle_exception() resets exception.{delay,recovering, retry} to 0 on entry, so calling it on success is what previously cleared the retry flag set by the preceding NFS4ERR_DELAY iteration. With the gate in place, exception.retry stays at 1 after the successful retry, the loop runs once more, and the resulting CREATE for an already-created name yields NFS4ERR_EXIST -> -EEXIST to userspace. Drop the conditional and call nfs4_handle_exception() unconditionally, matching every other do-while in fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c (nfs4_proc_symlink(), nfs4_proc_link(), etc.). The dentry/status separation introduced by that commit is preserved. Fixes: dd862da61e91 ("nfs: fix incorrect handling of large-number NFS errors in nfs4_do_mkdir()") Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Čípa Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/CA+9S74hSp_tJu2Ffe2BPNC2T25gfkhgjjDkdgSsF5c2rnJq_wA@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: NeilBrown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Igor Raits Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c index 711812d839909..fc858b5c3f66d 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c @@ -5303,10 +5303,9 @@ static struct dentry *nfs4_proc_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, do { alias = _nfs4_proc_mkdir(dir, dentry, sattr, label, &err); trace_nfs4_mkdir(dir, &dentry->d_name, err); + err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), err, &exception); if (err) - alias = ERR_PTR(nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(dir), - err, - &exception)); + alias = ERR_PTR(err); } while (exception.retry); nfs4_label_release_security(label); From 62c26720121bfcb565f136d99bc40a7378a66fa0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Markus Elfring Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 09:56:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 106/607] NFS: Prevent resource leak in nfs_alloc_server() commit d189f224308c8ac3feeea8e442c99922bd18f1b2 upstream. It was overlooked to call ida_free() after a failed nfs_alloc_iostats() call. Thus add the missed function call in an if branch. Fixes: 1c7251187dc067a6d460cf33ca67da9c1dd87807 ("NFS: add superblock sysfs entries") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Christophe Jaillet Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/1c8e10c9-def7-4f0d-8aa1-23c8035a38c8@wanadoo.fr/ Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfs/client.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/client.c b/fs/nfs/client.c index 2aaea9c98c2cd..404e75b0444d7 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/client.c +++ b/fs/nfs/client.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ struct nfs_server *nfs_alloc_server(void) server->io_stats = nfs_alloc_iostats(); if (!server->io_stats) { + ida_free(&s_sysfs_ids, server->s_sysfs_id); kfree(server); return NULL; } From 7627ff8c4f9919f14de562b0160ab4ec9d80b1f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hem Parekh Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 16:56:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 107/607] ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read in smb_check_perm_dacl() commit 1ef06004ed4bd6d3ed8c840d9d1a376b66d4935b upstream. The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them. CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header, so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid() result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read. A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr() into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs. Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl(). Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hem Parekh Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c index e3c512675c632..f5864dd1dd5f1 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c @@ -1480,7 +1480,9 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path, break; aces_size -= ace_size; - if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES) + if (ace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES || + ace_size < offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + + sizeof(__le32) * ace->sid.num_subauth) break; if (!compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid) || From 3d205fe80f2181f0109150ad1fa06ee5bc046935 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 19:37:45 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 108/607] serial: 8250_dw: unregister 8250 port if clk_notifier_register() fails commit 10fc708b4de7f86002d2d735a2dbf3b5b7f65692 upstream. dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port() and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the 8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a use-after-free hazard. Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path. Fixes: cc816969d7b5 ("serial: 8250_dw: Fix common clocks usage race condition") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514143746.23671-2-sozdayvek@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c index 4103178725e39..7a00083635439 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_dw.c @@ -846,8 +846,10 @@ static int dw8250_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) */ if (data->clk) { err = clk_notifier_register(data->clk, &data->clk_notifier); - if (err) + if (err) { + serial8250_unregister_port(data->data.line); return dev_err_probe(dev, err, "Failed to set the clock notifier\n"); + } queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &data->clk_work); } From e77fbefd1269b5c123e7c651a1ebdce1b87d19a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HanQuan Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 01:52:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 109/607] net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of key in del_async path commit 5ba9950bc9078e19b69cca1e56d1553b125c6857 upstream. In tcp_ao_delete_key(), the del_async path skips the current_key and rnext_key validity checks present in the synchronous path, assuming these pointers are always NULL on LISTEN sockets. However, if a key was added with set_current=1/set_rnext=1 while the socket was in CLOSE state, current_key and rnext_key will be non-NULL after listen() transitions the socket to LISTEN. When such a key is deleted with del_async=1, hlist_del_rcu() and call_rcu() free the key without clearing the dangling pointers. After the RCU grace period, getsockopt(TCP_AO_INFO) dereferences current_key->sndid and rnext_key->rcvid from freed slab memory. Clear current_key and rnext_key in the del_async path when they reference the key being deleted. Fixes: d6732b95b6fb ("net/tcp: Allow asynchronous delete for TCP-AO keys (MKTs)") Signed-off-by: HanQuan Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260623015208.1191687-1-eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c index aa624434b5556..46eb5b4683bb5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c @@ -1776,6 +1776,10 @@ static int tcp_ao_delete_key(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_ao_info *ao_info, * them and we can just free all resources in RCU fashion. */ if (del_async) { + if (ao_info->current_key == key) + WRITE_ONCE(ao_info->current_key, NULL); + if (ao_info->rnext_key == key) + WRITE_ONCE(ao_info->rnext_key, NULL); atomic_sub(tcp_ao_sizeof_key(key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); call_rcu(&key->rcu, tcp_ao_key_free_rcu); return 0; From 92c63a5ef3c7a2136ee71324c28f1799769206a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Johansen Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 16:34:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 110/607] apparmor: advertise the tcp fast open fix is applied commit 2f6701a5ce6257ae7a64ddc6d89d0a08d2a034f8 upstream. The fix for tcp-fast-open ensures that the connect permission is being mediated correctly but it didn't add an artifact to the feature set to advertise the fix is available. Add an artifact so that the test suite can identify if the fix has not been properly applied or a new unexpected regression has occurred. Fixes: 4d587cd8a7215 ("apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg") Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/apparmor/net.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c index 44c04102062f3..1fc6145ccbb8d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -22,12 +22,14 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open", 1), { } }; struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open", 1), { } }; From e46dc0adfe39724bcf52cea47b8f9c9aed86a394 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 13:44:22 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 111/607] Linux 6.18.38 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260702155112.110058792@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield Tested-by: Peter Schneider Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260703072816.644513463@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Wentao Guan Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 74cbca8abc6cb..7ee3beedcecaa 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 6 PATCHLEVEL = 18 -SUBLEVEL = 37 +SUBLEVEL = 38 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Baby Opossum Posse From 501543207378f69778c66213759e5085ee023302 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:07:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 112/607] bpf, arm64: Reject out-of-range B.cond targets commit 48d83d94930eb4db4c93d2de44838b9455cff626 upstream. aarch64_insn_gen_cond_branch_imm() calls label_imm_common() to compute a 19-bit signed byte offset for a conditional branch, but unlike its siblings aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm() and aarch64_insn_gen_comp_branch_imm(), it does not check whether label_imm_common() returned its out-of-range sentinel (range) before feeding the value to aarch64_insn_encode_immediate(). aarch64_insn_encode_immediate() unconditionally masks the value with the 19-bit field mask, so an offset that was rejected by label_imm_common() gets silently truncated. With the sentinel value SZ_1M, the resulting field ends up with bit 18 (the sign bit of the 19-bit signed displacement) set, and the CPU decodes it as a ~1 MiB *backward* branch, producing an incorrectly targeted B.cond instruction. For code-gen locations like the emit_bpf_tail_call() this function is the only barrier between an overflowing displacement and a silently miscompiled branch. Fix it by returning AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT when the offset is out of range, so callers see a loud failure instead of a silently misencoded branch. validate_code() scans the generated image for any AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT and then lets the JIT fail. Fixes: 345e0d35ecdd ("arm64: introduce aarch64_insn_gen_cond_branch_imm()") Fixes: c94ae4f7c5ec ("arm64: insn: remove BUG_ON from codegen") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: Puranjay Mohan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260415121403.639619-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/lib/insn.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/insn.c b/arch/arm64/lib/insn.c index 4e298baddc2e5..e9e9a70ac155c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/insn.c +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/insn.c @@ -338,6 +338,8 @@ u32 aarch64_insn_gen_cond_branch_imm(unsigned long pc, unsigned long addr, long offset; offset = label_imm_common(pc, addr, SZ_1M); + if (offset >= SZ_1M) + return AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT; insn = aarch64_insn_get_bcond_value(); From 7c702bb4f8d83cc11ffcd01141b0cc2ea6e3a298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olga Kornievskaia Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:24:07 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 113/607] nfsd: update mtime/ctime on CLONE in presense of delegated attributes commit 2863bac7f49c4acd80a048ce52506a2b9c8db015 upstream. When delegated attributes are given on open, the file is opened with NOCMTIME and modifying operations do not update mtime/ctime as to not get out-of-sync with the client's delegated view. However, for CLONE operation, the server should update its view of mtime/ctime and reflect that in any GETATTR queries. Fixes: e5e9b24ab8fa ("nfsd: freeze c/mtime updates with outstanding WRITE_ATTRS delegation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever [ cel: 9be4b7e74eb7 and 3daab3112f03 are missing from linux-6.18.y ] Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 3 +++ fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- fs/nfsd/state.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 9d876f9d98be2..5bfe49502a06f 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1350,6 +1350,9 @@ nfsd4_clone(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, dst, clone->cl_dst_pos, clone->cl_count, EX_ISSYNC(cstate->current_fh.fh_export)); + if (!status && (READ_ONCE(dst->nf_file->f_mode) & FMODE_NOCMTIME) != 0) + nfsd_update_cmtime_attr(dst->nf_file, 0); + nfsd_file_put(dst); nfsd_file_put(src); out: diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index b02fe9926b093..a063a4a83ec22 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -1226,10 +1226,6 @@ static void put_deleg_file(struct nfs4_file *fp) static void nfsd4_finalize_deleg_timestamps(struct nfs4_delegation *dp, struct file *f) { - struct iattr ia = { .ia_valid = ATTR_ATIME | ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_DELEG }; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(f); - int ret; - /* don't do anything if FMODE_NOCMTIME isn't set */ if ((READ_ONCE(f->f_mode) & FMODE_NOCMTIME) == 0) return; @@ -1247,17 +1243,7 @@ static void nfsd4_finalize_deleg_timestamps(struct nfs4_delegation *dp, struct f return; /* Stamp everything to "now" */ - inode_lock(inode); - ret = notify_change(&nop_mnt_idmap, f->f_path.dentry, &ia, NULL); - inode_unlock(inode); - if (ret) { - struct inode *inode = file_inode(f); - - pr_notice_ratelimited("Unable to update timestamps on inode %02x:%02x:%lu: %d\n", - MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), - MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), - inode->i_ino, ret); - } + nfsd_update_cmtime_attr(f, ATTR_ATIME); } static void nfs4_unlock_deleg_lease(struct nfs4_delegation *dp) @@ -9434,3 +9420,31 @@ nfsd4_deleg_getattr_conflict(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct dentry *dentry, nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid); return status; } + +/** + * nfsd_update_cmtime_attr - update file's delegated ctime/mtime, + * and optionally other attributes (ie ATTR_ATIME). + * @f: pointer to an opened file + * @flags: any additional flags that should be updated + * + * Given upon opening a file delegated attributes were issues, update + * @f attributes to current times. + */ +void nfsd_update_cmtime_attr(struct file *f, unsigned int flags) +{ + int ret; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(f); + struct iattr attr = { + .ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_DELEG | flags, + }; + + inode_lock(inode); + ret = notify_change(&nop_mnt_idmap, f->f_path.dentry, &attr, NULL); + inode_unlock(inode); + if (ret) + pr_notice_ratelimited("nfsd: Unable to update timestamps on " + "inode %02x:%02x:%lu: %d\n", + MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), + MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), + inode->i_ino, ret); +} diff --git a/fs/nfsd/state.h b/fs/nfsd/state.h index aaf513ed91045..2eed2c5b3cd0c 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/state.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h @@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ extern void nfsd4_shutdown_callback(struct nfs4_client *); extern void nfsd4_shutdown_copy(struct nfs4_client *clp); void nfsd4_async_copy_reaper(struct nfsd_net *nn); bool nfsd4_has_active_async_copies(struct nfs4_client *clp); +void nfsd_update_cmtime_attr(struct file *f, unsigned int flags); extern struct nfs4_client_reclaim *nfs4_client_to_reclaim(struct xdr_netobj name, struct xdr_netobj princhash, struct nfsd_net *nn); extern bool nfs4_has_reclaimed_state(struct xdr_netobj name, struct nfsd_net *nn); From 6f88ca186a984da0c1bfdc5163b949b96a707cc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olga Kornievskaia Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:24:08 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 114/607] nfsd: update mtime/ctime on COPY in presence of delegated attributes commit 4183cf383b6faec17a0882b84cd2d901dba62b16 upstream. When delegated attributes are given on open, the file is opened with NOCMTIME and modifying operations do not update mtime/ctime as to not get out-of-sync with the client's delegated view. However, for COPY operation, the server should update its view of mtime/ctime and reflect that in any GETATTR queries. Fixes: e5e9b24ab8fa ("nfsd: freeze c/mtime updates with outstanding WRITE_ATTRS delegation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 11 ++++++++++- fs/nfsd/xdr4.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 5bfe49502a06f..98086d217aa22 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1956,8 +1956,10 @@ static int nfsd4_do_async_copy(void *data) set_bit(NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, ©->cp_flags); trace_nfsd_copy_async_done(copy); - nfsd4_send_cb_offload(copy); atomic_dec(©->cp_nn->pending_async_copies); + if (copy->cp_res.wr_bytes_written > 0 && copy->attr_update) + nfsd_update_cmtime_attr(copy->nf_dst->nf_file, 0); + nfsd4_send_cb_offload(copy); return 0; } @@ -2017,6 +2019,9 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, memcpy(&result->cb_stateid, ©->cp_stateid.cs_stid, sizeof(result->cb_stateid)); dup_copy_fields(copy, async_copy); + if ((READ_ONCE(copy->nf_dst->nf_file->f_mode) & + FMODE_NOCMTIME) != 0) + async_copy->attr_update = true; memcpy(async_copy->cp_cb_offload.co_referring_sessionid.data, cstate->session->se_sessionid.data, NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN); @@ -2035,6 +2040,10 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, } else { status = nfsd4_do_copy(copy, copy->nf_src->nf_file, copy->nf_dst->nf_file, true); + if ((READ_ONCE(copy->nf_dst->nf_file->f_mode) & + FMODE_NOCMTIME) != 0 && + copy->cp_res.wr_bytes_written > 0) + nfsd_update_cmtime_attr(copy->nf_dst->nf_file, 0); } out: trace_nfsd_copy_done(copy, status); diff --git a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h index 1ce8e12ae3354..d0ef5e7f10778 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h +++ b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h @@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ struct nfsd4_copy { struct nfsd_file *nf_src; struct nfsd_file *nf_dst; + bool attr_update; copy_stateid_t cp_stateid; From 8dee7c278f1c2b5bb80e17a6281c3812fc8b0cdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Mason Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:24:09 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 115/607] nfsd: release layout stid on setlease failure commit 30d55c8aabb261bc3f427d6b9aae7ef6206063f9 upstream. nfs4_alloc_stid() publishes the new stid into cl->cl_stateids via idr_alloc_cyclic() under cl_lock before returning to nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid(). When nfsd4_layout_setlease() then fails, the error path frees the layout stateid directly with kmem_cache_free() without ever calling idr_remove(), leaving the IDR slot pointing at freed slab memory. Any subsequent IDR walker (states_show, client teardown) dereferences the dangling pointer. The correct teardown for an IDR-published stid is nfs4_put_stid(), which removes the IDR slot under cl_lock, dispatches sc_free (nfsd4_free_layout_stateid) to release ls->ls_file via nfsd4_close_layout(), and drops the nfs4_file reference in its tail. A second issue blocks that switch: nfsd4_free_layout_stateid() unconditionally inspects ls->ls_fence_work via delayed_work_pending() under ls_lock, but INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ls->ls_fence_work, ...) currently runs only after the setlease call. On the setlease-failure path the destructor would touch an uninitialized delayed_work. nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid() nfs4_alloc_stid() /* idr_alloc_cyclic under cl_lock */ nfsd4_layout_setlease() /* fails */ nfs4_put_stid() nfsd4_free_layout_stateid() delayed_work_pending(&ls->ls_fence_work) /* needs INIT */ nfsd4_close_layout() /* nfsd_file_put(ls->ls_file) */ put_nfs4_file() Fix by hoisting the ls_fenced / ls_fence_delay / INIT_DELAYED_WORK initialization above the nfsd4_layout_setlease() call, and replace the manual nfsd_file_put + put_nfs4_file + kmem_cache_free cleanup with a single nfs4_put_stid(stp). Fixes: c5c707f96fc9 ("nfsd: implement pNFS layout recalls") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7) Signed-off-by: Chris Mason Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever [ cel: drop fence_work init hoist absent from 6.18.y ] Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c index 683bd1130afe2..62762e43f810b 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4layouts.c @@ -256,9 +256,7 @@ nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, BUG_ON(!ls->ls_file); if (nfsd4_layout_setlease(ls)) { - nfsd_file_put(ls->ls_file); - put_nfs4_file(fp); - kmem_cache_free(nfs4_layout_stateid_cache, ls); + nfs4_put_stid(stp); return NULL; } From 3603500c868a1af34283bfa64cf207c940beb033 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 12:41:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 116/607] rust: str: use the "kernel vertical" imports style [ Upstream commit 724a93a9f6033800b02a3530dbcb464638448e7f ] Convert the imports to use the "kernel vertical" imports style [1]. No functional changes intended. Link: https://docs.kernel.org/rust/coding-guidelines.html#imports [1] Reviewed-by: Gary Guo Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609104152.261145-1-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda Stable-dep-of: 3fff4271809b ("rust: str: clean unused import for Rust >= 1.98") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- rust/kernel/str.rs | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/str.rs b/rust/kernel/str.rs index 8992fedabaf0f..3a276bc32962d 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/str.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/str.rs @@ -3,14 +3,29 @@ //! String representations. use crate::{ - alloc::{flags::*, AllocError, KVec}, - error::{to_result, Result}, - fmt::{self, Write}, - prelude::*, + alloc::{ + flags::*, + AllocError, + KVec, // + }, + error::{ + to_result, + Result, // + }, + fmt::{ + self, + Write, // + }, + prelude::*, // }; use core::{ marker::PhantomData, - ops::{self, Deref, DerefMut, Index}, + ops::{ + self, + Deref, + DerefMut, + Index, // + }, // }; /// Byte string without UTF-8 validity guarantee. From 3436a7dd067c5109c98a2da3b25ec91c6825a4eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 12:41:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 117/607] rust: str: clean unused import for Rust >= 1.98 [ Upstream commit 3fff4271809b57182c4011811e96556bdd4cb2f9 ] Starting with Rust 1.98.0 (expected 2026-08-20), the compiler has changed how the resolution algorithm works [1] in upstream commit c4d84db5f184 ("Resolver: Batched import resolution."), and it now spots: error: unused import: `flags::*` --> rust/kernel/str.rs:7:9 | 7 | flags::*, | ^^^^^^^^ | = note: `-D unused-imports` implied by `-D warnings` = help: to override `-D warnings` add `#[allow(unused_imports)]` It happens to not be needed because the `prelude::*` already provides the flags. Thus clean it up. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.18.y and later (prelude added to `str`). Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/145108 [1] Reviewed-by: Gary Guo Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609104152.261145-2-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- rust/kernel/str.rs | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/str.rs b/rust/kernel/str.rs index 3a276bc32962d..22cefbc985236 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/str.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/str.rs @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ use crate::{ alloc::{ - flags::*, AllocError, KVec, // }, From 60d696a037eeeedfb57756dfe7ec08a1587c8631 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kiryl Shutsemau Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:49:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 118/607] userfaultfd: gate must_wait writability check on pte_present() [ Upstream commit 8e80af52db652fbc41320eee45a4f73bc029faf2 ] userfaultfd_must_wait() and userfaultfd_huge_must_wait() read the PTE without taking the page table lock and then apply pte_write() / huge_pte_write() to it. Those accessors decode bits from the present encoding only; on a swap or migration entry they read the offset bits that happen to share the same position and return an undefined result. The intent of the check is "is this fault still WP-blocked?". A non-marker swap entry means the page is in transit -- the userfault context the original fault delivered against is no longer the same, and the swap-in or migration completion path will re-deliver a fresh fault if userspace still needs to handle it. Worst case under the current code the garbage write bit says "wait", and the thread stays asleep until a UFFDIO_WAKE that may never arrive. Gate the writability check on pte_present() so the lockless re-check only inspects present-PTE bits when the entry is actually present. The non-present, non-marker case returns "don't wait" and lets the fault path retry. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260529172331.356655-6-kas@kernel.org Fixes: 369cd2121be4 ("userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: userfaultfd_huge_must_wait for hugepmd ranges") Fixes: 63b2d4174c4a ("userfaultfd: wp: add the writeprotect API to userfaultfd ioctl") Signed-off-by: Kiryl Shutsemau Reported-by: Sashiko AI review Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Peter Xu Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Balbir Singh Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton [ kas: apply to fs/userfaultfd.c and fold the pte_present()/ huge_pte_present() gate into the existing writability checks; this tree predates the marker/return-style refactor of these functions ] Signed-off-by: Kiryl Shutsemau Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index a67afdbbf77af..7e40eb9131bd7 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -251,7 +251,12 @@ static inline bool userfaultfd_huge_must_wait(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, */ if (huge_pte_none_mostly(pte)) ret = true; - if (!huge_pte_write(pte) && (reason & VM_UFFD_WP)) + /* + * Gate the writability check on pte_present(): huge_pte_write() on a + * non-present migration entry decodes random offset bits. The + * migration completion path re-delivers the fault if still needed. + */ + if (pte_present(pte) && !huge_pte_write(pte) && (reason & VM_UFFD_WP)) ret = true; out: return ret; @@ -326,7 +331,12 @@ static inline bool userfaultfd_must_wait(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, ptent = ptep_get(pte); if (pte_none_mostly(ptent)) ret = true; - if (!pte_write(ptent) && (reason & VM_UFFD_WP)) + /* + * Gate the writability check on pte_present(): pte_write() on a + * non-present swap/migration entry decodes random offset bits. The + * page-in path re-delivers the fault if it still needs userspace. + */ + if (pte_present(ptent) && !pte_write(ptent) && (reason & VM_UFFD_WP)) ret = true; pte_unmap(pte); From 9c86a1f930bb2ddb85f867b4736716e82a4a4683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bartosz Golaszewski Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 11:40:11 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 119/607] device property: initialize the remaining fields of fwnode_handle in fwnode_init() [ Upstream commit 7eba000621fff223dd7bab484d48918c7c77a307 ] If a firmware node is allocated on the stack (for instance: temporary software node whose life-time we control) or on the heap - but using a non-zeroing allocation function - and initialized using fwnode_init(), its secondary pointer will contain uninitialized memory which likely will be neither NULL nor IS_ERR() and so may end up being dereferenced (for example: in dev_to_swnode()). Set fwnode->secondary to NULL on initialization. While at it: initialize the remaining fields of struct fwnode_handle too just to be sure. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 01bb86b380a3 ("driver core: Add fwnode_init()") Reviewed-by: Sakari Ailus Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511074927.9473-1-bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com [ Fix typo in commit message. - Danilo ] Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/fwnode.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/fwnode.h b/include/linux/fwnode.h index 31df7608737e7..c30a9baafc0d9 100644 --- a/include/linux/fwnode.h +++ b/include/linux/fwnode.h @@ -210,8 +210,10 @@ static inline void fwnode_init(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, { fwnode->secondary = NULL; fwnode->ops = ops; + fwnode->dev = NULL; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fwnode->consumers); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fwnode->suppliers); + fwnode->flags = 0; } static inline void fwnode_set_flag(struct fwnode_handle *fwnode, From 5a4d3968cf820686400fc757a4512dcaddd84846 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yongpeng Yang Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 08:33:29 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 120/607] f2fs: remove non-uptodate folio from the page cache in move_data_block [ Upstream commit 9609dd704725a40cd63d915f2ab6c44248a44598 ] During data movement, move_data_block acquires file folio without triggering a file read. Such folio are typically not uptodate, they need to be removed from the page cache after gc complete. This patch marks folio with the PG_dropbehind flag and uses folio_end_dropbehind to remove folio from the page cache. Signed-off-by: Yunlei He Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Stable-dep-of: e0288584baa5 ("f2fs: atomic: fix UAF issue on f2fs_inode_info.atomic_inode") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/gc.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/gc.c b/fs/f2fs/gc.c index 3d9f326ae840a..c7f6312cbb101 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/gc.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/gc.c @@ -1456,7 +1456,11 @@ static int move_data_block(struct inode *inode, block_t bidx, put_out: f2fs_put_dnode(&dn); out: - f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); + if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio)) + __folio_set_dropbehind(folio); + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_end_dropbehind(folio); + folio_put(folio); return err; } From a499f77c06050a28c897bdbd86cd2f0721ae0743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 08:33:30 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 121/607] f2fs: atomic: fix UAF issue on f2fs_inode_info.atomic_inode [ Upstream commit e0288584baa5dc41df4a829a023c4c1b33fe53d7 ] - ioctl(F2FS_IOC_GARBAGE_COLLECT_RANGE) - shrink - f2fs_gc - gc_data_segment - ra_data_block(cow_inode) - mapping = F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode->i_mapping : f2fs_is_cow_file(cow_inode) is true - f2fs_evict_inode(atomic_inode) - clear_inode_flag(fi->cow_inode, FI_COW_FILE) - F2FS_I(fi->cow_inode)->atomic_inode = NULL ... - truncate_inode_pages_final(atomic_inode) - f2fs_grab_cache_folio(mapping) : create folio in atomic_inode->mapping - clear_inode(atomic_inode) - BUG_ON(atomic_inode->i_data.nrpages) We need to add a reference on fi->atomic_inode before using its mapping field during garbage collection, otherwise, it will cause UAF issue. Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Daeho Jeong Cc: Sunmin Jeong Fixes: 3db1de0e582c ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way") Fixes: f18d00769336 ("f2fs: use meta inode for GC of COW file") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/gc.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/gc.c b/fs/f2fs/gc.c index c7f6312cbb101..7219a87955b20 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/gc.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/gc.c @@ -1208,8 +1208,8 @@ static bool is_alive(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct f2fs_summary *sum, static int ra_data_block(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index) { struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode); - struct address_space *mapping = f2fs_is_cow_file(inode) ? - F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode->i_mapping : inode->i_mapping; + struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping; + struct inode *atomic_inode = NULL; struct dnode_of_data dn; struct folio *folio, *efolio; struct f2fs_io_info fio = { @@ -1224,9 +1224,22 @@ static int ra_data_block(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index) }; int err = 0; + f2fs_down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem); + if (f2fs_is_cow_file(inode)) { + atomic_inode = igrab(F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode); + if (!atomic_inode) { + f2fs_up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem); + return -EBUSY; + } + mapping = atomic_inode->i_mapping; + } + f2fs_up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem); + folio = f2fs_grab_cache_folio(mapping, index, true); - if (IS_ERR(folio)) - return PTR_ERR(folio); + if (IS_ERR(folio)) { + err = PTR_ERR(folio); + goto out_iput; + } if (f2fs_lookup_read_extent_cache_block(inode, index, &dn.data_blkaddr)) { @@ -1287,11 +1300,16 @@ static int ra_data_block(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index) f2fs_update_iostat(sbi, inode, FS_DATA_READ_IO, F2FS_BLKSIZE); f2fs_update_iostat(sbi, NULL, FS_GDATA_READ_IO, F2FS_BLKSIZE); + if (atomic_inode) + iput(atomic_inode); return 0; put_encrypted_page: f2fs_put_page(fio.encrypted_page, 1); put_folio: f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); +out_iput: + if (atomic_inode) + iput(atomic_inode); return err; } @@ -1302,8 +1320,8 @@ static int ra_data_block(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index) static int move_data_block(struct inode *inode, block_t bidx, int gc_type, unsigned int segno, int off) { - struct address_space *mapping = f2fs_is_cow_file(inode) ? - F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode->i_mapping : inode->i_mapping; + struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping; + struct inode *atomic_inode = NULL; struct f2fs_io_info fio = { .sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode), .ino = inode->i_ino, @@ -1325,10 +1343,23 @@ static int move_data_block(struct inode *inode, block_t bidx, (fio.sbi->gc_mode != GC_URGENT_HIGH) ? CURSEG_ALL_DATA_ATGC : CURSEG_COLD_DATA; + f2fs_down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem); + if (f2fs_is_cow_file(inode)) { + atomic_inode = igrab(F2FS_I(inode)->atomic_inode); + if (!atomic_inode) { + f2fs_up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem); + return -EBUSY; + } + mapping = atomic_inode->i_mapping; + } + f2fs_up_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_sem); + /* do not read out */ folio = f2fs_grab_cache_folio(mapping, bidx, false); - if (IS_ERR(folio)) - return PTR_ERR(folio); + if (IS_ERR(folio)) { + err = PTR_ERR(folio); + goto out_iput; + } if (!check_valid_map(F2FS_I_SB(inode), segno, off)) { err = -ENOENT; @@ -1461,6 +1492,9 @@ static int move_data_block(struct inode *inode, block_t bidx, folio_unlock(folio); folio_end_dropbehind(folio); folio_put(folio); +out_iput: + if (atomic_inode) + iput(atomic_inode); return err; } diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index 171cd4172025f..c2aa52b025465 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -853,10 +853,15 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode) f2fs_abort_atomic_write(inode, true); if (fi->cow_inode && f2fs_is_cow_file(fi->cow_inode)) { - clear_inode_flag(fi->cow_inode, FI_COW_FILE); - F2FS_I(fi->cow_inode)->atomic_inode = NULL; - iput(fi->cow_inode); + struct inode *cow_inode = fi->cow_inode; + + f2fs_down_write(&F2FS_I(cow_inode)->i_sem); + clear_inode_flag(cow_inode, FI_COW_FILE); + F2FS_I(cow_inode)->atomic_inode = NULL; fi->cow_inode = NULL; + f2fs_up_write(&F2FS_I(cow_inode)->i_sem); + + iput(cow_inode); } trace_f2fs_evict_inode(inode); From 4ce2d52f680c1d8bfdad7cce05b815ea7ca9790d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 10:09:34 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 122/607] f2fs: bound i_inline_xattr_size for non-inline-xattr inodes [ Upstream commit 378acf3cf19b6af6cba55e8dd1154c4e1504bae8 ] When the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled, do_read_inode() loads the on-disk i_inline_xattr_size unconditionally: if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi)) fi->i_inline_xattr_size = le16_to_cpu(ri->i_inline_xattr_size); but sanity_check_inode() only range-checks it when the inode also has the FI_INLINE_XATTR flag set. An inode that carries an inline dentry or inline data but not FI_INLINE_XATTR -- the normal layout for an inline directory -- therefore keeps a fully attacker-controlled i_inline_xattr_size from a crafted image. get_inline_xattr_addrs() returns that value with no flag gating, so it feeds the inode geometry: MAX_INLINE_DATA() = 4 * (CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size - 1) NR_INLINE_DENTRY() = MAX_INLINE_DATA() * BITS_PER_BYTE / (...) addrs_per_page() = CUR_ADDRS_PER_INODE - i_inline_xattr_size A large i_inline_xattr_size drives MAX_INLINE_DATA() and NR_INLINE_DENTRY() negative, so make_dentry_ptr_inline() sets d->max (int) to a negative value. The inline directory walk then compares an unsigned long bit_pos against that negative d->max, which is promoted to a huge unsigned bound, and reads far past the inline area: while (bit_pos < d->max) /* fs/f2fs/dir.c */ ... test_bit_le(bit_pos, d->bitmap) / d->dentry[bit_pos] ... Mounting a crafted image and reading such a directory triggers an out-of-bounds read in f2fs_fill_dentries(); the same underflow also corrupts ADDRS_PER_INODE for regular files. Validate i_inline_xattr_size against MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE whenever the flexible_inline_xattr feature is enabled -- i.e. whenever the value is loaded from disk and consumed -- and keep the lower MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE bound gated on inodes that actually carry an inline xattr, so legitimate inodes with i_inline_xattr_size == 0 are still accepted. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 6afc662e68b5 ("f2fs: support flexible inline xattr size") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inode.c b/fs/f2fs/inode.c index c2aa52b025465..90cc20232f760 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/inode.c @@ -318,9 +318,9 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inode *inode, struct folio *node_folio) } if (f2fs_sb_has_flexible_inline_xattr(sbi) && - f2fs_has_inline_xattr(inode) && - (fi->i_inline_xattr_size < MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE || - fi->i_inline_xattr_size > MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE)) { + (fi->i_inline_xattr_size > MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE || + (f2fs_has_inline_xattr(inode) && + fi->i_inline_xattr_size < MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE))) { f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx) has corrupted i_inline_xattr_size: %d, min: %zu, max: %lu", __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_inline_xattr_size, MIN_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE, MAX_INLINE_XATTR_SIZE); From 998536c96b6ad9d99cd85dea11452ab83dc7c88d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruipeng Qi Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 14:03:16 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 123/607] f2fs: fix potential deadlock in f2fs_balance_fs() [ Upstream commit dd3114870771562036fdcf5abe813956f36d224d ] When the f2fs filesystem space is nearly exhausted, we encounter deadlock issues as below: INFO: task A:1890 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G O 6.12.41-g3fe07ddf05ab #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:A state:D stack:0 pid:1890 tgid:1626 ppid:1153 flags:0x00000204 Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x158 __schedule+0x27c/0x908 schedule+0x3c/0x118 io_schedule+0x44/0x68 folio_wait_bit_common+0x174/0x370 folio_wait_bit+0x20/0x38 folio_wait_writeback+0x54/0xc8 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x70/0x1e0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x1b0/0x450 truncate_pagecache+0x54/0x88 f2fs_file_write_iter+0x3e8/0xb80 do_iter_readv_writev+0xf0/0x1e0 vfs_writev+0x138/0x2c8 do_writev+0x88/0x130 __arm64_sys_writev+0x28/0x40 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x30/0xf8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 INFO: task kworker/u8:11:2680853 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G O 6.12.41-g3fe07ddf05ab #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u8:11 state:D stack:0 pid:2680853 tgid:2680853 ppid:2 flags:0x00000208 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:0) Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x158 __schedule+0x27c/0x908 schedule+0x3c/0x118 io_schedule+0x44/0x68 folio_wait_bit_common+0x174/0x370 __filemap_get_folio+0x214/0x348 pagecache_get_page+0x20/0x70 f2fs_get_read_data_page+0x150/0x3e8 f2fs_get_lock_data_page+0x2c/0x160 move_data_page+0x50/0x478 do_garbage_collect+0xd38/0x1528 f2fs_gc+0x240/0x7e0 f2fs_balance_fs+0x1a0/0x208 f2fs_write_single_data_page+0x6e4/0x730 f2fs_write_cache_pages+0x378/0x9b0 f2fs_write_data_pages+0x2e4/0x388 do_writepages+0x8c/0x2c8 __writeback_single_inode+0x4c/0x498 writeback_sb_inodes+0x234/0x4a8 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x58/0x118 wb_writeback+0x2f8/0x3c0 wb_workfn+0x2c4/0x508 process_one_work+0x180/0x408 worker_thread+0x258/0x368 kthread+0x118/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x200 INFO: task kworker/u8:8:2641297 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G O 6.12.41-g3fe07ddf05ab #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u8:8 state:D stack:0 pid:2641297 tgid:2641297 ppid:2 flags:0x00000208 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-254:0) Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x158 __schedule+0x27c/0x908 rt_mutex_schedule+0x30/0x60 __rt_mutex_slowlock_locked.constprop.0+0x460/0x8a8 rwbase_write_lock+0x24c/0x378 down_write+0x1c/0x30 f2fs_balance_fs+0x184/0x208 f2fs_write_inode+0xf4/0x328 __writeback_single_inode+0x370/0x498 writeback_sb_inodes+0x234/0x4a8 __writeback_inodes_wb+0x58/0x118 wb_writeback+0x2f8/0x3c0 wb_workfn+0x2c4/0x508 process_one_work+0x180/0x408 worker_thread+0x258/0x368 kthread+0x118/0x128 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 INFO: task B:1902 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G O 6.12.41-g3fe07ddf05ab #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:B state:D stack:0 pid:1902 tgid:1626 ppid:1153 flags:0x0000020c Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x158 __schedule+0x27c/0x908 rt_mutex_schedule+0x30/0x60 __rt_mutex_slowlock_locked.constprop.0+0x460/0x8a8 rwbase_write_lock+0x24c/0x378 down_write+0x1c/0x30 f2fs_balance_fs+0x184/0x208 f2fs_map_blocks+0x94c/0x1110 f2fs_file_write_iter+0x228/0xb80 do_iter_readv_writev+0xf0/0x1e0 vfs_writev+0x138/0x2c8 do_writev+0x88/0x130 __arm64_sys_writev+0x28/0x40 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x30/0xf8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 INFO: task sync:2769849 blocked for more than 120 seconds. Tainted: G O 6.12.41-g3fe07ddf05ab #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:sync state:D stack:0 pid:2769849 tgid:2769849 ppid:736 flags:0x0000020c Call trace: __switch_to+0xf4/0x158 __schedule+0x27c/0x908 schedule+0x3c/0x118 wb_wait_for_completion+0xb0/0xe8 sync_inodes_sb+0xc8/0x2b0 sync_inodes_one_sb+0x24/0x38 iterate_supers+0xa8/0x138 ksys_sync+0x54/0xc8 __arm64_sys_sync+0x18/0x30 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x30/0xf8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x198 The root cause is a potential deadlock between the following tasks: kworker/u8:11 Thread A - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - folio_start_writeback(X) - f2fs_outplace_write_data - bio_add_folio(X) - folio_unlock(X) - truncate_inode_pages_range - __filemap_get_folio(X, FGP_LOCK) - truncate_inode_partial_folio(X) - folio_wait_writeback(X) - f2fs_balance_fs - f2fs_gc - do_garbage_collect - move_data_page - f2fs_get_lock_data_page - __filemap_get_folio(X, FGP_LOCK) Both threads try to access folio X. Thread A holds the lock but waits for writeback, while kworker waits for the lock. This causes a deadlock. Other threads also enter D state, waiting for locks such as gc_lock and writepages. OPU/IPU DATA folio are all affected by this issue. To avoid such potential deadlocks, always commit these cached folios before triggering f2fs_gc() in f2fs_balance_fs(). Suggested-by: Chao Yu Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Ruipeng Qi Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Stable-dep-of: 8b4468ec023d ("f2fs: fix potential deadlock in gc_merge path of f2fs_balance_fs()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/data.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 + fs/f2fs/segment.c | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index 89105b22a0243..0f0f2d60fe699 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -898,6 +898,35 @@ void f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, } } +void f2fs_submit_all_merged_ipu_writes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) +{ + struct bio_entry *be, *tmp; + struct f2fs_bio_info *io; + enum temp_type temp; + + for (temp = HOT; temp < NR_TEMP_TYPE; temp++) { + LIST_HEAD(list); + + io = sbi->write_io[DATA] + temp; + + /* A lockless list_empty() check is safe here: any bios from + * other kworkers that we miss will be submitted by those + * kworkers accordingly. + */ + if (list_empty(&io->bio_list)) + continue; + + f2fs_down_write(&io->bio_list_lock); + list_splice_init(&io->bio_list, &list); + f2fs_up_write(&io->bio_list_lock); + + list_for_each_entry_safe(be, tmp, &list, list) { + f2fs_submit_write_bio(sbi, be->bio, DATA); + del_bio_entry(be); + } + } +} + int f2fs_merge_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio) { struct bio *bio = *fio->bio; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index a77858bd38779..ad6f08a30e9dc 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -4084,6 +4084,7 @@ void f2fs_submit_merged_write_cond(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t ino, enum page_type type); void f2fs_submit_merged_ipu_write(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct bio **bio, struct folio *folio); +void f2fs_submit_all_merged_ipu_writes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); void f2fs_flush_merged_writes(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); int f2fs_submit_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio); int f2fs_merge_page_bio(struct f2fs_io_info *fio); diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c index a7cf8627d8881..7acfb52a5fa13 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c @@ -461,6 +461,14 @@ void f2fs_balance_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool need) .should_migrate_blocks = false, .err_gc_skipped = false, .nr_free_secs = 1 }; + + /* + * Submit all cached OPU/IPU DATA bios before triggering + * foreground GC to avoid potential deadlocks. + */ + f2fs_submit_merged_write(sbi, DATA); + f2fs_submit_all_merged_ipu_writes(sbi); + f2fs_down_write(&sbi->gc_lock); stat_inc_gc_call_count(sbi, FOREGROUND); f2fs_gc(sbi, &gc_control); From 89479a27fa4e1e11f378b3724944eabceb84f114 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 14:03:17 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 124/607] f2fs: fix potential deadlock in gc_merge path of f2fs_balance_fs() [ Upstream commit 8b4468ec023d0d1b4669dfb867588997cc03a06b ] When we mount device w/ gc_merge mount option, we may suffer below potential deadlock: Kworker GC trehad Truncator - f2fs_write_cache_pages - f2fs_write_single_data_page - f2fs_do_write_data_page - folio_start_writeback --- set writeback flag on folio - f2fs_outplace_write_data : cached folio in internal bio cache - f2fs_balance_fs - wake_up(gc_thread) : wake up gc thread to run foreground GC - finish_wait(fggc_wq) : wait on the waitqueue --- wait on GC thread to finish the work - truncate_inode_pages_range - __filemap_get_folio(, FGP_LOCK) --- lock folio - truncate_inode_partial_folio - folio_wait_writeback --- wait on writeback being cleared - do_garbage_collect - move_data_page - f2fs_get_lock_data_folio - lock on folio --- blocked on folio's lock In order to avoid such deadlock, let's call below functions to commit cached bios in GC_MERGE path of f2fs_balance_fs() as the same as we did in NOGC_MERGE path. - f2fs_submit_merged_write(sbi, DATA); - f2fs_submit_all_merged_ipu_writes(sbi); Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 351df4b20115 ("f2fs: add segment operations") Cc: Ruipeng Qi Reported: Sandeep Dhavale Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c index 7acfb52a5fa13..0a080cb55c414 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c @@ -443,6 +443,13 @@ void f2fs_balance_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool need) if (has_enough_free_secs(sbi, 0, 0)) return; + /* + * Submit all cached OPU/IPU DATA bios before triggering + * foreground GC to avoid potential deadlocks. + */ + f2fs_submit_merged_write(sbi, DATA); + f2fs_submit_all_merged_ipu_writes(sbi); + if (test_opt(sbi, GC_MERGE) && sbi->gc_thread && sbi->gc_thread->f2fs_gc_task) { DEFINE_WAIT(wait); @@ -462,13 +469,6 @@ void f2fs_balance_fs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool need) .err_gc_skipped = false, .nr_free_secs = 1 }; - /* - * Submit all cached OPU/IPU DATA bios before triggering - * foreground GC to avoid potential deadlocks. - */ - f2fs_submit_merged_write(sbi, DATA); - f2fs_submit_all_merged_ipu_writes(sbi); - f2fs_down_write(&sbi->gc_lock); stat_inc_gc_call_count(sbi, FOREGROUND); f2fs_gc(sbi, &gc_control); From ec9f79c8d5b28a928e65b67cd138c841571cf502 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keshav Verma Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 14:39:41 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 125/607] f2fs: fix listxattr handling of corrupted xattr entries [ Upstream commit 5ef5bc304f23c3fe255d4936472378dcb74d0e94 ] Validate the xattr entry before reading its fields in f2fs_listxattr(). Return -EFSCORRUPTED when the entry is outside the valid xattr storage area instead of returning a successful partial result. Fixes: 688078e7f36c ("f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Keshav Verma Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c index b4e5c406632f8..8cb0de2a5bcf9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c @@ -581,8 +581,6 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) size_t prefix_len; size_t size; - prefix = f2fs_xattr_prefix(entry->e_name_index, dentry); - if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr || (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) { f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "list inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr", @@ -590,9 +588,11 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK); f2fs_handle_error(F2FS_I_SB(inode), ERROR_CORRUPTED_XATTR); - break; + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto cleanup; } + prefix = f2fs_xattr_prefix(entry->e_name_index, dentry); if (!prefix) continue; From 599d7d82eeecc0c2f0704831ed16055e8b8e9603 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 09:01:02 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 126/607] f2fs: use memalloc_retry_wait() as much as possible [ Upstream commit 30a8496694f1a93328e5d7f19206380346918b5a ] memalloc_retry_wait() is recommended in memory allocation retry logic, use it as much as possible. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Stable-dep-of: 8712353ed80f ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/super.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c index 0a080cb55c414..e1def471857a2 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int __replace_atomic_write_block(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, err = f2fs_get_dnode_of_data(&dn, index, ALLOC_NODE); if (err) { if (err == -ENOMEM) { - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + memalloc_retry_wait(GFP_NOFS); goto retry; } return err; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index 9154f702e1706..fc4a2e915ca09 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -3128,7 +3128,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type, &folio, &fsdata); if (unlikely(err)) { if (err == -ENOMEM) { - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + memalloc_retry_wait(GFP_NOFS); goto retry; } set_sbi_flag(F2FS_SB(sb), SBI_QUOTA_NEED_REPAIR); From 8dbc4c56868205bf41b0a3f0eb7e856017349b9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 09:01:03 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 127/607] f2fs: introduce f2fs_schedule_timeout() [ Upstream commit 76e780d88c771921ea643fb8a6c8d0b08c17cb7b ] In f2fs retry logic, we will call f2fs_io_schedule_timeout() to sleep as uninterruptible state (waiting for IO) for a while, however, in several paths below, we are not blocked by IO: - f2fs_write_single_data_page() return -EAGAIN due to racing on cp_rwsem. - f2fs_flush_device_cache() failed to submit preflush command. - __issue_discard_cmd_range() sleeps periodically in between two in batch discard submissions. So, in order to reveal state of task more accurate, let's introduce f2fs_schedule_timeout() and call it in above paths in where we are waiting for non-IO reasons. Then we can get real reason of uninterruptible sleep for a thread in tracepoint, perfetto, etc. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Stable-dep-of: 8712353ed80f ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 4 ++-- fs/f2fs/compress.c | 4 ++-- fs/f2fs/data.c | 4 ++-- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 22 +++++++++++++++------- fs/f2fs/segment.c | 4 ++-- fs/f2fs/super.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c index c27509d4b6ef4..739f46eb866c8 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c @@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ void f2fs_wait_on_all_pages(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type) f2fs_submit_merged_write(sbi, DATA); prepare_to_wait(&sbi->cp_wait, &wait, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); - io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); } finish_wait(&sbi->cp_wait, &wait); } @@ -1986,7 +1986,7 @@ void f2fs_flush_ckpt_thread(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) /* Let's wait for the previous dispatched checkpoint. */ while (atomic_read(&cprc->queued_ckpt)) - io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); } void f2fs_init_ckpt_req_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/compress.c b/fs/f2fs/compress.c index ae36bb1f93519..0399db98fccfc 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/compress.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/compress.c @@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ static void cancel_cluster_writeback(struct compress_ctx *cc, f2fs_submit_merged_write(F2FS_I_SB(cc->inode), DATA); while (atomic_read(&cic->pending_pages) != (cc->valid_nr_cpages - submitted + 1)) - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); } /* Cancel writeback and stay locked. */ @@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ static int f2fs_write_raw_pages(struct compress_ctx *cc, */ if (IS_NOQUOTA(cc->inode)) goto out; - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + f2fs_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); goto retry_write; } goto out; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c index 0f0f2d60fe699..872169b91913c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/data.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c @@ -3214,8 +3214,8 @@ static int f2fs_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping, } else if (ret == -EAGAIN) { ret = 0; if (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL) { - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout( - DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + f2fs_schedule_timeout( + DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); goto retry_write; } goto next; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index ad6f08a30e9dc..b96e5bc66ef7d 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -665,8 +665,8 @@ enum { #define DEFAULT_RETRY_IO_COUNT 8 /* maximum retry read IO or flush count */ -/* congestion wait timeout value, default: 20ms */ -#define DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT (msecs_to_jiffies(20)) +/* IO/non-IO congestion wait timeout value, default: 20ms */ +#define DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT (msecs_to_jiffies(20)) /* timeout value injected, default: 1000ms */ #define DEFAULT_FAULT_TIMEOUT (msecs_to_jiffies(1000)) @@ -4940,22 +4940,30 @@ static inline bool f2fs_block_unit_discard(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) return F2FS_OPTION(sbi).discard_unit == DISCARD_UNIT_BLOCK; } -static inline void f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(long timeout) +static inline void __f2fs_schedule_timeout(long timeout, bool io) { set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); - io_schedule_timeout(timeout); + if (io) + io_schedule_timeout(timeout); + else + schedule_timeout(timeout); } +#define f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(timeout) \ + __f2fs_schedule_timeout(timeout, true) +#define f2fs_schedule_timeout(timeout) \ + __f2fs_schedule_timeout(timeout, false) + static inline void f2fs_io_schedule_timeout_killable(long timeout) { while (timeout) { if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) return; set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); - io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); - if (timeout <= DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT) + io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); + if (timeout <= DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT) return; - timeout -= DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT; + timeout -= DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; } } diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c index e1def471857a2..5e2789cd96b5e 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c @@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ int f2fs_flush_device_cache(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) do { ret = __submit_flush_wait(sbi, FDEV(i).bdev); if (ret) - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + f2fs_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); } while (ret && --count); if (ret) { @@ -3480,7 +3480,7 @@ static unsigned int __issue_discard_cmd_range(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, blk_finish_plug(&plug); mutex_unlock(&dcc->cmd_lock); trimmed += __wait_all_discard_cmd(sbi, NULL); - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + f2fs_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); goto next; } skip: diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index fc4a2e915ca09..f6b75ce11d1c1 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -2656,7 +2656,7 @@ static int f2fs_enable_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) /* we should flush all the data to keep data consistency */ while (get_pages(sbi, F2FS_DIRTY_DATA)) { writeback_inodes_sb_nr(sbi->sb, nr_pages, WB_REASON_SYNC); - f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_IO_TIMEOUT); + f2fs_io_schedule_timeout(DEFAULT_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT); if (f2fs_time_over(sbi, ENABLE_TIME)) break; From ed87e57558dc573439503da8247cd3a14f1d07f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YH Lin Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 09:01:04 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 128/607] f2fs: optimize trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint with enums [ Upstream commit 8d1cb17aca466b361cca17834b8bb1cf3e3d1818 ] This patch optimizes the tracepoint by replacing these hardcoded strings with a new enumeration f2fs_cp_phase. 1.Defines enum f2fs_cp_phase with values for each checkpoint phase. 2.Updates trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint to accept a u16 phase argument instead of a string pointer. 3.Uses __print_symbolic in TP_printk to convert the enum values back to their corresponding strings for human-readable trace output. This change reduces the storage overhead for each trace event by replacing a variable-length string with a 2-byte integer, while maintaining the same readable output in ftrace. Signed-off-by: YH Lin Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Stable-dep-of: 8712353ed80f ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c | 6 +++--- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 6 ++++++ include/trace/events/f2fs.h | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c index 739f46eb866c8..66d3714dda32a 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c @@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ int f2fs_write_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct cp_control *cpc) goto out; } - trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint(sbi->sb, cpc->reason, "start block_ops"); + trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint(sbi->sb, cpc->reason, CP_PHASE_START_BLOCK_OPS); err = block_operations(sbi); if (err) @@ -1693,7 +1693,7 @@ int f2fs_write_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct cp_control *cpc) stat_cp_time(cpc, CP_TIME_OP_LOCK); - trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint(sbi->sb, cpc->reason, "finish block_ops"); + trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint(sbi->sb, cpc->reason, CP_PHASE_FINISH_BLOCK_OPS); f2fs_flush_merged_writes(sbi); @@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ int f2fs_write_checkpoint(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct cp_control *cpc) /* update CP_TIME to trigger checkpoint periodically */ f2fs_update_time(sbi, CP_TIME); - trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint(sbi->sb, cpc->reason, "finish checkpoint"); + trace_f2fs_write_checkpoint(sbi->sb, cpc->reason, CP_PHASE_FINISH_CHECKPOINT); out: if (cpc->reason != CP_RESIZE) f2fs_up_write(&sbi->cp_global_sem); diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index b96e5bc66ef7d..163ce8e2a8f52 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -319,6 +319,12 @@ struct cp_control { struct cp_stats stats; }; +enum f2fs_cp_phase { + CP_PHASE_START_BLOCK_OPS, + CP_PHASE_FINISH_BLOCK_OPS, + CP_PHASE_FINISH_CHECKPOINT, +}; + /* * indicate meta/data type */ diff --git a/include/trace/events/f2fs.h b/include/trace/events/f2fs.h index edbbd869078f0..abf5bc7dad9a0 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/f2fs.h +++ b/include/trace/events/f2fs.h @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(CP_PAUSE); TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(CP_RESIZE); TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(EX_READ); TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(EX_BLOCK_AGE); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(CP_PHASE_START_BLOCK_OPS); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(CP_PHASE_FINISH_BLOCK_OPS); +TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(CP_PHASE_FINISH_CHECKPOINT); #define show_block_type(type) \ __print_symbolic(type, \ @@ -175,6 +178,12 @@ TRACE_DEFINE_ENUM(EX_BLOCK_AGE); #define S_ALL_PERM (S_ISUID | S_ISGID | S_ISVTX | \ S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO) +#define show_cp_phase(phase) \ + __print_symbolic(phase, \ + { CP_PHASE_START_BLOCK_OPS, "start block_ops" }, \ + { CP_PHASE_FINISH_BLOCK_OPS, "finish block_ops" }, \ + { CP_PHASE_FINISH_CHECKPOINT, "finish checkpoint" }) + struct f2fs_sb_info; struct f2fs_io_info; struct extent_info; @@ -1541,26 +1550,26 @@ TRACE_EVENT(f2fs_readpages, TRACE_EVENT(f2fs_write_checkpoint, - TP_PROTO(struct super_block *sb, int reason, const char *msg), + TP_PROTO(struct super_block *sb, int reason, u16 phase), - TP_ARGS(sb, reason, msg), + TP_ARGS(sb, reason, phase), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(dev_t, dev) __field(int, reason) - __string(dest_msg, msg) + __field(u16, phase) ), TP_fast_assign( __entry->dev = sb->s_dev; __entry->reason = reason; - __assign_str(dest_msg); + __entry->phase = phase; ), TP_printk("dev = (%d,%d), checkpoint for %s, state = %s", show_dev(__entry->dev), show_cpreason(__entry->reason), - __get_str(dest_msg)) + show_cp_phase(__entry->phase)) ); DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(f2fs_discard, From 3f42fbd3c891dc05de20301903b85a181b5309f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 09:01:05 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 129/607] f2fs: detect more inconsistent cases in sanity_check_node_footer() [ Upstream commit 93ffb6c28ff180560d2d7313ac106efcd9e012b8 ] Let's enhance sanity_check_node_footer() to detect more inconsistent cases as below: Node Type Node Footer Info =================== ============================= NODE_TYPE_REGULAR inode = true and xnode = true NODE_TYPE_INODE inode = false or xnode = true NODE_TYPE_XATTR inode = true or xnode = false NODE_TYPE_NON_INODE inode = false Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Stable-dep-of: 8712353ed80f ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/node.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c index feb152c21d2eb..9c28e8f451baf 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/node.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c @@ -1504,20 +1504,29 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, struct folio *folio, pgoff_t nid, enum node_type ntype, bool in_irq) { + bool is_inode, is_xnode; + if (unlikely(nid != nid_of_node(folio))) goto out_err; + is_inode = IS_INODE(folio); + is_xnode = f2fs_has_xattr_block(ofs_of_node(folio)); + switch (ntype) { + case NODE_TYPE_REGULAR: + if (is_inode && is_xnode) + goto out_err; + break; case NODE_TYPE_INODE: - if (!IS_INODE(folio)) + if (!is_inode || is_xnode) goto out_err; break; case NODE_TYPE_XATTR: - if (!f2fs_has_xattr_block(ofs_of_node(folio))) + if (is_inode || !is_xnode) goto out_err; break; case NODE_TYPE_NON_INODE: - if (IS_INODE(folio)) + if (is_inode) goto out_err; break; default: From 406c28af75123432d38cf9bbaa6f1476f7b14770 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 09:01:06 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 130/607] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on f2fs_get_node_folio_ra() [ Upstream commit 8712353ed80f87271d732297567dcdbe4b84e8c7 ] kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/file.c:845! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5336 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x1115/0x1140 fs/f2fs/file.c:845 Code: fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 8b 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b e8 83 9d 9a fd 48 89 df 48 c7 c6 60 d1 1a 8c e8 54 f1 fc fc 90 0f 0b e8 6c 9d 9a fd 90 <0f> 0b e8 64 9d 9a fd 90 0f 0b 90 e9 93 fd ff ff e8 56 9d 9a fd 90 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e4474c0 EFLAGS: 00010283 RAX: ffffffff842b1d34 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000100000 RDX: ffffc9000f03a000 RSI: 0000000000035503 RDI: 0000000000035504 RBP: ffffc9000e447608 R08: ffff8880123b0000 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: 00000000fffffffe R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 1ffff92001c88ea0 R15: 00000000ffff039c FS: 00007f7e02ee36c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c887000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ff0305c4000 CR3: 0000000012d4c000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:882 f2fs_truncate+0x471/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:940 f2fs_evict_inode+0xa3f/0x1ac0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:907 evict+0x61e/0xb10 fs/inode.c:841 f2fs_fill_super+0x5f43/0x78f0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5224 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x431/0x4f0 fs/super.c:1694 vfs_get_tree+0x92/0x2a0 fs/super.c:1754 fc_mount fs/namespace.c:1193 [inline] do_new_mount_fc fs/namespace.c:3758 [inline] do_new_mount+0x341/0xd30 fs/namespace.c:3834 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4167 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4383 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x31d/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4360 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f count = ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode); count -= dn.ofs_in_node; f2fs_bug_on(sbi, count < 0); The fuzz test will trigger above bug_on in f2fs. The root cause should be: in the corrupted inode, there is a direct node which has the same ino and nid in its footer, so in f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(), after f2fs_get_dnode_of_data() finds such dnode: 1) ADDRS_PER_PAGE(dn.node_folio, inode) will return 923 2) once dn.ofs_in_node points to addr[923, 1017] Then it will trigger the system panic. Let's introduce NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE to indicate current node should not be an inode or xattr node, and then use it in below path to detect inconsistent node chain in inode mapping table: - f2fs_do_truncate_blocks - f2fs_get_dnode_of_data - f2fs_get_node_folio_ra - __get_node_folio - f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer - case NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE -> check whether it is inode|xnode Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+2488d8d751b27f7ce268@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69fa3697.170a0220.59368.0018.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 + fs/f2fs/node.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 163ce8e2a8f52..f1d7a22293b37 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -1533,6 +1533,7 @@ enum node_type { NODE_TYPE_INODE, NODE_TYPE_XATTR, NODE_TYPE_NON_INODE, + NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE, /* non inode and xnode */ }; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c index 9c28e8f451baf..3918021553311 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/node.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c @@ -1529,6 +1529,10 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_node_footer(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, if (is_inode) goto out_err; break; + case NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE: + if (is_inode || is_xnode) + goto out_err; + break; default: break; } @@ -1622,7 +1626,7 @@ static struct folio *f2fs_get_node_folio_ra(struct folio *parent, int start) struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_F_SB(parent); nid_t nid = get_nid(parent, start, false); - return __get_node_folio(sbi, nid, parent, start, NODE_TYPE_REGULAR); + return __get_node_folio(sbi, nid, parent, start, NODE_TYPE_NON_IXNODE); } static void flush_inline_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t ino) From 076b1aa65f77a49bce5a48a4a55a397cfcafa2b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn> Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 11:19:43 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 131/607] fbdev: fbcon: fix out-of-bounds read in err_out of fbcon_do_set_font() [ Upstream commit 8fdc8c2057eea08d40ce2c8eed41ff9e451c65c2 ] When fbcon_do_set_font() fails (e.g., due to a memory allocation failure inside vc_resize() under heavy memory pressure), it jumps to the `err_out` label to roll back the console state. However, the current rollback logic forgets to restore the `hi_font` state, leading to a severe state machine corruption. Earlier in the function, `set_vc_hi_font()` might be called to change `vc->vc_hi_font_mask` and mutate the screen buffer. If `vc_resize()` subsequently fails, the `err_out` path restores `vc_font.charcount` but entirely skips rolling back the `vc_hi_font_mask` and the screen buffer. This mismatch leaves the terminal in a desynchronized state. Because `vc_hi_font_mask` remains set, the VT subsystem will still accept character indices greater than 255 from userspace and write them to the screen buffer. Subsequent rendering calls (e.g., `fbcon_putcs()`) will then use these inflated indices to access the reverted, 256-character font array, leading to a deterministic out-of-bounds read and potential kernel memory disclosure. Fix this by adding the missing rollback logic for the `hi_font` mask and screen buffer in the error path. Fixes: a5a923038d70 ("fbdev: fbcon: Properly revert changes when vc_resize() failed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann Signed-off-by: Helge Deller [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 8baad7ec1b856..926905ad46a30 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2422,6 +2422,7 @@ static int fbcon_do_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, int w, int h, int charcount, struct fbcon_display *p = &fb_display[vc->vc_num]; int resize, ret, old_userfont, old_width, old_height, old_charcount; u8 *old_data = vc->vc_font.data; + unsigned short old_hi_font_mask = vc->vc_hi_font_mask; resize = (w != vc->vc_font.width) || (h != vc->vc_font.height); vc->vc_font.data = (void *)(p->fontdata = data); @@ -2475,6 +2476,12 @@ static int fbcon_do_set_font(struct vc_data *vc, int w, int h, int charcount, vc->vc_font.height = old_height; vc->vc_font.charcount = old_charcount; + /* Restore the hi_font state and screen buffer */ + if (old_hi_font_mask && !vc->vc_hi_font_mask) + set_vc_hi_font(vc, true); + else if (!old_hi_font_mask && vc->vc_hi_font_mask) + set_vc_hi_font(vc, false); + return ret; } From c4b70c1512b8f9f33f23c2c8196dfd1210207681 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xingquan Liu Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 11:13:47 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 132/607] net/sched: dualpi2: fix GSO backlog accounting commit 05ed733b65ab977dd931e7f7ac0f62fdb81205c2 upstream. When DualPI2 splits a GSO skb into N segments, it propagates N additional packets to its parent before returning NET_XMIT_SUCCESS. The parent then accounts for the original skb once more, leaving its qlen one larger than the number of packets actually queued. With QFQ as the parent, after all real packets are dequeued, QFQ still has a non-zero qlen while its in-service aggregate has no active classes. qfq_choose_next_agg() returns NULL and qfq_dequeue() passes the result to qfq_peek_skb(), causing a NULL pointer dereference. Follow the same pattern used by tbf_segment() and taprio: count only successfully queued segments, propagate the difference between the original skb and those segments, and return NET_XMIT_SUCCESS whenever at least one segment was queued. Fixes: 8f9516daedd6 ("sched: Add enqueue/dequeue of dualpi2 qdisc") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xingquan Liu Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Reviewed-by: Victor Nogueira Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619151447.223640-1-b1n@b1n.io Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c b/net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c index efa32240c5a95..6beb6f5bbff1a 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_dualpi2.c @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static int dualpi2_qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(nskb)) return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free); - cnt = 1; + cnt = 0; byte_len = 0; orig_len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb); skb_list_walk_safe(nskb, nskb, next) { @@ -489,16 +489,15 @@ static int dualpi2_qdisc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, byte_len += nskb->len; } } - if (cnt > 1) { + if (cnt > 0) { /* The caller will add the original skb stats to its * backlog, compensate this if any nskb is enqueued. */ - --cnt; - byte_len -= orig_len; + qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(sch, 1 - cnt, + orig_len - byte_len); } - qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(sch, -cnt, -byte_len); consume_skb(skb); - return err; + return cnt > 0 ? NET_XMIT_SUCCESS : err; } return dualpi2_enqueue_skb(skb, sch, to_free); } From 05e48af3bf58d0a73ab3e20a16c1a25a0546f379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NeilBrown Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 12:55:13 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 133/607] nfsd: move name lookup out of nfsd4_list_rec_dir() [ Upstream commit 89bd77cf436bf25e448817a662ebf76515f22863 ] nfsd4_list_rec_dir() is called with two different callbacks. One of the callbacks uses vfs_rmdir() to remove the directory. The other doesn't use the dentry at all, just the name. As only one callback needs the dentry, this patch moves the lookup into that callback. This prepares of changes to how directory operations are locked. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Stable-dep-of: 4552f4e3f2c9 ("nfsd: change nfs4_client_to_reclaim() to allocate data") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c index 3ea4b8a861631..8ab0b26c1f91a 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp) nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred); } -typedef int (recdir_func)(struct dentry *, struct dentry *, struct nfsd_net *); +typedef int (recdir_func)(struct dentry *, char *, struct nfsd_net *); struct name_list { char name[HEXDIR_LEN]; @@ -291,24 +291,14 @@ nfsd4_list_rec_dir(recdir_func *f, struct nfsd_net *nn) } status = iterate_dir(nn->rec_file, &ctx.ctx); - inode_lock_nested(d_inode(dir), I_MUTEX_PARENT); list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ctx.names, list) { - if (!status) { - struct dentry *dentry; - dentry = lookup_one(&nop_mnt_idmap, - &QSTR(entry->name), dir); - if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { - status = PTR_ERR(dentry); - break; - } - status = f(dir, dentry, nn); - dput(dentry); - } + if (!status) + status = f(dir, entry->name, nn); + list_del(&entry->list); kfree(entry); } - inode_unlock(d_inode(dir)); nfs4_reset_creds(original_cred); list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ctx.names, list) { @@ -406,18 +396,19 @@ nfsd4_remove_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp) } static int -purge_old(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *child, struct nfsd_net *nn) +purge_old(struct dentry *parent, char *cname, struct nfsd_net *nn) { int status; + struct dentry *child; struct xdr_netobj name; - if (child->d_name.len != HEXDIR_LEN - 1) { - printk("%s: illegal name %pd in recovery directory\n", - __func__, child); + if (strlen(cname) != HEXDIR_LEN - 1) { + printk("%s: illegal name %s in recovery directory\n", + __func__, cname); /* Keep trying; maybe the others are OK: */ return 0; } - name.data = kmemdup_nul(child->d_name.name, child->d_name.len, GFP_KERNEL); + name.data = kstrdup(cname, GFP_KERNEL); if (!name.data) { dprintk("%s: failed to allocate memory for name.data!\n", __func__); @@ -427,10 +418,17 @@ purge_old(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *child, struct nfsd_net *nn) if (nfs4_has_reclaimed_state(name, nn)) goto out_free; - status = vfs_rmdir(&nop_mnt_idmap, d_inode(parent), child); - if (status) - printk("failed to remove client recovery directory %pd\n", - child); + inode_lock_nested(d_inode(parent), I_MUTEX_PARENT); + child = lookup_one(&nop_mnt_idmap, &QSTR(cname), parent); + if (!IS_ERR(child)) { + status = vfs_rmdir(&nop_mnt_idmap, d_inode(parent), child); + if (status) + printk("failed to remove client recovery directory %pd\n", + child); + dput(child); + } + inode_unlock(d_inode(parent)); + out_free: kfree(name.data); out: @@ -461,18 +459,18 @@ nfsd4_recdir_purge_old(struct nfsd_net *nn) } static int -load_recdir(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *child, struct nfsd_net *nn) +load_recdir(struct dentry *parent, char *cname, struct nfsd_net *nn) { struct xdr_netobj name; struct xdr_netobj princhash = { .len = 0, .data = NULL }; - if (child->d_name.len != HEXDIR_LEN - 1) { - printk("%s: illegal name %pd in recovery directory\n", - __func__, child); + if (strlen(cname) != HEXDIR_LEN - 1) { + printk("%s: illegal name %s in recovery directory\n", + __func__, cname); /* Keep trying; maybe the others are OK: */ return 0; } - name.data = kmemdup_nul(child->d_name.name, child->d_name.len, GFP_KERNEL); + name.data = kstrdup(cname, GFP_KERNEL); if (!name.data) { dprintk("%s: failed to allocate memory for name.data!\n", __func__); From 2539f67b75461f21cb0ff66127b910988f97dc51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NeilBrown Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2025 11:38:33 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 134/607] nfsd: change nfs4_client_to_reclaim() to allocate data [ Upstream commit 4552f4e3f2c96597914f07b060d5c5db84420ddd ] The calling convention for nfs4_client_to_reclaim() is clumsy in that the caller needs to free memory if the function fails. It is much cleaner if the function frees its own memory. This patch changes nfs4_client_to_reclaim() to re-allocate the .data fields to be stored in the newly allocated struct nfs4_client_reclaim, and to free everything on failure. __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall() needs to allocate the data anyway to copy it from user-space, so now that data is allocated twice. I think that is a small price to pay for a cleaner interface. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c | 67 +++++++++++++++---------------------------- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 22 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c index 8ab0b26c1f91a..8c5b5b8a5c880 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c @@ -147,24 +147,13 @@ legacy_recdir_name_error(struct nfs4_client *clp, int error) static void __nfsd4_create_reclaim_record_grace(struct nfs4_client *clp, - const char *dname, int len, struct nfsd_net *nn) + char *dname, struct nfsd_net *nn) { - struct xdr_netobj name; + struct xdr_netobj name = { .len = strlen(dname), .data = dname }; struct xdr_netobj princhash = { .len = 0, .data = NULL }; struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp; - name.data = kmemdup(dname, len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!name.data) { - dprintk("%s: failed to allocate memory for name.data!\n", - __func__); - return; - } - name.len = len; crp = nfs4_client_to_reclaim(name, princhash, nn); - if (!crp) { - kfree(name.data); - return; - } crp->cr_clp = clp; } @@ -223,8 +212,7 @@ nfsd4_create_clid_dir(struct nfs4_client *clp) inode_unlock(d_inode(dir)); if (status == 0) { if (nn->in_grace) - __nfsd4_create_reclaim_record_grace(clp, dname, - HEXDIR_LEN, nn); + __nfsd4_create_reclaim_record_grace(clp, dname, nn); vfs_fsync(nn->rec_file, 0); } else { printk(KERN_ERR "NFSD: failed to write recovery record" @@ -461,7 +449,7 @@ nfsd4_recdir_purge_old(struct nfsd_net *nn) static int load_recdir(struct dentry *parent, char *cname, struct nfsd_net *nn) { - struct xdr_netobj name; + struct xdr_netobj name = { .len = HEXDIR_LEN, .data = cname }; struct xdr_netobj princhash = { .len = 0, .data = NULL }; if (strlen(cname) != HEXDIR_LEN - 1) { @@ -470,16 +458,7 @@ load_recdir(struct dentry *parent, char *cname, struct nfsd_net *nn) /* Keep trying; maybe the others are OK: */ return 0; } - name.data = kstrdup(cname, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!name.data) { - dprintk("%s: failed to allocate memory for name.data!\n", - __func__); - goto out; - } - name.len = HEXDIR_LEN; - if (!nfs4_client_to_reclaim(name, princhash, nn)) - kfree(name.data); -out: + nfs4_client_to_reclaim(name, princhash, nn); return 0; } @@ -777,6 +756,8 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const struct cld_msg_v2 __user *cmsg, { uint8_t cmd, princhashlen; struct xdr_netobj name, princhash = { .len = 0, .data = NULL }; + char *namecopy __free(kfree) = NULL; + char *princhashcopy __free(kfree) = NULL; uint16_t namelen; if (get_user(cmd, &cmsg->cm_cmd)) { @@ -794,20 +775,20 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const struct cld_msg_v2 __user *cmsg, dprintk("%s: invalid namelen (%u)", __func__, namelen); return -EINVAL; } - name.data = memdup_user(&ci->cc_name.cn_id, namelen); - if (IS_ERR(name.data)) - return PTR_ERR(name.data); + namecopy = memdup_user(&ci->cc_name.cn_id, namelen); + if (IS_ERR(namecopy)) + return PTR_ERR(namecopy); + name.data = namecopy; name.len = namelen; if (get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len)) return -EFAULT; if (princhashlen > 0) { - princhash.data = memdup_user( - &ci->cc_princhash.cp_data, - princhashlen); - if (IS_ERR(princhash.data)) { - kfree(name.data); - return PTR_ERR(princhash.data); - } + princhashcopy = memdup_user( + &ci->cc_princhash.cp_data, + princhashlen); + if (IS_ERR(princhashcopy)) + return PTR_ERR(princhashcopy); + princhash.data = princhashcopy; princhash.len = princhashlen; } else princhash.len = 0; @@ -821,9 +802,10 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const struct cld_msg_v2 __user *cmsg, dprintk("%s: invalid namelen (%u)", __func__, namelen); return -EINVAL; } - name.data = memdup_user(&cnm->cn_id, namelen); - if (IS_ERR(name.data)) - return PTR_ERR(name.data); + namecopy = memdup_user(&cnm->cn_id, namelen); + if (IS_ERR(namecopy)) + return PTR_ERR(namecopy); + name.data = namecopy; name.len = namelen; } #ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_LEGACY_CLIENT_TRACKING @@ -831,15 +813,12 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const struct cld_msg_v2 __user *cmsg, struct cld_net *cn = nn->cld_net; name.len = name.len - 5; - memmove(name.data, name.data + 5, name.len); + name.data = name.data + 5; cn->cn_has_legacy = true; } #endif - if (!nfs4_client_to_reclaim(name, princhash, nn)) { - kfree(name.data); - kfree(princhash.data); + if (!nfs4_client_to_reclaim(name, princhash, nn)) return -EFAULT; - } return nn->client_tracking_ops->msglen; } return -EFAULT; diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index a063a4a83ec22..a3e6076a3e645 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -8831,9 +8831,6 @@ nfs4_has_reclaimed_state(struct xdr_netobj name, struct nfsd_net *nn) /* * failure => all reset bets are off, nfserr_no_grace... - * - * The caller is responsible for freeing name.data if NULL is returned (it - * will be freed in nfs4_remove_reclaim_record in the normal case). */ struct nfs4_client_reclaim * nfs4_client_to_reclaim(struct xdr_netobj name, struct xdr_netobj princhash, @@ -8842,6 +8839,22 @@ nfs4_client_to_reclaim(struct xdr_netobj name, struct xdr_netobj princhash, unsigned int strhashval; struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp; + name.data = kmemdup(name.data, name.len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name.data) { + dprintk("%s: failed to allocate memory for name.data!\n", + __func__); + return NULL; + } + if (princhash.len) { + princhash.data = kmemdup(princhash.data, princhash.len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!princhash.data) { + dprintk("%s: failed to allocate memory for princhash.data!\n", + __func__); + kfree(name.data); + return NULL; + } + } else + princhash.data = NULL; crp = alloc_reclaim(); if (crp) { strhashval = clientstr_hashval(name); @@ -8853,6 +8866,9 @@ nfs4_client_to_reclaim(struct xdr_netobj name, struct xdr_netobj princhash, crp->cr_princhash.len = princhash.len; crp->cr_clp = NULL; nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl_size++; + } else { + kfree(name.data); + kfree(princhash.data); } return crp; } From 1c2672781b1b30533bdd7d4f50e4573256c9e7ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pedro Falcato Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 16:13:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 135/607] mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing [There is no upstream commit, as this code was removed by upstream commit 044925f9b565 ("mm: fs: remove filemap_nr_thps*() functions and their users")] As-is, khugepaged and writable-file opening exclude each other. A file cannot be open writeable and have THPs (because the filesystem is not aware of them). khugepaged will never collapse file pages for files that are opened writeable. On an open(O_RDWR/O_WRONLY), the page cache for that particular file is dropped. This is fine because nothing could've been dirtied. However, there is an edge-case: collapse_file() might not be able to coexist with concurrent writers, but it can coexist with dirty folios (from previous writers). Therefore, the following can happen: open(file, O_RDWR) write(file) close(file) madvise(file_mapping, MADV_COLLAPSE, some non-dirty range) open(file, O_RDWR) nr_thps > 0 truncate_inode_pages() /* THPs are cleared out, but so are the dirty folios */ When this edge-case happens, there is data loss, as the dirty folios are fully discarded. Fix it by fully writing back the page cache (and waiting) when collapsing file THPs. Doing so provides the guarantee that no dirty folio will be observed while there are active THPs. To fully ensure this is safe, the invalidate_lock needs to be held while doing the writeout, so that do_dentry_open()'s page cache truncation excludes this write-and-wait. As a side effect, move the nr_thps counter bumping outside the i_pages lock. This is correct since the counter itself is an atomic_t and the producer <-> consumer correctness is provided by a full memory barrier: smp_mb() in collapse_file()/memory barrier implied by full ordering in get_write_access() -> atomic_inc_unless_negative(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Song Liu Cc: Eric Hagberg Cc: Zi Yan Fixes: 99cb0dbd47a1 ("mm,thp: add read-only THP support for (non-shmem) FS") Reported-by: Gregg Leventhal Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAFN_u7H_0ECF3jixP=T=U7AH5=Q3wQNvJMo8an3VqUDMerQfUw@mail.gmail.com/ Tested-by: Zi Yan Tested-by: Lance Yang Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index 3dcd884c844e8..01a5d443ffc58 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -2077,32 +2077,43 @@ static int collapse_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, goto xa_unlocked; } - if (!is_shmem) { +xa_locked: + xas_unlock_irq(&xas); +xa_unlocked: + + /* + * If collapse is successful, flush must be done now before copying. + * If collapse is unsuccessful, does flush actually need to be done? + * Do it anyway, to clear the state. + */ + try_to_unmap_flush(); + + if (result == SCAN_SUCCEED && !is_shmem && !mapping_large_folio_support(mapping)) { + /* + * invalidate_lock as shared excludes against concurrent opens + * in do_dentry_open() truncating the page cache. This is + * particularly important if there are dirty folios in transit. + */ + filemap_invalidate_lock_shared(mapping); filemap_nr_thps_inc(mapping); /* * Paired with the fence in do_dentry_open() -> get_write_access() * to ensure i_writecount is up to date and the update to nr_thps * is visible. Ensures the page cache will be truncated if the - * file is opened writable. + * file is opened writable. If collapse looks to be successful, + * flush any dirty pages out the page cache. With the nr_thps + * incremented, there won't be any new writers (nor new dirties). */ smp_mb(); - if (inode_is_open_for_write(mapping->host)) { + if (inode_is_open_for_write(mapping->host) || filemap_write_and_wait(mapping)) { result = SCAN_FAIL; filemap_nr_thps_dec(mapping); + filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared(mapping); + goto rollback; } + filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared(mapping); } -xa_locked: - xas_unlock_irq(&xas); -xa_unlocked: - - /* - * If collapse is successful, flush must be done now before copying. - * If collapse is unsuccessful, does flush actually need to be done? - * Do it anyway, to clear the state. - */ - try_to_unmap_flush(); - if (result == SCAN_SUCCEED && nr_none && !shmem_charge(mapping->host, nr_none)) result = SCAN_FAIL; From 2dca62902eb3501432ee9bd098fce878cfbb2c1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2025 15:30:34 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 136/607] slab: Introduce kmalloc_flex() and family commit e4c8b46b924eb8de66c6f0accc9cdd0c2e8fa23b upstream. As done for kmalloc_obj*(), introduce a type-aware allocator for flexible arrays, which may also have "counted_by" annotations: ptr = kmalloc(struct_size(ptr, flex_member, count), gfp); becomes: ptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count, gfp); The internal use of __flex_counter() allows for automatically setting the counter member of a struct's flexible array member when it has been annotated with __counted_by(), avoiding any missed early size initializations while __counted_by() annotations are added to the kernel. Additionally, this also checks for "too large" allocations based on the type size of the counter variable. For example: if (count > type_max(ptr->flex_counter)) fail...; size = struct_size(ptr, flex_member, count); ptr = kmalloc(size, gfp); if (!ptr) fail...; ptr->flex_counter = count; becomes (n.b. unchanged from earlier example): ptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count, gfp); if (!ptr) fail...; ptr->flex_counter = count; Note that manual initialization of the flexible array counter is still required (at some point) after allocation as not all compiler versions support the __counted_by annotation yet. But doing it internally makes sure they cannot be missed when __counted_by _is_ available, meaning that the bounds checker will not trip due to the lack of "early enough" initializations that used to work before enabling the stricter bounds checking. For example: ptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count, gfp); fill(ptr->flex, count); ptr->flex_count = count; This works correctly before adding a __counted_by annotation (since nothing is checking ptr->flex accesses against ptr->flex_count). After adding the annotation, the bounds sanitizer would trip during fill() because ptr->flex_count wasn't set yet. But with kmalloc_flex() setting ptr->flex_count internally at allocation time, the existing code works without needing to move the ptr->flex_count assignment before the call to fill(). (This has been a stumbling block for __counted_by adoption.) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251203233036.3212363-4-kees@kernel.org Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Kees Cook [Backport-notes: Removed the actual flex counter handling. That's a new feature, which isn't necessary for just adding the new allocation APIs to get backports to apply cleanly. Also, the allocation-time overflow check in the upstream commit was reverted upstream.] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/process/deprecated.rst | 7 +++++ include/linux/slab.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst index 91c628fa2d59c..fed56864d0363 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst @@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ allocations. For example, these open coded assignments:: ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr), gfp); ptr = kmalloc_array(count, sizeof(*ptr), gfp); ptr = kcalloc(count, sizeof(*ptr), gfp); + ptr = kmalloc(struct_size(ptr, flex_member, count), gfp); ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct foo, gfp); become, respectively:: @@ -395,4 +396,10 @@ become, respectively:: ptr = kzalloc_obj(*ptr, gfp); ptr = kmalloc_objs(*ptr, count, gfp); ptr = kzalloc_objs(*ptr, count, gfp); + ptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count, gfp); __auto_type ptr = kmalloc_obj(struct foo, gfp); + +If `ptr->flex_member` is annotated with __counted_by(), the allocation +will automatically fail if `count` is larger than the maximum +representable value that can be stored in the counter member associated +with `flex_member`. diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h index cbb64a2698f5d..67f5b9831c56b 100644 --- a/include/linux/slab.h +++ b/include/linux/slab.h @@ -982,6 +982,27 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); (TYPE *)KMALLOC(__obj_size, GFP); \ }) +/** + * __alloc_flex - Allocate an object that has a trailing flexible array + * @KMALLOC: kmalloc wrapper function to use for allocation. + * @GFP: GFP flags for the allocation. + * @TYPE: type of structure to allocate space for. + * @FAM: The name of the flexible array member of @TYPE structure. + * @COUNT: how many @FAM elements to allocate space for. + * + * Returns: Newly allocated pointer to @TYPE with @COUNT-many trailing + * @FAM elements, or NULL on failure or if @COUNT cannot be represented + * by the member of @TYPE that counts the @FAM elements (annotated via + * __counted_by()). + */ +#define __alloc_flex(KMALLOC, GFP, TYPE, FAM, COUNT) \ +({ \ + const size_t __count = (COUNT); \ + const size_t __obj_size = struct_size_t(TYPE, FAM, __count); \ + TYPE *__obj_ptr = KMALLOC(__obj_size, GFP); \ + __obj_ptr; \ +}) + /** * kmalloc_obj - Allocate a single instance of the given type * @VAR_OR_TYPE: Variable or type to allocate. @@ -1005,23 +1026,44 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); #define kmalloc_objs(VAR_OR_TYPE, COUNT, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kmalloc, GFP, typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), COUNT) +/** + * kmalloc_flex - Allocate a single instance of the given flexible structure + * @VAR_OR_TYPE: Variable or type to allocate (with its flex array). + * @FAM: The name of the flexible array member of the structure. + * @COUNT: How many flexible array member elements are desired. + * @GFP: GFP flags for the allocation. + * + * Returns: newly allocated pointer to @VAR_OR_TYPE on success, NULL on + * failure. If @FAM has been annotated with __counted_by(), the allocation + * will immediately fail if @COUNT is larger than what the type of the + * struct's counter variable can represent. + */ +#define kmalloc_flex(VAR_OR_TYPE, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ + __alloc_flex(kmalloc, GFP, typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), FAM, COUNT) + /* All kzalloc aliases for kmalloc_(obj|objs|flex). */ #define kzalloc_obj(P, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), 1) #define kzalloc_objs(P, COUNT, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), COUNT) +#define kzalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ + __alloc_flex(kzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) /* All kvmalloc aliases for kmalloc_(obj|objs|flex). */ #define kvmalloc_obj(P, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kvmalloc, GFP, typeof(P), 1) #define kvmalloc_objs(P, COUNT, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kvmalloc, GFP, typeof(P), COUNT) +#define kvmalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ + __alloc_flex(kvmalloc, GFP, typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) /* All kvzalloc aliases for kmalloc_(obj|objs|flex). */ #define kvzalloc_obj(P, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kvzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), 1) #define kvzalloc_objs(P, COUNT, GFP) \ __alloc_objs(kvzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), COUNT) +#define kvzalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ + __alloc_flex(kvzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) #define kmem_buckets_alloc(_b, _size, _flags) \ alloc_hooks(__kmalloc_node_noprof(PASS_BUCKET_PARAMS(_size, _b), _flags, NUMA_NO_NODE)) From 50c26b461b8e7b547c7ee71deca9db3ecf4d1036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 16:14:11 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 137/607] add default_gfp() helper macro and use it in the new *alloc_obj() helpers commit e19e1b480ac73c3e62ffebbca1174f0f511f43e7 upstream. Most simple allocations use GFP_KERNEL, and with the new allocation helpers being introduced, let's just take advantage of that to simplify that default case. It's a numbers game: git grep 'alloc_obj(' | sed 's/.*\(GFP_[_A-Z]*\).*/\1/' | sort | uniq -c | sort -n | tail shows that about 90% of all those new allocator instances just use that standard GFP_KERNEL. Those helpers are already macros, and we can easily just make it be the default case when the gfp argument is missing. And yes, we could do that for all the legacy interfaces too, but let's keep it to just the new ones at least for now, since those all got converted recently anyway, so this is not any "extra" noise outside of that limited conversion. And, in fact, I want to do this before doing the -rc1 release, exactly so that we don't get extra merge conflicts. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/gfp.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/slab.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h index b155929af5b11..09559f7126ac7 100644 --- a/include/linux/gfp.h +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ struct vm_area_struct; struct mempolicy; +/* Helper macro to avoid gfp flags if they are the default one */ +#define __default_gfp(a,...) a +#define default_gfp(...) __default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__ __VA_OPT__(,) GFP_KERNEL) + /* Convert GFP flags to their corresponding migrate type */ #define GFP_MOVABLE_MASK (__GFP_RECLAIMABLE|__GFP_MOVABLE) #define GFP_MOVABLE_SHIFT 3 diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h index 67f5b9831c56b..976c781a78420 100644 --- a/include/linux/slab.h +++ b/include/linux/slab.h @@ -1011,8 +1011,8 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); * Returns: newly allocated pointer to a @VAR_OR_TYPE on success, or NULL * on failure. */ -#define kmalloc_obj(VAR_OR_TYPE, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kmalloc, GFP, typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), 1) +#define kmalloc_obj(VAR_OR_TYPE, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kmalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), 1) /** * kmalloc_objs - Allocate an array of the given type @@ -1023,8 +1023,8 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); * Returns: newly allocated pointer to array of @VAR_OR_TYPE on success, * or NULL on failure. */ -#define kmalloc_objs(VAR_OR_TYPE, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kmalloc, GFP, typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), COUNT) +#define kmalloc_objs(VAR_OR_TYPE, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kmalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), COUNT) /** * kmalloc_flex - Allocate a single instance of the given flexible structure @@ -1038,32 +1038,32 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); * will immediately fail if @COUNT is larger than what the type of the * struct's counter variable can represent. */ -#define kmalloc_flex(VAR_OR_TYPE, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_flex(kmalloc, GFP, typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), FAM, COUNT) +#define kmalloc_flex(VAR_OR_TYPE, FAM, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_flex(kmalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(VAR_OR_TYPE), FAM, COUNT) /* All kzalloc aliases for kmalloc_(obj|objs|flex). */ -#define kzalloc_obj(P, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), 1) -#define kzalloc_objs(P, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), COUNT) -#define kzalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_flex(kzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) +#define kzalloc_obj(P, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kzalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), 1) +#define kzalloc_objs(P, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kzalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), COUNT) +#define kzalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_flex(kzalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) /* All kvmalloc aliases for kmalloc_(obj|objs|flex). */ -#define kvmalloc_obj(P, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kvmalloc, GFP, typeof(P), 1) -#define kvmalloc_objs(P, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kvmalloc, GFP, typeof(P), COUNT) -#define kvmalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_flex(kvmalloc, GFP, typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) +#define kvmalloc_obj(P, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kvmalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), 1) +#define kvmalloc_objs(P, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kvmalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), COUNT) +#define kvmalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_flex(kvmalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) /* All kvzalloc aliases for kmalloc_(obj|objs|flex). */ -#define kvzalloc_obj(P, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kvzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), 1) -#define kvzalloc_objs(P, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_objs(kvzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), COUNT) -#define kvzalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, GFP) \ - __alloc_flex(kvzalloc, GFP, typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) +#define kvzalloc_obj(P, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kvzalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), 1) +#define kvzalloc_objs(P, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_objs(kvzalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), COUNT) +#define kvzalloc_flex(P, FAM, COUNT, ...) \ + __alloc_flex(kvzalloc, default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__), typeof(P), FAM, COUNT) #define kmem_buckets_alloc(_b, _size, _flags) \ alloc_hooks(__kmalloc_node_noprof(PASS_BUCKET_PARAMS(_size, _b), _flags, NUMA_NO_NODE)) From 1776f29327a136aed6c80c720740489d0b6d015c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2026 09:33:08 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 138/607] default_gfp(): avoid using the "newfangled" __VA_OPT__ trick commit 551d44200152cb26f75d2ef990aeb6185b7e37fd upstream. The default_gfp() helper that I added is not wrong, but it turns out that it causes unnecessary headaches for 'sparse' which doesn't support the use of __VA_OPT__ (introduced in C++20 and C23, and supported by gcc and clang for a long time). We do already use __VA_OPT__ in some other cases in the kernel (drm/xe and btrfs), but it has been fairly limited. Now it triggers for pretty much everything, and sparse ends up not working at all. We can use the traditional gcc ',##__VA_ARGS__' syntax instead: it may not be the "C standard" way and is slightly less natural in this context, but it is the traditional model for this and avoids the sparse problem. Reported-and-tested-by: Ricardo Ribalda Reported-and-tested-by: Richard Fitzgerald Reported-by: Ben Dooks Fixes: e19e1b480ac7 ("add default_gfp() helper macro and use it in the new *alloc_obj() helpers") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/gfp.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h index 09559f7126ac7..647b3db8a7574 100644 --- a/include/linux/gfp.h +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ struct vm_area_struct; struct mempolicy; /* Helper macro to avoid gfp flags if they are the default one */ -#define __default_gfp(a,...) a -#define default_gfp(...) __default_gfp(__VA_ARGS__ __VA_OPT__(,) GFP_KERNEL) +#define __default_gfp(a,b,...) b +#define default_gfp(...) __default_gfp(,##__VA_ARGS__,GFP_KERNEL) /* Convert GFP flags to their corresponding migrate type */ #define GFP_MOVABLE_MASK (__GFP_RECLAIMABLE|__GFP_MOVABLE) From 47e4c6e06e78ec7b38bcba41ef52fe08d1952b38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Randy Dunlap Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 09:31:25 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 139/607] slab: recognize @GFP parameter as optional in kernel-doc commit 7b5f5865fb11e60edd03c5e063e2d228b7062317 upstream. Since the @GFP parameter in kmalloc_obj() etc. is now optional, change the kernel-doc to indicate that it is optional. This avoids kernel-doc warnings: WARNING: include/linux/slab.h:1101 Excess function parameter 'GFP' description in 'kmalloc_obj' WARNING: include/linux/slab.h:1113 Excess function parameter 'GFP' description in 'kmalloc_objs' WARNING: include/linux/slab.h:1128 Excess function parameter 'GFP' description in 'kmalloc_flex' Fixes: e19e1b480ac7 ("add default_gfp() helper macro and use it in the new *alloc_obj() helpers") Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap Acked-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617163125.2716279-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/slab.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h index 976c781a78420..22daf3f34a76f 100644 --- a/include/linux/slab.h +++ b/include/linux/slab.h @@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); /** * kmalloc_obj - Allocate a single instance of the given type * @VAR_OR_TYPE: Variable or type to allocate. - * @GFP: GFP flags for the allocation. + * @...: optional GFP flags for the allocation (GFP_KERNEL when not specified). * * Returns: newly allocated pointer to a @VAR_OR_TYPE on success, or NULL * on failure. @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); * kmalloc_objs - Allocate an array of the given type * @VAR_OR_TYPE: Variable or type to allocate an array of. * @COUNT: How many elements in the array. - * @GFP: GFP flags for the allocation. + * @...: optional GFP flags for the allocation (GFP_KERNEL when not specified). * * Returns: newly allocated pointer to array of @VAR_OR_TYPE on success, * or NULL on failure. @@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node); * @VAR_OR_TYPE: Variable or type to allocate (with its flex array). * @FAM: The name of the flexible array member of the structure. * @COUNT: How many flexible array member elements are desired. - * @GFP: GFP flags for the allocation. + * @...: optional GFP flags for the allocation (GFP_KERNEL when not specified). * * Returns: newly allocated pointer to @VAR_OR_TYPE on success, NULL on * failure. If @FAM has been annotated with __counted_by(), the allocation From 9baa2833e6bc83180da22c532b56555e1034b2d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Fainelli Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 12:23:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 140/607] perf trace beauty fcntl: Fix build with older kernel headers commit 7ee7f48413c42b90230de4a8e40898b757bc8e82 upstream. Toolchains with older kernel headers that do not include upstream commit c75b1d9421f80f41 ("fs: add fcntl() interface for setting/getting write life time hints") will now fail to build perf due to missing definitions for F_GET_RW_HINT/F_SET_RW_HINT/F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT/F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT. Provide a fallback definition for these when they are not already defined. Fixes: 9c47f66748381ecb ("perf trace beauty fcntl: Basic 'arg' beautifier") Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli Cc: Adrian Hunter Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: James Clark Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Markus Mayer Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/trace/beauty/fcntl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/perf/trace/beauty/fcntl.c b/tools/perf/trace/beauty/fcntl.c index d075904dccced..e1b99b8f55eb0 100644 --- a/tools/perf/trace/beauty/fcntl.c +++ b/tools/perf/trace/beauty/fcntl.c @@ -9,6 +9,22 @@ #include #include +#ifndef F_GET_RW_HINT +#define F_GET_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 11) +#endif + +#ifndef F_SET_RW_HINT +#define F_SET_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 12) +#endif + +#ifndef F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT +#define F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 13) +#endif + +#ifndef F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT +#define F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 14) +#endif + static size_t fcntl__scnprintf_getfd(unsigned long val, char *bf, size_t size, bool show_prefix) { return val ? scnprintf(bf, size, "%s", "0") : From 0d0187a46b16efc00e4a6bf682e8423814ee693f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 09:22:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 141/607] KVM: x86: Move update_cr8_intercept() to lapic.c MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream Commit c7722e5e1daeeabbd9f969554d52bb7158120b27 ] Move update_cr8_intercept() to lapic.c so that it's globally visible in anticipation of extracting most of the register-specific code out of x86.c and into a new compilation unit. Opportunistically prefix the helper kvm_lapic_ to make its role/scope more obvious. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Kai Huang Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260529222223.870923-14-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Carlos López Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 34 +++------------------------------- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index 0e842dad4194a..4a6a8d8c7626f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -2754,6 +2754,32 @@ u64 kvm_lapic_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return (tpr & 0xf0) >> 4; } +void kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + int max_irr, tpr; + + if (!kvm_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept) + return; + + if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) + return; + + if (vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active) + return; + + if (!vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr) + max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu); + else + max_irr = -1; + + if (max_irr != -1) + max_irr >>= 4; + + tpr = kvm_lapic_get_cr8(vcpu); + + kvm_x86_call(update_cr8_intercept)(vcpu, tpr, max_irr); +} + static void __kvm_apic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value) { u64 old_value = vcpu->arch.apic_base; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h index e5f5a222eced0..959380b4c067f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ int kvm_apic_accept_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_lapic_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event); u64 kvm_lapic_get_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_lapic_set_tpr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr8); +void kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_lapic_set_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_apic_set_version(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void kvm_apic_after_set_mcg_cap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index a21ebe04aa23a..28771be285a13 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE); KVM_X2APIC_ENABLE_SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST | \ KVM_X2APIC_DISABLE_SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST) -static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); static void process_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); static void __kvm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags); static void store_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); @@ -5357,7 +5356,7 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, r = kvm_apic_set_state(vcpu, s); if (r) return r; - update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); + kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); return 0; } @@ -10565,33 +10564,6 @@ static void post_kvm_run_save(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_run->flags |= KVM_RUN_X86_GUEST_MODE; } -static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) -{ - int max_irr, tpr; - - if (!kvm_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept) - return; - - if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu)) - return; - - if (vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active) - return; - - if (!vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_addr) - max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu); - else - max_irr = -1; - - if (max_irr != -1) - max_irr >>= 4; - - tpr = kvm_lapic_get_cr8(vcpu); - - kvm_x86_call(update_cr8_intercept)(vcpu, tpr, max_irr); -} - - int kvm_check_nested_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) { @@ -11298,7 +11270,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_x86_call(enable_irq_window)(vcpu); if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu)) { - update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); + kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(vcpu); } } @@ -12424,7 +12396,7 @@ static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs, kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->tr, VCPU_SREG_TR); kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR); - update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); + kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); /* Older userspace won't unhalt the vcpu on reset. */ if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) && kvm_rip_read(vcpu) == 0xfff0 && From 3dcfb04dd43b16fa1240fc6487fff578ad57264c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 09:22:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 142/607] KVM: VMX: Grab vmcs12 on CR8 interception update iff vCPU is in guest mode MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit 7ef78d71ca713d8c00f7c34ddcf276c808143f77 ] When updating CR8 intercepts, get vmcs12 if and only if the vCPU is in guest mode so that a future change can have update CR8 intercepts during vCPU creation, without running afoul of get_vmcs12()'s lockdep assertion. ------------[ cut here ]------------ debug_locks && !(lock_is_held(&(&vcpu->mutex)->dep_map) || !refcount_read(&vcpu->kvm->users_count)) WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:61 at get_vmcs12 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:60 [inline], CPU#0: syz.2.19/5879 WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:61 at vmx_update_cr8_intercept+0x3de/0x4e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6879, CPU#0: syz.2.19/5879 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5879 Comm: syz.2.19 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:get_vmcs12 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h:60 [inline] RIP: 0010:vmx_update_cr8_intercept+0x3de/0x4e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6879 Call Trace: apic_update_ppr arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:984 [inline] kvm_lapic_reset+0x1c24/0x2980 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:3023 kvm_vcpu_reset+0x44c/0x1bf0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12986 kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x746/0x8b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12847 kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu+0x428/0x930 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4201 kvm_vm_ioctl+0x893/0xd50 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5159 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f No functional change intended. Reported-by: syzbot ci Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a2adf3b.3b0a2d4e.8c8d1.0012.GAE@google.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-ID: <20260618174347.1981064-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Carlos López Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index b7798ced7b505..d7a2b75b6c915 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6734,11 +6734,10 @@ static noinstr void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) void vmx_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr) { - struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); int tpr_threshold; if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && - nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) + nested_cpu_has(get_vmcs12(vcpu), CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) return; tpr_threshold = (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) ? 0 : irr; From ff9c4c6428883182960cfe5c78928f0896d80ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Carlos=20L=C3=B3pez?= Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 09:22:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 143/607] KVM: x86: Unconditionally recompute CR8 intercept on PPR update MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Upstream commit bb365a506b1e6fb050c0fceaad354fe395385ef0 ] The TPR_THRESHOLD field in the VMCS is used by VMX to induce VM exits when the guest's virtual TPR falls under the specified threshold, allowing KVM to inject previously masked interrupts. KVM handles these VM exits in handle_tpr_below_threshold(). Commit eb90f3417a0c ("KVM: vmx: speed up TPR below threshold vmexits") optimized this function by calling apic_update_ppr() instead of raising KVM_REQ_EVENT. apic_update_ppr() then raises KVM_REQ_EVENT if there is a pending, deliverable interrupt. However, if there are no new interrupts pending, apic_update_ppr() does not issue the request. Thus, kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() and vmx_update_cr8_intercept() are not called before VM entry, which results in a high, stale TPR_THRESHOLD. This is problematic due to the following sentence in 28.2.1.1 "VM-Execution Control Fields" in the SDM: The following check is performed if the “use TPR shadow” VM-execution control is 1 and the “virtualize APIC accesses” and “virtual-interrupt delivery” VM-execution controls are both 0: the value of bits 3:0 of the TPR threshold VM-execution control field should not be greater than the value of bits 7:4 of VTPR. This error condition is typically not observed when KVM runs on a bare metal system because modern processors support APICv, which enables virtual-interrupt delivery, and which KVM uses when possible. This causes the processor to no longer generate TPR-below-threshold exits and to no longer check TPR_THRESHOLD on entry. However, when running on older platforms, or under nested virtualization on a hypervisor that does not support virtual-interrupt delivery and enforces this check (like Hyper-V) this can cause a VM entry failure with hardware error 0x7, as seen in [1]. Call kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() if apic_update_ppr() does not find a deliverable interrupt (and thus does not raise KVM_REQ_EVENT). Remove calls to kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept() on paths that end up in apic_update_ppr(), as they now become redundant. This ensures that any path that updates the guest's PPR also figures out if KVM needs to wait for a TPR change (using TPR_THRESHOLD on VMX or CR8 intercepts on SVM). Link: https://github.com/coconut-svsm/svsm/issues/1081 [1] Tested-by: Stefano Garzarella Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eb90f3417a0c ("KVM: vmx: speed up TPR below threshold vmexits") Signed-off-by: Carlos López Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-ID: <20260618174347.1981064-3-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index 4a6a8d8c7626f..fe2806348c94a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -1001,6 +1001,8 @@ static void apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_lapic *apic) if (__apic_update_ppr(apic, &ppr) && apic_has_interrupt_for_ppr(apic, ppr) != -1) kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, apic->vcpu); + else + kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(apic->vcpu); } void kvm_apic_update_ppr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 28771be285a13..7be3ed9e2c7dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5356,7 +5356,6 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, r = kvm_apic_set_state(vcpu, s); if (r) return r; - kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); return 0; } @@ -12366,8 +12365,6 @@ static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs, kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3); kvm_x86_call(post_set_cr3)(vcpu, sregs->cr3); - kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, sregs->cr8); - *mmu_reset_needed |= vcpu->arch.efer != sregs->efer; kvm_x86_call(set_efer)(vcpu, sregs->efer); @@ -12396,7 +12393,7 @@ static int __set_sregs_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs *sregs, kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->tr, VCPU_SREG_TR); kvm_set_segment(vcpu, &sregs->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR); - kvm_lapic_update_cr8_intercept(vcpu); + kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, sregs->cr8); /* Older userspace won't unhalt the vcpu on reset. */ if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu) && kvm_rip_read(vcpu) == 0xfff0 && From f29dc6132d4968e39d8fa575d1a12e2c718ce57b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeremy Linton Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 18:58:08 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 144/607] ACPI: CPPC: Suppress UBSAN warning caused by field misuse commit 1b1acf2dada0cc3931bb2cb9ff8832edfbee46a1 upstream. The definition of reg->access_width changes depending on the reg->space_id type. Type ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM uses access_width to indicate the PCC region, which can result in a UBSAN if the value is greater than 4. For example: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c:1090:9 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' CPU: 61 UID: 0 PID: 1220 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.0.10-201.fc44.aarch64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. Call trace: ...(trimming) ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x48 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0xdc/0x1e0 cpc_write+0x4d0/0x670 cppc_set_perf+0x18c/0x490 cppc_cpufreq_cpu_init+0x1c8/0x380 [cppc_cpufreq] ... (trimming) Lets fix this by validating the region type, as well as whether access_width has a value. Then since we are returning bit_width directly for ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM, drop the code correcting the size. Fixes: 2f4a4d63a193 ("ACPI: CPPC: Use access_width over bit_width for system memory accesses") Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton Tested-by: Jarred White Reviewed-by: Jarred White Reviewed-by: Easwar Hariharan Cc: All applicable Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260601235808.1113137-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c index ad763a5bf3af5..60d2548f0eea4 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c @@ -185,8 +185,13 @@ show_cppc_data(cppc_get_perf_caps, cppc_perf_caps, nominal_freq); show_cppc_data(cppc_get_perf_ctrs, cppc_perf_fb_ctrs, reference_perf); show_cppc_data(cppc_get_perf_ctrs, cppc_perf_fb_ctrs, wraparound_time); -/* Check for valid access_width, otherwise, fallback to using bit_width */ -#define GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg) ((reg)->access_width ? (8 << ((reg)->access_width - 1)) : (reg)->bit_width) +/* + * PCC reuses the access_width field as the subspace id, so only decode access + * size for non-PCC registers. Otherwise, use the bit_width. + */ +#define GET_BIT_WIDTH(reg) (((reg)->access_width && \ + (reg)->space_id != ACPI_ADR_SPACE_PLATFORM_COMM) ? \ + (8 << ((reg)->access_width - 1)) : (reg)->bit_width) /* Shift and apply the mask for CPC reads/writes */ #define MASK_VAL_READ(reg, val) (((val) >> (reg)->bit_offset) & \ @@ -1036,7 +1041,6 @@ static int cpc_read(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 *val) * by the bit width field; the access size is used to indicate * the PCC subspace id. */ - size = reg->bit_width; vaddr = GET_PCC_VADDR(reg->address, pcc_ss_id); } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) @@ -1109,7 +1113,6 @@ static int cpc_write(int cpu, struct cpc_register_resource *reg_res, u64 val) * by the bit width field; the access size is used to indicate * the PCC subspace id. */ - size = reg->bit_width; vaddr = GET_PCC_VADDR(reg->address, pcc_ss_id); } else if (reg->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) From 452945662fd8e9862a2d2043239c7ee1815d1ac4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Rafael J. Wysocki" Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 19:56:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 145/607] ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference commit 027e128abb82788189d6d45b68e3e8e7329b67be upstream. After commit 9b311b7313d6 ("ACPI: NFIT: Install Notify() handler before getting NFIT table"), acpi_nfit_probe() installs an ACPI notify handler for the NFIT device before checking the presence of the NFIT table. If that table is not there, 0 is returned without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the driver data pointer of the NFIT device. If the platform firmware triggers an NFIT_NOTIFY_UC_MEMORY_ERROR notification on the NFIT device at that point, acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify() will dereference a NULL pointer. Prevent that from occurring by adding an acpi_desc check against NULL to acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify(). Fixes: 9b311b7313d6 ("ACPI: NFIT: Install Notify() handler before getting NFIT table") Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Cc: All applicable Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2418508.ElGaqSPkdT@rafael.j.wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c index 3eb56b77cb6d9..2eb9989372ca5 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c @@ -3447,6 +3447,9 @@ static void acpi_nfit_uc_error_notify(struct device *dev, acpi_handle handle) { struct acpi_nfit_desc *acpi_desc = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + if (!acpi_desc) + return; + if (acpi_desc->scrub_mode == HW_ERROR_SCRUB_ON) acpi_nfit_ars_rescan(acpi_desc, ARS_REQ_LONG); else From 86df6499dfd232fbc1c82c0d6eb9322ca67b8cd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HyeongJun An Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 02:49:05 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 146/607] platform/x86: intel-hid: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit c085d82613d5618814b84406c8b2d64f1bc305e7 upstream. Since commit e2ffcda16290 ("ACPI: OSL: Allow Notify () handlers to run on all CPUs") ACPI notify handlers like the intel-hid notify_handler() may run on multiple CPU cores racing with themselves. On convertibles and detachables (matched by DMI chassis-type 31 and 32 in dmi_auto_add_switch[]) the SW_TABLET_MODE input device is registered lazily from notify_handler() on the first tablet-mode event, via intel_hid_switches_setup(). When two such events race on different CPUs both can pass the !priv->switches check and register the priv->switches input device twice, resulting in a duplicate sysfs entry and a subsequent NULL pointer dereference. This is the same class of bug fixed by commit e075c3b13a0a ("platform/x86: intel-vbtn: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion") for the sibling intel-vbtn driver. Protect intel-hid notify_handler() from racing with itself with a mutex to fix this. Fixes: e2ffcda16290 ("ACPI: OSL: Allow Notify () handlers to run on all CPUs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260605174905.131095-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/platform/x86/intel/hid.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/hid.c b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/hid.c index f7e358be1af3a..0dcf3a68a3355 100644 --- a/drivers/platform/x86/intel/hid.c +++ b/drivers/platform/x86/intel/hid.c @@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -224,6 +226,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id dmi_auto_add_switch[] = { }; struct intel_hid_priv { + struct mutex mutex; /* Avoid notify_handler() racing with itself */ struct input_dev *input_dev; struct input_dev *array; struct input_dev *switches; @@ -559,6 +562,8 @@ static void notify_handler(acpi_handle handle, u32 event, void *context) struct key_entry *ke; int err; + guard(mutex)(&priv->mutex); + /* * Some convertible have unreliable VGBS return which could cause incorrect * SW_TABLET_MODE report, in these cases we enable support when receiving @@ -714,6 +719,10 @@ static int intel_hid_probe(struct platform_device *device) return -ENOMEM; dev_set_drvdata(&device->dev, priv); + err = devm_mutex_init(&device->dev, &priv->mutex); + if (err) + return err; + /* See dual_accel_detect.h for more info on the dual_accel check. */ if (enable_sw_tablet_mode == TABLET_SW_AUTO) { if (dmi_check_system(dmi_vgbs_allow_list)) From 30d5d4eef35a9edf00d0ec005710c785594eeca2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huacai Chen Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 13:03:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 147/607] LoongArch: Add PIO for early access before ACPI PCI root register commit 6061e65f95713b01f4313cda6637dfe3aa5412b4 upstream. For ACPI system we suppose the ISA/LPC PIO range is registered together with PCI root bridge. But the fact is there may be some early access to the ISA/LPC PIO range before ACPI PCI root register (most of them are due to abnormal BIOS). Unconditionally register the ISA/LPC PIO range usually causes ACPI PCI root register fail because of the address range confliction. So we add a pair of helpers: acpi_add_early_pio() to add PIO for early access, and acpi_remove_early_pio() to remove PIO before PCI root register. Since acpi_remove_early_pio() may be called multiple times, we add an acpi_pio flag to ensure PIO be removed only once. Cc: Tested-by: Yuanzhen Gan Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h | 2 ++ arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 2 ++ arch/loongarch/pci/acpi.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h index 7376840fa9f78..32999f281d5be 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/acpi.h @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ static inline bool acpi_has_cpu_in_madt(void) extern struct list_head acpi_wakeup_device_list; extern struct acpi_madt_core_pic acpi_core_pic[MAX_CORE_PIC]; +extern void acpi_add_early_pio(void); +extern void acpi_remove_early_pio(void); extern int __init parse_acpi_topology(void); static inline u32 get_acpi_id_for_cpu(unsigned int cpu) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c index 1367ca759468f..88ad24d1e729a 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/acpi.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -59,6 +60,33 @@ void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size) return ioremap_cache(phys, size); } +#define PIO_BASE (unsigned long)PCI_IOBASE +#define PIO_SIZE ALIGN(ISA_IOSIZE, PAGE_SIZE) + +static bool acpi_pio; + +/* Add PIO for early access */ +void acpi_add_early_pio(void) +{ + if (!acpi_disabled) { + acpi_pio = true; + vmap_page_range(PIO_BASE, PIO_BASE + PIO_SIZE, + LOONGSON_LIO_BASE, pgprot_device(PAGE_KERNEL)); + } +} + +/* Remove PIO for PCI register */ +void acpi_remove_early_pio(void) +{ + if (!acpi_pio) + return; + + if (!acpi_disabled) { + acpi_pio = false; + vunmap_range(PIO_BASE, PIO_BASE + PIO_SIZE); + } +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP static int set_processor_mask(u32 id, u32 pass) { diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c index 2b260d15b2e25..75e3dfa060553 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c @@ -510,6 +510,8 @@ static __init int arch_reserve_pio_range(void) { struct device_node *np; + acpi_add_early_pio(); + for_each_node_by_name(np, "isa") { struct of_range range; struct of_range_parser parser; diff --git a/arch/loongarch/pci/acpi.c b/arch/loongarch/pci/acpi.c index a6d869e103c14..1a28fe847d472 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/pci/acpi.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/pci/acpi.c @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ static int acpi_prepare_root_resources(struct acpi_pci_root_info *ci) struct resource_entry *entry, *tmp; struct acpi_device *device = ci->bridge; + acpi_remove_early_pio(); + status = acpi_pci_probe_root_resources(ci); if (status > 0) { acpi_evaluate_integer(device->handle, "PCIH", NULL, &pci_h); From c1dd0b10710041b748fac58e29e91bbb0838375c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miguel Ojeda Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 11:58:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 148/607] rust: cpufreq: clean new `clippy::map_or_identity` lint for Rust 1.98.0 commit 3473e0a219fdb2cb013da0a5d917e66fef052325 upstream. Starting with Rust 1.98.0 (expected 2026-08-20), Clippy is likely introducing a new lint `clippy::map_or_identity` [1][2], which currently triggers in a single case: warning: expression can be simplified using `Result::unwrap_or()` --> rust/kernel/cpufreq.rs:1326:60 | 1326 | PolicyCpu::from_cpu(cpu_id).map_or(0, |mut policy| T::get(&mut policy).map_or(0, |f| f)) | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | = help: for further information visit https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#map_or_identity = note: `-W clippy::map-or-identity` implied by `-W clippy::all` = help: to override `-W clippy::all` add `#[allow(clippy::map_or_identity)]` help: consider using `unwrap_or` | 1326 - PolicyCpu::from_cpu(cpu_id).map_or(0, |mut policy| T::get(&mut policy).map_or(0, |f| f)) 1326 + PolicyCpu::from_cpu(cpu_id).map_or(0, |mut policy| T::get(&mut policy).unwrap_or(0)) | The suggestion is valid, thus clean it up. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # Needed in 6.18.y and later. Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/issues/15801 [1] Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-clippy/pull/16052 [2] Reviewed-by: Zhongqiu Han Reviewed-by: Gary Guo Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot Acked-by: Viresh Kumar Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530095809.213611-1-ojeda@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- rust/kernel/cpufreq.rs | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/cpufreq.rs b/rust/kernel/cpufreq.rs index 19729ccb3f6d2..a509d09ca4523 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/cpufreq.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/cpufreq.rs @@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ impl Registration { // SAFETY: The C API guarantees that `cpu` refers to a valid CPU number. let cpu_id = unsafe { CpuId::from_u32_unchecked(cpu) }; - PolicyCpu::from_cpu(cpu_id).map_or(0, |mut policy| T::get(&mut policy).map_or(0, |f| f)) + PolicyCpu::from_cpu(cpu_id).map_or(0, |mut policy| T::get(&mut policy).unwrap_or(0)) } /// Driver's `update_limit` callback. From e7636f26f77070a529c26d65afd217514ce85ce4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoze Xie Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 14:11:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 149/607] rust: block: fix GenDisk cleanup paths commit 2957771379fa335103a4b539db57bb2271e12142 upstream. GenDiskBuilder::build() still has fallible work after __blk_mq_alloc_disk(), but its error path only recovers the foreign queue data. That leaks the temporary gendisk and request_queue until later teardown. If the caller moved the last Arc> into build(), the leaked queue can retain blk-mq state after the tag set is dropped. Fix the pre-registration failure path by dropping the temporary gendisk reference with put_disk() before recovering queue_data, so disk_release() can tear down the owned queue. Also pair GenDisk::drop() with put_disk() after del_gendisk(). Once a Rust GenDisk has been added with device_add_disk(), del_gendisk() only unregisters it; the final gendisk reference still has to be dropped to complete the release path. Fixes: 3253aba3408a ("rust: block: introduce `kernel::block::mq` module") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Xin Liu Reviewed-by: Andreas Hindborg Signed-off-by: Haoze Xie Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b70aff9a920cc42110fe5cf454c3099561863519.1780063368.git.royenheart@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs b/rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs index 1ce815c8cdab0..23c6a8929c347 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/block/mq/gen_disk.rs @@ -153,6 +153,19 @@ impl GenDiskBuilder { // SAFETY: `gendisk` is a valid pointer as we initialized it above unsafe { (*gendisk).fops = &TABLE }; + let cleanup_failure = ScopeGuard::new_with_data((gendisk, data), |(gendisk, data)| { + // SAFETY: `gendisk` came from `__blk_mq_alloc_disk()` above and + // has not been added to the VFS on this cleanup path. + unsafe { bindings::put_disk(gendisk) }; + // SAFETY: `data` came from `into_foreign()` above and has not been + // converted back on this cleanup path. + drop(unsafe { T::QueueData::from_foreign(data) }); + }); + + // The failure guard now owns both pieces of cleanup; the early guard + // must not run on this path anymore. + recover_data.dismiss(); + let mut writer = NullTerminatedFormatter::new( // SAFETY: `gendisk` points to a valid and initialized instance. We // have exclusive access, since the disk is not added to the VFS @@ -175,7 +188,7 @@ impl GenDiskBuilder { }, )?; - recover_data.dismiss(); + cleanup_failure.dismiss(); // INVARIANT: `gendisk` was initialized above. // INVARIANT: `gendisk` was added to the VFS via `device_add_disk` above. @@ -218,6 +231,11 @@ impl Drop for GenDisk { // to the VFS. unsafe { bindings::del_gendisk(self.gendisk) }; + // SAFETY: By type invariant, `self.gendisk` was added to the VFS, so + // `put_disk()` must follow `del_gendisk()` to drop the final gendisk + // reference and trigger the remaining release path. + unsafe { bindings::put_disk(self.gendisk) }; + // SAFETY: `queue.queuedata` was created by `GenDiskBuilder::build` with // a call to `ForeignOwnable::into_foreign` to create `queuedata`. // `ForeignOwnable::from_foreign` is only called here. From 70fe1ac8647b0f872b22bdb508f0e177abab25e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gary Guo Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 14:25:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 150/607] rust: doctest: fix incorrect pattern in replacement commit ac4d1caa82d487e7ed46d0597da1adc9c1a51c70 upstream. The `-> Result<(), impl core::fmt::Debug>` string is generated by rustdoc and by adding "::" into the string it no longer finds anything, making the line useless. Remove the "::" in the pattern. Omit it in the replacement too, for consistency with upstream rustdoc. Fixes: de7cd3e4d638 ("rust: use absolute paths in macros referencing core and kernel") Signed-off-by: Gary Guo Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616132559.2245814-1-gary@kernel.org [ Added link in code comment to `rustdoc`'s 1.87 PR that fully qualified it for context. Improved comments for consistency. Reworded to drop changelog and to fix typo. - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs b/scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs index f7540bcf595ac..df864437cef70 100644 --- a/scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs +++ b/scripts/rustdoc_test_builder.rs @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ fn main() { // // ``` // fn main() { #[allow(non_snake_case)] fn _doctest_main_rust_kernel_file_rs_28_0() { - // fn main() { #[allow(non_snake_case)] fn _doctest_main_rust_kernel_file_rs_37_0() -> Result<(), impl ::core::fmt::Debug> { + // fn main() { #[allow(non_snake_case)] fn _doctest_main_rust_kernel_file_rs_37_0() -> Result<(), impl core::fmt::Debug> { // ``` // // It should be unlikely that doctest code matches such lines (when code is formatted properly). @@ -47,12 +47,16 @@ fn main() { }) .expect("No test function found in `rustdoc`'s output."); - // Qualify `Result` to avoid the collision with our own `Result` coming from the prelude. + // Replicate `rustdoc` 1.87+ behaviour [1] by fully qualifying `Result` to avoid the collision + // with our own `Result` coming from the prelude. + // + // [1]: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/137807 + // + // TODO: Remove this when MSRV is bumped above 1.87. let body = body.replace( - &format!("{rustdoc_function_name}() -> Result<(), impl ::core::fmt::Debug> {{"), - &format!( - "{rustdoc_function_name}() -> ::core::result::Result<(), impl ::core::fmt::Debug> {{" - ), + &format!("{rustdoc_function_name}() -> Result<(), impl core::fmt::Debug> {{"), + // This intentionally does not use absolute paths to match `rustdoc` 1.87 behaviour. + &format!("{rustdoc_function_name}() -> core::result::Result<(), impl core::fmt::Debug> {{"), ); // For tests that get generated with `Result`, like above, `rustdoc` generates an `unwrap()` on From 1cc8f512cd90581d3ef9f743766a5cba34d454ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alice Ryhl Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:30:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 151/607] rust: Kbuild: set frame-pointer llvm module flag for CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER commit 191f49f1e38b1c10eb44b0f967c6175c884ef7db upstream. Due to a rustc bug, the -Cforce-frame-pointers=y flag only emits the frame-pointer annotation for functions, but not for the module. This means that functions generated by the LLVM backend such as 'asan.module_ctor' do not receive the frame-pointer annotation. This is likely to lead to broken backtraces and may also cause issues with ftrace if these features are used with functions generated by the LLVM backend. Thus, use -Zllvm_module_flag to work around this rustc bug if using a rustc without the fix. [ The fix [1] has landed for Rust 1.98.0 (expected release on 2026-08-20). - Miguel ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12.y and later (flag not available in pinned Rust in older LTSs). Fixes: 2f7ab1267dc9 ("Kbuild: add Rust support") Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/156980 [1] Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616-frame-ptr-fix-v1-1-dc6b29a631d9@google.com [ - Adjusted Cc: stable@ as discussed. - Added comment with link to the PR, similar to what we did in commit ac35b5580ace ("rust: arm64: set uwtable llvm module flag for CONFIG_UNWIND_TABLES"). - Miguel ] Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 7ee3beedcecaa..9c602286d8e19 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -905,6 +905,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(stackp-flags-y) ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += -Cforce-frame-pointers=y +# Work around rustc bug on compilers without +# https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/156980. +KBUILD_RUSTFLAGS += $(if $(call rustc-min-version,109800),,-Zllvm_module_flag=frame-pointer:u32:2:max) else # Some targets (ARM with Thumb2, for example), can't be built with frame # pointers. For those, we don't have FUNCTION_TRACER automatically From 94396fd93226a3e7ade1399f029841b2e8a1386e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 15:11:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 152/607] futex/requeue: Revert "Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock"" commit 39def6d250d370298f86c116f4ac60093cefadaa upstream. The commit cited below should not have been merged. It attemted to fix an existing problem ansd thereby introduced new problems by keeping the pi_state in state Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS and leaking it. Based on the commit description the intention was to handle the case when task_blocks_on_rt_mutex() returns -EDEADLK and the following remove_waiter() dereferences the NULL pointer in waiter->task. That is already handled by Davidlohr in commit 40a25d59e85b3 ("locking/rtmutex: Skip remove_waiter() when waiter is not enqueued") and requires no further acting. Revert the commit breaking the "waiter == owner" case again. Fixes: 74e144274af39 ("futex/requeue: Prevent NULL pointer dereference in remove_waiter() on self-deadlock") Reported-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701131150.0Ijhq4Dw@linutronix.de Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260629020049.2082397-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/futex/requeue.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex/requeue.c b/kernel/futex/requeue.c index 1d99a84dc9adb..b597cb3d17fc1 100644 --- a/kernel/futex/requeue.c +++ b/kernel/futex/requeue.c @@ -643,12 +643,6 @@ int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags1, continue; } - /* Self-deadlock: non-top waiter already owns the PI futex. */ - if (rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex) == this->task) { - ret = -EDEADLK; - break; - } - ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, this->rt_waiter, this->task); From a2d5d3ee7b6e3953114726b1521e62123ab5b043 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 23:22:18 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 153/607] perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec [ Upstream commit 037a3c43edfb597665dd34457cd22b14692f2ba3 ] perf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling perf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from the context with DETACH_EXIT only. This can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group leader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group was active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the removed leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid group leader on the PMU context active lists. A later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the still-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can then add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU context active list. With DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in merge_sched_in(). Fix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an event. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while ensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves the context. Fixes: 2e498d0a74e5 ("perf: Add support for event removal on exec") Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ai65GgZcC0LAlWLG@Taeyangs-MacBook-Pro.local Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/events/core.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 6b6fea8d33e04..449550b3bb286 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -4586,7 +4586,7 @@ static void perf_remove_from_owner(struct perf_event *event); static void perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx, struct task_struct *task, - bool revoke); + unsigned long detach_flags); /* * Removes all events from the current task that have been marked @@ -4613,7 +4613,7 @@ static void perf_event_remove_on_exec(struct perf_event_context *ctx) modified = true; - perf_event_exit_event(event, ctx, ctx->task, false); + perf_event_exit_event(event, ctx, ctx->task, DETACH_GROUP); } raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags); @@ -12511,7 +12511,7 @@ static void __pmu_detach_event(struct pmu *pmu, struct perf_event *event, /* * De-schedule the event and mark it REVOKED. */ - perf_event_exit_event(event, ctx, ctx->task, true); + perf_event_exit_event(event, ctx, ctx->task, DETACH_REVOKE); /* * All _free_event() bits that rely on event->pmu: @@ -14095,12 +14095,13 @@ static void perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx, struct task_struct *task, - bool revoke) + unsigned long detach_flags) { struct perf_event *parent_event = event->parent; - unsigned long detach_flags = DETACH_EXIT; unsigned int attach_state; + detach_flags |= DETACH_EXIT; + if (parent_event) { /* * Do not destroy the 'original' grouping; because of the @@ -14123,8 +14124,8 @@ perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, sync_child_event(event, task); } - if (revoke) - detach_flags |= DETACH_GROUP | DETACH_REVOKE; + if (detach_flags & DETACH_REVOKE) + detach_flags |= DETACH_GROUP; perf_remove_from_context(event, detach_flags); /* @@ -14212,7 +14213,7 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *task, bool exit) perf_event_task(task, ctx, 0); list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) - perf_event_exit_event(child_event, ctx, exit ? task : NULL, false); + perf_event_exit_event(child_event, ctx, exit ? task : NULL, 0); mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); From 20133754d46fe42dac8a56f590ea742645e6ba64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alice Ryhl Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 19:59:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 154/607] rust: kasan: KASAN+RUST requires clang [ Upstream commit 5b271543d0f08e9733d4732721e960e285f6448f ] Kernel KASAN involves passing various llvm/gcc specific arguments to the C and Rust compiler. Since these arguments differ between llvm and gcc, it's not safe to mix an llvm-based rustc with a gcc build when kasan is enabled. Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Reviewed-by: Gary Guo Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3117404b411 ("kbuild: rust: Enable KASAN support") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408-kasan-rust-sw-tags-v3-1-e07964d14363@google.com Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- init/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index cab3ad28ca49e..0c25e78e10f47 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -2096,6 +2096,7 @@ config RUST depends on !CFI || HAVE_CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS_RUSTC select CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS if CFI depends on !CALL_PADDING || RUSTC_VERSION >= 108100 + depends on !KASAN || CC_IS_CLANG depends on !KASAN_SW_TAGS depends on !(MITIGATION_RETHUNK && KASAN) || RUSTC_VERSION >= 108300 help From 85f8b440a09bad8d8f75156c89f72ac37c9d0d48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 11:06:51 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 155/607] fscrypt: Fix key setup in edge case with multiple data unit sizes [ Upstream commit dd015b566d505d698386103e9c80b739c7336eb8 ] The addition of support for customizable data unit sizes introduced an edge case where a file's contents can be en/decrypted with the wrong data unit size. It occurs when there are multiple v2 policies that: - Have *different* data unit sizes, via the log2_data_unit_size field - Share the same master_key_identifier, contents_encryption_mode, and either FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY, FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32, or FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 - Are being used on the same filesystem, which also must be mounted with the "inlinecrypt" mount option. Fortunately this edge case doesn't actually occur in practice. I just found it via code review. But it needs to be fixed regardless. The bug is caused by the data unit size not being fully considered when blk_crypto_keys are cached in mk_direct_keys, mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys, and mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys. They're differentiated only by master key, encryption mode, and flag. However, each one actually has a data unit size too. Only the first data unit size that is cached is used. To fix this, start using the data unit size to differentiate the cached keys. For several reasons, including avoiding increasing the size of struct fscrypt_master_key, just replace all three arrays with a single linked list instead of changing them into two-dimensional arrays. This works well when considering that in practice at most 2 entries are used across all three arrays, so it was already mostly wasted space. For simplicity, make the list also take over the publish/subscribe of the prepared key itself. That is, create separate list nodes for blk_crypto_keys vs crypto_skciphers, and add nodes to the list only when their key is actually prepared. (Note that the legacy fscrypt_direct_keys table in fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c already works this way.) This eliminates the need for the additional memory barriers when reading and writing the fields of struct fscrypt_prepared_key. Note that I technically should have included the data unit size in the HKDF info string as well. But it's too late to change that. Fixes: 5b1188847180 ("fscrypt: support crypto data unit size less than filesystem block size") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618180652.52742-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 52 +++++++++------- fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 8 +-- fs/crypto/keyring.c | 23 ++++--- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 4 files changed, 120 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 4e8e82a9ccf9a..3bcde4b59efb0 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ struct fscrypt_symlink_data { * @tfm: crypto API transform object * @blk_key: key for blk-crypto * - * Normally only one of the fields will be non-NULL. + * Only one of the fields is non-NULL. */ struct fscrypt_prepared_key { struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm; @@ -245,6 +245,15 @@ struct fscrypt_prepared_key { #endif }; +/* An entry in the linked list ->mk_mode_keys */ +struct fscrypt_mode_key { + struct fscrypt_prepared_key key; + struct list_head link; + u8 hkdf_context; + u8 mode_num; + u8 data_unit_bits; +}; + /* * fscrypt_inode_info - the "encryption key" for an inode * @@ -433,20 +442,12 @@ int fscrypt_derive_sw_secret(struct super_block *sb, * @prep_key, depending on which encryption implementation the file will use. */ static inline bool -fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, +fscrypt_is_key_prepared(const struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci) { - /* - * The two smp_load_acquire()'s here pair with the smp_store_release()'s - * in fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key() and fscrypt_prepare_key(). - * I.e., in some cases (namely, if this prep_key is a per-mode - * encryption key) another task can publish blk_key or tfm concurrently, - * executing a RELEASE barrier. We need to use smp_load_acquire() here - * to safely ACQUIRE the memory the other task published. - */ if (fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(ci)) - return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->blk_key) != NULL; - return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->tfm) != NULL; + return prep_key->blk_key != NULL; + return prep_key->tfm != NULL; } #else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */ @@ -489,10 +490,10 @@ fscrypt_derive_sw_secret(struct super_block *sb, } static inline bool -fscrypt_is_key_prepared(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, +fscrypt_is_key_prepared(const struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci) { - return smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->tfm) != NULL; + return prep_key->tfm != NULL; } #endif /* !CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION_INLINE_CRYPT */ @@ -580,8 +581,8 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { /* * Active and structural reference counts. An active ref guarantees * that the struct continues to exist, continues to be in the keyring - * ->s_master_keys, and that any embedded subkeys (e.g. - * ->mk_direct_keys) that have been prepared continue to exist. + * ->s_master_keys, and that any non-file-scoped subkeys (e.g. + * ->mk_mode_keys) that have been prepared continue to exist. * A structural ref only guarantees that the struct continues to exist. * * There is one active ref associated with ->mk_present being true, and @@ -635,12 +636,21 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { spinlock_t mk_decrypted_inodes_lock; /* - * Per-mode encryption keys for the various types of encryption policies - * that use them. Allocated and derived on-demand. + * A list of 'struct fscrypt_mode_key' for the (hkdf_context, mode_num, + * data_unit_bits, inlinecrypt) combinations that are in use for this + * master key, for hkdf_context in [HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, + * HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY]. + * + * This is a linked list and not a hash table because in practice + * there's just a single encryption policy per master key, using + * _at most_ 2 nodes in this list. Per-file keys don't use this at all. + * + * This list is append-only until the master key is fully removed, at + * which time the list is cleared. Before then, + * fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex synchronizes appends, and searches use + * the RCU read lock together with ->mk_sem held for read. */ - struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_direct_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; - struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; - struct fscrypt_prepared_key mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX + 1]; + struct list_head mk_mode_keys; /* Hash key for inode numbers. Initialized only when needed. */ siphash_key_t mk_ino_hash_key; diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c index ed6e926226b51..645cc49360729 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c @@ -198,13 +198,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, goto fail; } - /* - * Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_is_key_prepared(). - * I.e., here we publish ->blk_key with a RELEASE barrier so that - * concurrent tasks can ACQUIRE it. Note that this concurrency is only - * possible for per-mode keys, not for per-file keys. - */ - smp_store_release(&prep_key->blk_key, blk_key); + prep_key->blk_key = blk_key; return 0; fail: diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index 3adbd7167055a..29bea5f3c9823 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -87,14 +87,14 @@ void fscrypt_put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb, struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { - size_t i; + struct fscrypt_mode_key *node, *tmp; if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_active_refs)) return; /* * No active references left, so complete the full removal of this * fscrypt_master_key struct by removing it from the keyring and - * destroying any subkeys embedded in it. + * destroying any non-file-scoped subkeys. */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sb->s_master_keys)) @@ -110,13 +110,16 @@ void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb, WARN_ON_ONCE(mk->mk_present); WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes)); - for (i = 0; i <= FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX; i++) { - fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key( - sb, &mk->mk_direct_keys[i]); - fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key( - sb, &mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys[i]); - fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key( - sb, &mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys[i]); + /* + * Destroy any non-file-scoped subkeys. Since ->mk_active_refs == 0, + * they're no longer referenced by any inodes. Nor can key setup run + * and use them again. So they're no longer needed. (This implies no + * concurrent readers, so we don't need list_del_rcu() for example.) + */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(node, tmp, &mk->mk_mode_keys, link) { + fscrypt_destroy_prepared_key(sb, &node->key); + list_del(&node->link); + kfree(node); } memzero_explicit(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key, sizeof(mk->mk_ino_hash_key)); @@ -445,6 +448,8 @@ static int add_new_master_key(struct super_block *sb, INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes); spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_mode_keys); + if (mk_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) { err = allocate_master_key_users_keyring(mk); if (err) diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 4bd3918f50e3f..f27997ef9a08c 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -163,13 +163,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, raw_key, ci->ci_inode); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm); - /* - * Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_is_key_prepared(). - * I.e., here we publish ->tfm with a RELEASE barrier so that - * concurrent tasks can ACQUIRE it. Note that this concurrency is only - * possible for per-mode keys, not for per-file keys. - */ - smp_store_release(&prep_key->tfm, tfm); + prep_key->tfm = tfm; return 0; } @@ -190,9 +184,37 @@ int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, return fscrypt_prepare_key(&ci->ci_enc_key, raw_key, ci); } +/* + * Find the fscrypt_prepared_key (if any) for a particular (mk, hkdf_context, + * mode_num, data_unit_bits, inlinecrypt) combination. + * + * The caller must hold ->mk_sem for reading and ->mk_present must be true, + * ensuring that ->mk_mode_keys is still append-only. + */ +static struct fscrypt_prepared_key * +fscrypt_find_mode_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, u8 hkdf_context, + u8 mode_num, const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci) +{ + struct fscrypt_mode_key *node; + + /* + * The RCU read lock here is used only to synchronize with concurrent + * list_add_tail_rcu(). Concurrent deletions are impossible here, so + * returning a pointer to a node without taking any refcount is safe. + */ + guard(rcu)(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &mk->mk_mode_keys, link) { + if (node->hkdf_context == hkdf_context && + node->mode_num == mode_num && + node->data_unit_bits == ci->ci_data_unit_bits && + fscrypt_is_key_prepared(&node->key, ci)) + return &node->key; + } + return NULL; +} + static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, - struct fscrypt_prepared_key *keys, u8 hkdf_context, bool include_fs_uuid) { const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode; @@ -200,7 +222,8 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode; const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes; struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key; - u8 mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE]; + struct fscrypt_mode_key *new_node; + u8 raw_mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE]; u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)]; unsigned int hkdf_infolen = 0; bool use_hw_wrapped_key = false; @@ -223,48 +246,56 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, use_hw_wrapped_key = true; } - prep_key = &keys[mode_num]; - if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, ci)) { + prep_key = fscrypt_find_mode_key(mk, hkdf_context, mode_num, ci); + if (prep_key) { ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key; return 0; } - mutex_lock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); + guard(mutex)(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); - if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, ci)) - goto done_unlock; + prep_key = fscrypt_find_mode_key(mk, hkdf_context, mode_num, ci); + if (prep_key) { + ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key; + return 0; + } + + new_node = kzalloc_obj(*new_node); + if (!new_node) + return -ENOMEM; + new_node->hkdf_context = hkdf_context; + new_node->mode_num = mode_num; + new_node->data_unit_bits = ci->ci_data_unit_bits; + prep_key = &new_node->key; if (use_hw_wrapped_key) { err = fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(prep_key, mk->mk_secret.bytes, mk->mk_secret.size, true, ci); - if (err) - goto out_unlock; - goto done_unlock; + } else { + static_assert(sizeof(mode_num) == 1); + static_assert(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) == 16); + static_assert(sizeof(hkdf_info) == 17); + hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num; + if (include_fs_uuid) { + memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid, + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)); + hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid); + } + fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context, + hkdf_info, hkdf_infolen, raw_mode_key, + mode->keysize); + err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, raw_mode_key, ci); + memzero_explicit(raw_mode_key, mode->keysize); } - - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(mode_num) != 1); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) != 16); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hkdf_info) != 17); - hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num; - if (include_fs_uuid) { - memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid, - sizeof(sb->s_uuid)); - hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid); + if (err) { + kfree(new_node); + return err; } - fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context, hkdf_info, - hkdf_infolen, mode_key, mode->keysize); - err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, ci); - memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize); - if (err) - goto out_unlock; -done_unlock: + list_add_tail_rcu(&new_node->link, &mk->mk_mode_keys); ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key; - err = 0; -out_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); - return err; + return 0; } /* @@ -311,8 +342,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, { int err; - err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys, - HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, true); + err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, + true); if (err) return err; @@ -364,8 +395,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, * encryption key. This ensures that the master key is * consistently used only for HKDF, avoiding key reuse issues. */ - err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_keys, - HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false); + err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, + false); } else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) { /* @@ -374,9 +405,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, * the IVs. This format is optimized for use with inline * encryption hardware compliant with the UFS standard. */ - err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys, - HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY, - true); + err = setup_per_mode_enc_key( + ci, mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY, true); } else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) { err = fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(ci, mk); From 9d1dc507b99ceb1c15036c9382fb001b919a614b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:19:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 156/607] fscrypt: Replace mk_users keyring with simple list [ Upstream commit 696c030e1e3438955aba443b308ee8b6faa3983e ] Change mk_users (the set of user claims to an fscrypt master key) from a 'struct key' keyring to a simple linked list. It's still a collection of 'struct key' for quota tracking. It was originally thought to be natural that a collection of 'struct key' should be held in a 'struct key' keyring. In reality, it's just been causing problems, similar to how using 'struct key' for the filesystem keyring caused problems and was removed in commit d7e7b9af104c ("fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key"). Commit d3a7bd420076 ("fscrypt: clear keyring before calling key_put()") fixed mk_users cleanup to be synchronous. But that apparently wasn't enough: the keyring subsystem's redundant locking is still generating lockdep false positives due to the interaction with filesystem reclaim. With the simple list, the redundant locking and lockdep issue goes away. Of course, searching a linked list is linear-time whereas the 'struct key' keyring used a fancy constant-time associative array. But that's fine here, since in practice there's just one entry in the list. In fact the new code is much faster in practice, since it's much smaller and doesn't have to convert the kuid_t into a string to search for it. Reported-by: syzbot+f55b043dacf43776b50c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f55b043dacf43776b50c Reported-by: Mohammed EL Kadiri Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260614150041.21172-1-med08elkadiri@gmail.com/ Fixes: 23c688b54016 ("fscrypt: allow unprivileged users to add/remove keys for v2 policies") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618221921.87896-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 32 ++++-- fs/crypto/keyring.c | 216 +++++++++++++++--------------------- 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 3bcde4b59efb0..886ea39e924df 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -499,6 +499,19 @@ fscrypt_is_key_prepared(const struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, /* keyring.c */ +/* + * fscrypt_master_key_user - a user's claim to a master key + */ +struct fscrypt_master_key_user { + struct list_head link; + kuid_t uid; + /* + * This 'struct key' contains no secret. It exists solely to charge the + * appropriate user's key quota. + */ + struct key *quota_key; +}; + /* * fscrypt_master_key_secret - secret key material of an in-use master key */ @@ -614,19 +627,18 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec; /* - * Keyring which contains a key of type 'key_type_fscrypt_user' for each - * user who has added this key. Normally each key will be added by just - * one user, but it's possible that multiple users share a key, and in - * that case we need to keep track of those users so that one user can't - * remove the key before the others want it removed too. + * List of user claims to this key (struct fscrypt_master_key_user). + * Normally each key will be added by just one user, but it's possible + * that multiple users share a key, and in that case we need to keep + * track of those users so that one user can't remove the key before the + * others want it removed too. * - * This is NULL for v1 policy keys; those can only be added by root. + * Used only for v2 policy keys. v1 policy keys can be added only by + * root, so user tracking doesn't apply to them. * - * Locking: protected by ->mk_sem. (We don't just rely on the keyrings - * subsystem semaphore ->mk_users->sem, as we need support for atomic - * search+insert along with proper synchronization with other fields.) + * Locking: protected by ->mk_sem. */ - struct key *mk_users; + struct list_head mk_users; /* * List of inodes that were unlocked using this key. This allows the diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index 29bea5f3c9823..4ea4ee5cfc64b 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -65,22 +65,19 @@ static void fscrypt_free_master_key(struct rcu_head *head) kfree_sensitive(mk); } +static void clear_mk_users(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk); + void fscrypt_put_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_struct_refs)) return; /* - * No structural references left, so free ->mk_users, and also free the + * No structural references left, so clear ->mk_users, and also free the * fscrypt_master_key struct itself after an RCU grace period ensures * that concurrent keyring lookups can no longer find it. */ WARN_ON_ONCE(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 0); - if (mk->mk_users) { - /* Clear the keyring so the quota gets released right away. */ - keyring_clear(mk->mk_users); - key_put(mk->mk_users); - mk->mk_users = NULL; - } + clear_mk_users(mk); call_rcu(&mk->mk_rcu_head, fscrypt_free_master_key); } @@ -165,8 +162,8 @@ static void fscrypt_user_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) } /* - * Type of key in ->mk_users. Each key of this type represents a particular - * user who has added a particular master key. + * Type of fscrypt_master_key_user::quota_key. This contains no secret; it + * exists solely to charge a user's key quota. * * Note that the name of this key type really should be something like * ".fscrypt-user" instead of simply ".fscrypt". But the shorter name is chosen @@ -180,30 +177,9 @@ static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt_user = { .describe = fscrypt_user_key_describe, }; -#define FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE \ - (CONST_STRLEN("fscrypt-") + 2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + \ - CONST_STRLEN("-users") + 1) - #define FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE \ (2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE + CONST_STRLEN(".uid.") + 10 + 1) -static void format_mk_users_keyring_description( - char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE], - const u8 mk_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]) -{ - sprintf(description, "fscrypt-%*phN-users", - FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, mk_identifier); -} - -static void format_mk_user_description( - char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE], - const u8 mk_identifier[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE]) -{ - - sprintf(description, "%*phN.uid.%u", FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, - mk_identifier, __kuid_val(current_fsuid())); -} - /* Create ->s_master_keys if needed. Synchronized by fscrypt_add_key_mutex. */ static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(struct super_block *sb) { @@ -338,91 +314,94 @@ fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb, return mk; } -static int allocate_master_key_users_keyring(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) -{ - char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USERS_DESCRIPTION_SIZE]; - struct key *keyring; - - format_mk_users_keyring_description(description, - mk->mk_spec.u.identifier); - keyring = keyring_alloc(description, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, - current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH | - KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_VIEW, - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(keyring)) - return PTR_ERR(keyring); - - mk->mk_users = keyring; - return 0; -} - -/* - * Find the current user's "key" in the master key's ->mk_users. - * Returns ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) if not found. - */ -static struct key *find_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +/* Find the current user's claim in ->mk_users. ->mk_sem must be held. */ +static struct fscrypt_master_key_user * +find_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { - char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE]; - key_ref_t keyref; + struct fscrypt_master_key_user *mk_user; + kuid_t uid = current_fsuid(); - format_mk_user_description(description, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier); - - /* - * We need to mark the keyring reference as "possessed" so that we - * acquire permission to search it, via the KEY_POS_SEARCH permission. - */ - keyref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(mk->mk_users, true /*possessed*/), - &key_type_fscrypt_user, description, false); - if (IS_ERR(keyref)) { - if (PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EAGAIN || /* not found */ - PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EKEYREVOKED) /* recently invalidated */ - keyref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); - return ERR_CAST(keyref); + list_for_each_entry(mk_user, &mk->mk_users, link) { + if (uid_eq(mk_user->uid, uid)) + return mk_user; } - return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref); + return NULL; } /* - * Give the current user a "key" in ->mk_users. This charges the user's quota + * Give the current user a claim in ->mk_users. This charges the user's quota * and marks the master key as added by the current user, so that it cannot be * removed by another user with the key. Either ->mk_sem must be held for * write, or the master key must be still undergoing initialization. */ static int add_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { + kuid_t uid = current_fsuid(); char description[FSCRYPT_MK_USER_DESCRIPTION_SIZE]; - struct key *mk_user; + struct key *quota_key; + struct fscrypt_master_key_user *mk_user; int err; - format_mk_user_description(description, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier); - mk_user = key_alloc(&key_type_fscrypt_user, description, - current_fsuid(), current_gid(), current_cred(), - KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW, 0, NULL); - if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) - return PTR_ERR(mk_user); + snprintf(description, sizeof(description), "%*phN.uid.%u", + FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, mk->mk_spec.u.identifier, + __kuid_val(uid)); + quota_key = key_alloc(&key_type_fscrypt_user, description, uid, + current_gid(), current_cred(), + KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW, 0, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(quota_key)) + return PTR_ERR(quota_key); + + err = key_instantiate_and_link(quota_key, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (err) { + key_put(quota_key); + return err; + } - err = key_instantiate_and_link(mk_user, NULL, 0, mk->mk_users, NULL); - key_put(mk_user); - return err; + mk_user = kzalloc_obj(*mk_user); + if (!mk_user) { + key_put(quota_key); + return -ENOMEM; + } + mk_user->uid = uid; + mk_user->quota_key = quota_key; + list_add(&mk_user->link, &mk->mk_users); + return 0; +} + +static void unlink_and_free_mk_user(struct fscrypt_master_key_user *mk_user) +{ + list_del(&mk_user->link); + key_put(mk_user->quota_key); + kfree(mk_user); } /* - * Remove the current user's "key" from ->mk_users. + * Remove the current user's claim from ->mk_users. * ->mk_sem must be held for write. * - * Returns 0 if removed, -ENOKEY if not found, or another -errno code. + * Returns 0 if removed or -ENOKEY if not found. */ static int remove_master_key_user(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { - struct key *mk_user; - int err; + struct fscrypt_master_key_user *mk_user; mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk); - if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) - return PTR_ERR(mk_user); - err = key_unlink(mk->mk_users, mk_user); - key_put(mk_user); - return err; + if (!mk_user) + return -ENOKEY; + unlink_and_free_mk_user(mk_user); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Clear ->mk_users. Either ->mk_sem must be held for write, or 'mk' must have + * no structural references left. + */ +static void clear_mk_users(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +{ + struct fscrypt_master_key_user *mk_user, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(mk_user, tmp, &mk->mk_users, link) + unlink_and_free_mk_user(mk_user); } /* @@ -445,15 +424,14 @@ static int add_new_master_key(struct super_block *sb, refcount_set(&mk->mk_struct_refs, 1); mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_users); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes); spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_mode_keys); if (mk_spec->type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) { - err = allocate_master_key_users_keyring(mk); - if (err) - goto out_put; err = add_master_key_user(mk); if (err) goto out_put; @@ -482,19 +460,13 @@ static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, int err; /* - * If the current user is already in ->mk_users, then there's nothing to - * do. Otherwise, we need to add the user to ->mk_users. (Neither is - * applicable for v1 policy keys, which have NULL ->mk_users.) + * For v2 policy keys (FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER): If the current + * user is already in ->mk_users, then there's nothing to do. + * Otherwise, add the user to ->mk_users. */ - if (mk->mk_users) { - struct key *mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk); - - if (mk_user != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) { - if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) - return PTR_ERR(mk_user); - key_put(mk_user); + if (mk->mk_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) { + if (find_master_key_user(mk) != NULL) return 0; - } err = add_master_key_user(mk); if (err) return err; @@ -893,7 +865,6 @@ int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb, { struct fscrypt_key_specifier mk_spec; struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; - struct key *mk_user; int err; mk_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER; @@ -905,13 +876,10 @@ int fscrypt_verify_key_added(struct super_block *sb, goto out; } down_read(&mk->mk_sem); - mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk); - if (IS_ERR(mk_user)) { - err = PTR_ERR(mk_user); - } else { - key_put(mk_user); + if (find_master_key_user(mk) != NULL) err = 0; - } + else + err = -ENOKEY; up_read(&mk->mk_sem); fscrypt_put_master_key(mk); out: @@ -1103,16 +1071,18 @@ static int do_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg, bool all_users) down_write(&mk->mk_sem); /* If relevant, remove current user's (or all users) claim to the key */ - if (mk->mk_users && mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) { - if (all_users) - err = keyring_clear(mk->mk_users); - else + if (!list_empty(&mk->mk_users)) { + if (all_users) { + clear_mk_users(mk); + err = 0; + } else { err = remove_master_key_user(mk); + } if (err) { up_write(&mk->mk_sem); goto out_put_key; } - if (mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) { + if (!list_empty(&mk->mk_users)) { /* * Other users have still added the key too. We removed * the current user's claim to the key, but we still @@ -1198,6 +1168,8 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg) struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb; struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg arg; struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; + kuid_t uid; + const struct fscrypt_master_key_user *mk_user; int err; if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) @@ -1230,19 +1202,13 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg) } arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT; - if (mk->mk_users) { - struct key *mk_user; - arg.user_count = mk->mk_users->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree; - mk_user = find_master_key_user(mk); - if (!IS_ERR(mk_user)) { + uid = current_fsuid(); + list_for_each_entry(mk_user, &mk->mk_users, link) { + arg.user_count++; + if (uid_eq(mk_user->uid, uid)) arg.status_flags |= FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_FLAG_ADDED_BY_SELF; - key_put(mk_user); - } else if (mk_user != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) { - err = PTR_ERR(mk_user); - goto out_release_key; - } } err = 0; out_release_key: From e01e7814b4223560eab0513b7c15b8c82bdc83f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 13:08:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 157/607] usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check to response query commit 95f90eea070837f7c72207d5520f805bdefc3bc5 upstream. Add variable representations for BufLength and BufOffset in rndis_query_response(), and perform a length check on them. This is identical to how rndis_set_response() handles these parameters. Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000 Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260708-usb-gadget-rndis-v1-1-e77e026dcc6a@kroah.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c index afd75d72412c9..1eb40ab326d65 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c @@ -591,6 +591,7 @@ static int rndis_init_response(struct rndis_params *params, static int rndis_query_response(struct rndis_params *params, rndis_query_msg_type *buf) { + u32 BufLength, BufOffset; rndis_query_cmplt_type *resp; rndis_resp_t *r; @@ -598,6 +599,13 @@ static int rndis_query_response(struct rndis_params *params, if (!params->dev) return -ENOTSUPP; + BufLength = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset = le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset); + if ((BufLength > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) || + (BufOffset > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE) || + (BufOffset + 8 >= RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + /* * we need more memory: * gen_ndis_query_resp expects enough space for @@ -614,10 +622,8 @@ static int rndis_query_response(struct rndis_params *params, resp->RequestID = buf->RequestID; /* Still LE in msg buffer */ if (gen_ndis_query_resp(params, le32_to_cpu(buf->OID), - le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferOffset) - + 8 + (u8 *)buf, - le32_to_cpu(buf->InformationBufferLength), - r)) { + BufOffset + 8 + (u8 *)buf, + BufLength, r)) { /* OID not supported */ resp->Status = cpu_to_le32(RNDIS_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED); resp->MessageLength = cpu_to_le32(sizeof *resp); From 7515a6d4a9e9e4838b833825882efa00e85f8901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Griffin Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 13:08:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 158/607] usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check for header commit 21b5bf155435008e0fb0736795289788e63d426f upstream. Add a length check for the rndis header in rndis_rm_hdr, to ensure that MessageType, MessageLength, DataOffset, and DataLength fields are present before they are accessed. Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000 Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Griffin Kroah-Hartman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260708-usb-gadget-rndis-v1-2-e77e026dcc6a@kroah.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c index 1eb40ab326d65..2a52de847d3fc 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/rndis.c @@ -1080,6 +1080,12 @@ int rndis_rm_hdr(struct gether *port, /* tmp points to a struct rndis_packet_msg_type */ __le32 *tmp = (void *)skb->data; + /* Need at least MessageType, MessageLength, DataOffset, DataLength */ + if (skb->len < 16) { + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* MessageType, MessageLength */ if (cpu_to_le32(RNDIS_MSG_PACKET) != get_unaligned(tmp++)) { From 3e766526827acd542bcd36c20c4d5f397e0f6521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 02:18:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 159/607] iio: accel: bmc150: clamp the device-reported FIFO frame count commit ce0e1cae26096fe959a0da5563a6d6d5a801d5fb upstream. __bmc150_accel_fifo_flush() copies the number of samples the device reports in its hardware FIFO into an on-stack buffer u16 buffer[BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH * 3]; which is sized for at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH (32) samples. The frame count is read from the FIFO_STATUS register and only masked to its 7 valid bits: count = val & 0x7F; so it can be 0..127. The only other limit applied to it is the optional caller-supplied sample budget: if (samples && count > samples) count = samples; which does not constrain count on the flush-all path (samples == 0), and leaves it well above 32 whenever samples is larger. count samples are then transferred into buffer[]: bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count); bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer() reads count * 6 bytes through regmap, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit accelerometer (or an attacker tampering with the I2C/SPI bus) that reports up to 127 frames writes up to 762 bytes into the 192-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write of up to 570 bytes that clobbers the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. Clamp count to BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH, the number of samples buffer[] is sized for, before the transfer, mirroring the watermark clamp already done in bmc150_accel_set_watermark(). A well-formed flush reports at most BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH frames, so legitimate devices are unaffected. Fixes: 3bbec9773389 ("iio: bmc150_accel: add support for hardware fifo") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/accel/bmc150-accel-core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/bmc150-accel-core.c b/drivers/iio/accel/bmc150-accel-core.c index 42ccf0316ce59..f6c89e1657c89 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/bmc150-accel-core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/bmc150-accel-core.c @@ -991,6 +991,8 @@ static int __bmc150_accel_fifo_flush(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, if (samples && count > samples) count = samples; + count = min_t(u8, count, BMC150_ACCEL_FIFO_LENGTH); + ret = bmc150_accel_fifo_transfer(data, (u8 *)buffer, count); if (ret) return ret; From 6293211d142605bec435229ef0aa3668b8964164 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biren Pandya Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 12:45:46 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 160/607] iio: accel: kxsd9: fix runtime PM imbalance on write_raw() error commit 44a5fd874bb6873bdaec59f722c1d57832fbc9df upstream. kxsd9_write_raw() takes a runtime PM reference with pm_runtime_get_sync() but returns -EINVAL directly when a scale with a non-zero integer part is requested, skipping the matching pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(). This leaks a runtime PM usage-counter reference on every such write, after which the device can no longer autosuspend. Set the error code and fall through to the existing put instead of returning early. Fixes: 9a9a369d6178 ("iio: accel: kxsd9: Deploy system and runtime PM") Signed-off-by: Biren Pandya Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 coccinelle Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9.c b/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9.c index 4717d80fc24af..7ac885d94d7f4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/kxsd9.c @@ -147,8 +147,9 @@ static int kxsd9_write_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, if (mask == IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE) { /* Check no integer component */ if (val) - return -EINVAL; - ret = kxsd9_write_scale(indio_dev, val2); + ret = -EINVAL; + else + ret = kxsd9_write_scale(indio_dev, val2); } pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(st->dev); From e6ade81631d7621b9e95c3f8596b62ae90c89395 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Moelius Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 16:45:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 161/607] iio: adc: ad7380: select REGMAP MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 6697091b386a4e2830bdd38512c87a4befff2b32 upstream. The AD7380 driver uses generic regmap types and APIs. However, its Kconfig entry does not select REGMAP. As a result, AD7380 can be enabled from an allnoconfig-derived config with SPI_MASTER=y while REGMAP remains unset, causing ad7380.o to fail to build. Fixes: b095217c104b ("iio: adc: ad7380: new driver for AD7380 ADCs") Signed-off-by: Samuel Moelius Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig index 58a14e6833f60..427d21523b4ac 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ config AD7298 config AD7380 tristate "Analog Devices AD7380 ADC driver" depends on SPI_MASTER + select REGMAP select SPI_OFFLOAD select IIO_BUFFER select IIO_BUFFER_DMAENGINE From 24a9514b606e76499ec85e7cba95d3f146dfe5d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Cameron Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2026 16:55:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 162/607] iio: adc: ad7768-1: Select GPIOLIB commit 5a9c90350be4f6f175bdd193e8bd60a7aedfb4d2 upstream. This driver provides a gpio chip a some related functions are not stubbed if GPIOLIB is not built. ad7768-1.c:420: undefined reference to `gpiochip_get_data' ad7768-1.c:498: undefined reference to `devm_gpiochip_add_data_with_key' Dual sign off reflects change of affiliation whilst this was under review. Fixes: d569ae0f052e ("iio: adc: ad7768-1: Add GPIO controller support") Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202512271235.WwAmAbOa-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Cc: Stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig index 427d21523b4ac..1a4caa0dee964 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig @@ -386,6 +386,7 @@ config AD7766 config AD7768_1 tristate "Analog Devices AD7768-1 ADC driver" depends on SPI + select GPIOLIB select REGULATOR select REGMAP_SPI select IIO_BUFFER From 46e93fcbe7c2caa80c83da260158c71ec915bc88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Crofts Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 21:21:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 163/607] iio: adc: ad7779: add missing 'select IIO_TRIGGERED_BUFFER' to Kconfig commit fd354554af1d2b33232ca6c8a3d79ed82413d715 upstream. The Kconfig entry for the AD7779 is missing a 'select IIO_TRIGGERED_BUFFER' parameter, causing build failures. Fixes: c9a3f8c7bfcb ("drivers: iio: adc: add support for ad777x family") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joshua Crofts Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig index 1a4caa0dee964..d4965c4b5d86f 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/Kconfig @@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ config AD7779 depends on SPI select CRC8 select IIO_BUFFER + select IIO_TRIGGERED_BUFFER select IIO_BACKEND help Say yes here to build support for Analog Devices AD777X family From 3394e0b3328422431cadaf314fa58d3717ed4936 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Radu Sabau Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 12:38:39 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 164/607] iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix clear_pending_event for registerless devices MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 91bc6767a4f55dc470d8a56b55b9f2ea09094efe upstream. ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event() falls through to the status register read path for devices with has_registers = false and no rdy_gpiod. For such devices, ad_sd_read_reg() skips the address byte entirely and clocks raw MISO bytes with no address phase — making it byte-for-byte identical to reading conversion data. If a pending conversion result is present, this partially consumes it and corrupts the data stream for the subsequent ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). Furthermore, with num_resetclks = 0 on these devices, data_read_len evaluates to 0. If the clocked byte has bit 7 clear, pending_event is set and the code attempts memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1), overflowing to SIZE_MAX and corrupting the heap. Fix by returning 0 immediately when neither rdy_gpiod nor has_registers is set. This is safe for all current registerless devices: ad7191 and ad7780 (with powerdown GPIO) are reset between conversions by CS deassertion, so there is no stale result to drain; ad7780 (without powerdown GPIO) and max11205 are continuously-converting and cycle ~DRDY at the output data rate regardless of whether the previous result was read, so the next falling edge fires naturally. A future registerless device that holds ~DRDY asserted until data is read would be broken by this early return and would require either num_resetclks set or a rdy-gpio. The same heap corruption is reachable on any device with rdy_gpiod set but num_resetclks = 0: if the GPIO indicates a pending event, the drain path executes memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1) regardless of has_registers. Add an explicit data_read_len == 0 guard after the pending event check; the stale result is then consumed by the first ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). Fixes: 132d44dc6966 ("iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: Check for previous ready signals") Signed-off-by: Radu Sabau Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c index 7852884703b0b..dfe52eab88bce 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c @@ -260,11 +260,25 @@ static int ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event(struct ad_sigma_delta *sigma_delta /* * Read R̅D̅Y̅ pin (if possible) or status register to check if there is an - * old event. + * old event. For devices with neither an RDY GPIO nor registers, + * ad_sd_read_reg() transmits no address byte and clocks raw MISO bytes, + * which is indistinguishable from reading conversion data and would + * partially consume a pending result. Skip the check for such devices. + * + * This is safe for all current registerless devices: ad7191 and ad7780 + * (with powerdown GPIO) are reset between conversions by CS deassertion, + * so there is no stale result to drain; ad7780 (without powerdown GPIO) + * and max11205 are continuously-converting and cycle ~DRDY at the output + * data rate regardless of whether the previous result was read, so the + * next falling edge fires naturally. + * + * A future registerless device that holds ~DRDY asserted until data is + * read would be broken by this early return and would need either + * num_resetclks set or a rdy-gpio. */ if (sigma_delta->rdy_gpiod) { pending_event = gpiod_get_value(sigma_delta->rdy_gpiod); - } else { + } else if (sigma_delta->info->has_registers) { unsigned int status_reg; ret = ad_sd_read_reg(sigma_delta, AD_SD_REG_STATUS, 1, &status_reg); @@ -272,11 +286,24 @@ static int ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event(struct ad_sigma_delta *sigma_delta return ret; pending_event = !(status_reg & AD_SD_REG_STATUS_RDY); + } else { + return 0; } if (!pending_event) return 0; + /* + * With num_resetclks = 0, data_read_len is 0 and the drain sequence + * below would compute memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1), underflowing to + * SIZE_MAX and corrupting the heap. There is no safe way to drain the + * stale result without knowing the data register size; it will be + * consumed by the first ad_sd_read_reg() call in + * ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). + */ + if (!data_read_len) + return 0; + /* * In general the size of the data register is unknown. It varies from * device to device, might be one byte longer if CONTROL.DATA_STATUS is From c313bb7c38855e94ceef939d152dd75e5a904b5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Radu Sabau Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 12:38:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 165/607] iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix CS held asserted and state leaks commit c72da0688575e5ef39c36bb44fed53aa18f8ae65 upstream. In ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(), set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) and disable_one() were called from the out: block while keep_cs_asserted was still true. This caused any SPI transfer issued by those callbacks to carry cs_change=1, leaving CS permanently asserted after the conversion. Fix by moving both calls into the out_unlock: block, after keep_cs_asserted is cleared, matching the pattern already used in ad_sd_calibrate(). In the error path of ad_sd_buffer_postenable(), if an operation fails after set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_CONTINUOUS) has already succeeded (e.g. spi_offload_trigger_enable()), the device is left in continuous conversion mode with CS physically asserted. Additionally, bus_locked remaining true after spi_bus_unlock() causes subsequent SPI operations to call spi_sync_locked() without the bus lock actually held, allowing concurrent SPI access. Fix the error path by clearing keep_cs_asserted first, then calling set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) to revert the device mode and deassert CS, then clearing bus_locked before releasing the bus. For devices that implement neither set_mode nor disable_one (such as MAX11205, which has no physical CS pin), no SPI transfer is issued during cleanup and the cs_change flag has no effect on any physical line. Fixes: 132d44dc6966 ("iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: Check for previous ready signals") Signed-off-by: Radu Sabau Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c index dfe52eab88bce..e2cf5f9136705 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c @@ -466,11 +466,10 @@ int ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, out: ad_sd_disable_irq(sigma_delta); - ad_sigma_delta_set_mode(sigma_delta, AD_SD_MODE_IDLE); - ad_sigma_delta_disable_one(sigma_delta, chan->address); - out_unlock: sigma_delta->keep_cs_asserted = false; + ad_sigma_delta_set_mode(sigma_delta, AD_SD_MODE_IDLE); + ad_sigma_delta_disable_one(sigma_delta, chan->address); sigma_delta->bus_locked = false; spi_bus_unlock(sigma_delta->spi->controller); out_release: @@ -603,6 +602,9 @@ static int ad_sd_buffer_postenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) return 0; err_unlock: + sigma_delta->keep_cs_asserted = false; + ad_sigma_delta_set_mode(sigma_delta, AD_SD_MODE_IDLE); + sigma_delta->bus_locked = false; spi_bus_unlock(sigma_delta->spi->controller); spi_unoptimize_message(&sigma_delta->sample_msg); From 9e2e8b8cdfd37ae7c7a8a5c96c59e98a768731c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxwell Doose Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 19:58:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 166/607] iio: adc: lpc32xx: Initialize completion before requesting IRQ commit e561b35633f450ee607e87a6401d97f156a0cd54 upstream. In the report from Jaeyoung Chung: "lpc32xx_adc_probe() in drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c registers its interrupt handler with devm_request_irq() before it initializes st->completion with init_completion(). If an interrupt arrives after devm_request_irq() and before init_completion(), the handler calls complete() on an uninitialized completion, causing a kernel panic. The probe path, in lpc32xx_adc_probe(): iodev = devm_iio_device_alloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*st)); /* st kzalloc-zeroed */ ... retval = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, lpc32xx_adc_isr, 0, LPC32XXAD_NAME, st); /* register handler */ ... init_completion(&st->completion); /* initialize completion */ lpc32xx_adc_isr() calls complete(): complete(&st->completion); If the device raises an interrupt before init_completion() runs, complete() acquires the uninitialized wait.lock and walks the zeroed task_list in swake_up_locked(). The zeroed task_list makes list_empty() return false, so swake_up_locked() dereferences a NULL list entry, triggering a KASAN wild-memory-access." Fix the chance of a spurious IRQ causing an uninitialized pointer dereference by moving init_completion() above devm_request_irq(). Fixes: 7901b2a1453e ("staging:iio:adc:lpc32xx rename local state structure to _state") Reported-by: Sangyun Kim Reported-by: Kyungwook Boo Reported-by: Jaeyoung Chung Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20260610115700.774689-1-jjy600901@snu.ac.kr/ Signed-off-by: Maxwell Doose Reviewed-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c index 43a7bc8158b57..db3a602327ffe 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/lpc32xx_adc.c @@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ static int lpc32xx_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (irq < 0) return irq; + init_completion(&st->completion); + retval = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, lpc32xx_adc_isr, 0, LPC32XXAD_NAME, st); if (retval < 0) { @@ -197,8 +199,6 @@ static int lpc32xx_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) platform_set_drvdata(pdev, iodev); - init_completion(&st->completion); - iodev->name = LPC32XXAD_NAME; iodev->info = &lpc32xx_adc_iio_info; iodev->modes = INDIO_DIRECT_MODE; From bbfebae473ac2c8a194523b29ccb9b45f02f134c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxwell Doose Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 19:58:11 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 167/607] iio: adc: spear: Initialize completion before requesting IRQ commit 3ee2128b6f0eb0be7b6cb8f6e0f1f113a65201a0 upstream. In the report from Jaeyoung Chung: "spear_adc_probe() in drivers/iio/adc/spear_adc.c registers its interrupt handler with devm_request_irq() before it initializes st->completion with init_completion(). If an interrupt arrives after devm_request_irq() and before init_completion(), the handler calls complete() on an uninitialized completion, causing a kernel panic. The probe path, in spear_adc_probe(): iodev = devm_iio_device_alloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*st)); /* st kzalloc-zeroed */ ... retval = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, irq, spear_adc_isr, 0, LPC32XXAD_NAME, st); /* register handler */ ... init_completion(&st->completion); /* initialize completion */ spear_adc_isr() calls complete(): complete(&st->completion); If the device raises an interrupt before init_completion() runs, complete() acquires the uninitialized wait.lock and walks the zeroed task_list in swake_up_locked(). The zeroed task_list makes list_empty() return false, so swake_up_locked() dereferences a NULL list entry, triggering a KASAN wild-memory-access." Fix the chance of a spurious IRQ causing an uninitialized pointer dereference by moving init_completion() above devm_request_irq(). Fixes: b586e5d9eee0 ("staging:iio:adc:spear rename device specific state structure to _state") Reported-by: Sangyun Kim Reported-by: Kyungwook Boo Reported-by: Jaeyoung Chung Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20260610115700.774689-1-jjy600901@snu.ac.kr/ Signed-off-by: Maxwell Doose Reviewed-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/spear_adc.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/spear_adc.c b/drivers/iio/adc/spear_adc.c index 50b0a607baeb7..79b0aa1df61df 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/spear_adc.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/spear_adc.c @@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ static int spear_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) st = iio_priv(indio_dev); st->dev = dev; + init_completion(&st->completion); mutex_init(&st->lock); /* @@ -326,8 +327,6 @@ static int spear_adc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) spear_adc_configure(st); - init_completion(&st->completion); - indio_dev->name = SPEAR_ADC_MOD_NAME; indio_dev->info = &spear_adc_info; indio_dev->modes = INDIO_DIRECT_MODE; From ffb2195921c3d629194b9807de589578df9f9cb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guangshuo Li Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 20:16:40 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 168/607] iio: adc: ti-ads1119: fix PM reference leak in buffer preenable commit adf4bc07f814da8329278d32600147f5a150938c upstream. ads1119_triggered_buffer_preenable() resumes the device with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() before starting a conversion. If i2c_smbus_write_byte() fails, the function returns the error directly and leaves the runtime PM usage counter elevated. The matching postdisable callback is not called when preenable fails, so the reference is leaked and the device may remain runtime-active indefinitely. Store the I2C transfer result in ret and drop the runtime PM reference on failure before returning the error. Fixes: a9306887eba41 ("iio: adc: ti-ads1119: Add driver") Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads1119.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads1119.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads1119.c index 79be71b4de963..9324408cb3b05 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads1119.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads1119.c @@ -459,7 +459,11 @@ static int ads1119_triggered_buffer_preenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) if (ret) return ret; - return i2c_smbus_write_byte(st->client, ADS1119_CMD_START_SYNC); + ret = i2c_smbus_write_byte(st->client, ADS1119_CMD_START_SYNC); + if (ret) + pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(dev); + + return ret; } static int ads1119_triggered_buffer_postdisable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) From 0f30e68dd6c1f5c6451de7e0f0b3bc79f9d12ba4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pengpeng Hou Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 13:44:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 169/607] iio: adc: ti-ads124s08: Return reset GPIO lookup errors commit 7dc4de2aa6316f1d044cde21f5acfec5f3ec6b47 upstream. devm_gpiod_get_optional() returns NULL when the optional GPIO is absent, but returns an ERR_PTR when the GPIO provider lookup fails, including probe deferral. Probe currently logs the ERR_PTR case as if the reset GPIO were simply absent and keeps the error pointer in reset_gpio. Later ads124s_reset() treats any non-NULL reset_gpio as a valid descriptor and passes it to gpiod_set_value_cansleep(). Return the lookup error instead of retaining the ERR_PTR. Fixes: e717f8c6dfec ("iio: adc: Add the TI ads124s08 ADC code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Joshua Crofts Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads124s08.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads124s08.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads124s08.c index 8ea1269f74db0..57eed8554bd92 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads124s08.c +++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ti-ads124s08.c @@ -321,7 +321,8 @@ static int ads124s_probe(struct spi_device *spi) ads124s_priv->reset_gpio = devm_gpiod_get_optional(&spi->dev, "reset", GPIOD_OUT_LOW); if (IS_ERR(ads124s_priv->reset_gpio)) - dev_info(&spi->dev, "Reset GPIO not defined\n"); + return dev_err_probe(&spi->dev, PTR_ERR(ads124s_priv->reset_gpio), + "Failed to get reset GPIO\n"); ads124s_priv->chip_info = &ads124s_chip_info_tbl[spi_id->driver_data]; From c28835b8618ecb288605ba139c7d192f6d239cc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 10:16:11 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 170/607] iio: backend: fix uninitialized data in debugfs commit a6e8b14a4897d0b6df9744f33d0a30e6b92368eb upstream. If the *ppos value is non-zero then simple_write_to_buffer() will not initialize the start of the buf[] buffer. Non-zero ppos values aren't going to work at all. Check for that at the start of the function and return -ENOSPC. Fixes: cdf01e0809a4 ("iio: backend: add debugFs interface") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/industrialio-backend.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-backend.c b/drivers/iio/industrialio-backend.c index 23760652a046d..b8ffc0baa28ef 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-backend.c +++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-backend.c @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static ssize_t iio_backend_debugfs_write_reg(struct file *file, ssize_t rc; int ret; - if (count >= sizeof(buf)) + if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(buf)) return -ENOSPC; rc = simple_write_to_buffer(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, ppos, userbuf, count); From 82accdd57404399eddf3d56fd9beda7c61307388 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxwell Doose Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 17:55:24 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 171/607] iio: chemical: scd30: Cleanup initializations and fix sign-extension bug commit 60d877910a43c305b5165131b258a17b1d772d57 upstream. Include linux/bitfield.h for FIELD_GET(). Create new macros for bit manipulation in combination with manual bit manipulation being replaced with FIELD_GET(). The current variable declaration and initializations are barely readable and use comma separations across multiple lines. Refactor the initializations so that mantissa and exp have separate declarations and sign gets initialized later. In addition (and due to the nature of the cleanup), fix a sign-extension bug where, float32 would get bitwise anded with ~BIT(31) (which is 0xFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF) which corrupted the exponent. Fixes: 64b3d8b1b0f5c ("iio: chemical: scd30: add core driver") Reported-by: sashiko Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260524020309.18618-1-m32285159%40gmail.com Signed-off-by: Maxwell Doose Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c b/drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c index 11d6bc1b63e67..d02f2de42327d 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/chemical/scd30_core.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * * Copyright (c) 2020 Tomasz Duszynski */ + +#include #include #include #include @@ -43,6 +45,11 @@ #define SCD30_TEMP_OFFSET_MAX 655360 #define SCD30_EXTRA_TIMEOUT_PER_S 250 +/* Floating point arithmetic macros */ +#define SCD30_FLOAT_MANTISSA_MSK GENMASK(22, 0) +#define SCD30_FLOAT_EXP_MSK GENMASK(30, 23) +#define SCD30_FLOAT_SIGN_MSK BIT(31) + enum { SCD30_CONC, SCD30_TEMP, @@ -89,10 +96,14 @@ static int scd30_reset(struct scd30_state *state) /* simplified float to fixed point conversion with a scaling factor of 0.01 */ static int scd30_float_to_fp(int float32) { - int fraction, shift, - mantissa = float32 & GENMASK(22, 0), - sign = (float32 & BIT(31)) ? -1 : 1, - exp = (float32 & ~BIT(31)) >> 23; + int fraction, shift, sign; + int mantissa = FIELD_GET(SCD30_FLOAT_MANTISSA_MSK, float32); + int exp = FIELD_GET(SCD30_FLOAT_EXP_MSK, float32); + + if (float32 & SCD30_FLOAT_SIGN_MSK) + sign = -1; + else + sign = 1; /* special case 0 */ if (!exp && !mantissa) From b947bde73461ff523da014462f8de043e2cbd4e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herman van Hazendonk Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 15:02:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 172/607] iio: common: st_sensors: honour channel endianness in read_axis_data MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 55052184ac9011db2ea983e54d6c21f0b1079a12 upstream. st_sensors_read_axis_data() unconditionally decoded multi-byte results with get_unaligned_le16() / get_unaligned_le24() regardless of the channel's declared scan_type.endianness. For every ST sensor that has used this helper since it was introduced this happened to be fine because the ST IMU/accel/gyro/pressure families publish their data registers as little-endian and the channel specs in those drivers declare IIO_LE accordingly. The LSM303DLH magnetometer however publishes its X/Y/Z output as a pair of big-endian bytes (the H register sits at the lower address, 0x03/0x05/0x07, and the L register immediately after), and its channel specs in st_magn_core.c correctly declare IIO_BE -- but read_axis_data() ignored that and decoded as little-endian, swapping the high and low bytes of every magnetometer sample. The LSM303DLHC and LSM303DLM share the same st_magn_16bit_channels (IIO_BE) and were therefore byte-swapped by the same bug; users of those parts will see different in_magn_*_raw values after this fix lands. The bug is most visible on a stationary chip: in earth's field the true X reading is small and the high byte sits at 0x00, so swapping the bytes pins sysfs X at exactly the low byte's pattern (e.g. 0x00F0 = 240). Y and Z still appear "to vary" because their magnitudes are larger and the noise in the low byte produces big swings in the swapped high byte: before (LSM303DLH flat, sysfs in_magn_*_raw): X=240 (stuck), Y= 12032..23296, Z=-16128..-9728 after (direct i2c-dev big-endian decode, same chip same orientation): X≈-4096, Y≈210, Z≈80 (sensible values reflecting earth's ambient field at low gauss range) Fix read_axis_data() to dispatch on ch->scan_type.endianness and call get_unaligned_be16() / get_unaligned_be24() when the channel declares IIO_BE. Existing IIO_LE consumers (st_accel, st_gyro, st_pressure, st_lsm6dsx and others) are unaffected because their channel specs already declare IIO_LE and the LE path is unchanged. While restructuring the branches, replace the previously implicit silent-success-with-uninitialised-*data fall-through for byte_for_channel outside 1..3 with an explicit return -EINVAL. No in-tree ST sensor publishes such a channel, but the new behaviour is strictly safer than handing userspace garbage. Fixes: 23491b513bcd ("iio:common: Add STMicroelectronics common library") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 sparse smatch clang-analyzer coccinelle checkpatch Assisted-by: Sashiko:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Herman van Hazendonk Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c | 23 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c index dac593be56958..88c0eb9aa8ebf 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c @@ -498,6 +498,7 @@ static int st_sensors_read_axis_data(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, u8 *outdata; struct st_sensor_data *sdata = iio_priv(indio_dev); unsigned int byte_for_channel; + u32 tmp; byte_for_channel = DIV_ROUND_UP(ch->scan_type.realbits + ch->scan_type.shift, 8); @@ -510,12 +511,22 @@ static int st_sensors_read_axis_data(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, if (err < 0) goto st_sensors_free_memory; - if (byte_for_channel == 1) - *data = (s8)*outdata; - else if (byte_for_channel == 2) - *data = (s16)get_unaligned_le16(outdata); - else if (byte_for_channel == 3) - *data = (s32)sign_extend32(get_unaligned_le24(outdata), 23); + if (byte_for_channel == 1) { + tmp = *outdata; + } else if (byte_for_channel == 2) { + if (ch->scan_type.endianness == IIO_BE) + tmp = get_unaligned_be16(outdata); + else + tmp = get_unaligned_le16(outdata); + } else if (byte_for_channel == 3) { + if (ch->scan_type.endianness == IIO_BE) + tmp = get_unaligned_be24(outdata); + else + tmp = get_unaligned_le24(outdata); + } else { + return -EINVAL; + } + *data = sign_extend32(tmp, BYTES_TO_BITS(byte_for_channel) - 1); st_sensors_free_memory: kfree(outdata); From e166a8cfb28a3d0da260dd70cae274eb8c7cec8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 10:16:27 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 173/607] iio: core: fix uninitialized data in debugfs commit ab92ed206d41fd171ebd37bc46360d9f2140d043 upstream. If *ppos is non-zero then simple_write_to_buffer() will not initialize the start of buf[]. Non zero values for *ppos aren't going to work anyway. Test for them at the start of the function and return -EINVAL. Fixes: 6d5dd486c715 ("iio: core: make use of simple_write_to_buffer()") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Maxwell Doose Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c b/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c index 117ffad4f3769..be2b3259c8e71 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-core.c @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ static ssize_t iio_debugfs_write_reg(struct file *file, char buf[80]; int ret; - if (count >= sizeof(buf)) + if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(buf)) return -EINVAL; ret = simple_write_to_buffer(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, ppos, userbuf, From 2358da87315d117e9e5134afc1d2a18fa2da72f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 10:15:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 174/607] iio: dac: ad3552r-hs: fix uninitialized data ni ad3552r_hs_write_data_source() commit eaaa7eef181892ef7ba56c6295b81f0ae4492c13 upstream. If the *ppos value is non-zero then the simple_write_to_buffer() function won't initialized the start of the buf[] buffer. Non-zero values for *ppos won't work here generally, so just test for them and return -ENOSPC at the start of the function. Fixes: b1c5d68ea66e ("iio: dac: ad3552r-hs: add support for internal ramp") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Angelo Dureghello Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r-hs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r-hs.c b/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r-hs.c index a9578afa7015d..6bc64f53bce91 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r-hs.c +++ b/drivers/iio/dac/ad3552r-hs.c @@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static ssize_t ad3552r_hs_write_data_source(struct file *f, guard(mutex)(&st->lock); - if (count >= sizeof(buf)) + if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(buf)) return -ENOSPC; ret = simple_write_to_buffer(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, ppos, userbuf, From 9edefd4c56bee3fe331e0355d1f10a533134999d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lars-Peter Clausen Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 21:48:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 175/607] iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit af791d295737ea6b6ff2c8d8488462a49c14af01 upstream. `iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with `anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the caller. The IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned, but before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace. But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess the newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd has been installed. This means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in parallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`. The kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader. Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as `kfifo_reset()`. If that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out` index to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out` index past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to userspace. Move the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot access it while the FIFO is reset. Fixes: b91accafbb10 ("iio:event: Fix and cleanup locking") Reported-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/industrialio-event.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/industrialio-event.c b/drivers/iio/industrialio-event.c index 06295cfc2da8b..1eee1ad2036f9 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/industrialio-event.c +++ b/drivers/iio/industrialio-event.c @@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ static int iio_event_getfd(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) goto unlock; } + kfifo_reset_out(&ev_int->det_events); + iio_device_get(indio_dev); fd = anon_inode_getfd("iio:event", &iio_event_chrdev_fileops, @@ -214,10 +216,7 @@ static int iio_event_getfd(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) if (fd < 0) { clear_bit(IIO_BUSY_BIT_POS, &ev_int->flags); iio_device_put(indio_dev); - } else { - kfifo_reset_out(&ev_int->det_events); } - unlock: mutex_unlock(&iio_dev_opaque->mlock); return fd; From 7bbf02b63961fc1768c9c654392c11f2077d4c59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 07:35:00 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 176/607] iio: gyro: bmg160: bail out when bandwidth/filter is not in table commit 8320c77e67382d5d55d77043a5f60a867d408a2b upstream. bmg160_get_filter() walks bmg160_samp_freq_table[] looking for the entry matching the bw_bits value read from the chip: for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bmg160_samp_freq_table); ++i) { if (bmg160_samp_freq_table[i].bw_bits == bw_bits) break; } *val = bmg160_samp_freq_table[i].filter; If no entry matches, i ends up equal to the array size and the next line reads one slot past the end. bmg160_set_filter() has the same shape, driven by 'val' instead of bw_bits. smatch flags both: drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c:204 bmg160_get_filter() error: buffer overflow 'bmg160_samp_freq_table' 7 <= 7 drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c:222 bmg160_set_filter() error: buffer overflow 'bmg160_samp_freq_table' 7 <= 7 Return -EINVAL when no entry matches. The set_filter() path is reachable from userspace via the sysfs in_anglvel_filter_low_pass_3db_frequency interface, so userspace can trivially trigger the out-of-bounds read with a value that is not in bmg160_samp_freq_table[].filter. Fixes: 22b46c45fb9b ("iio:gyro:bmg160 Gyro Sensor driver") Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c b/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c index 38394b5f32755..58963f3ea186f 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c @@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ static int bmg160_get_filter(struct bmg160_data *data, int *val) break; } + if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(bmg160_samp_freq_table)) + return -EINVAL; + *val = bmg160_samp_freq_table[i].filter; return ret ? ret : IIO_VAL_INT; @@ -218,6 +221,9 @@ static int bmg160_set_filter(struct bmg160_data *data, int val) break; } + if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(bmg160_samp_freq_table)) + return -EINVAL; + ret = regmap_write(data->regmap, BMG160_REG_PMU_BW, bmg160_samp_freq_table[i].bw_bits); if (ret < 0) { From 001527e2382e31d948415818f425b2d4b7da012e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 11:40:20 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 177/607] iio: gyro: bmg160: wait full startup time after mode change at probe commit 088fcb9b567f8723074ad9eb1bf5cb46f8a0096b upstream. bmg160_chip_init() calls bmg160_set_mode(BMG160_MODE_NORMAL) and then waits only 500-1000 us. Per the BMG160 datasheet (BST-BMG160-DS000-07 Rev. 1.0, May 2013), the start-up and wake-up times (tsu, twusm) are 30 ms. The same file already waits BMG160_MAX_STARTUP_TIME_MS (80 ms) in bmg160_runtime_resume() after the same set_mode(NORMAL) operation. The 500 us value at probe was likely a unit mix-up; the old comment said "500 ms" while the code used microseconds. Reuse the same constant via msleep() and add a code comment explaining the datasheet basis for the wait. Without this, register writes that follow the mode change can hit the chip before it is ready. Fixes: 22b46c45fb9b ("iio:gyro:bmg160 Gyro Sensor driver") Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c b/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c index 58963f3ea186f..d611341a0e2ad 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/gyro/bmg160_core.c @@ -264,8 +264,14 @@ static int bmg160_chip_init(struct bmg160_data *data) if (ret < 0) return ret; - /* Wait upto 500 ms to be ready after changing mode */ - usleep_range(500, 1000); + /* + * Wait for the chip to be ready after switching to normal mode. + * The BMG160 datasheet (BST-BMG160-DS000-07 Rev. 1.0, May 2013) + * specifies a start-up / wake-up time (tsu, twusm) of 30 ms; use + * BMG160_MAX_STARTUP_TIME_MS (80 ms) as a safety margin, matching + * what bmg160_runtime_resume() already does. + */ + msleep(BMG160_MAX_STARTUP_TIME_MS); /* Set Bandwidth */ ret = bmg160_set_bw(data, BMG160_DEF_BW); From bdafd53ae671ed38ff2c1a4c88ce0fbc60e92f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 09:42:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 178/607] iio: imu: adis: add IRQF_NO_THREAD to non-FIFO trigger IRQ commit 6e1b9bff1202da55c464e36bd34a2b6863d7fe30 upstream. devm_adis_probe_trigger() registers iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll() through devm_request_irq() on the non-FIFO path, but it does not add IRQF_NO_THREAD to the IRQ flags. When the kernel is booted with forced IRQ threading, the parent IRQ can otherwise be threaded by the IRQ core and the subsequent IIO trigger child IRQ is then dispatched from irq/... thread context instead of hardirq context. Because iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll() immediately drives iio_trigger_poll(), this violates the hardirq-only IIO trigger helper contract and can push downstream trigger consumers through the wrong execution context. Add IRQF_NO_THREAD on top of the existing adis->irq_flag value for the non-FIFO request_irq() path, while preserving the current trigger polarity and IRQF_NO_AUTOEN behavior. Fixes: fec86c6b8369 ("iio: imu: adis: Add Managed device functions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/imu/adis_trigger.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/adis_trigger.c b/drivers/iio/imu/adis_trigger.c index d76e13cbac680..3e6a7af6ab017 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/adis_trigger.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/adis_trigger.c @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ int devm_adis_probe_trigger(struct adis *adis, struct iio_dev *indio_dev) else ret = devm_request_irq(&adis->spi->dev, adis->spi->irq, &iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll, - adis->irq_flag, + adis->irq_flag | IRQF_NO_THREAD, indio_dev->name, adis->trig); if (ret) From 0522819228284eab9ec91fa4258c37fa8eb160a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 09:42:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 179/607] iio: imu: bmi160: add IRQF_NO_THREAD to data-ready trigger IRQ commit cd5a6a5096b246e10600da3ac47a1274ce9573c8 upstream. bmi160_probe_trigger() registers iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll() through devm_request_irq(), but it passes only irq_type and does not add IRQF_NO_THREAD. When the kernel is booted with forced IRQ threading, the parent IRQ can otherwise be threaded by the IRQ core and the subsequent IIO trigger child IRQ is dispatched from irq/... thread context instead of hardirq context. Because the handler immediately pushes the event into iio_trigger_poll(), this violates the hardirq-only IIO trigger helper contract and can drive downstream trigger consumers through the wrong execution context. Add IRQF_NO_THREAD on top of irq_type when registering the BMI160 data- ready trigger handler. Fixes: 895bf81e6bbf ("iio:bmi160: add drdy interrupt support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c b/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c index 4abb83b75e2e8..86f6ecfd64aa2 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/bmi160/bmi160_core.c @@ -788,7 +788,8 @@ int bmi160_probe_trigger(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int irq, u32 irq_type) ret = devm_request_irq(&indio_dev->dev, irq, &iio_trigger_generic_data_rdy_poll, - irq_type, "bmi160", data->trig); + irq_type | IRQF_NO_THREAD, + "bmi160", data->trig); if (ret) return ret; From 34656a59322e5951bb346728adf4e53ff9e74740 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean-Baptiste Maneyrol Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 16:22:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 180/607] iio: imu: inv_icm42600: fix timestamp clock period by using lower value commit 8b0b864c11a2e2ada470f9d5010e1c2bf1eceef2 upstream. Clock period value is used for computing periods of sampling. There is no need for it to be higher than the maximum odr, otherwise we are losing precision in the computation for nothing. Switch clock period value to maximum odr period (8kHz). Fixes: 0ecc363ccea7 ("iio: make invensense timestamp module generic") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jean-Baptiste Maneyrol Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_accel.c | 4 ++-- drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_gyro.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_accel.c b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_accel.c index 0ab6eddf0543f..96a6213770d41 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_accel.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_accel.c @@ -1170,10 +1170,10 @@ struct iio_dev *inv_icm42600_accel_init(struct inv_icm42600_state *st) accel_st->filter = INV_ICM42600_FILTER_AVG_16X; /* - * clock period is 32kHz (31250ns) + * clock period is 8kHz (125000ns) * jitter is +/- 2% (20 per mille) */ - ts_chip.clock_period = 31250; + ts_chip.clock_period = 125000; ts_chip.jitter = 20; ts_chip.init_period = inv_icm42600_odr_to_period(st->conf.accel.odr); inv_sensors_timestamp_init(&accel_st->ts, &ts_chip); diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_gyro.c b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_gyro.c index 11339ddf1da36..a18dcac939298 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_gyro.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_gyro.c @@ -755,10 +755,10 @@ struct iio_dev *inv_icm42600_gyro_init(struct inv_icm42600_state *st) } /* - * clock period is 32kHz (31250ns) + * clock period is 8kHz (125000ns) * jitter is +/- 2% (20 per mille) */ - ts_chip.clock_period = 31250; + ts_chip.clock_period = 125000; ts_chip.jitter = 20; ts_chip.init_period = inv_icm42600_odr_to_period(st->conf.accel.odr); inv_sensors_timestamp_init(&gyro_st->ts, &ts_chip); From 76e12a71ac0538560e1e497e1dc9bbf4b4451e9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jean-Baptiste Maneyrol Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 21:51:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 181/607] iio: imu: inv_icm42600: fix timestamping by limiting FIFO reading commit affe3f077d7a4eeb25937f5323ff059a54b4712c upstream. Timestamps are made by measuring the chip clock using the watermark interrupts. If we read more than watermark samples as done today, we are reducing the period between interrupts and distort the time measurement. Fix that by reading only watermark samples in the interrupt case. Fixes: 7f85e42a6c54 ("iio: imu: inv_icm42600: add buffer support in iio devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jean-Baptiste Maneyrol Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.c | 9 +++++---- drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.c b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.c index 68a3957580318..5c3840acf0857 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.c @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ int inv_icm42600_buffer_update_watermark(struct inv_icm42600_state *st) /* compute watermark value in bytes */ wm_size = watermark * packet_size; + st->fifo.watermark.value = watermark; /* changing FIFO watermark requires to turn off watermark interrupt */ ret = regmap_update_bits_check(st->map, INV_ICM42600_REG_INT_SOURCE0, @@ -454,11 +455,10 @@ int inv_icm42600_buffer_fifo_read(struct inv_icm42600_state *st, st->fifo.nb.accel = 0; st->fifo.nb.total = 0; - /* compute maximum FIFO read size */ + /* compute maximum FIFO read size (watermark for max = 0 interrupt case) */ if (max == 0) - max_count = sizeof(st->fifo.data); - else - max_count = max * inv_icm42600_get_packet_size(st->fifo.en); + max = st->fifo.watermark.value; + max_count = max * inv_icm42600_get_packet_size(st->fifo.en); /* read FIFO count value */ raw_fifo_count = (__be16 *)st->buffer; @@ -574,6 +574,7 @@ int inv_icm42600_buffer_init(struct inv_icm42600_state *st) st->fifo.watermark.eff_gyro = 1; st->fifo.watermark.eff_accel = 1; + st->fifo.watermark.value = 1; /* * Default FIFO configuration (bits 7 to 5) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.h b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.h index ffca4da1e2493..88b8b9f780af3 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.h +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/inv_icm42600/inv_icm42600_buffer.h @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct inv_icm42600_fifo { unsigned int accel; unsigned int eff_gyro; unsigned int eff_accel; + unsigned int value; } watermark; size_t count; struct { From 482b24660ec3b4b4a0991472508e5549410b5c08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Kempe Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 10:41:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 182/607] iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: deselect shub page before reading whoami commit aede83625ff5d9539508582036df30c809d51058 upstream. As part of driver initialization, e.g. st_lsm6dsx_init_shub() selects the shub register page using st_lsm6dsx_set_page(). Selecting the shub register page shadows the regular register space so whoami, among other registers, is no longer accessible. In applications where the IMU is permanently powered separately from the processor, there is a window where a reset of the CPU leaves the IMU in the shub register page. Once this occurs, any subsequent probe attempt fails because of the register shadowing. Using the ism330dlc, the error typically looks like st_lsm6dsx_i2c 3-006a: unsupported whoami [10] with the unknown whoami read from a reserved register in the shub page. The reset register is also shadowed by the page select, preventing a reset from recovering the chip. Unconditionally clear the shub page before the whoami readout to ensure normal register access and allow the initialization to proceed. Place the fix in st_lsm6dsx_check_whoami() before the whoami check because hw->settings, which st_lsm6dsx_set_page() relies on, is first assigned in that function. Placing the fix in a more logical place than the whoami check would require a bigger restructuring of the code. Fixes: c91c1c844ebd ("iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: add i2c embedded controller support") Signed-off-by: Andreas Kempe Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/imu/st_lsm6dsx/st_lsm6dsx_core.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/imu/st_lsm6dsx/st_lsm6dsx_core.c b/drivers/iio/imu/st_lsm6dsx/st_lsm6dsx_core.c index 28ebb27d89249..2a826da915e0d 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/imu/st_lsm6dsx/st_lsm6dsx_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/imu/st_lsm6dsx/st_lsm6dsx_core.c @@ -1597,6 +1597,26 @@ static int st_lsm6dsx_check_whoami(struct st_lsm6dsx_hw *hw, int id, return -ENODEV; } + hw->settings = &st_lsm6dsx_sensor_settings[i]; + + if (hw->settings->shub_settings.page_mux.addr) { + /* + * If the IMU has the shub page selected on init, for example + * after a CPU watchdog reset while the page is selected, the + * regular register space is shadowed. While the regular + * register space is shadowed, the registers needed for + * initializing the IMU are not available. + * + * Unconditionally clear the shub page selection to ensure + * normal register access. + */ + err = st_lsm6dsx_set_page(hw, false); + if (err < 0) { + dev_err(hw->dev, "failed to clear shub page\n"); + return err; + } + } + err = regmap_read(hw->regmap, ST_LSM6DSX_REG_WHOAMI_ADDR, &data); if (err < 0) { dev_err(hw->dev, "failed to read whoami register\n"); @@ -1609,7 +1629,6 @@ static int st_lsm6dsx_check_whoami(struct st_lsm6dsx_hw *hw, int id, } *name = st_lsm6dsx_sensor_settings[i].id[j].name; - hw->settings = &st_lsm6dsx_sensor_settings[i]; return 0; } From 6afb69bb969ed1ea22612bf6cd44f16fe68e1d47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Crofts Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 21:38:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 183/607] iio: light: al3000a: add missing REGMAP_I2C to Kconfig commit a2d30022b7c316ad845d1b696e724058b88e5a4e upstream. The KConfig entry for the al3000a is missing a `select REGMAP_I2C`, causing build failures. Fixes: d531b9f78949 ("iio: light: Add support for AL3000a illuminance sensor") Signed-off-by: Joshua Crofts Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: David Heidelberg Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig index ac1408d374c92..e8a136dc270f0 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config ADUX1020 config AL3000A tristate "AL3000a ambient light sensor" + select REGMAP_I2C depends on I2C help Say Y here if you want to build a driver for the Dyna Image AL3000a From 9fb4ff07d97e33eab5dd33dcb8188156215cff6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Crofts Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 21:38:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 184/607] iio: light: al3010: add missing REGMAP_I2C to Kconfig commit 84486e3bbda18a2df1ed74ca78e1e14bde9a941b upstream. The KConfig entry for the AL3010 is missing a `select REGMAP_I2C`, causing build failures. Fixes: 0e5e21e23dd6 ("iio: light: al3010: Implement regmap support") Signed-off-by: Joshua Crofts Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: David Heidelberg Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig index e8a136dc270f0..2e354a8d9f3d1 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ config AL3000A config AL3010 tristate "AL3010 ambient light sensor" + select REGMAP_I2C depends on I2C help Say Y here if you want to build a driver for the Dyna Image AL3010 From cd278561640c716b2eff0b0143fd02cc9ee8b437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vidhu Sarwal Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 17:22:45 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 185/607] iio: light: al3010: fix incorrect scale for the highest gain range commit aa411adc6ce40ad1a55ebc965f255a4cfc0005f8 upstream. al3010_scales[] encodes the highest gain range as {0, 1187200}. For IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_MICRO, the fractional part must be less than 1000000, so the scale 1.1872 should instead be represented as { 1, 187200 }. Since write_raw() compares the value from userspace against this table, writing the advertised 1.1872 scale never matches the malformed entry and returns -EINVAL. As a result, the highest gain range cannot be selected. Reading the scale in that state also reports the malformed value. Fixes: c36b5195ab70 ("iio: light: add Dyna-Image AL3010 driver") Signed-off-by: Vidhu Sarwal Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/al3010.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c b/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c index 0932fa2b49fa7..11eb68e889cb7 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ enum al3xxxx_range { }; static const int al3010_scales[][2] = { - {0, 1187200}, {0, 296800}, {0, 74200}, {0, 18600} + { 1, 187200 }, { 0, 296800 }, { 0, 74200 }, { 0, 18600 }, }; static const struct regmap_config al3010_regmap_config = { From a00d471cf3580d033bdabc196b09c4ccabff64aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Alexander A. Klimov" Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 13:44:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 186/607] iio: light: al3010: read both ALS ADC registers again commit ee78fae068f52a5582aaf448d9414f826855c106 upstream. al3010_read_raw() used to read two adjacent registers until the driver was modernized using the regmap framework. That cleanup accidentally replaced the 16-bit word read with a single byte read. I'm reverting latter. Fixes: 0e5e21e23dd6 ("iio: light: al3010: Implement regmap support") Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/al3010.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c b/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c index 11eb68e889cb7..0e72906c637f0 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/al3010.c @@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static int al3010_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int *val2, long mask) { struct al3010_data *data = iio_priv(indio_dev); - int ret, gain, raw; + int ret, gain; + __le16 raw; switch (mask) { case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: @@ -120,11 +121,12 @@ static int al3010_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, * - low byte of output is stored at AL3010_REG_DATA_LOW * - high byte of output is stored at AL3010_REG_DATA_LOW + 1 */ - ret = regmap_read(data->regmap, AL3010_REG_DATA_LOW, &raw); + ret = regmap_bulk_read(data->regmap, AL3010_REG_DATA_LOW, + &raw, sizeof(raw)); if (ret) return ret; - *val = raw; + *val = le16_to_cpu(raw); return IIO_VAL_INT; case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE: From a1dafc918d793274fd5b14cdf2eae65371dd1f2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Crofts Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 21:38:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 187/607] iio: light: al3320a: add missing REGMAP_I2C to Kconfig commit 9efcc9ba9b2e940cc01e63d132ae741e4c5d09c7 upstream. The Kconfig entry for the al3320a is missing a `select REGMAP_I2C`, causing build failures. Fixes: 1850e6ae7f91 ("iio: light: al3320a: Implement regmap support") Signed-off-by: Joshua Crofts Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: David Heidelberg Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig b/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig index 2e354a8d9f3d1..b567efdc7d506 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/iio/light/Kconfig @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ config AL3010 config AL3320A tristate "AL3320A ambient light sensor" + select REGMAP_I2C depends on I2C help Say Y here if you want to build a driver for the Dyna Image AL3320A From a60bf629a760d176e22182302284f1314db8c76b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Alexander A. Klimov" Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 13:44:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 188/607] iio: light: al3320a: read both ALS ADC registers again commit 744bccc2647c6b2206290e8e40890a23812116b3 upstream. al3320a_read_raw() used to read two adjacent registers until the driver was modernized using the regmap framework. That cleanup accidentally replaced the 16-bit word read with a single byte read. I'm reverting latter. Fixes: 1850e6ae7f91 ("iio: light: al3320a: Implement regmap support") Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/al3320a.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/al3320a.c b/drivers/iio/light/al3320a.c index 63f5a85912fc9..b9076f4344179 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/al3320a.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/al3320a.c @@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ static int al3320a_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int *val2, long mask) { struct al3320a_data *data = iio_priv(indio_dev); - int ret, gain, raw; + int ret, gain; + __le16 raw; switch (mask) { case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: @@ -144,11 +145,12 @@ static int al3320a_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, * - low byte of output is stored at AL3320A_REG_DATA_LOW * - high byte of output is stored at AL3320A_REG_DATA_LOW + 1 */ - ret = regmap_read(data->regmap, AL3320A_REG_DATA_LOW, &raw); + ret = regmap_bulk_read(data->regmap, AL3320A_REG_DATA_LOW, + &raw, sizeof(raw)); if (ret) return ret; - *val = raw; + *val = le16_to_cpu(raw); return IIO_VAL_INT; case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE: From 0c655d067ac69ee24e2e9d706c54179ea58a43db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biren Pandya Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 12:45:49 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 189/607] iio: light: gp2ap002: fix runtime PM leak on read error commit 38b72267b7e22768a1f26d9935de4e1752a1dc85 upstream. gp2ap002_read_raw() calls pm_runtime_get_sync() before reading the lux value, but if gp2ap002_get_lux() fails, it returns directly. This skips the pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() call at the "out" label, permanently leaking a runtime PM reference and preventing the device from autosuspending. Replace the direct return with a "goto out" to ensure the reference is properly dropped on the error path. Fixes: f6dbf83c17cb ("iio: light: gp2ap002: Take runtime PM reference on light read") Signed-off-by: Biren Pandya Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/gp2ap002.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/gp2ap002.c b/drivers/iio/light/gp2ap002.c index a0d8a58f27042..886accf5e8591 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/gp2ap002.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/gp2ap002.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static int gp2ap002_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, case IIO_LIGHT: ret = gp2ap002_get_lux(gp2ap002); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto out; *val = ret; ret = IIO_VAL_INT; goto out; From 9d421c2827ea176dab1ca472921510eadd74afdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Crofts Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 13:15:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 190/607] iio: light: opt3001: fix missing state reset on timeout commit c123ca6ee26ad98f70a866ff428b08145c5a24fe upstream. Currently in the function opt3001_get_processed(), there is a check that directly returns -ETIMEDOUT if the conversion IRQ times out, completely bypassing the err label, leaving ok_to_ignore_lock permanently true, potentially breaking the device's falling threshold interrupt detection. Assign -ETIMEDOUT to the return variable and jump to the error label to ensure ok_to_ignore_lock is properly reset. Fixes: 26d90b559057 ("iio: light: opt3001: Fixed timeout error when 0 lux") Reported-by: Sashiko Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260525-opt3001-cleanup-v4-0-65b36a174f78%40gmail.com?part=1 Signed-off-by: Joshua Crofts Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/opt3001.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/opt3001.c b/drivers/iio/light/opt3001.c index 393a3d2fbe1d7..e3584457a167f 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/opt3001.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/opt3001.c @@ -366,8 +366,10 @@ static int opt3001_get_processed(struct opt3001 *opt, int *val, int *val2) ret = wait_event_timeout(opt->result_ready_queue, opt->result_ready, msecs_to_jiffies(OPT3001_RESULT_READY_LONG)); - if (ret == 0) - return -ETIMEDOUT; + if (ret == 0) { + ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + goto err; + } } else { /* Sleep for result ready time */ timeout = (opt->int_time == OPT3001_INT_TIME_SHORT) ? From ef6c2a521454fdd9aedba24fdce89f434283a304 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 14:43:11 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 191/607] iio: light: tsl2591: return actual error from probe IRQ failure commit a00ffd15674bfaf8b906503c1600e3d8709af56c upstream. When devm_request_threaded_irq() fails, probe logs the error and then returns -EINVAL, dropping the real error code and breaking the deferred-probe flow for -EPROBE_DEFER. Return ret directly; the IRQ subsystem already prints on failure. Fixes: 2335f0d7c790 ("iio: light: Added AMS tsl2591 driver implementation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/tsl2591.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/tsl2591.c b/drivers/iio/light/tsl2591.c index c5557867ea43d..c5ccd833dde6f 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/tsl2591.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/tsl2591.c @@ -1137,10 +1137,8 @@ static int tsl2591_probe(struct i2c_client *client) NULL, tsl2591_event_handler, IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING | IRQF_ONESHOT, "tsl2591_irq", indio_dev); - if (ret) { - dev_err_probe(&client->dev, ret, "IRQ request error\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } + if (ret) + return ret; indio_dev->info = &tsl2591_info; } else { indio_dev->info = &tsl2591_info_no_irq; From 0975e013179d30b87c4f0beabdf750565f5e345a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Javier Carrasco Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 14:01:11 +1300 Subject: [PATCH 192/607] iio: light: veml6030: fix channel type when pushing events commit c52bb33b641ebaae3e209f97714cb1758206f7d9 upstream. The events are registered for IIO_LIGHT and not for IIO_INTENSITY. Use the correct channel type. When at it, fix minor checkpatch code style warning (alignment). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 7b779f573c48 ("iio: light: add driver for veml6030 ambient light sensor") Signed-off-by: Javier Carrasco Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/light/veml6030.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/veml6030.c b/drivers/iio/light/veml6030.c index 6bcacae3863c0..da8c32cabfd68 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/veml6030.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/veml6030.c @@ -875,9 +875,11 @@ static irqreturn_t veml6030_event_handler(int irq, void *private) else evtdir = IIO_EV_DIR_FALLING; - iio_push_event(indio_dev, IIO_UNMOD_EVENT_CODE(IIO_INTENSITY, - 0, IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, evtdir), - iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev)); + iio_push_event(indio_dev, IIO_UNMOD_EVENT_CODE(IIO_LIGHT, + 0, + IIO_EV_TYPE_THRESH, + evtdir), + iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev)); return IRQ_HANDLED; } From f829d6c32f31bee77a1a3a0e368cab0b841d40b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 10:27:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 193/607] iio: magnetometer: ak8975: Add missed pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() call commit e94944d7364d3ddb273539492f9bd9c9a622549a upstream. On the failure in the ak8975_read_axis() the PM runtime gets unbalanced. Balance it by calling pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() on error path as well. Fixes: cde4cb5dd422 ("iio: magn: ak8975: deploy runtime and system PM") Reported-by: Sashiko Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260505-magnetometer-fixes-v5-0-831b9b5550fc%40gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Joshua Crofts Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c b/drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c index d30315ad85ded..cc1fb1e633339 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c +++ b/drivers/iio/magnetometer/ak8975.c @@ -784,6 +784,7 @@ static int ak8975_read_axis(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int index, int *val) exit: mutex_unlock(&data->lock); + pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(&data->client->dev); dev_err(&client->dev, "Error in reading axis\n"); return ret; } From e2d5b9673bf712836186664dc18df6e63a5048e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Carlier Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 18:34:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 194/607] iio: pressure: bmp280: zero-init bmp580 trigger handler buffer commit 1172160f2a2de7bade3bec64b8c5ecf945cde5ed upstream. bmp580_trigger_handler() builds an on-stack scan buffer containing two __le32 fields and an aligned_s64 timestamp, and pushes it to userspace via iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts(). However, only the low 3 bytes of each __le32 field are populated by the device data: memcpy(&buffer.comp_press, &data->buf[3], 3); memcpy(&buffer.comp_temp, &data->buf[0], 3); The high byte of each field is left uninitialised on the stack. The bmp580 channels declare storagebits = 32, so the IIO core transports all four bytes per sample to userspace as part of the scan element, leaking two bytes of kernel stack per scan. Zero-initialise the buffer before populating it, mirroring the fix applied to bme280_trigger_handler() in commit 018f50909e66 ("iio: bmp280: zero-init buffer"). Fixes: 872c8014e05e ("iio: pressure: bmp280: drop sensor_data array") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David Carlier Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c b/drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c index 9b489766e457a..0ebe0b682caae 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c @@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ static irqreturn_t bmp380_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p) u32 comp_press; s32 comp_temp; aligned_s64 timestamp; - } buffer; + } buffer = { }; int ret; guard(mutex)(&data->lock); From b3f1af4ba8e9cf33aa08c4cdcaa5a17b140521ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Biren Pandya Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 12:45:48 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 195/607] iio: pressure: mpl115: fix runtime PM leak on read error commit fbe67ff37a6fd855a6c097f84f3738bd13d0a898 upstream. mpl115_read_raw() takes a runtime PM reference with pm_runtime_get_sync() before reading the processed pressure or raw temperature, but on the read error path it returns without calling pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(). Each failed read therefore leaks a runtime PM reference and prevents the device from autosuspending. Drop the reference before checking the return value so both the success and error paths are balanced. Fixes: 0c3a333524a3 ("iio: pressure: mpl115: Implementing low power mode by shutdown gpio") Signed-off-by: Biren Pandya Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 coccinelle Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/pressure/mpl115.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/pressure/mpl115.c b/drivers/iio/pressure/mpl115.c index 830a5065c008f..16e112b796ba9 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/pressure/mpl115.c +++ b/drivers/iio/pressure/mpl115.c @@ -106,18 +106,18 @@ static int mpl115_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, case IIO_CHAN_INFO_PROCESSED: pm_runtime_get_sync(data->dev); ret = mpl115_comp_pressure(data, val, val2); + pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(data->dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; - pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(data->dev); return IIO_VAL_INT_PLUS_MICRO; case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: pm_runtime_get_sync(data->dev); /* temperature -5.35 C / LSB, 472 LSB is 25 C */ ret = mpl115_read_temp(data); + pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(data->dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; - pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(data->dev); *val = ret >> 6; return IIO_VAL_INT; From c6ca87c7bbb3f6d45413d35da0446a080269ca36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 19:37:10 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 196/607] iio: proximity: vl53l0x: notify trigger and clear IRQ on error paths commit be843b0579f872ec7590d825e2c9a656d4790c4b upstream. vl53l0x_trigger_handler() returns directly on the I2C read failure paths without calling iio_trigger_notify_done() or vl53l0x_clear_irq(). A single transient i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data() failure (negative errno or a short read) therefore leaves two pieces of state behind: - iio_trigger_notify_done() never decrements the trigger's use_count, so iio_trigger_poll_nested() silently drops further dispatches (see industrialio-trigger.c, the !atomic_read(&trig->use_count) guard); - vl53l0x_clear_irq() never writes SYSTEM_INTERRUPT_CLEAR, so the chip keeps the DRDY interrupt asserted. The sensor's buffer mode stays wedged from then on, recoverable only by re-binding the driver. The sibling driver vl53l1x-i2c.c handles exactly the same case correctly by jumping to a "notify_and_clear_irq" label that always calls both helpers; mirror that here. The bogus negative-int return value cast to irqreturn_t also goes away as a side effect. Fixes: 762186c6e7b1 ("iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: Added continuous mode support") Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/proximity/vl53l0x-i2c.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/proximity/vl53l0x-i2c.c b/drivers/iio/proximity/vl53l0x-i2c.c index ad3e46d47fa8d..6c6e6dab045f7 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/proximity/vl53l0x-i2c.c +++ b/drivers/iio/proximity/vl53l0x-i2c.c @@ -87,15 +87,14 @@ static irqreturn_t vl53l0x_trigger_handler(int irq, void *priv) ret = i2c_smbus_read_i2c_block_data(data->client, VL_REG_RESULT_RANGE_STATUS, sizeof(buffer), buffer); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - else if (ret != 12) - return -EREMOTEIO; + if (ret != 12) + goto done; scan.chan = get_unaligned_be16(&buffer[10]); iio_push_to_buffers_with_ts(indio_dev, &scan, sizeof(scan), iio_get_time_ns(indio_dev)); +done: iio_trigger_notify_done(indio_dev->trig); vl53l0x_clear_irq(data); From 7d4d60f7c0541862f64df79d09cc978c4ec78049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 18:31:38 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 197/607] iio: resolver: ad2s1210: notify trigger and clear state on fault read error commit 70247658d0e783c93b48fcbc3b81d99e992ff478 upstream. ad2s1210_trigger_handler() walks several scan-mask branches and uses "goto error_ret" to land on the iio_trigger_notify_done() teardown at the bottom of the function for every I/O error -- except the MOD_CONFIG fault-register read, which uses a bare "return ret": if (st->fixed_mode == MOD_CONFIG) { unsigned int reg_val; ret = regmap_read(st->regmap, AD2S1210_REG_FAULT, ®_val); if (ret < 0) return ret; ... } Two problems on that path: - the handler returns a negative errno where the prototype expects an irqreturn_t (IRQ_HANDLED / IRQ_NONE), so the caller in the IIO core sees a value outside the enum; - iio_trigger_notify_done() is skipped, leaving the trigger busy-flag set. A single transient SPI/regmap error on the fault read then wedges the trigger so subsequent samples are dropped until the consumer is detached. Convert the error path to "goto error_ret" so the failure path goes through the same notify_done() teardown as every other error in the handler. Fixes: f9b9ff95be8c ("iio: resolver: ad2s1210: add support for adi,fixed-mode") Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Reviewed-by: David Lechner Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/resolver/ad2s1210.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/resolver/ad2s1210.c b/drivers/iio/resolver/ad2s1210.c index 9b028c8bb1db1..ca8f04c9fd426 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/resolver/ad2s1210.c +++ b/drivers/iio/resolver/ad2s1210.c @@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ static irqreturn_t ad2s1210_trigger_handler(int irq, void *p) ret = regmap_read(st->regmap, AD2S1210_REG_FAULT, ®_val); if (ret < 0) - return ret; + goto error_ret; st->sample.fault = reg_val; } From b50344ab202f353231898fde9127aafc4f634588 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pengpeng Hou Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 13:42:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 198/607] iio: temperature: Build mlx90635 with CONFIG_MLX90635 commit 63a76e3a587c4143e8e24e8a6b0c232fa0676034 upstream. drivers/iio/temperature/Kconfig has a dedicated MLX90635 option, but the Makefile currently builds mlx90635.o under CONFIG_MLX90632. This means enabling CONFIG_MLX90635 alone does not carry its provider object into the build, while enabling CONFIG_MLX90632 unexpectedly also builds mlx90635.o. Gate mlx90635.o on the matching generated Kconfig symbol. Fixes: a1d1ba5e1c28 ("iio: temperature: mlx90635 MLX90635 IR Temperature sensor") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Crt Mori Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/temperature/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/temperature/Makefile b/drivers/iio/temperature/Makefile index 07d6e65709f7f..0850bf6918204 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/temperature/Makefile +++ b/drivers/iio/temperature/Makefile @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MAX31865) += max31865.o obj-$(CONFIG_MCP9600) += mcp9600.o obj-$(CONFIG_MLX90614) += mlx90614.o obj-$(CONFIG_MLX90632) += mlx90632.o -obj-$(CONFIG_MLX90632) += mlx90635.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MLX90635) += mlx90635.o obj-$(CONFIG_TMP006) += tmp006.o obj-$(CONFIG_TMP007) += tmp007.o obj-$(CONFIG_TMP117) += tmp117.o From e16258913be6a15e542410e894ab5976d64ef2ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liviu Stan Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 19:39:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 199/607] iio: temperature: ltc2983: Fix n_wires default bypassing rotation check commit 434c150752675f44dc52c384a7fa22e5176bc35a upstream. When adi,number-of-wires is absent, n_wires is left at 0. The binding documents a default of 2 wires, matching the hardware default. However the current-rotate validation checks n_wires == 2 || n_wires == 3, so with n_wires = 0 the guard is bypassed and adi,current-rotate is accepted for a 2-wire RTD. Initialize n_wires = 2 to match the binding default and ensure the rotation check fires correctly when the property is absent. Fixes: f110f3188e56 ("iio: temperature: Add support for LTC2983") Signed-off-by: Liviu Stan Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c b/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c index 7dd40d69cce68..a210a60f57f4a 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c +++ b/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c @@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ ltc2983_rtd_new(const struct fwnode_handle *child, struct ltc2983_data *st, struct ltc2983_rtd *rtd; int ret = 0; struct device *dev = &st->spi->dev; - u32 excitation_current = 0, n_wires = 0; + u32 excitation_current = 0, n_wires = 2; rtd = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*rtd), GFP_KERNEL); if (!rtd) From 62a0d75bedd4bce3c55b45fa360d4a5a2e8f2edd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liviu Stan Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 19:39:29 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 200/607] iio: temperature: ltc2983: Fix reinit_completion() called after conversion start commit 5cb9fdb446bfc3ae0524496f53fb68e67051701b upstream. reinit_completion() was called after regmap_write() initiated the hardware conversion, creating a race window where the interrupt could fire and call complete() before reinit_completion() reset the completion. Move reinit_completion() before the regmap_write() to close the race. ltc2983_eeprom_cmd() already does it in the correct order. Fixes: f110f3188e56 ("iio: temperature: Add support for LTC2983") Signed-off-by: Liviu Stan Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c b/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c index a210a60f57f4a..cfdd1d6039f15 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c +++ b/drivers/iio/temperature/ltc2983.c @@ -1177,12 +1177,11 @@ static int ltc2983_chan_read(struct ltc2983_data *st, start_conversion |= LTC2983_STATUS_CHAN_SEL(sensor->chan); dev_dbg(&st->spi->dev, "Start conversion on chan:%d, status:%02X\n", sensor->chan, start_conversion); + reinit_completion(&st->completion); /* start conversion */ ret = regmap_write(st->regmap, LTC2983_STATUS_REG, start_conversion); if (ret) return ret; - - reinit_completion(&st->completion); /* * wait for conversion to complete. * 300 ms should be more than enough to complete the conversion. From a4f8491da9563ba6eb77969ac26fc7052114c476 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stepan Ionichev Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 23:26:13 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 201/607] iio: temperature: tmp006: use devm_iio_trigger_register commit 3c5eed894efd93d68d7f6a359a81ddef0e928774 upstream. tmp006_probe() allocates the DRDY trigger with devm_iio_trigger_alloc() but registers it with plain iio_trigger_register(). The driver has no .remove() callback, so on module unload the trigger stays in the global trigger list while its memory is freed by devm, leaving a dangling entry. Switch to devm_iio_trigger_register() so the registration is undone in the same devm scope as the allocation. Fixes: 91f75ccf9f03 ("iio: temperature: tmp006: add triggered buffer support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/temperature/tmp006.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/temperature/tmp006.c b/drivers/iio/temperature/tmp006.c index 10bd3f221929d..cf59dda63f8b6 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/temperature/tmp006.c +++ b/drivers/iio/temperature/tmp006.c @@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static int tmp006_probe(struct i2c_client *client) data->drdy_trig->ops = &tmp006_trigger_ops; iio_trigger_set_drvdata(data->drdy_trig, indio_dev); - ret = iio_trigger_register(data->drdy_trig); + ret = devm_iio_trigger_register(&client->dev, data->drdy_trig); if (ret) return ret; From c071df05bcda0e47aac581d4b564b2bebcb1ff60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HyeongJun An Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:52:31 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 202/607] ALSA: usx2y: us144mkii: fix work UAF on disconnect commit 147996e7e7c9e8339c0e04f6fa7ccb3e4d448ff7 upstream. tascam_disconnect() cancels capture_work and midi_in_work before usb_kill_anchored_urbs() kills the capture/MIDI-in URBs. Those URBs self-resubmit, and their completion handlers reschedule the work. A URB that completes in the small window between cancel_work_sync() and usb_kill_anchored_urbs() therefore re-arms the work after its only cancel. Nothing cancels it again before snd_card_free() frees the card-private tascam structure, so the work handler then runs on freed memory. Kill the anchored URBs before cancelling the work; once the work is cancelled no remaining URB can complete to re-arm it. Fixes: c1bb0c13e430 ("ALSA: usb-audio: us144mkii: Implement audio capture and decoding") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701095231.1020811-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii.c b/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii.c index 4854144a72bf4..ecfb07186e73d 100644 --- a/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii.c +++ b/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii.c @@ -585,19 +585,24 @@ static void tascam_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) return; if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) { - /* Ensure all deferred work is complete before freeing resources */ snd_card_disconnect(tascam->card); - cancel_work_sync(&tascam->stop_work); - cancel_work_sync(&tascam->capture_work); - cancel_work_sync(&tascam->midi_in_work); - cancel_work_sync(&tascam->midi_out_work); - cancel_work_sync(&tascam->stop_pcm_work); + /* + * Kill the URBs before cancelling the work, so a late URB + * completion cannot re-arm a work that then runs after + * snd_card_free(). + */ usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&tascam->playback_anchor); usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&tascam->capture_anchor); usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&tascam->feedback_anchor); usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&tascam->midi_in_anchor); usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&tascam->midi_out_anchor); + + cancel_work_sync(&tascam->stop_work); + cancel_work_sync(&tascam->capture_work); + cancel_work_sync(&tascam->midi_in_work); + cancel_work_sync(&tascam->midi_out_work); + cancel_work_sync(&tascam->stop_pcm_work); timer_delete_sync(&tascam->error_timer); tascam_free_urbs(tascam); snd_card_free(tascam->card); From df0fe53a7104bc61e47775804bec289f29bcc277 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 10:32:25 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 203/607] ALSA: virtio: Add missing 384 kHz PCM rate mapping MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 83fbbcb7935ec6d2c8ba3bc133e8a0ead2ab0b2d upstream. The VirtIO sound UAPI defines VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_384000, and ALSA has SNDRV_PCM_RATE_384000. However, virtio-snd's rate conversion tables stop at 192 kHz. A device advertising only 384 kHz is rejected as having no supported PCM frame rates. A device advertising 384 kHz together with lower rates does not expose 384 kHz through the ALSA hardware constraints. The selected ALSA rate also needs a reverse mapping for SET_PARAMS. Add the missing 384 kHz entries to both conversion tables. Fixes: 29b96bf50ba9 ("ALSA: virtio: build PCM devices and substream hardware descriptors") Fixes: da76e9f3e43a ("ALSA: virtio: PCM substream operators") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515-alsa-virtio-384k-rate-v1-1-35ecb5df835c@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/virtio/virtio_pcm.c | 3 ++- sound/virtio/virtio_pcm_ops.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm.c b/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm.c index 3602b6690fcd9..67b8020d2d5a7 100644 --- a/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm.c +++ b/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static const struct virtsnd_v2a_rate g_v2a_rate_map[] = { [VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_88200] = { SNDRV_PCM_RATE_88200, 88200 }, [VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_96000] = { SNDRV_PCM_RATE_96000, 96000 }, [VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_176400] = { SNDRV_PCM_RATE_176400, 176400 }, - [VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_192000] = { SNDRV_PCM_RATE_192000, 192000 } + [VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_192000] = { SNDRV_PCM_RATE_192000, 192000 }, + [VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_384000] = { SNDRV_PCM_RATE_384000, 384000 } }; /** diff --git a/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm_ops.c b/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm_ops.c index 6297a9c61e70b..1105e7ff3523a 100644 --- a/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm_ops.c +++ b/sound/virtio/virtio_pcm_ops.c @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ static const struct virtsnd_a2v_rate g_a2v_rate_map[] = { { 88200, VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_88200 }, { 96000, VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_96000 }, { 176400, VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_176400 }, - { 192000, VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_192000 } + { 192000, VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_192000 }, + { 384000, VIRTIO_SND_PCM_RATE_384000 } }; static int virtsnd_pcm_sync_stop(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream); From 5da9742de22db0dbaa8d414214ab5e1bedde00f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 11:28:30 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 204/607] ALSA: virtio: Validate control metadata from the device MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit c77a6cbb36ff8cbc1f084d94f8dcda5250935271 upstream. virtio-snd control handling trusts the device-provided control type and value count returned by the device. That metadata is then used directly to index g_v2a_type_map[] in virtsnd_kctl_info(), and to size loops and memcpy() operations in virtsnd_kctl_get() and virtsnd_kctl_put() against fixed-size virtio_snd_ctl_value and snd_ctl_elem_value arrays. A buggy or malicious device can therefore trigger out-of-bounds access by advertising an invalid control type or an oversized value count. Validate control type and count once in virtsnd_kctl_parse_cfg(), before querying enumerated items or exposing the control to ALSA. Fixes: d6568e3de42d ("ALSA: virtio: add support for audio controls") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507-alsa-virtio-validate-kctl-info-v1-1-7404fb12ec37@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/virtio/virtio_kctl.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/virtio/virtio_kctl.c b/sound/virtio/virtio_kctl.c index ffb903d56297a..45f7b6a5b3080 100644 --- a/sound/virtio/virtio_kctl.c +++ b/sound/virtio/virtio_kctl.c @@ -18,6 +18,21 @@ static const snd_ctl_elem_type_t g_v2a_type_map[] = { [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_IEC958] = SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_IEC958 }; +/* Map for converting VirtIO types to maximum value counts. */ +static const unsigned int g_v2a_count_map[] = { + [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_BOOLEAN] = + ARRAY_SIZE(((struct virtio_snd_ctl_value *)0)->value.integer), + [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_INTEGER] = + ARRAY_SIZE(((struct virtio_snd_ctl_value *)0)->value.integer), + [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_INTEGER64] = + ARRAY_SIZE(((struct virtio_snd_ctl_value *)0)->value.integer64), + [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_ENUMERATED] = + ARRAY_SIZE(((struct virtio_snd_ctl_value *)0)->value.enumerated), + [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_BYTES] = + ARRAY_SIZE(((struct virtio_snd_ctl_value *)0)->value.bytes), + [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_IEC958] = 1 +}; + /* Map for converting VirtIO access rights to ALSA access rights. */ static const unsigned int g_v2a_access_map[] = { [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_ACCESS_READ] = SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READ, @@ -36,6 +51,37 @@ static const unsigned int g_v2a_mask_map[] = { [VIRTIO_SND_CTL_EVT_MASK_TLV] = SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV }; +static int virtsnd_kctl_validate_info(struct virtio_snd *snd, u32 cid, + struct virtio_snd_ctl_info *kinfo) +{ + struct virtio_device *vdev = snd->vdev; + unsigned int type = le32_to_cpu(kinfo->type); + unsigned int count = le32_to_cpu(kinfo->count); + + if (type >= ARRAY_SIZE(g_v2a_type_map)) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, "control #%u: unknown type %u\n", + cid, type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (count > g_v2a_count_map[type] || + (type == VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_IEC958 && count != 1)) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, "control #%u: invalid count %u for type %u\n", + cid, count, type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (type == VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_ENUMERATED && + !le32_to_cpu(kinfo->value.enumerated.items)) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, + "control #%u: no items for enumerated control\n", + cid); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + /** * virtsnd_kctl_info() - Returns information about the control. * @kcontrol: ALSA control element. @@ -385,6 +431,10 @@ int virtsnd_kctl_parse_cfg(struct virtio_snd *snd) struct virtio_snd_ctl_info *kinfo = &snd->kctl_infos[i]; unsigned int type = le32_to_cpu(kinfo->type); + rc = virtsnd_kctl_validate_info(snd, i, kinfo); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (type == VIRTIO_SND_CTL_TYPE_ENUMERATED) { rc = virtsnd_kctl_get_enum_items(snd, i); if (rc) From f6538a318947b627710b08a268bc80a48c23bde7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Dongdong Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:09:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 205/607] ALSA: ymfpci: check snd_ctl_new1() return value commit e64d170346d00b580c0043de3e5ccb3e331c47d4 upstream. snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_ymfpci_create_spdif_controls() does not check the return value before dereferencing kctl->id.device, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails. Assisted-by: Opencode:DeepSeek-V4-Flash Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c9b83ae4a160 ("ALSA: ymfpci: Fix kctl->id initialization") Signed-off-by: Zhao Dongdong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_4745C5DC2333325C0EDAB1EFC88A136E6809@qq.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/ymfpci/ymfpci_main.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/ymfpci/ymfpci_main.c b/sound/pci/ymfpci/ymfpci_main.c index eb373d9395e35..044b5ce63fa13 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ymfpci/ymfpci_main.c +++ b/sound/pci/ymfpci/ymfpci_main.c @@ -1781,16 +1781,22 @@ int snd_ymfpci_mixer(struct snd_ymfpci *chip, int rear_switch) if (snd_BUG_ON(!chip->pcm_spdif)) return -ENXIO; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ymfpci_spdif_default, chip); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = chip->pcm_spdif->device; err = snd_ctl_add(chip->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ymfpci_spdif_mask, chip); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = chip->pcm_spdif->device; err = snd_ctl_add(chip->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ymfpci_spdif_stream, chip); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = chip->pcm_spdif->device; err = snd_ctl_add(chip->card, kctl); if (err < 0) From fd786466889e4a6e6de0f4462bd0068edea63960 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Dongdong Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:09:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 206/607] ALSA: aoa: check snd_ctl_new1() return value commit 8df560fefe6fed6a20b7e06720eeaeccec349ac0 upstream. snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. In layout.c, the function does not check the return value before dereferencing ctl->id.name or passing to aoa_snd_ctl_add(), which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return early if any fails. Assisted-by: Opencode:DeepSeek-V4-Flash Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f3d9478b2ce4 ("[ALSA] snd-aoa: add snd-aoa") Signed-off-by: Zhao Dongdong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_35F3A25FEEBF190A2E15ED787754C57E3708@qq.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/aoa/fabrics/layout.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/aoa/fabrics/layout.c b/sound/aoa/fabrics/layout.c index bb2a0ef3004bf..5cb6f5f4d83fc 100644 --- a/sound/aoa/fabrics/layout.c +++ b/sound/aoa/fabrics/layout.c @@ -948,6 +948,8 @@ static void layout_attached_codec(struct aoa_codec *codec) if (lineout == 1) ldev->gpio.methods->set_lineout(codec->gpio, 1); ctl = snd_ctl_new1(&lineout_ctl, codec->gpio); + if (!ctl) + return; if (cc->connected & CC_LINEOUT_LABELLED_HEADPHONE) strscpy(ctl->id.name, "Headphone Switch"); ldev->lineout_ctrl = ctl; @@ -961,12 +963,16 @@ static void layout_attached_codec(struct aoa_codec *codec) if (ldev->have_lineout_detect) { ctl = snd_ctl_new1(&lineout_detect_choice, ldev); + if (!ctl) + return; if (cc->connected & CC_LINEOUT_LABELLED_HEADPHONE) strscpy(ctl->id.name, "Headphone Detect Autoswitch"); aoa_snd_ctl_add(ctl); ctl = snd_ctl_new1(&lineout_detected, ldev); + if (!ctl) + return; if (cc->connected & CC_LINEOUT_LABELLED_HEADPHONE) strscpy(ctl->id.name, "Headphone Detected"); From a5fd3122283bf75c04f6414bf610100beb0565b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 14:03:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 207/607] ALSA: caiaq: fix out-of-bounds read in the Traktor Kontrol S4 input parser commit f7f3f9fd81e7adbaa12c2e62ee07f0e094a543fd upstream. snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch() decodes the Traktor Kontrol S4 input stream in fixed 16-byte (TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) message blocks. On every iteration it advances buf and subtracts the block size while looping on "while (len)". len is urb->actual_length. That value is supplied by the device and is not guaranteed to be a multiple of 16. When a final short block leaves len between 1 and 15, the loop runs once more, reads up to buf[15], and then does "len -= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE". As len is unsigned this underflows to a huge value. The loop then keeps iterating and walking buf far past the end of the 512-byte ep4_in_buf, reading out of bounds until a bogus block id happens to be hit. Iterate only while a full message block is available. This stops the unsigned underflow and silently drops any trailing partial block, which carries no complete control value anyway. The sibling endpoint-4 parsers are not affected. The Traktor Kontrol X1 and Maschine arms in snd_usb_caiaq_ep4_reply_dispatch() floor urb->actual_length before dispatching. Fixes: 15c5ab607045 ("ALSA: snd-usb-caiaq: Add support for Traktor Kontrol S4") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178176259547.3343534.2724779296835237429@maoyixie.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/caiaq/input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c index 5c70fdf61cc13..2db4d1332df1c 100644 --- a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c +++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ static void snd_usb_caiaq_tks4_dispatch(struct snd_usb_caiaqdev *cdev, { struct device *dev = caiaqdev_to_dev(cdev); - while (len) { + while (len >= TKS4_MSGBLOCK_SIZE) { unsigned int i, block_id = (buf[0] << 8) | buf[1]; switch (block_id) { From af2b009b773bc42995546507963e5e78970dc3ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Dongdong Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:09:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 208/607] ALSA: cmipci: check snd_ctl_new1() return value commit c205bd1b28fb7e5f1061a4e78813fad7d315cb3e upstream. snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_cmipci_spdif_controls() does not check the return value before dereferencing kctl->id.device, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails. Assisted-by: Opencode:DeepSeek-V4-Flash Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f2f312ad88c6 ("ALSA: cmipci: Fix kctl->id initialization") Signed-off-by: Zhao Dongdong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_964433DCD132125D5EDA79EE068A2D6EFA09@qq.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/cmipci.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/cmipci.c b/sound/pci/cmipci.c index 0666be543474a..f7b4677ab6b82 100644 --- a/sound/pci/cmipci.c +++ b/sound/pci/cmipci.c @@ -2637,16 +2637,22 @@ static int snd_cmipci_mixer_new(struct cmipci *cm, int pcm_spdif_device) } if (cm->can_ac3_hw) { kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_cmipci_spdif_default, cm); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = pcm_spdif_device; err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_cmipci_spdif_mask, cm); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = pcm_spdif_device; err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_cmipci_spdif_stream, cm); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = pcm_spdif_device; err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) From b27a75d42044d9d4709095617730b91b1c4af423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:37:26 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 209/607] ALSA: compress: Fix task creation error unwind MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 4a60127debb9e370d6c0e22a307326b624a141f3 upstream. snd_compr_task_new() allocates the driver task before validating the returned DMA buffers and reserving file descriptors. When either of those later steps fails, the core frees its task wrapper and DMA-buffer references without calling the driver's task_free() callback. Any driver resources allocated by task_create() are therefore leaked. The dual-fd allocation path also jumps to cleanup without storing the negative get_unused_fd_flags() result in retval. Since retval still contains the successful task_create() return value, TASK_CREATE can incorrectly report success although the task was discarded. Preserve the fd allocation errors and call task_free() when failure occurs after a successful task_create() callback. Fixes: 04177158cf98 ("ALSA: compress_offload: introduce accel operation mode") Fixes: 3d3f43fab4cf ("ALSA: compress_offload: improve file descriptors installation for dma-buf") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260615-alsa-compress-task-unwind-v1-1-39e8ad3ddb27@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/compress_offload.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/compress_offload.c b/sound/core/compress_offload.c index 2181442e3a1da..065cdfaef1eaa 100644 --- a/sound/core/compress_offload.c +++ b/sound/core/compress_offload.c @@ -1070,15 +1070,18 @@ static int snd_compr_task_new(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, struct snd_compr_ file descriptors are allocated before fd_install() */ if (!task->input || !task->input->file || !task->output || !task->output->file) { retval = -EINVAL; - goto cleanup; + goto free_driver_task; } fd_i = get_unused_fd_flags(O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); - if (fd_i < 0) - goto cleanup; + if (fd_i < 0) { + retval = fd_i; + goto free_driver_task; + } fd_o = get_unused_fd_flags(O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC); if (fd_o < 0) { + retval = fd_o; put_unused_fd(fd_i); - goto cleanup; + goto free_driver_task; } /* keep dmabuf reference until freed with task free ioctl */ get_dma_buf(task->input); @@ -1090,6 +1093,8 @@ static int snd_compr_task_new(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, struct snd_compr_ list_add_tail(&task->list, &stream->runtime->tasks); stream->runtime->total_tasks++; return 0; +free_driver_task: + stream->ops->task_free(stream, task); cleanup: snd_compr_task_free(task); return retval; From 9e53e99b6fa3cd82992d963cbff58dbbd1df8651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Dongdong Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:09:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 210/607] ALSA: es1938: check snd_ctl_new1() return value commit 1edd1f02dddd20aeb6066ded41017615766ea42f upstream. snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_es1938_mixer() does not check the return value before dereferencing the pointer, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add a NULL check after snd_ctl_new1() and return -ENOMEM if it fails. Assisted-by: Opencode:DeepSeek-V4-Flash Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Zhao Dongdong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E0DC65165FDF2C8982BAFB6794B854B53B0A@qq.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/es1938.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/es1938.c b/sound/pci/es1938.c index 280125eff3624..b6dcb721fffce 100644 --- a/sound/pci/es1938.c +++ b/sound/pci/es1938.c @@ -1655,6 +1655,8 @@ static int snd_es1938_mixer(struct es1938 *chip) for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(snd_es1938_controls); idx++) { struct snd_kcontrol *kctl; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_es1938_controls[idx], chip); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; switch (idx) { case 0: chip->master_volume = kctl; From db25755e7629da9093f248f6a43a384ec1009b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 02:59:04 +0930 Subject: [PATCH 211/607] ALSA: FCP: Add Focusrite ISA C8X support commit e0ecb324246be9cf3a0689346a658e48a38546b2 upstream. Add USB PID 0x821e to the list of devices handled by the Focusrite Control Protocol (FCP) driver. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ajlw4HK+2RSW3nUl@m.b4.vu Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c index 7126a2cf9e79b..dd56f4bfb84d2 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c @@ -4346,6 +4346,7 @@ int snd_usb_mixer_apply_create_quirk(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer) case USB_ID(0x1235, 0x821b): /* Focusrite Scarlett 16i16 4th Gen */ case USB_ID(0x1235, 0x821c): /* Focusrite Scarlett 18i16 4th Gen */ case USB_ID(0x1235, 0x821d): /* Focusrite Scarlett 18i20 4th Gen */ + case USB_ID(0x1235, 0x821e): /* Focusrite ISA C8X */ err = snd_fcp_init(mixer); break; From 8e48a29813df8dd71503800b7acf69c12c035045 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 23:09:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 212/607] ALSA: firewire: isight: bound the sample count to the packet payload commit 29b9667982e4df2ed7744f86b1144f8bb58eb698 upstream. isight_packet() takes the frame count from the device iso packet and checks it only against the device claimed iso length. count = be32_to_cpu(payload->sample_count); if (likely(count <= (length - 16) / 4)) isight_samples(isight, payload->samples, count); length is the iso header data_length. It can be up to 0xffff. So the gate allows a count up to about 16379. isight_samples() then copies count frames out of payload->samples into the PCM DMA buffer. payload->samples holds only 2 * MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET values. The device multiplexes two samples per frame. A count past MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET reads past the payload. A count past the buffer size writes past runtime->dma_area. The smallest PCM buffer is larger than MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET. Bounding the count to MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET keeps both the read and the write in range. A malicious or faulty Apple iSight on the FireWire bus reaches this during a normal capture. Add the MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET bound to the gate. Fixes: 3a691b28a0ca ("ALSA: add Apple iSight microphone driver") Suggested-by: Takashi Sakamoto Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178205454729.1900991.7807310178296762772@maoyixie.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/firewire/isight.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/firewire/isight.c b/sound/firewire/isight.c index 2b7f071d593b9..33c9dd48b3b0b 100644 --- a/sound/firewire/isight.c +++ b/sound/firewire/isight.c @@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ static void isight_packet(struct fw_iso_context *context, u32 cycle, if (likely(length >= 16 && payload->signature == cpu_to_be32(0x73676874/*"sght"*/))) { count = be32_to_cpu(payload->sample_count); - if (likely(count <= (length - 16) / 4)) { + if (likely(count <= (length - 16) / 4 && + count <= MAX_FRAMES_PER_PACKET)) { total = be32_to_cpu(payload->sample_total); if (unlikely(total != isight->total_samples)) { if (!isight->first_packet) From 5e74e5e8cb7cc25f7a89f59abaf3489bf0c6f4a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Dongdong Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:09:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 213/607] ALSA: gus: check snd_ctl_new1() return value commit c7fa99d30c7a166a5e5db5a585ce7501ff68326b upstream. snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. snd_gf1_pcm_volume_control() does not check the return value before dereferencing kctl->id.index, which can lead to a NULL pointer dereference. Add a NULL check after snd_ctl_new1() and return -ENOMEM if it fails. Assisted-by: Opencode:DeepSeek-V4-Flash Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c5ae57b1bb99 ("ALSA: gus: Fix kctl->id initialization") Signed-off-by: Zhao Dongdong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_F644A3DCAD32945D62DB2FEEBE8A996F6809@qq.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/isa/gus/gus_pcm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/isa/gus/gus_pcm.c b/sound/isa/gus/gus_pcm.c index 9249cbff30f37..b724421ba5eeb 100644 --- a/sound/isa/gus/gus_pcm.c +++ b/sound/isa/gus/gus_pcm.c @@ -849,6 +849,8 @@ int snd_gf1_pcm_new(struct snd_gus_card *gus, int pcm_dev, int control_index) kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_gf1_pcm_volume_control1, gus); else kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_gf1_pcm_volume_control, gus); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.index = control_index; err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); if (err < 0) From ce0a903d0591e3e2c790c5b628802b08d1b287cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 01:29:34 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 214/607] ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit b65020d5398f499c09498c9786dba6d67ae57664 upstream. cs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the cs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue fw_load_work. Those controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove only cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is skipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart disabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been initialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued work runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver state that is no longer valid. Track the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control callback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel fw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel the work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown. Fixes: 47ceabd99a28 ("ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Support Firmware switching and reloading") Fixes: 4c870513fbb0 ("ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Add read-only ALSA control for forced mute") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Reviewed-by: Stefan Binding Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511-alsa-hda-cs35l41-fw-work-teardown-v1-1-1184e9bc4f25@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c | 77 +++++++++++++++------- sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.h | 5 ++ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c b/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c index 47263c5a021cb..438a19bd979bf 100644 --- a/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c +++ b/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.c @@ -1328,6 +1328,43 @@ static int cs35l41_fw_type_ctl_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_ct return snd_ctl_enum_info(uinfo, 1, ARRAY_SIZE(cs35l41_hda_fw_ids), cs35l41_hda_fw_ids); } +static void cs35l41_remove_controls(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41) +{ + if (!cs35l41->codec) + return; + + snd_ctl_remove(cs35l41->codec->card, cs35l41->mute_override_ctl); + cs35l41->mute_override_ctl = NULL; + + snd_ctl_remove(cs35l41->codec->card, cs35l41->fw_load_ctl); + cs35l41->fw_load_ctl = NULL; + + snd_ctl_remove(cs35l41->codec->card, cs35l41->fw_type_ctl); + cs35l41->fw_type_ctl = NULL; +} + +static int cs35l41_add_control(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41, + struct snd_kcontrol_new *ctl, + struct snd_kcontrol **kctl) +{ + int ret; + + *kctl = snd_ctl_new1(ctl, cs35l41); + if (!*kctl) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, *kctl); + if (ret) { + dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", ctl->name, ret); + *kctl = NULL; + return ret; + } + + dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", ctl->name); + + return 0; +} + static int cs35l41_create_controls(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41) { char fw_type_ctl_name[SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN]; @@ -1363,32 +1400,23 @@ static int cs35l41_create_controls(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41) scnprintf(mute_override_ctl_name, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN, "%s Forced Mute Status", cs35l41->amp_name); - ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, snd_ctl_new1(&fw_type_ctl, cs35l41)); - if (ret) { - dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", fw_type_ctl.name, ret); - return ret; - } - - dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", fw_type_ctl.name); - - ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, snd_ctl_new1(&fw_load_ctl, cs35l41)); - if (ret) { - dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", fw_load_ctl.name, ret); - return ret; - } - - dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", fw_load_ctl.name); + ret = cs35l41_add_control(cs35l41, &fw_type_ctl, &cs35l41->fw_type_ctl); + if (ret) + goto err; - ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, snd_ctl_new1(&mute_override_ctl, cs35l41)); - if (ret) { - dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", mute_override_ctl.name, - ret); - return ret; - } + ret = cs35l41_add_control(cs35l41, &fw_load_ctl, &cs35l41->fw_load_ctl); + if (ret) + goto err; - dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", mute_override_ctl.name); + ret = cs35l41_add_control(cs35l41, &mute_override_ctl, &cs35l41->mute_override_ctl); + if (ret) + goto err; return 0; + +err: + cs35l41_remove_controls(cs35l41); + return ret; } static bool cs35l41_dsm_supported(acpi_handle handle, unsigned int commands) @@ -1527,6 +1555,10 @@ static void cs35l41_hda_unbind(struct device *dev, struct device *master, void * device_link_remove(&cs35l41->codec->core.dev, cs35l41->dev); unlock_system_sleep(sleep_flags); memset(comp, 0, sizeof(*comp)); + + cs35l41_remove_controls(cs35l41); + cancel_work_sync(&cs35l41->fw_load_work); + cs35l41->codec = NULL; } } @@ -2065,6 +2097,7 @@ void cs35l41_hda_remove(struct device *dev) struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41 = dev_get_drvdata(dev); component_del(cs35l41->dev, &cs35l41_hda_comp_ops); + cancel_work_sync(&cs35l41->fw_load_work); pm_runtime_get_sync(cs35l41->dev); pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(cs35l41->dev); diff --git a/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.h b/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.h index 7d003c598e93e..56ec07c0bb745 100644 --- a/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.h +++ b/sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l41_hda.h @@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ enum control_bus { SPI }; +struct snd_kcontrol; + struct cs35l41_hda { struct device *dev; struct regmap *regmap; @@ -75,6 +77,9 @@ struct cs35l41_hda { int speaker_id; struct mutex fw_mutex; struct work_struct fw_load_work; + struct snd_kcontrol *fw_type_ctl; + struct snd_kcontrol *fw_load_ctl; + struct snd_kcontrol *mute_override_ctl; struct regmap_irq_chip_data *irq_data; bool firmware_running; From 4dd2552e559bd448c04b7474c69360954398c5cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cameron Graham Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 21:46:01 +1200 Subject: [PATCH 215/607] ALSA: hda/hdmi: Add force-connect quirk for HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini commit 0ec17ee704615125c0b6e100c38129393a346bcc upstream. The HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini (PCI subsystem 103c:8595) uses Cannon Lake PCH cAVS HDA with DisplayPort audio pins 0x05 and 0x06 set to AC_JACK_PORT_NONE (N/A) in BIOS defaults, causing hdmi_add_pin() to skip them and the DP audio device to not appear in ALSA. Add the board to the existing force_connect_list alongside the similar HP EliteDesk 800 G4 entries. Signed-off-by: Cameron Graham Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612094601.1209845-1-cam.graham@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c b/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c index c2e3adc7b3c00..df3b325d31484 100644 --- a/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c +++ b/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c @@ -1549,6 +1549,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk force_connect_list[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x83e2, "HP EliteDesk 800 G4", 1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x83ef, "HP MP9 G4 Retail System AMS", 1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x845a, "HP EliteDesk 800 G4 DM 65W", 1), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8595, "HP EliteDesk 800 G5 Mini", 1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x83f3, "HP ProDesk 400", 1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x870f, "HP", 1), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x871a, "HP", 1), From 1933e6ee136b1dba697755b1be28453a7ae4671f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huacai Chen Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 22:08:41 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 216/607] ALSA: hda/hdmi: Use 'AC_PINSENSE_ELDV' to detect pinsense for Loongson commit 958e4450e961d75bd9d8f5bfe245fb15bc78e02a upstream. Due to a hardware defect, for Loongson PCI HDMI devices with a reversion ID of 2, the pin sense status must be determined via the ELD. Add a codec flag, eld_jack_detect, to indicate this case, and do special handlings in read_pin_sense(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Baoqi Zhang Signed-off-by: Haowei Zheng Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527140841.3407183-1-chenhuacai@loongson.cn Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/sound/hda_codec.h | 1 + sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c | 8 +++++++- sound/hda/common/jack.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/sound/hda_codec.h b/include/sound/hda_codec.h index 5d9f0ef228af1..3c9e64dc02524 100644 --- a/include/sound/hda_codec.h +++ b/include/sound/hda_codec.h @@ -259,6 +259,7 @@ struct hda_codec { unsigned int forced_resume:1; /* forced resume for jack */ unsigned int no_stream_clean_at_suspend:1; /* do not clean streams at suspend */ unsigned int ctl_dev_id:1; /* old control element id build behaviour */ + unsigned int eld_jack_detect:1; /* Machine jack-detection by ELD */ unsigned long power_on_acct; unsigned long power_off_acct; diff --git a/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c b/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c index df3b325d31484..1036d08d1431a 100644 --- a/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c +++ b/sound/hda/codecs/hdmi/hdmi.c @@ -2286,6 +2286,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(snd_hda_hdmi_acomp_init, "SND_HDA_CODEC_HDMI"); enum { MODEL_GENERIC, MODEL_GF, + MODEL_LOONGSON, }; static int generichdmi_probe(struct hda_codec *codec, @@ -2303,6 +2304,11 @@ static int generichdmi_probe(struct hda_codec *codec, if (id->driver_data == MODEL_GF) codec->no_sticky_stream = 1; + if (id->driver_data == MODEL_LOONGSON) { + if (codec->bus && codec->bus->pci->revision == 0x2) + codec->eld_jack_detect = 1; /* Jack-detection by ELD */ + } + return 0; } @@ -2320,7 +2326,7 @@ static const struct hda_codec_ops generichdmi_codec_ops = { /* */ static const struct hda_device_id snd_hda_id_generichdmi[] = { - HDA_CODEC_ID_MODEL(0x00147a47, "Loongson HDMI", MODEL_GENERIC), + HDA_CODEC_ID_MODEL(0x00147a47, "Loongson HDMI", MODEL_LOONGSON), HDA_CODEC_ID_MODEL(0x10951390, "SiI1390 HDMI", MODEL_GENERIC), HDA_CODEC_ID_MODEL(0x10951392, "SiI1392 HDMI", MODEL_GENERIC), HDA_CODEC_ID_MODEL(0x11069f84, "VX11 HDMI/DP", MODEL_GENERIC), diff --git a/sound/hda/common/jack.c b/sound/hda/common/jack.c index 7d7786df60ea7..f921b10f39c93 100644 --- a/sound/hda/common/jack.c +++ b/sound/hda/common/jack.c @@ -58,6 +58,12 @@ static u32 read_pin_sense(struct hda_codec *codec, hda_nid_t nid, int dev_id) AC_VERB_GET_PIN_SENSE, dev_id); if (codec->inv_jack_detect) val ^= AC_PINSENSE_PRESENCE; + if (codec->eld_jack_detect) { + if (val & AC_PINSENSE_ELDV) + val |= AC_PINSENSE_PRESENCE; + else + val &= ~AC_PINSENSE_PRESENCE; + } return val; } From 04dd2101805758fe9e443f3f0933a12b2000b167 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Aaron Erhardt Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 17:49:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 217/607] ALSA: hda/realtek: Fix noisy mic for Clevo V6xxAW commit 493765b8e922a506e09e22e80b6cc9ff05e8295b upstream. Add a PCI quirk to reduce the volume of the internal microphone to prevent extremely noisy signal. Signed-off-by: Aaron Erhardt Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260519155047.106096-1-wse@tuxedocomputers.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c b/sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c index c18c18f9e6521..04c2bbe9560f8 100644 --- a/sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c +++ b/sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc269.c @@ -7290,6 +7290,7 @@ static const struct hda_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x51b3, "Clevo NS70AU", ALC256_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x5630, "Clevo NP50RNJS", ALC256_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x5700, "Clevo X560WN[RST]", ALC256_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x6480, "Clevo V6xxAW", ALC245_FIXUP_CLEVO_NOISY_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x70a1, "Clevo NB70T[HJK]", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x70b3, "Clevo NK70SB", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1558, 0x70f2, "Clevo NH79EPY", ALC293_FIXUP_SYSTEM76_MIC_NO_PRESENCE), From 71b87108ad93d433cdb20704a8dc8852304cf2c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Dongdong Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 20:09:11 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 218/607] ALSA: ice1712: check snd_ctl_new1() return value commit 2b929b91b0f3bc6de8a844370049cd99ee8e31ff upstream. snd_ctl_new1() can return NULL when memory allocation fails. The ice1712 driver calls snd_ctl_new1() without checking the return value before dereferencing the pointer in multiple places (ice1712.c, ice1724.c, aureon.c), which can lead to NULL pointer dereferences. Add NULL checks after snd_ctl_new1() calls and return -ENOMEM if any fails. Assisted-by: Opencode:DeepSeek-V4-Flash Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b9a4efd61b6b ("ALSA: ice1712,ice1724: fix the kcontrol->id initialization") Signed-off-by: Zhao Dongdong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_42E5E2AB1B6A5101F7EE8C2117F1F687BB07@qq.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/ice1712/aureon.c | 2 ++ sound/pci/ice1712/ice1712.c | 8 ++++++++ sound/pci/ice1712/ice1724.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/ice1712/aureon.c b/sound/pci/ice1712/aureon.c index b4c9e7d116095..1b5532ddab8b8 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ice1712/aureon.c +++ b/sound/pci/ice1712/aureon.c @@ -1891,6 +1891,8 @@ static int aureon_add_controls(struct snd_ice1712 *ice) for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cs8415_controls); i++) { struct snd_kcontrol *kctl; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&cs8415_controls[i], ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; if (i > 1) kctl->id.device = ice->pcm->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); diff --git a/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1712.c b/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1712.c index 1e39b985bef26..4cec56769c0f6 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1712.c +++ b/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1712.c @@ -2346,21 +2346,29 @@ int snd_ice1712_spdif_build_controls(struct snd_ice1712 *ice) if (snd_BUG_ON(!ice->pcm_pro)) return -EIO; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ice1712_spdif_default, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm_pro->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ice1712_spdif_maskc, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm_pro->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ice1712_spdif_maskp, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm_pro->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_ice1712_spdif_stream, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm_pro->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) diff --git a/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1724.c b/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1724.c index e2dbbbfbca9fa..7efb0bbcea550 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1724.c +++ b/sound/pci/ice1712/ice1724.c @@ -2379,16 +2379,22 @@ static int snd_vt1724_spdif_build_controls(struct snd_ice1712 *ice) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_vt1724_spdif_default, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_vt1724_spdif_maskc, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) return err; kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&snd_vt1724_spdif_maskp, ice); + if (!kctl) + return -ENOMEM; kctl->id.device = ice->pcm->device; err = snd_ctl_add(ice->card, kctl); if (err < 0) From 651ba82fe2a144bc7356d940bfd235c3810b0549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: HyeongJun An Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 08:38:40 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 219/607] ALSA: seq: Fix uninitialised heap leak in snd_seq_event_dup() commit 435990e25bf1f4af3e6df12a6fbfd1f7ba4a97d4 upstream. snd_seq_event_dup() copies an incoming event into a pool cell and, in the UMP-enabled build, clears the trailing cell->ump.raw.extra word that the memcpy() did not cover. The guard deciding whether to clear it compares the copied size against sizeof(cell->event): memcpy(&cell->ump, event, size); if (size < sizeof(cell->event)) cell->ump.raw.extra = 0; For a legacy (non-UMP) event, size == sizeof(struct snd_seq_event) == sizeof(cell->event), so the condition is false and the extra word keeps stale data. The cell pool is allocated with kvmalloc() (not zeroed) and cells are reused via a free list, so that word holds uninitialised heap or leftover event data. When such a cell is delivered to a UMP client (client->midi_version > 0) that set SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_NO_CONVERT -- so the legacy event reaches it unconverted -- snd_seq_read() reads it out as the larger struct snd_seq_ump_event and copies the stale word to user space, a 4-byte kernel heap infoleak to an unprivileged /dev/snd/seq client. Compare against sizeof(cell->ump) instead, so the trailing word is zeroed for every event shorter than the UMP cell. Fixes: 46397622a3fa ("ALSA: seq: Add UMP support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260623233841.853326-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c index ccde0ca3d2082..e7edea10027f3 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int snd_seq_event_dup(struct snd_seq_pool *pool, struct snd_seq_event *event, size = snd_seq_event_packet_size(event); memcpy(&cell->ump, event, size); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_SEQ_UMP) - if (size < sizeof(cell->event)) + if (size < sizeof(cell->ump)) cell->ump.raw.extra = 0; #endif From 16f14f55141d4c55c3f321f93c328fff7cd6860a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WenTao Liang Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 12:29:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 220/607] ALSA: us144mkii: capture_urb_complete: redundant usb_anchor_urb corrupts anchor list on each resubmission commit 5cff1529a2f9b3461a7f5a6e36a86682fc290534 upstream. In capture_urb_complete(), usb_anchor_urb() is called on every completion callback, but the URB is already anchored from the initial submission in tascam_trigger_start(). Each redundant call corrupts the anchor's doubly-linked list and inflates the URB refcount. When usb_kill_anchored_urbs() traverses the list during stream stop / suspend / disconnect, the corrupted list leads to use-after-free. Remove the redundant usb_anchor_urb() from the resubmit path. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c1bb0c13e430 ("ALSA: usb-audio: us144mkii: Implement audio capture and decoding") Signed-off-by: WenTao Liang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260627042949.61767-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii_capture.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii_capture.c b/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii_capture.c index 00188ff6cd51c..6a45d2b6130ca 100644 --- a/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii_capture.c +++ b/sound/usb/usx2y/us144mkii_capture.c @@ -302,7 +302,6 @@ void capture_urb_complete(struct urb *urb) } usb_get_urb(urb); - usb_anchor_urb(urb, &tascam->capture_anchor); ret = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (ret < 0) { dev_err_ratelimited(tascam->card->dev, @@ -312,6 +311,7 @@ void capture_urb_complete(struct urb *urb) usb_put_urb(urb); atomic_dec( &tascam->active_urbs); /* Decrement on failed resubmission */ + return; } out: usb_put_urb(urb); From a263eb12cbe2e208e6e637df0f9b0be9a484158e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Darvell Long Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 07:37:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 221/607] ALSA: usb-audio: avoid kobject path lookup in DualSense match commit 7693c0cc415f3a16a7a3355f245474a5e661be4e upstream. The DualSense jack-detection input handler verifies that a matching input device belongs to the same physical controller by building kobject path strings for both the input device and the USB audio device, then comparing the path prefix. This was observed when a weak physical connection caused the controller to rapidly disconnect and reconnect. During that repeated hotplug, snd_dualsense_ih_match() can run while the controller's USB device is being disconnected. kobject_get_path() walks ancestor kobjects and dereferences their names; if the USB device kobject name is no longer valid, this can fault in strlen(): RIP: 0010:strlen+0x10/0x30 Call Trace: kobject_get_path+0x34/0x150 snd_dualsense_ih_match+0x49/0xd0 [snd_usb_audio] input_register_device+0x566/0x6a0 ps_probe+0xb89/0x1590 [hid_playstation] The same ownership check can be done without building kobject path strings. The input device is parented below the HID device, USB interface and USB device, so walking the input device parent chain and comparing against the mixer USB device preserves the check without dereferencing kobject names during disconnect. Fixes: 79d561c4ec04 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add mixer quirk for Sony DualSense PS5") Cc: Assisted-by: Cute:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Darvell Long Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260624143723.2986353-1-contact@darvell.me Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 40 ++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c index dd56f4bfb84d2..e56f98615b4ce 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c @@ -567,46 +567,30 @@ static bool snd_dualsense_ih_match(struct input_handler *handler, { struct dualsense_mixer_elem_info *mei; struct usb_device *snd_dev; - char *input_dev_path, *usb_dev_path; - size_t usb_dev_path_len; - bool match = false; + struct device *parent; mei = container_of(handler, struct dualsense_mixer_elem_info, ih); snd_dev = mei->info.head.mixer->chip->dev; - input_dev_path = kobject_get_path(&dev->dev.kobj, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!input_dev_path) { - dev_warn(&snd_dev->dev, "Failed to get input dev path\n"); - return false; - } - - usb_dev_path = kobject_get_path(&snd_dev->dev.kobj, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!usb_dev_path) { - dev_warn(&snd_dev->dev, "Failed to get USB dev path\n"); - goto free_paths; - } - /* * Ensure the VID:PID matched input device supposedly owned by the * hid-playstation driver belongs to the actual hardware handled by - * the current USB audio device, which implies input_dev_path being - * a subpath of usb_dev_path. + * the current USB audio device. * * This verification is necessary when there is more than one identical * controller attached to the host system. + * + * The input device is registered below the HID device, USB interface and + * USB device, so compare the parent chain directly instead of building + * kobject path strings. This avoids dereferencing kobject names while the + * USB device hierarchy is being torn down during disconnect. */ - usb_dev_path_len = strlen(usb_dev_path); - if (usb_dev_path_len >= strlen(input_dev_path)) - goto free_paths; - - usb_dev_path[usb_dev_path_len] = '/'; - match = !memcmp(input_dev_path, usb_dev_path, usb_dev_path_len + 1); - -free_paths: - kfree(input_dev_path); - kfree(usb_dev_path); + for (parent = dev->dev.parent; parent; parent = parent->parent) { + if (parent == &snd_dev->dev) + return true; + } - return match; + return false; } static int snd_dualsense_ih_connect(struct input_handler *handler, From bfd28b07541e510d64b937d28f3459e3e2500da5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 17:30:30 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 222/607] ALSA: usb-audio: Propagate errors in scarlett_ctl_enum_put() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 0f25cf1f02e3dba626791d949c759a48c0a44996 upstream. scarlett_ctl_enum_put() ignores the return value from snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value() and reports success whenever the requested enum value differs from the current one. If the SET_CUR request fails, the callback still returns success even though neither the hardware state nor the cached mixer value changed. Fixes: 76b188c4b370 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett mixer interface for 6i6, 18i6, 18i8 and 18i20") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419-usb-write-error-propagation-v1-2-5a3bd4a673ae@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett.c index 8babfa3f7c458..c7f2ad6e657fe 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett.c @@ -439,7 +439,9 @@ static int scarlett_ctl_enum_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, val = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; val = val + opt->start; if (val != oval) { - snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(elem, 0, 0, val); + err = snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(elem, 0, 0, val); + if (err < 0) + return err; return 1; } return 0; From 3061b6c114458d3570a1c48634a27d420a47c2ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 17:30:31 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 223/607] ALSA: usb-audio: Propagate US-16x08 write errors in route/mix EQ-switch put callbacks MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 3c06aec8abda6ba068b58a8b7119cdb2a48456b1 upstream. Several US-16x08 mixer put callbacks log failed control URBs but still return success to userspace. That hides device write failures even though the requested value was not applied. Return the negative write error instead in the route, master, bus, channel, and EQ switch put callbacks. Fixes: d2bb390a2081 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Tascam US-16x08 DSP mixer quirk") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419-usb-write-error-propagation-v1-3-5a3bd4a673ae@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c b/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c index f9df40730effd..72a240e497867 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c @@ -224,14 +224,14 @@ static int snd_us16x08_route_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, err = snd_us16x08_send_urb(chip, buf, sizeof(route_msg)); - if (err > 0) { - elem->cached |= 1 << index; - elem->cache_val[index] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set routing, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } - return err > 0 ? 1 : 0; + elem->cached |= 1 << index; + elem->cache_val[index] = val; + return 1; } static int snd_us16x08_master_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, @@ -283,14 +283,14 @@ static int snd_us16x08_master_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, buf[5] = index + 1; err = snd_us16x08_send_urb(chip, buf, sizeof(mix_msg_out)); - if (err > 0) { - elem->cached |= 1 << index; - elem->cache_val[index] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set master, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } - return err > 0 ? 1 : 0; + elem->cached |= 1 << index; + elem->cache_val[index] = val; + return 1; } static int snd_us16x08_bus_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, @@ -324,14 +324,14 @@ static int snd_us16x08_bus_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, break; } - if (err > 0) { - elem->cached |= 1; - elem->cache_val[0] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set bus parameter, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } - return err > 0 ? 1 : 0; + elem->cached |= 1; + elem->cache_val[0] = val; + return 1; } static int snd_us16x08_bus_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, @@ -392,14 +392,14 @@ static int snd_us16x08_channel_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, err = snd_us16x08_send_urb(chip, buf, sizeof(mix_msg_in)); - if (err > 0) { - elem->cached |= 1 << index; - elem->cache_val[index] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set channel, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } - return err > 0 ? 1 : 0; + elem->cached |= 1 << index; + elem->cache_val[index] = val; + return 1; } static int snd_us16x08_mix_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, @@ -529,13 +529,13 @@ static int snd_us16x08_eqswitch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, msleep(15); } - if (err > 0) { - elem->cached |= 1 << index; - elem->cache_val[index] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set eq switch, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } + elem->cached |= 1 << index; + elem->cache_val[index] = val; return 1; } @@ -1418,4 +1418,3 @@ int snd_us16x08_controls_create(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer) return 0; } - From f3e8a6cca15b8b4cc7bf04282d57deff28defe85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 10:20:01 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 224/607] ALSA: usb-audio: Roll back quirk control caches on write errors MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 6380957fa24251856a532e48a46a4dc3d1ae26b6 upstream. Several mixer quirk callbacks cache the requested control value in kcontrol->private_value before issuing a single vendor or class write. Their paired get and resume paths consume that cache directly, so a failed write currently leaves software state changed even though the update did not succeed. That can make later reads report a value the device never accepted and can replay the stale cache on resume. Restore the previous cached value on failure in the Audigy2NX LED, Emu0204 channel switch, Xonar U1 output switch, Native Instruments controls, FTU effect program switch, and Sound Blaster E1 input source switch. Fixes: 9cf3689bfe07 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add audigy2nx resume support") Fixes: 5f503ee9e270 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add Emu0204 channel switch resume support") Fixes: 2bfb14c3b8fb ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add Xonar U1 resume support") Fixes: da6d276957ea ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add resume support for Native Instruments controls") Fixes: 0b4e9cfcef05 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Add resume support for FTU controls") Fixes: 388fdb8f882a ("ALSA: usb-audio: Support changing input on Sound Blaster E1") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260429-alsa-usb-quirks-cache-rollback-v1-1-01b35c688b80@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c index e56f98615b4ce..791670105f932 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c @@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ static int snd_audigy2nx_led_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, int index = kcontrol->private_value & 0xff; unsigned int value = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; int old_value = kcontrol->private_value >> 8; + unsigned long old_pval = kcontrol->private_value; int err; if (value > 1) @@ -341,7 +342,11 @@ static int snd_audigy2nx_led_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, return 0; kcontrol->private_value = (value << 8) | index; err = snd_audigy2nx_led_update(mixer, value, index); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + if (err < 0) { + kcontrol->private_value = old_pval; + return err; + } + return 1; } static int snd_audigy2nx_led_resume(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list) @@ -487,6 +492,7 @@ static int snd_emu0204_ch_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol); struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = list->mixer; unsigned int value = ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0]; + unsigned long old_pval = kcontrol->private_value; int err; if (value > 1) @@ -497,7 +503,11 @@ static int snd_emu0204_ch_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, kcontrol->private_value = value; err = snd_emu0204_ch_switch_update(mixer, value); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + if (err < 0) { + kcontrol->private_value = old_pval; + return err; + } + return 1; } static int snd_emu0204_ch_switch_resume(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list) @@ -805,7 +815,11 @@ static int snd_xonar_u1_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, kcontrol->private_value = new_status; err = snd_xonar_u1_switch_update(list->mixer, new_status); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + if (err < 0) { + kcontrol->private_value = old_status; + return err; + } + return 1; } static int snd_xonar_u1_switch_resume(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list) @@ -1143,7 +1157,8 @@ static int snd_nativeinstruments_control_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol) { struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol); - u8 oldval = (kcontrol->private_value >> 24) & 0xff; + unsigned long old_pval = kcontrol->private_value; + u8 oldval = (old_pval >> 24) & 0xff; u8 newval = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; int err; @@ -1153,7 +1168,11 @@ static int snd_nativeinstruments_control_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, kcontrol->private_value &= ~(0xff << 24); kcontrol->private_value |= (unsigned int)newval << 24; err = snd_ni_update_cur_val(list); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + if (err < 0) { + kcontrol->private_value = old_pval; + return err; + } + return 1; } static const struct snd_kcontrol_new snd_nativeinstruments_ta6_mixers[] = { @@ -1308,7 +1327,8 @@ static int snd_ftu_eff_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol) { struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list = snd_kcontrol_chip(kctl); - unsigned int pval = list->kctl->private_value; + unsigned long old_pval = list->kctl->private_value; + unsigned int pval = old_pval; int cur_val, err, new_val; cur_val = pval >> 24; @@ -1319,7 +1339,11 @@ static int snd_ftu_eff_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, kctl->private_value &= ~(0xff << 24); kctl->private_value |= new_val << 24; err = snd_ftu_eff_switch_update(list); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + if (err < 0) { + kctl->private_value = old_pval; + return err; + } + return 1; } static int snd_ftu_create_effect_switch(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer, @@ -2098,13 +2122,18 @@ static int snd_soundblaster_e1_switch_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, { struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol); unsigned char value = !!ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; + unsigned long old_pval = kcontrol->private_value; int err; if (kcontrol->private_value == value) return 0; kcontrol->private_value = value; err = snd_soundblaster_e1_switch_update(list->mixer, value); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + if (err < 0) { + kcontrol->private_value = old_pval; + return err; + } + return 1; } static int snd_soundblaster_e1_switch_resume(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list) From 54c448e4f26a7c86552d83edf715c5ca5ab31dbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 10:20:02 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 225/607] ALSA: usb-audio: Update Babyface Pro control caches only after successful writes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit d8f802ccf1fdbeb89d62748d6a0d0fbd442c8127 upstream. snd_bbfpro_ctl_put() and snd_bbfpro_vol_put() cache the requested packed control state in kcontrol->private_value before issuing the USB write. Their get and resume paths use that cached value directly, so a failed write can leave the driver reporting and later replaying a setting the hardware never accepted. Update the cached state only after a successful USB write. Fixes: 3e8f3bd04716 ("ALSA: usb-audio: RME Babyface Pro mixer patch") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260429-alsa-usb-quirks-cache-rollback-v1-2-01b35c688b80@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c index 791670105f932..02d9ede674670 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_quirks.c @@ -2905,12 +2905,14 @@ static int snd_bbfpro_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, if (val == old_value) return 0; + err = snd_bbfpro_ctl_update(mixer, reg, idx, val); + if (err < 0) + return err; + kcontrol->private_value = reg | ((idx & SND_BBFPRO_CTL_IDX_MASK) << SND_BBFPRO_CTL_IDX_SHIFT) | ((val & SND_BBFPRO_CTL_VAL_MASK) << SND_BBFPRO_CTL_VAL_SHIFT); - - err = snd_bbfpro_ctl_update(mixer, reg, idx, val); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + return 1; } static int snd_bbfpro_ctl_resume(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list) @@ -3095,11 +3097,13 @@ static int snd_bbfpro_vol_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, new_val = uvalue & SND_BBFPRO_MIXER_VAL_MASK; + err = snd_bbfpro_vol_update(mixer, idx, new_val); + if (err < 0) + return err; + kcontrol->private_value = idx | (new_val << SND_BBFPRO_MIXER_VAL_SHIFT); - - err = snd_bbfpro_vol_update(mixer, idx, new_val); - return err < 0 ? err : 1; + return 1; } static int snd_bbfpro_vol_resume(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list) From afc90150551dd0d97a012dd51be2cdd7e0235eec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?C=C3=A1ssio=20Gabriel?= Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 17:30:32 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 226/607] ALSA: usb-audio: Update US-16x08 EQ/comp shadow state after successful writes MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit a440c17869ecd71da0f295b62868fc742d09a8ba upstream. snd_us16x08_comp_put() and snd_us16x08_eq_put() update their software stores before sending the USB write. If the transfer fails, later get callbacks report a value the hardware never accepted. Build the outgoing message from the current store plus the pending value, then commit the store only after a successful write. Fixes: d2bb390a2081 ("ALSA: usb-audio: Tascam US-16x08 DSP mixer quirk") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419-usb-write-error-propagation-v1-4-5a3bd4a673ae@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c b/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c index 72a240e497867..e53f0808be1ae 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_us16x08.c @@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ static int snd_us16x08_comp_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, int index = ucontrol->id.index; char buf[sizeof(comp_msg)]; int val_idx, val; + int threshold, ratio, attack, release, gain, switch_on; int err; val = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; @@ -447,36 +448,61 @@ static int snd_us16x08_comp_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, /* new control value incl. bias*/ val_idx = elem->head.id - SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_BASE; - store->val[val_idx][index] = ucontrol->value.integer.value[0]; + threshold = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_THRESHOLD)] + [index]; + ratio = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_RATIO)][index]; + attack = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_ATTACK)][index]; + release = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_RELEASE)] + [index]; + gain = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_GAIN)][index]; + switch_on = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_SWITCH)] + [index]; + + switch (val_idx) { + case COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_THRESHOLD): + threshold = val; + break; + case COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_RATIO): + ratio = val; + break; + case COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_ATTACK): + attack = val; + break; + case COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_RELEASE): + release = val; + break; + case COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_GAIN): + gain = val; + break; + case COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_SWITCH): + switch_on = val; + break; + } /* prepare compressor URB message from template */ memcpy(buf, comp_msg, sizeof(comp_msg)); /* place comp values in message buffer watch bias! */ - buf[8] = store->val[ - COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_THRESHOLD)][index] - - SND_US16X08_COMP_THRESHOLD_BIAS; - buf[11] = ratio_map[store->val[ - COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_RATIO)][index]]; - buf[14] = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_ATTACK)][index] - + SND_US16X08_COMP_ATTACK_BIAS; - buf[17] = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_RELEASE)][index] - + SND_US16X08_COMP_RELEASE_BIAS; - buf[20] = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_GAIN)][index]; - buf[26] = store->val[COMP_STORE_IDX(SND_US16X08_ID_COMP_SWITCH)][index]; + buf[8] = threshold - SND_US16X08_COMP_THRESHOLD_BIAS; + buf[11] = ratio_map[ratio]; + buf[14] = attack + SND_US16X08_COMP_ATTACK_BIAS; + buf[17] = release + SND_US16X08_COMP_RELEASE_BIAS; + buf[20] = gain; + buf[26] = switch_on; /* place channel selector in message buffer */ buf[5] = index + 1; err = snd_us16x08_send_urb(chip, buf, sizeof(comp_msg)); - if (err > 0) { - elem->cached |= 1 << index; - elem->cache_val[index] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set compressor, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } + store->val[val_idx][index] = val; + elem->cached |= 1 << index; + elem->cache_val[index] = val; return 1; } @@ -578,11 +604,10 @@ static int snd_us16x08_eq_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, /* copy URB buffer from EQ template */ memcpy(buf, eqs_msq, sizeof(eqs_msq)); - store->val[b_idx][p_idx][index] = val; - buf[20] = store->val[b_idx][3][index]; - buf[17] = store->val[b_idx][2][index]; - buf[14] = store->val[b_idx][1][index]; - buf[11] = store->val[b_idx][0][index]; + buf[20] = p_idx == 3 ? val : store->val[b_idx][3][index]; + buf[17] = p_idx == 2 ? val : store->val[b_idx][2][index]; + buf[14] = p_idx == 1 ? val : store->val[b_idx][1][index]; + buf[11] = p_idx == 0 ? val : store->val[b_idx][0][index]; /* place channel index in URB buffer */ buf[5] = index + 1; @@ -592,14 +617,15 @@ static int snd_us16x08_eq_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, err = snd_us16x08_send_urb(chip, buf, sizeof(eqs_msq)); - if (err > 0) { - /* store new value in EQ band cache */ - elem->cached |= 1 << index; - elem->cache_val[index] = val; - } else { + if (err < 0) { usb_audio_dbg(chip, "Failed to set eq param, err:%d\n", err); + return err; } + store->val[b_idx][p_idx][index] = val; + /* store new value in EQ band cache */ + elem->cached |= 1 << index; + elem->cache_val[index] = val; return 1; } From a385d3435a7af36c4ac18e9536981b99d5d1c2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Raghavendra Rao Ananta Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 17:34:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 227/607] vfio/pci: Use a private flag to prevent power state change with VFs commit 40ef3edf151e184d021917a5c4c771cc0870844a upstream. The current implementation uses pci_num_vf() while holding the memory_lock to prevent changing the power state of a PF when VFs are enabled. This creates a lockdep circular dependency warning because memory_lock is held during device probing. [ 286.997167] ====================================================== [ 287.003363] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 287.009562] 7.0.0-dbg-DEV #3 Tainted: G S [ 287.015074] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 287.021270] vfio_pci_sriov_/18636 is trying to acquire lock: [ 287.026942] ff45bea2294d4968 (&vdev->memory_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.036530] [ 287.036530] but task is already holding lock: [ 287.042383] ff45bea3a96b8230 (&new_dev_set->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x44d/0x7b0 [ 287.051879] [ 287.051879] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 287.051879] [ 287.060070] [ 287.060070] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 287.067568] [ 287.067568] -> #2 (&new_dev_set->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 287.073941] __mutex_lock+0x92/0xb80 [ 287.078058] vfio_assign_device_set+0x66/0x1b0 [ 287.083042] vfio_pci_core_register_device+0xd1/0x2a0 [ 287.088638] vfio_pci_probe+0xd2/0x100 [ 287.092933] local_pci_probe_callback+0x4d/0xa0 [ 287.098001] process_scheduled_works+0x2ca/0x680 [ 287.103158] worker_thread+0x1e8/0x2f0 [ 287.107452] kthread+0x10c/0x140 [ 287.111230] ret_from_fork+0x18e/0x360 [ 287.115519] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 287.119983] [ 287.119983] -> #1 ((work_completion)(&arg.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 287.127219] __flush_work+0x345/0x490 [ 287.131429] pci_device_probe+0x2e3/0x490 [ 287.135979] really_probe+0x1f9/0x4e0 [ 287.140180] __driver_probe_device+0x77/0x100 [ 287.145079] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x110 [ 287.149803] __device_attach_driver+0xe3/0x170 [ 287.154789] bus_for_each_drv+0x125/0x150 [ 287.159346] __device_attach+0xca/0x1a0 [ 287.163720] device_initial_probe+0x34/0x50 [ 287.168445] pci_bus_add_device+0x6e/0x90 [ 287.172995] pci_iov_add_virtfn+0x3c9/0x3e0 [ 287.177719] sriov_add_vfs+0x2c/0x60 [ 287.181838] sriov_enable+0x306/0x4a0 [ 287.186038] vfio_pci_core_sriov_configure+0x184/0x220 [ 287.191715] sriov_numvfs_store+0xd9/0x1c0 [ 287.196351] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x13f/0x1d0 [ 287.201338] vfs_write+0x2be/0x3b0 [ 287.205286] ksys_write+0x73/0x100 [ 287.209233] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x750 [ 287.213529] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 287.219120] [ 287.219120] -> #0 (&vdev->memory_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 287.225491] __lock_acquire+0x14c6/0x2800 [ 287.230048] lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2f0 [ 287.234168] down_write+0x3a/0xc0 [ 287.238019] vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.243436] __rpm_callback+0x8c/0x310 [ 287.247730] rpm_resume+0x529/0x6f0 [ 287.251765] __pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0x90 [ 287.256402] vfio_pci_core_enable+0x44/0x310 [ 287.261216] vfio_pci_open_device+0x1c/0x80 [ 287.265947] vfio_df_open+0x10f/0x150 [ 287.270148] vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x4a4/0x7b0 [ 287.275476] __se_sys_ioctl+0x71/0xc0 [ 287.279679] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x750 [ 287.283975] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 287.289559] [ 287.289559] other info that might help us debug this: [ 287.289559] [ 287.297582] Chain exists of: [ 287.297582] &vdev->memory_lock --> (work_completion)(&arg.work) --> &new_dev_set->lock [ 287.297582] [ 287.310023] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 287.310023] [ 287.315961] CPU0 CPU1 [ 287.320510] ---- ---- [ 287.325059] lock(&new_dev_set->lock); [ 287.328917] lock((work_completion)(&arg.work)); [ 287.336153] lock(&new_dev_set->lock); [ 287.342523] lock(&vdev->memory_lock); [ 287.346382] [ 287.346382] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 287.346382] [ 287.352315] 2 locks held by vfio_pci_sriov_/18636: [ 287.357125] #0: ff45bea208ed3e18 (&group->group_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x3e3/0x7b0 [ 287.367048] #1: ff45bea3a96b8230 (&new_dev_set->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x44d/0x7b0 [ 287.376976] [ 287.376976] stack backtrace: [ 287.381353] CPU: 191 UID: 0 PID: 18636 Comm: vfio_pci_sriov_ Tainted: G S 7.0.0-dbg-DEV #3 PREEMPTLAZY [ 287.381355] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 287.381356] Call Trace: [ 287.381357] [ 287.381358] dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70 [ 287.381361] print_circular_bug+0x2e1/0x300 [ 287.381363] check_noncircular+0xf9/0x120 [ 287.381364] ? __lock_acquire+0x5b4/0x2800 [ 287.381366] __lock_acquire+0x14c6/0x2800 [ 287.381368] ? pci_mmcfg_read+0x4f/0x220 [ 287.381370] ? pci_mmcfg_write+0x57/0x220 [ 287.381371] ? lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2f0 [ 287.381373] ? pci_mmcfg_write+0x57/0x220 [ 287.381374] ? lock_release+0xef/0x360 [ 287.381376] ? vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381377] lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2f0 [ 287.381378] ? vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381379] ? lock_is_held_type+0x76/0x100 [ 287.381382] down_write+0x3a/0xc0 [ 287.381382] ? vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381383] vfio_pci_core_runtime_resume+0x1f/0xa0 [ 287.381384] ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 287.381385] __rpm_callback+0x8c/0x310 [ 287.381386] ? ktime_get_mono_fast_ns+0x3d/0xb0 [ 287.381389] ? __pfx_pci_pm_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 287.381390] rpm_resume+0x529/0x6f0 [ 287.381392] ? lock_is_held_type+0x76/0x100 [ 287.381394] __pm_runtime_resume+0x68/0x90 [ 287.381396] vfio_pci_core_enable+0x44/0x310 [ 287.381398] vfio_pci_open_device+0x1c/0x80 [ 287.381399] vfio_df_open+0x10f/0x150 [ 287.381401] vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x4a4/0x7b0 [ 287.381402] __se_sys_ioctl+0x71/0xc0 [ 287.381404] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0x750 [ 287.381405] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 287.381406] ? trace_irq_disable+0x25/0xd0 [ 287.381409] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Introduce a private flag 'sriov_active' in the vfio_pci_core_device struct. This allows the driver to track the SR-IOV power state requirement without relying on pci_num_vf() while holding the memory_lock. The lock is now only held to set the flag and ensure the device is in D0, after which pci_enable_sriov() can be called without the lock. Fixes: f4162eb1e2fc ("vfio/pci: Change the PF power state to D0 before enabling VFs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe Suggested-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Raghavendra Rao Ananta Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260514173449.3282188-1-rananta@google.com [promote bitfield to plain bool to avoid storage-unit races] Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c index 53a846d3e6758..1f5dde6b022d4 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c @@ -271,8 +271,11 @@ int vfio_pci_set_power_state(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, pci_power_t stat int ret; /* Prevent changing power state for PFs with VFs enabled */ - if (pci_num_vf(pdev) && state > PCI_D0) - return -EBUSY; + if (state > PCI_D0) { + lockdep_assert_held_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + if (vdev->sriov_active) + return -EBUSY; + } if (vdev->needs_pm_restore) { if (pdev->current_state < PCI_D3hot && state >= PCI_D3hot) { @@ -2309,8 +2312,9 @@ int vfio_pci_core_sriov_configure(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, down_write(&vdev->memory_lock); vfio_pci_set_power_state(vdev, PCI_D0); - ret = pci_enable_sriov(pdev, nr_virtfn); + vdev->sriov_active = true; up_write(&vdev->memory_lock); + ret = pci_enable_sriov(pdev, nr_virtfn); if (ret) { pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); goto out_del; @@ -2324,6 +2328,13 @@ int vfio_pci_core_sriov_configure(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, } out_del: + /* + * Avoid taking the memory_lock intentionally. A race with a power + * state transition would at most result in an -EBUSY, leaving the + * device in PCI_D0. + */ + vdev->sriov_active = false; + mutex_lock(&vfio_pci_sriov_pfs_mutex); list_del_init(&vdev->sriov_pfs_item); out_unlock: diff --git a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h index 0ddc42732647e..1225db35aa73a 100644 --- a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h +++ b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct vfio_pci_core_device { bool needs_pm_restore:1; bool pm_intx_masked:1; bool pm_runtime_engaged:1; + bool sriov_active; struct pci_saved_state *pci_saved_state; struct pci_saved_state *pm_save; int ioeventfds_nr; From f6c67cf0051f96ba61d186731d3d9409b9927db2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 13:12:29 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 228/607] vfio/pci: Latch disable_idle_d3 per device commit 4575e9aac5336d1365138c0284773bf8da4b1fa3 upstream. When disable_idle_d3 was introduced in vfio-pci, it directly manipulated the device power state with pci_set_power_state(). There were no refcounts to maintain or balanced operations, we could unconditionally bring the device to D0 and conditionally move it to D3hot. Therefore the module parameter was made writable. Later, in commit c61302aa48f7 ("vfio/pci: Move module parameters to vfio_pci.c"), as part of the vfio-pci-core split, the writable aspect of the module parameter was nullified. The parameter value could still be changed through sysfs, but the vfio-pci driver latched the values into vfio-pci-core globals at module init. Loading the vfio-pci module, or unloading and reloading, with non-default or different values could change the globals relative to existing devices bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. Runtime PM was introduced in commit 7ab5e10eda02 ("vfio/pci: Move the unused device into low power state with runtime PM"), which marks the point where power states became refcounted. PM get and put operations need to be balanced, but the same module operations noted above can change the global variables relative to those devices already bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. This introduces a window where PM operations can now become unbalanced. To resolve this with a narrow footprint for stable backports, the disable_idle_d3 flag is latched into the vfio_pci_core_device at the time of initialization, such that the device always operates with a consistent value. NB. vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset() now unconditionally raises the runtime PM usage count around bus reset to account for disable_idle_d3 becoming a per-device rather than global flag. When this flag is set, the additional get/put pair is harmless and allows continued use of the shared vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get() helper. Fixes: 7ab5e10eda02 ("vfio/pci: Move the unused device into low power state with runtime PM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615191241.688297-2-alex.williamson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c index 1f5dde6b022d4..c2562285b97be 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) u16 cmd; u8 msix_pos; - if (!disable_idle_d3) { + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) { ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(&pdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) out_disable_device: pci_disable_device(pdev); out_power: - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); return ret; } @@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ void vfio_pci_core_disable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(vdev->vdev.dev_set); /* Put the pm-runtime usage counter acquired during enable */ - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfio_pci_core_disable); @@ -2131,6 +2131,8 @@ int vfio_pci_core_init_dev(struct vfio_device *core_vdev) init_rwsem(&vdev->memory_lock); xa_init(&vdev->ctx); + vdev->disable_idle_d3 = disable_idle_d3; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfio_pci_core_init_dev); @@ -2222,7 +2224,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) dev->driver->pm = &vfio_pci_core_pm_ops; pm_runtime_allow(dev); - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(dev); ret = vfio_register_group_dev(&vdev->vdev); @@ -2231,7 +2233,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) return 0; out_power: - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev); pm_runtime_forbid(dev); @@ -2250,7 +2252,7 @@ void vfio_pci_core_unregister_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) vfio_pci_vf_uninit(vdev); vfio_pci_vga_uninit(vdev); - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_get_noresume(&vdev->pdev->dev); pm_runtime_forbid(&vdev->pdev->dev); @@ -2578,7 +2580,7 @@ static void vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(struct vfio_device_set *dev_set) * state. Increment the usage count for all the devices in the dev_set * before reset and decrement the same after reset. */ - if (!disable_idle_d3 && vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get(dev_set)) + if (vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get(dev_set)) return; if (!pci_reset_bus(pdev)) @@ -2588,8 +2590,7 @@ static void vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(struct vfio_device_set *dev_set) if (reset_done) cur->needs_reset = false; - if (!disable_idle_d3) - pm_runtime_put(&cur->pdev->dev); + pm_runtime_put(&cur->pdev->dev); } } diff --git a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h index 1225db35aa73a..a303b1dff22c8 100644 --- a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h +++ b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct vfio_pci_core_device { bool needs_pm_restore:1; bool pm_intx_masked:1; bool pm_runtime_engaged:1; + bool disable_idle_d3:1; bool sriov_active; struct pci_saved_state *pci_saved_state; struct pci_saved_state *pm_save; From 52adb2dff7ce3d8430e2bdc5988b618a430def85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 13:12:30 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 229/607] vfio/pci: Release the VGA arbiter client on register_device() failure commit daedde7f024ecf88bc8e832ed40cf2c795f0796a upstream. The re-order in the Fixes commit below displaced vfio_pci_vga_init() as the last failure point of what is now vfio_pci_core_register_device() without introducing an unwind for the VGA arbiter registration. In current kernels this is mostly benign because vfio_pci_set_decode() only uses pci_dev state, but the original failure path could leave a callback with a freed vdev cookie. The stale registration also becomes unsafe again once the callback follows drvdata to the vfio device. Add the required VGA unwind callout. Fixes: 4aeec3984ddc ("vfio/pci: Re-order vfio_pci_probe()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615191241.688297-3-alex.williamson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c index c2562285b97be..a807a678277c6 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c @@ -2237,6 +2237,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev); pm_runtime_forbid(dev); + vfio_pci_vga_uninit(vdev); out_vf: vfio_pci_vf_uninit(vdev); return ret; From ba96666d991e6d6111f5dbdb7faad878485ceb22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 13:12:31 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 230/607] vfio/pci: Fix racy bitfields and tighten struct layout commit e73638e55f861758d49f14d7bb5dba3035981cd7 upstream. Bitfield operations are not atomic, they use a read-modify-write pattern, therefore we should be careful not to pack bitfields that can be concurrently updated into the same storage unit. This split takes a binary approach: flags that are only modified pre/post open/close remain bitfields, flags modified from user action, including actions that reach across to another device (ex. reset) use dedicated storage units. Note that the virq_disabled and bardirty flags are relocated to fill an existing hole in the structure. Bitfield justifications: has_dyn_msix: written only in vfio_pci_core_enable() pci_2_3: written only in vfio_pci_core_enable() reset_works: written only in vfio_pci_core_enable() extended_caps: written only in vfio_cap_len() under vfio_config_init() has_vga: written only in vfio_pci_core_enable() nointx: written only in vfio_pci_core_enable() needs_pm_restore: written only in vfio_pci_probe_power_state() disable_idle_d3: written only at .init in vfio_pci_core_init_dev() Dedicated storage units: virq_disabled: written by guest INTx command writes in vfio_basic_config_write() while the device is open bardirty: written by guest BAR writes in vfio_basic_config_write() while the device is open pm_intx_masked: written in the runtime-PM suspend path. pm_runtime_engaged: written by low-power feature entry/exit paths needs_reset: set in vfio_pci_core_disable() and cleared for devices in the set by vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset() sriov_active: written by vfio_pci_core_sriov_configure() via sysfs sriov_numvfs while bound. Fixes: 9cd0f6d5cbb6 ("vfio/pci: Use bitfield for struct vfio_pci_core_device flags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615191241.688297-4-alex.williamson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h index a303b1dff22c8..327cfd3946d4d 100644 --- a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h +++ b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ struct vfio_pci_core_device { struct pci_dev *pdev; void __iomem *barmap[PCI_STD_NUM_BARS]; bool bar_mmap_supported[PCI_STD_NUM_BARS]; + /* Flags modified at runtime - dedicated storage unit */ + bool virq_disabled; + bool bardirty; u8 *pci_config_map; u8 *vconfig; struct perm_bits *msi_perm; @@ -74,19 +77,19 @@ struct vfio_pci_core_device { u16 msix_size; u32 msix_offset; u32 rbar[7]; + /* Flags only modified on setup/release - bitfield ok */ bool has_dyn_msix:1; bool pci_2_3:1; - bool virq_disabled:1; bool reset_works:1; bool extended_caps:1; - bool bardirty:1; bool has_vga:1; - bool needs_reset:1; bool nointx:1; bool needs_pm_restore:1; - bool pm_intx_masked:1; - bool pm_runtime_engaged:1; bool disable_idle_d3:1; + /* Flags modified at runtime - dedicated storage unit */ + bool needs_reset; + bool pm_intx_masked; + bool pm_runtime_engaged; bool sriov_active; struct pci_saved_state *pci_saved_state; struct pci_saved_state *pm_save; From 7f2d6b31089e48db4653df832c9a6afdde9a1c29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junrui Luo Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 16:58:48 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 231/607] vfio: prevent infinite loop in vfio_mig_get_next_state() on blocked arc commit a26b499b757cfc8bbff1088bb1b844639e250893 upstream. vfio_mig_get_next_state() walks vfio_from_fsm_table[] one step at a time, looping to skip optional states the device does not support until *next_fsm is supported. A blocked transition is encoded as VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR, which the trailing return reports as -EINVAL. The skip loop does not account for the ERROR sentinel. state_flags_table[ERROR] is ~0U and vfio_from_fsm_table[ERROR][*] is ERROR, so once *next_fsm becomes ERROR the loop condition stays true and *next_fsm never changes. The blocked arcs STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY and STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY_P2P map to ERROR yet pass the support check on a precopy-capable device, causing the loop to spin forever while holding the driver state mutex. This can result in a soft lockup, and a panic with softlockup_panic set. Terminate the skip loop on the ERROR sentinel so a blocked transition falls through to the existing return and reports -EINVAL. Fixes: 4db52602a607 ("vfio: Extend the device migration protocol with PRE_COPY") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/SYBPR01MB7881290BBDE79B61AE6A017FAF122@SYBPR01MB7881.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c index 38c8e9350a60e..45ae63214b4b6 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c @@ -846,7 +846,8 @@ int vfio_mig_get_next_state(struct vfio_device *device, * logical state, as per the above comment. */ *next_fsm = vfio_from_fsm_table[cur_fsm][new_fsm]; - while ((state_flags_table[*next_fsm] & device->migration_flags) != + while (*next_fsm != VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR && + (state_flags_table[*next_fsm] & device->migration_flags) != state_flags_table[*next_fsm]) *next_fsm = vfio_from_fsm_table[*next_fsm][new_fsm]; From a53109ffb6b5148e11a27fb7670355b92db12dd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Williamson Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:47:00 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 232/607] vfio: Remove device debugfs before releasing devres commit dc7fe87de492ea7f33a72b78d26650b75bf37f4f upstream. VFIO device debugfs files created with debugfs_create_devm_seqfile() store a devres allocated debugfs_devm_entry as inode private data. vfio_unregister_group_dev() currently calls vfio_device_del() before vfio_device_debugfs_exit(), but device_del() releases devres. This can leave debugfs entries visible with stale inode private data while unregister waits for userspace references to drain. Remove the per-device debugfs tree before vfio_device_del(). The debugfs view is diagnostic only, so losing it at the start of unregister is preferable to preserving entries whose backing storage may already have been released. Complete the teardown by clearing the per-device debugfs root after removal. This matches the global debugfs root cleanup and prevents future users from mistaking a removed dentry for a live debugfs tree during the remainder of unregister. Fixes: 2202844e4468 ("vfio/migration: Add debugfs to live migration driver") Reported-by: Sashiko AI Review Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615192725.6A2221F000E9@smtp.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Longfang Liu Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615204717.735302-1-alex.williamson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/vfio/debugfs.c | 1 + drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/debugfs.c b/drivers/vfio/debugfs.c index 8b0ca7a090640..8a2f1b0cce3f1 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/debugfs.c @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ void vfio_device_debugfs_init(struct vfio_device *vdev) void vfio_device_debugfs_exit(struct vfio_device *vdev) { debugfs_remove_recursive(vdev->debug_root); + vdev->debug_root = NULL; } void vfio_debugfs_create_root(void) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c index 45ae63214b4b6..19c40fc596999 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c @@ -395,6 +395,13 @@ void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device) */ vfio_device_group_unregister(device); + /* + * Remove debugfs before device_del(), which releases devres. Some + * debugfs entries are created with debugfs_create_devm_seqfile() and + * therefore rely on devres-managed inode private data. + */ + vfio_device_debugfs_exit(device); + /* * Balances vfio_device_add() in register path, also prevents * new device opened by userspace in the cdev path. @@ -424,7 +431,6 @@ void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device) } } - vfio_device_debugfs_exit(device); /* Balances vfio_device_set_group in register path */ vfio_device_remove_group(device); } From 79f9e221dddecb86c982eed525960295c36c17b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zenm Chen Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 00:19:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 233/607] Bluetooth: btusb: Add USB ID 2c4e:0128 for Mercusys MA60XNB commit 88b4d528eda4ac71c2952b3458f2abbc80a91cd2 upstream. Add USB ID 2c4e:0128 for Mercusys MA60XNB, an RTL8851BU-based Wi-Fi + Bluetooth adapter. The information in /sys/kernel/debug/usb/devices about the Bluetooth device is listed as the below: T: Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=04 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.00 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=2c4e ProdID=0128 Rev= 0.00 S: Manufacturer=Realtek S: Product=802.11ax WLAN Adapter S: SerialNumber=00e04c000001 C:* #Ifs= 3 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA A: FirstIf#= 0 IfCount= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 I:* If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=81(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 0 Ivl=1ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 9 Ivl=1ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 2 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 17 Ivl=1ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 3 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 25 Ivl=1ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 4 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 33 Ivl=1ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 5 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 49 Ivl=1ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 6 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb E: Ad=03(O) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 63 Ivl=1ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=01(Isoc) MxPS= 63 Ivl=1ms I:* If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 8 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=rtw89_8851bu E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=09(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=0a(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=0b(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=0c(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6.x Signed-off-by: Zenm Chen Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index 25236fd97aed5..7fa108893ed3d 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id quirks_table[] = { BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, { USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0xe611), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x2c4e, 0x0128), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | + BTUSB_WIDEBAND_SPEECH }, /* Realtek 8852AE Bluetooth devices */ { USB_DEVICE(0x0bda, 0x2852), .driver_info = BTUSB_REALTEK | From 8db0ce3de78367f61c2970c0f16d9adee8830a23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 08:37:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 234/607] Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on registration failure commit eedc6867ebad73edbfaf9a0a65fbef7115cc4753 upstream. Make sure to release the sibling interfaces in case controller registration fails to avoid use-after-free and double-free when they are eventually disconnected. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup source leak in the btusb probe errors paths. Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260402092704.2346710-1-johan%40kernel.org Fixes: 9bfa35fe422c ("[Bluetooth] Add SCO support to btusb driver") Fixes: 9d08f50401ac ("Bluetooth: btusb: Add support for Broadcom LM_DIAG interface") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.27 Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index 7fa108893ed3d..f4a3824d8f080 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -4381,7 +4381,7 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, err = hci_register_dev(hdev); if (err < 0) - goto out_free_dev; + goto err_release_siblings; usb_set_intfdata(intf, data); @@ -4390,6 +4390,15 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, return 0; +err_release_siblings: + if (data->diag) { + usb_set_intfdata(data->diag, NULL); + usb_driver_release_interface(&btusb_driver, data->diag); + } + if (data->isoc) { + usb_set_intfdata(data->isoc, NULL); + usb_driver_release_interface(&btusb_driver, data->isoc); + } out_free_dev: if (data->reset_gpio) gpiod_put(data->reset_gpio); From a7e941a395711791c7e98d9870c6562c2c9e9ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 08:37:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 235/607] Bluetooth: btusb: fix use-after-free on marvell probe failure commit c5b600a3c05b1a7a110d558df935a8fc8a471c79 upstream. Make sure to stop any TX URBs submitted during Marvell OOB wakeup configuration on later probe failures to avoid use-after-free in the completion callback. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing a fix for a wakeup source leak in the btusb probe errors paths. Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260402092704.2346710-1-johan%40kernel.org Fixes: a4ccc9e33d2f ("Bluetooth: btusb: Configure Marvell to use one of the pins for oob wakeup") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11 Cc: Rajat Jain Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index f4a3824d8f080..458b1e5809776 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -4193,7 +4193,7 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, if (id->driver_info & BTUSB_INTEL_COMBINED) { err = btintel_configure_setup(hdev, btusb_driver.name); if (err) - goto out_free_dev; + goto err_kill_tx_urbs; /* Transport specific configuration */ hdev->send = btusb_send_frame_intel; @@ -4355,7 +4355,7 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, err = usb_set_interface(data->udev, 0, 0); if (err < 0) { BT_ERR("failed to set interface 0, alt 0 %d", err); - goto out_free_dev; + goto err_kill_tx_urbs; } } @@ -4363,7 +4363,7 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, err = usb_driver_claim_interface(&btusb_driver, data->isoc, data); if (err < 0) - goto out_free_dev; + goto err_kill_tx_urbs; } if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_HCIBTUSB_BCM) && data->diag) { @@ -4399,6 +4399,8 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, usb_set_intfdata(data->isoc, NULL); usb_driver_release_interface(&btusb_driver, data->isoc); } +err_kill_tx_urbs: + usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&data->tx_anchor); out_free_dev: if (data->reset_gpio) gpiod_put(data->reset_gpio); From 17a2d3f903455f6b95539a58ef8ca5fa5a76e7cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 08:37:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 236/607] Bluetooth: btusb: fix wakeup source leak on probe failure commit 3d93e1bb0fb881fe3ef961d1120556658e9cac4d upstream. Make sure to disable wakeup on probe failure to avoid leaking the wakeup source. Fixes: fd913ef7ce61 ("Bluetooth: btusb: Add out-of-band wakeup support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11 Cc: Rajat Jain Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c index 458b1e5809776..b9e5adecfed60 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c @@ -2934,6 +2934,11 @@ static int marvell_config_oob_wake(struct hci_dev *hdev) return 0; } +#else +static inline int marvell_config_oob_wake(struct hci_dev *hdev) +{ + return 0; +} #endif static int btusb_set_bdaddr_marvell(struct hci_dev *hdev, @@ -3793,6 +3798,11 @@ static int btusb_config_oob_wake(struct hci_dev *hdev) bt_dev_info(hdev, "OOB Wake-on-BT configured at IRQ %u", irq); return 0; } +#else +static inline int btusb_config_oob_wake(struct hci_dev *hdev) +{ + return 0; +} #endif static void btusb_check_needs_reset_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) @@ -4147,7 +4157,6 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, hdev->wakeup = btusb_wakeup; hdev->hci_drv = &btusb_hci_drv; -#ifdef CONFIG_PM err = btusb_config_oob_wake(hdev); if (err) goto out_free_dev; @@ -4156,9 +4165,9 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, if (id->driver_info & BTUSB_MARVELL && data->oob_wake_irq) { err = marvell_config_oob_wake(hdev); if (err) - goto out_free_dev; + goto err_disable_wakeup; } -#endif + if (id->driver_info & BTUSB_CW6622) hci_set_quirk(hdev, HCI_QUIRK_BROKEN_STORED_LINK_KEY); @@ -4401,6 +4410,9 @@ static int btusb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, } err_kill_tx_urbs: usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&data->tx_anchor); +err_disable_wakeup: + if (data->oob_wake_irq) + device_init_wakeup(&data->udev->dev, false); out_free_dev: if (data->reset_gpio) gpiod_put(data->reset_gpio); From ea02df466df60ecd758eb3b4df3f0cadc5c886ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Llamas Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 18:52:30 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 237/607] binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release() commit 114a116aaa5f0295376cdf12da743c5bce3b20ce upstream. When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc, the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired. This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction() and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715 CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c [...] Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s: __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150 binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354 binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c [...] Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294 binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8 binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads the t->to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus, it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc. Cc: stable Fixes: 7a4408c6bd3e ("binder: make sure accesses to proc/thread are safe") Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index a6b3bfe0d9b81..c39af7b63c024 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -1658,7 +1658,11 @@ static void binder_txn_latency_free(struct binder_transaction *t) static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t) { - struct binder_proc *target_proc = t->to_proc; + struct binder_proc *target_proc; + + spin_lock(&t->lock); + target_proc = t->to_proc; + spin_unlock(&t->lock); if (target_proc) { binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc); From 328ccf32acb87e8bbb1fe2b065068c574e4db2bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Llamas Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 18:52:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 238/607] binder: fix UAF in binder_free_transaction() commit f223d27a546c1e1f48d38fd67760e78f068fe8c4 upstream. In binder_free_transaction(), the t->to_proc is read under the t->lock. However, once the t->lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel. This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its inner lock right afterwards: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672 CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320 binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8 binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0 [...] Allocated by task 675: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_open+0x118/0xb70 do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040 vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc [...] Freed by task 212: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0 binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0 [...] ================================================================== To prevent this, pin the target thread (t->to_thread) to guarantee the target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current context in those paths. Cc: stable Reported-by: Alice Ryhl Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aikJKVuny_eOivwN@google.com/ Fixes: a370003cc301 ("binder: fix possible UAF when freeing buffer") Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619185233.2194678-2-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index c39af7b63c024..558164f0918fb 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -1658,10 +1658,19 @@ static void binder_txn_latency_free(struct binder_transaction *t) static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t) { + struct binder_thread *target_thread; struct binder_proc *target_proc; spin_lock(&t->lock); target_proc = t->to_proc; + target_thread = t->to_thread; + /* + * Pin target_thread to keep target_proc alive. Undelivered + * transactions with !target_thread are safe, as target_proc + * can only be the current context there. + */ + if (target_thread) + atomic_inc(&target_thread->tmp_ref); spin_unlock(&t->lock); if (target_proc) { @@ -1676,6 +1685,10 @@ static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t) t->buffer->transaction = NULL; binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc); } + + if (target_thread) + binder_thread_dec_tmpref(target_thread); + if (trace_binder_txn_latency_free_enabled()) binder_txn_latency_free(t); /* From 89b8cc948dce661af87527623b3a41cdd115e2f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunwoo Kim Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 22:29:24 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 239/607] rust_binder: use a u64 stride when cleaning up the offsets array commit 803c8a9502e9b97cd6ae937618ef4a8fd6274343 upstream. Allocation's Drop walks the offsets array (binder_size_t = u64 entries), cleaning up the objects, but it used usize instead of u64 for both the stride and the per-entry read. On 64-bit kernels (usize == u64) this is harmless, but on 32-bit kernels it walks the 8-byte entries in 4-byte steps, iterating an N-entry array 2N times, and reads the always-zero high word as offset 0, cleaning up the object at offset 0 N extra times. As a result the referenced node or handle ends up with a lower reference count than it actually has (a refcount over-decrement), and binder's reference accounting is corrupted; for example, the owner can be notified of a strong reference release (BR_RELEASE) even though references still remain. Change the stride to u64, and read each entry as a u64, narrowing it to usize with try_into(). On 32-bit ARM, when this over-decrement would drive a count below zero, the driver's existing refcount guard refuses it and fires: rust_binder: Failure: refcount underflow! Cc: stable Fixes: eafedbc7c050 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim Acked-by: Carlos Llamas Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ahw3tFhLz9bMMJAO@v4bel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs b/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs index d9113e9b98b2b..a9475e136d76f 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ impl Drop for Allocation { if let Some(offsets) = info.offsets.clone() { let view = AllocationView::new(self, offsets.start); - for i in offsets.step_by(size_of::()) { + for i in offsets.step_by(size_of::()) { if view.cleanup_object(i).is_err() { pr_warn!("Error cleaning up object at offset {}\n", i) } @@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ impl<'a> AllocationView<'a> { } fn cleanup_object(&self, index_offset: usize) -> Result { - let offset = self.alloc.read(index_offset)?; + let offset = self.alloc.read::(index_offset)?; + let offset: usize = offset.try_into().map_err(|_| EINVAL)?; let header = self.read::(offset)?; match header.type_ { BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER | BINDER_TYPE_BINDER => { From 08e21d86d272243d54c6413cb19d1dcefe792272 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keshav Verma Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 16:09:57 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 240/607] rust_binder: reject context manager self-transaction commit 6849cabfd30fb5727cfd31e8241e15801e17ebf9 upstream. Rust binder resolved handle 0 to the context manager node, but it does not reject the case where the caller owns the same node. The C binder driver rejects transactions from the context-manager process to handle 0 after resolving the target node. Match that behavior in Rust Binder by rejecting handle 0 transactions when the resolved context-manager node is owned by the calling process. This applies to both synchronous and oneway transactions because both paths resolve the target through Process::get_transaction_node(). Cc: stable Fixes: eafedbc7c050 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver") Signed-off-by: Keshav Verma Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625103957.730-1-iganschel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder/process.rs | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/process.rs b/drivers/android/binder/process.rs index 5e95aee95347d..b0e9516a5f7c0 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/process.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/process.rs @@ -873,7 +873,11 @@ impl Process { pub(crate) fn get_transaction_node(&self, handle: u32) -> BinderResult { // When handle is zero, try to get the context manager. if handle == 0 { - Ok(self.ctx.get_manager_node(true)?) + let node_ref = self.ctx.get_manager_node(true)?; + if core::ptr::eq(self, &*node_ref.node.owner) { + return Err(EINVAL.into()); + } + Ok(node_ref) } else { Ok(self.get_node_from_handle(handle, true)?) } From 281335996ab21e0849047a9e20cf04aacce990ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Keshav Verma Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 02:47:43 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 241/607] rust_binder: synchronize Rust Binder stats with freeze commands commit eb1645bf10190e71f6f0316e37ff70755d719b53 upstream. Rust Binder stats use BC_COUNT and BR_COUNT to size the command and return counters, and use event string tables when printing debug statistics. The Binder protocol includes freeze-related commands and return codes, but the Rust Binder statistics code was not updated to cover them. As a result, those commands and return codes are not accounted for or printed by the stats debug output. Update the counts and event string tables so these commands and return codes are included in the debug statistics output. Fixes: eafedbc7c050 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver") Cc: stable Acked-by: Carlos Llamas Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Keshav Verma Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260615211743.734-1-iganschel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder/rust_binder_events.c | 7 ++++++- drivers/android/binder/stats.rs | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/rust_binder_events.c b/drivers/android/binder/rust_binder_events.c index 488b1470060cc..5792aa59cc825 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/rust_binder_events.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder/rust_binder_events.c @@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ const char * const binder_command_strings[] = { "BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE", "BC_TRANSACTION_SG", "BC_REPLY_SG", + "BC_REQUEST_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION", + "BC_CLEAR_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION", + "BC_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION_DONE", }; const char * const binder_return_strings[] = { @@ -51,7 +54,9 @@ const char * const binder_return_strings[] = { "BR_FAILED_REPLY", "BR_FROZEN_REPLY", "BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT", - "BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN" + "BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN", + "BR_FROZEN_BINDER", + "BR_CLEAR_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION_DONE", }; #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs b/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs index a83ec111d2cb5..f7ee24dd387a9 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/stats.rs @@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ use crate::defs::*; use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicU32, Ordering::Relaxed}; use kernel::{ioctl::_IOC_NR, seq_file::SeqFile, seq_print}; -const BC_COUNT: usize = _IOC_NR(BC_REPLY_SG) as usize + 1; -const BR_COUNT: usize = _IOC_NR(BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN) as usize + 1; +const BC_COUNT: usize = _IOC_NR(BC_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION_DONE) as usize + 1; +const BR_COUNT: usize = _IOC_NR(BR_CLEAR_FREEZE_NOTIFICATION_DONE) as usize + 1; pub(crate) static GLOBAL_STATS: BinderStats = BinderStats::new(); From 91b27f8172cdbf265240104772fd042a461a7767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alice Ryhl Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 11:25:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 242/607] rust_binder: clear freeze listener on node removal commit bc4a9828897871ff3e5a1f8a1d346decbf4ee95e upstream. Generally userspace is supposed to explicitly clear freeze listeners before they drop the refcount on the node ref to zero, but there's nothing forcing that. Currently, in this scenario the freeze listener remains in the freeze_listeners rbtree and in the remote node's freeze listener list, even though the ref for which the listener is registered is gone. This could potentially lead to a memory leak due to a refcount cycle. Thus, remove the freeze listener in this scenario. Cc: stable Fixes: eafedbc7c050 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver") Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703-remove-freeze-on-remove-node-v3-1-6e0c4547af46@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder/freeze.rs | 11 +++++++++-- drivers/android/binder/node.rs | 10 ++++++---- drivers/android/binder/process.rs | 12 +++++++++++- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/freeze.rs b/drivers/android/binder/freeze.rs index 220de35ae85ac..e3b7aba2279f8 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/freeze.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/freeze.rs @@ -154,10 +154,17 @@ impl DeliverToRead for FreezeMessage { } impl FreezeListener { - pub(crate) fn on_process_exit(&self, proc: &Arc) { + /// Called when this freeze listener is cleared abnormally. + /// + /// This occurs either because the process exited or because the process dropped its last + /// refcount on the node ref without explicitly removing the freeze listener first. + /// + /// The returned `KVVec` is just a value that should be dropped outside of the lock. + pub(crate) fn on_process_cleanup(&self, proc: &Process) -> KVVec> { if !self.is_clearing { - self.node.remove_freeze_listener(proc); + return self.node.remove_freeze_listener(proc); } + KVVec::new() } } diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/node.rs b/drivers/android/binder/node.rs index c26d113ede966..b76ecff80f911 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/node.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/node.rs @@ -674,12 +674,13 @@ impl Node { } } - pub(crate) fn remove_freeze_listener(&self, p: &Arc) { - let _unused_capacity; + pub(crate) fn remove_freeze_listener(&self, p: &Process) -> KVVec> { let mut guard = self.owner.inner.lock(); let inner = self.inner.access_mut(&mut guard); let len = inner.freeze_list.len(); - inner.freeze_list.retain(|proc| !Arc::ptr_eq(proc, p)); + inner + .freeze_list + .retain(|proc| !core::ptr::eq::(&**proc, p)); if len == inner.freeze_list.len() { pr_warn!( "Could not remove freeze listener for {}\n", @@ -687,8 +688,9 @@ impl Node { ); } if inner.freeze_list.is_empty() { - _unused_capacity = mem::take(&mut inner.freeze_list); + return mem::take(&mut inner.freeze_list); } + KVVec::new() } pub(crate) fn freeze_list<'a>(&'a self, guard: &'a ProcessInner) -> &'a [Arc] { diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/process.rs b/drivers/android/binder/process.rs index b0e9516a5f7c0..8ccc9ffbcd90e 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/process.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/process.rs @@ -919,6 +919,8 @@ impl Process { // To preserve original binder behaviour, we only fail requests where the manager tries to // increment references on itself. + let _to_free_freeze_listener; + let _to_free_freeze_listener_cleanup; let mut refs = self.node_refs.lock(); if let Some(info) = refs.by_handle.get_mut(&handle) { if info.node_ref().update(inc, strong) { @@ -934,6 +936,14 @@ impl Process { unsafe { info.node_ref2().node.remove_node_info(info) }; let id = info.node_ref().node.global_id(); + + if let Some(freeze) = *info.freeze() { + if let Some(fl) = refs.freeze_listeners.remove(&freeze) { + _to_free_freeze_listener_cleanup = fl.on_process_cleanup(&self); + _to_free_freeze_listener = fl; + } + } + refs.by_handle.remove(&handle); refs.by_node.remove(&id); } @@ -1348,7 +1358,7 @@ impl Process { // Clean up freeze listeners. let freeze_listeners = take(&mut self.node_refs.lock().freeze_listeners); for listener in freeze_listeners.values() { - listener.on_process_exit(&self); + listener.on_process_cleanup(&self); } drop(freeze_listeners); From f90586129cf9e1fbdb718ef602eea3f15dc1c31c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=E8=83=A1=E8=BF=9E=E5=8B=A4?= Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 17:40:33 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 243/607] usb: xhci: Fix sleep in atomic context in xhci_free_streams() commit 42c37c4b75d38b51d84f31a8e29427f5e06a7c2a upstream. When a USB device with active stream endpoints is disconnected, xhci_free_streams() is called from the hub_event workqueue to free the stream resources. It calls xhci_free_stream_info() while holding xhci->lock with irqs disabled. xhci_free_stream_info() invokes xhci_free_stream_ctx(), which calls dma_free_coherent() for large stream context arrays. dma_free_coherent() can sleep (e.g. via vunmap), triggering a BUG when called from atomic context. Call trace: dma_free_attrs+0x174/0x220 xhci_free_stream_info+0xd0/0x11c xhci_free_streams+0x278/0x37c usb_free_streams+0x98/0xc0 usb_unbind_interface+0x1b8/0x2f8 device_release_driver_internal+0x1d4/0x2cc device_release_driver+0x18/0x28 bus_remove_device+0x160/0x1a4 device_del+0x1ec/0x350 usb_disable_device+0x98/0x214 usb_disconnect+0xf0/0x35c hub_event+0xab4/0x19ec process_one_work+0x278/0x63c Fix this by saving the stream_info pointers and clearing the ep references under the lock, then calling xhci_free_stream_info() outside the lock where sleeping is allowed. Fixes: 8df75f42f8e6 ("USB: xhci: Add memory allocation for USB3 bulk streams.") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Lianqin Hu Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703144033.483286-3-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/host/xhci.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c index a8dee373a485e..a06758addbf82 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci.c @@ -3774,6 +3774,7 @@ static int xhci_free_streams(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct usb_device *udev, struct xhci_virt_device *vdev; struct xhci_command *command; struct xhci_input_control_ctx *ctrl_ctx; + struct xhci_stream_info *stream_info[EP_CTX_PER_DEV]; unsigned int ep_index; unsigned long flags; u32 changed_ep_bitmask; @@ -3834,10 +3835,15 @@ static int xhci_free_streams(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct usb_device *udev, if (ret < 0) return ret; + /* + * dma_free_coherent() called by xhci_free_stream_info() may sleep, + * so save stream_info pointers and clear references under lock, + * then free the memory outside lock. + */ spin_lock_irqsave(&xhci->lock, flags); for (i = 0; i < num_eps; i++) { ep_index = xhci_get_endpoint_index(&eps[i]->desc); - xhci_free_stream_info(xhci, vdev->eps[ep_index].stream_info); + stream_info[i] = vdev->eps[ep_index].stream_info; vdev->eps[ep_index].stream_info = NULL; /* FIXME Unset maxPstreams in endpoint context and * update deq ptr to point to normal string ring. @@ -3847,6 +3853,9 @@ static int xhci_free_streams(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct usb_device *udev, } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&xhci->lock, flags); + for (i = 0; i < num_eps; i++) + xhci_free_stream_info(xhci, stream_info[i]); + return 0; } From 99d00a9e35e311a91d258029d5bb584377296c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Rao Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 17:40:32 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 244/607] xhci: sideband: fix ring sg table pages leak commit 49f6e3c3ef19f04f6657ed8dce550e36c763abb8 upstream. xhci_ring_to_sgtable() allocates a temporary pages array and uses it to build the returned sg_table with sg_alloc_table_from_pages(). The error paths free the pages array, but the success path returns the sg_table without freeing it. This leaks the temporary array every time a sideband client gets an endpoint or event ring buffer. Free the pages array after sg_alloc_table_from_pages() succeeds. The returned sg_table has its own scatterlist entries and does not depend on the temporary array after construction. Fixes: de66754e9f80 ("xhci: sideband: add initial api to register a secondary interrupter entity") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Xu Rao Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703144033.483286-2-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-sideband.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-sideband.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-sideband.c index 6519736061376..ceca614d3a662 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-sideband.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-sideband.c @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ xhci_ring_to_sgtable(struct xhci_sideband *sb, struct xhci_ring *ring) if (sg_alloc_table_from_pages(sgt, pages, n_pages, 0, sz, GFP_KERNEL)) goto err; + kvfree(pages); + /* * Save first segment dma address to sg dma_address field for the sideband * client to have access to the IOVA of the ring. From e5406c8fb71cd2f89a46300a746f6e7972e621e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Myeonghun Pak Date: Mon, 6 Jul 2026 23:53:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 245/607] usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: unregister TCPCI port with devres commit e8da46d99d3710106e7c44db14566bf9b57386b5 upstream. rt1711h_probe() registers the TCPCI port before requesting the interrupt and enabling alert interrupts. If either of those later steps fails, the probe function returns without unregistering the TCPCI port. The explicit unregister currently only happens from the remove callback. Register a devres action immediately after tcpci_register_port() succeeds, so tcpci_unregister_port() runs on later probe failures and on driver detach. Drop the remove callback to avoid unregistering the same port twice. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. Fixes: 302c570bf36e ("usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: avoid screaming irq causing boot hangs") Cc: stable Co-developed-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Myeonghun Pak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260706145312.37260-1-mhun512@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_rt1711h.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_rt1711h.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_rt1711h.c index 88c50b984e8a3..cd74cb9350fa7 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_rt1711h.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpci_rt1711h.c @@ -330,6 +330,8 @@ static int rt1711h_check_revision(struct i2c_client *i2c, struct rt1711h_chip *c return ret; } +static void rt1711h_unregister_tcpci_port(void *tcpci); + static int rt1711h_probe(struct i2c_client *client) { int ret; @@ -381,6 +383,10 @@ static int rt1711h_probe(struct i2c_client *client) if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(chip->tcpci)) return PTR_ERR(chip->tcpci); + ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(chip->dev, rt1711h_unregister_tcpci_port, chip->tcpci); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = devm_request_threaded_irq(chip->dev, client->irq, NULL, rt1711h_irq, IRQF_ONESHOT | IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW, @@ -398,11 +404,9 @@ static int rt1711h_probe(struct i2c_client *client) return 0; } -static void rt1711h_remove(struct i2c_client *client) +static void rt1711h_unregister_tcpci_port(void *tcpci) { - struct rt1711h_chip *chip = i2c_get_clientdata(client); - - tcpci_unregister_port(chip->tcpci); + tcpci_unregister_port(tcpci); } static const struct rt1711h_chip_info rt1711h = { @@ -435,7 +439,6 @@ static struct i2c_driver rt1711h_i2c_driver = { .of_match_table = rt1711h_of_match, }, .probe = rt1711h_probe, - .remove = rt1711h_remove, .id_table = rt1711h_id, }; module_i2c_driver(rt1711h_i2c_driver); From d666c5aec822d42e8a26dce29eddfdf6d154b169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ziyao Li Date: Sun, 12 Apr 2026 18:17:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 246/607] PCI: loongson: Override PCIe bridge supported speeds for Loongson-3C6000 series commit e373c789bac0ad73b472d8b44714df3bd18a4edf upstream. Older steppings of the Loongson-3C6000 series incorrectly report the supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 0x3c19, 0x3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. As a result, since commit 774c71c52aa4 ("PCI/bwctrl: Enable only if more than one speed is supported"), bwctrl will be disabled if there's only one 2.5 GT/s value in vector 'supported_speeds'. Manually override the 'supported_speeds' field for affected PCIe bridges with those found on the upstream bus to correctly reflect the supported link speeds. Updating the speeds to reflect what the hardware actually supports avoids quirks in drivers consuming the speed information. This commit was originally found from AOSC OS[1]. Fixes: cd89edda4002 ("PCI: loongson: Add ACPI init support") Signed-off-by: Ayden Meng Signed-off-by: Mingcong Bai [Ziyao Li: move from drivers/pci/quirks.c to drivers/pci/controller/pci-loongson.c] Signed-off-by: Ziyao Li [Xi Ruoyao: Fixed falling through logic, added debug log, Fixes tag and rebased to 7.0-rc7] Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam [bhelgaas: commit log, https://lore.kernel.org/all/9d815df3b33a63223112b97440c01247935363c1.camel@xry111.site] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Tested-by: Lain Fearyncess Yang Tested-by: Ayden Meng Tested-by: Mingcong Bai Reviewed-by: Huacai Chen Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/AOSC-Tracking/linux/commit/4392f441363abdf6fa0a0433d73175a17f493454 Link: https://github.com/AOSC-Tracking/linux/pull/2 #1 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260412101731.107059-1-xry111@xry111.site Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-loongson.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-loongson.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-loongson.c index bc630ab8a2831..9609e6f50b981 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-loongson.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-loongson.c @@ -176,6 +176,42 @@ static void loongson_pci_msi_quirk(struct pci_dev *dev) } DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_FINAL(PCI_VENDOR_ID_LOONGSON, DEV_LS7A_PCIE_PORT5, loongson_pci_msi_quirk); +/* + * Older steppings of the Loongson-3C6000 series incorrectly report the + * supported link speeds on their PCIe bridges (device IDs 0x3c19, + * 0x3c29) as only 2.5 GT/s, despite the upstream bus supporting speeds + * from 2.5 GT/s up to 16 GT/s. + */ +static void loongson_pci_bridge_speed_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + u8 old_supported_speeds = pdev->supported_speeds; + + switch (pdev->bus->max_bus_speed) { + case PCIE_SPEED_16_0GT: + pdev->supported_speeds |= PCI_EXP_LNKCAP2_SLS_16_0GB; + fallthrough; + case PCIE_SPEED_8_0GT: + pdev->supported_speeds |= PCI_EXP_LNKCAP2_SLS_8_0GB; + fallthrough; + case PCIE_SPEED_5_0GT: + pdev->supported_speeds |= PCI_EXP_LNKCAP2_SLS_5_0GB; + fallthrough; + case PCIE_SPEED_2_5GT: + pdev->supported_speeds |= PCI_EXP_LNKCAP2_SLS_2_5GB; + break; + default: + pci_warn(pdev, "unexpected max bus speed"); + + return; + } + + if (pdev->supported_speeds != old_supported_speeds) + pci_info(pdev, "fixed up supported link speeds: 0x%x => 0x%x", + old_supported_speeds, pdev->supported_speeds); +} +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_LOONGSON, 0x3c19, loongson_pci_bridge_speed_quirk); +DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_LOONGSON, 0x3c29, loongson_pci_bridge_speed_quirk); + static struct loongson_pci *pci_bus_to_loongson_pci(struct pci_bus *bus) { struct pci_config_window *cfg; From 5e42a981887d24580c19bee1ba99a5292e572713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mahesh Vaidya Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 13:43:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 247/607] PCI: altera: Do not dispose parent IRQ mapping commit 5ef4bac02189bee0b7c170e352d7a38e13fe9678 upstream. altera_pcie_irq_teardown() calls irq_dispose_mapping() on pcie->irq. However, pcie->irq is the parent IRQ returned by platform_get_irq(), not the mapping created by Altera INTx irq_domain. The Altera driver only sets the chained handler on the parent IRQ. It should detach that handler during teardown, but it should not dispose the parent IRQ mapping, which belongs to the parent interrupt controller's irq_domain. Drop irq_dispose_mapping(pcie->irq) from the teardown path. Note that during irqchip remove(), the child IRQs should've disposed. But since the chained handler itself is removed, there is no way the stale child IRQs (if exists) could fire. So it is safe here. Fixes: ec15c4d0d5d2 ("PCI: altera: Allow building as module") Signed-off-by: Mahesh Vaidya [mani: added a note about IRQ disposal] Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Reviewed-by: Subhransu S. Prusty Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260430204330.3121003-2-mahesh.vaidya@altera.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c index 3dbb7adc421c4..3d3519b8d88f0 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c @@ -868,7 +868,6 @@ static void altera_pcie_irq_teardown(struct altera_pcie *pcie) { irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(pcie->irq, NULL, NULL); irq_domain_remove(pcie->irq_domain); - irq_dispose_mapping(pcie->irq); } static int altera_pcie_parse_dt(struct altera_pcie *pcie) From 09c43b7b7d29c6fadb27f32cdf7f3bb6598befa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mahesh Vaidya Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 13:43:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 248/607] PCI: altera: Fix resource leaks on probe failure commit 7a94138caeb27f3c49c1dbd93bf422098925bb28 upstream. The chained IRQ handler is set during probe, but is only removed during the driver remove(). If pci_host_probe() fails, the handler and INTx IRQ domain remain set even though the devm-managed host bridge storage containing struct altera_pcie will be released, leaving the handler with a stale data pointer. Interrupts are also enabled before pci_host_probe() is called. If probe fails after that point, the controller interrupt source should be disabled before the chained handler and INTx domain are removed. So set the chained handler only after the INTx domain has been created. Disable controller interrupts during IRQ teardown, and tear the IRQ setup down if pci_host_probe() fails. Fixes: c63aed7334c2 ("PCI: altera: Use pci_host_probe() to register host") Signed-off-by: Mahesh Vaidya [mani: commit log] Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Reviewed-by: Subhransu S. Prusty Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260430204330.3121003-3-mahesh.vaidya@altera.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c index 3d3519b8d88f0..76f3823d96139 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-altera.c @@ -864,8 +864,23 @@ static int altera_pcie_init_irq_domain(struct altera_pcie *pcie) return 0; } +static void altera_pcie_disable_irq(struct altera_pcie *pcie) +{ + if (pcie->pcie_data->version == ALTERA_PCIE_V1 || + pcie->pcie_data->version == ALTERA_PCIE_V2) { + /* Disable all P2A interrupts */ + cra_writel(pcie, 0, P2A_INT_ENABLE); + } else if (pcie->pcie_data->version == ALTERA_PCIE_V3) { + /* Disable port-level interrupts (CFG_AER, etc.) */ + writel(0, pcie->hip_base + + pcie->pcie_data->port_conf_offset + + pcie->pcie_data->port_irq_enable_offset); + } +} + static void altera_pcie_irq_teardown(struct altera_pcie *pcie) { + altera_pcie_disable_irq(pcie); irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(pcie->irq, NULL, NULL); irq_domain_remove(pcie->irq_domain); } @@ -890,7 +905,6 @@ static int altera_pcie_parse_dt(struct altera_pcie *pcie) if (pcie->irq < 0) return pcie->irq; - irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(pcie->irq, pcie->pcie_data->ops->rp_isr, pcie); return 0; } @@ -1019,6 +1033,14 @@ static int altera_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return ret; } + /* + * The chained handler uses pcie->irq_domain, so set it only after the + * INTx domain has been created. + */ + irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(pcie->irq, + pcie->pcie_data->ops->rp_isr, + pcie); + if (pcie->pcie_data->version == ALTERA_PCIE_V1 || pcie->pcie_data->version == ALTERA_PCIE_V2) { /* clear all interrupts */ @@ -1036,7 +1058,16 @@ static int altera_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) bridge->busnr = pcie->root_bus_nr; bridge->ops = &altera_pcie_ops; - return pci_host_probe(bridge); + ret = pci_host_probe(bridge); + if (ret) + goto err_teardown_irq; + + return 0; + +err_teardown_irq: + altera_pcie_irq_teardown(pcie); + + return ret; } static void altera_pcie_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) From 9c698af5c2a12035d093244ca37e3c0971fd05e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Maciej W. Rozycki" Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2025 19:24:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 249/607] PCI: Always lift 2.5GT/s restriction in PCIe failed link retraining commit 72780f7964684939d7d2f69c348876213b184484 upstream. Discard Vendor:Device ID matching in the PCIe failed link retraining quirk and ignore the link status for the removal of the 2.5GT/s speed clamp, whether applied by the quirk itself or the firmware earlier on. Revert to the original target link speed if this final link retraining has failed. This is so that link training noise in hot-plug scenarios does not make a link remain clamped to the 2.5GT/s speed where an event race has led the quirk to apply the speed clamp for one device, only to leave it in place for a subsequent device to be plugged in. Refer to the Link Capabilities register directly for the maximum link speed determination so as to streamline backporting. Fixes: a89c82249c37 ("PCI: Work around PCIe link training failures") Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Tested-by: Alok Tiwari Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/alpine.DEB.2.21.2512080331530.49654@angie.orcam.me.uk Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/quirks.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c index d32a47e81fcf3..f6001be94955e 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c @@ -79,11 +79,10 @@ static bool pcie_lbms_seen(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 lnksta) * Restrict the speed to 2.5GT/s then with the Target Link Speed field, * request a retrain and check the result. * - * If this turns out successful and we know by the Vendor:Device ID it is - * safe to do so, then lift the restriction, letting the devices negotiate - * a higher speed. Also check for a similar 2.5GT/s speed restriction the - * firmware may have already arranged and lift it with ports that already - * report their data link being up. + * If this turns out successful, or where a 2.5GT/s speed restriction has + * been previously arranged by the firmware and the port reports its link + * already being up, lift the restriction, in a hope it is safe to do so, + * letting the devices negotiate a higher speed. * * Otherwise revert the speed to the original setting and request a retrain * again to remove any residual state, ignoring the result as it's supposed @@ -94,51 +93,37 @@ static bool pcie_lbms_seen(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 lnksta) */ int pcie_failed_link_retrain(struct pci_dev *dev) { - static const struct pci_device_id ids[] = { - { PCI_VDEVICE(ASMEDIA, 0x2824) }, /* ASMedia ASM2824 */ - {} - }; - u16 lnksta, lnkctl2; + u16 lnksta, lnkctl2, oldlnkctl2; int ret = -ENOTTY; + u32 lnkcap; if (!pci_is_pcie(dev) || !pcie_downstream_port(dev) || !pcie_cap_has_lnkctl2(dev) || !dev->link_active_reporting) return ret; pcie_capability_read_word(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKSTA, &lnksta); + pcie_capability_read_word(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2, &oldlnkctl2); if (!(lnksta & PCI_EXP_LNKSTA_DLLLA) && pcie_lbms_seen(dev, lnksta)) { - u16 oldlnkctl2; - pci_info(dev, "broken device, retraining non-functional downstream link at 2.5GT/s\n"); - - pcie_capability_read_word(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2, &oldlnkctl2); ret = pcie_set_target_speed(dev, PCIE_SPEED_2_5GT, false); - if (ret) { - pci_info(dev, "retraining failed\n"); - pcie_set_target_speed(dev, PCIE_LNKCTL2_TLS2SPEED(oldlnkctl2), - true); - return ret; - } - - pcie_capability_read_word(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKSTA, &lnksta); + if (ret) + goto err; } pcie_capability_read_word(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2, &lnkctl2); - - if ((lnksta & PCI_EXP_LNKSTA_DLLLA) && - (lnkctl2 & PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2_TLS) == PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2_TLS_2_5GT && - pci_match_id(ids, dev)) { - u32 lnkcap; - + pcie_capability_read_dword(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCAP, &lnkcap); + if ((lnkctl2 & PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2_TLS) == PCI_EXP_LNKCTL2_TLS_2_5GT && + (lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS) != PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_2_5GB) { pci_info(dev, "removing 2.5GT/s downstream link speed restriction\n"); - pcie_capability_read_dword(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCAP, &lnkcap); ret = pcie_set_target_speed(dev, PCIE_LNKCAP_SLS2SPEED(lnkcap), false); - if (ret) { - pci_info(dev, "retraining failed\n"); - return ret; - } + if (ret) + goto err; } + return ret; +err: + pci_info(dev, "retraining failed\n"); + pcie_set_target_speed(dev, PCIE_LNKCTL2_TLS2SPEED(oldlnkctl2), true); return ret; } From 1d2e66a4bc0dd6c1f6f2f28247450e4d4ce7f5ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ratheesh Kannoth Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 13:47:30 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 250/607] PCI: host-common: Request bus reassignment when not probe-only commit fda8749ba73638f5bbca3ffb39bc6861eb3b23fa upstream. pci_host_common_init() is used by several generic ECAM host drivers. After PCI core changes around pci_flags and preserve_config, these hosts no longer opted into full bus number reassignment the way they did before, which broke enumeration of devices on a Marvell CN106XX board. When PCI_PROBE_ONLY is not set, add PCI_REASSIGN_ALL_BUS so pci_scan_bridge_extend() takes the reassignment path: bus numbers can be assigned from firmware EA data (e.g. pci_ea_fixed_busnrs()). Skip the flag in probe-only mode so existing assignments are not overridden. Fixes: 7246a4520b4b ("PCI: Use preserve_config in place of pci_flags") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/abkqm_LCd9zAM8cW@rkannoth-OptiPlex-7090/ Signed-off-by: Ratheesh Kannoth [mani: added stable tag] Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam [bhelgaas: add problem report link] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vidya Sagar Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414081730.3864372-1-rkannoth@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pci-host-common.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-host-common.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-host-common.c index 810d1c8de24e9..422c2c4600173 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-host-common.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-host-common.c @@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ int pci_host_common_init(struct platform_device *pdev, if (IS_ERR(cfg)) return PTR_ERR(cfg); + /* Do not reassign bus numbers if probe only */ + if (!pci_has_flag(PCI_PROBE_ONLY)) + pci_add_flags(PCI_REASSIGN_ALL_BUS); + bridge->sysdata = cfg; bridge->ops = (struct pci_ops *)&ops->pci_ops; bridge->enable_device = ops->enable_device; From 69416a5308675ab6d4e22a83f14048a5cc02e9bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Zhu Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 17:08:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 251/607] PCI: imx6: Fix IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN handling commit aad953fb4eed0df5486cd54ccad80ac197678e01 upstream. The IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN bit does not control the PCIe reference clock on i.MX6SX. Instead, it is part of i.MX6SX PCIe core reset sequence. Move the IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN assertion/deassertion into the core reset functions to properly reflect its purpose. Remove the .enable_ref_clk() callback for i.MX6SX since it was incorrectly manipulating this bit. Fixes: e3c06cd063d6 ("PCI: imx6: Add initial imx6sx support") Signed-off-by: Richard Zhu Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Frank Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260319090844.444987-1-hongxing.zhu@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c | 12 +++--------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c index 9083658a4287f..d7de9790fe9fd 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c @@ -659,14 +659,6 @@ static int imx_pcie_attach_pd(struct device *dev) return 0; } -static int imx6sx_pcie_enable_ref_clk(struct imx_pcie *imx_pcie, bool enable) -{ - regmap_update_bits(imx_pcie->iomuxc_gpr, IOMUXC_GPR12, - IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN, - enable ? 0 : IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN); - return 0; -} - static int imx6q_pcie_enable_ref_clk(struct imx_pcie *imx_pcie, bool enable) { if (enable) { @@ -765,6 +757,9 @@ static int imx6sx_pcie_core_reset(struct imx_pcie *imx_pcie, bool assert) if (assert) regmap_set_bits(imx_pcie->iomuxc_gpr, IOMUXC_GPR12, IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN); + else + regmap_clear_bits(imx_pcie->iomuxc_gpr, IOMUXC_GPR12, + IMX6SX_GPR12_PCIE_TEST_POWERDOWN); /* Force PCIe PHY reset */ regmap_update_bits(imx_pcie->iomuxc_gpr, IOMUXC_GPR5, IMX6SX_GPR5_PCIE_BTNRST_RESET, @@ -1852,7 +1847,6 @@ static const struct imx_pcie_drvdata drvdata[] = { .mode_off[0] = IOMUXC_GPR12, .mode_mask[0] = IMX6Q_GPR12_DEVICE_TYPE, .init_phy = imx6sx_pcie_init_phy, - .enable_ref_clk = imx6sx_pcie_enable_ref_clk, .core_reset = imx6sx_pcie_core_reset, .ops = &imx_pcie_host_ops, }, From 6e6a529d6f779413379b4404c9ef6a36c0337225 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manivannan Sadhasivam Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 23:16:17 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 252/607] PCI: mediatek: Fix IRQ domain leak when port fails to enable commit f865a57896bd92d7662eb2818d8f48872e2cbbc7 upstream. When mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails, mtk_pcie_port_free() removes the port from pcie->ports and frees the port structure. However, the IRQ domains set up earlier by mtk_pcie_init_irq_domain() are never freed. Fix this by refactoring mtk_pcie_irq_teardown() into a per-port helper, mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(), and calling it from mtk_pcie_setup() when mtk_pcie_enable_port() fails. Since the IRQ teardown must only happen in the probe error path (during resume, child devices may have active MSI mappings and the NOIRQ context prohibits sleeping locks), mtk_pcie_enable_port() is changed to return an error code so callers can distinguish the two paths and act accordingly. This issue was reported by Sashiko while reviewing the EcoNet EN7528 SoC support series. Fixes: b099631df160 ("PCI: mediatek: Add controller support for MT2712 and MT7622") Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10 Cc: Caleb James DeLisle Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521174617.17692-1-mani@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c index e0bf667c2b4c6..d779baf1ae6d8 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pcie-mediatek.c @@ -519,23 +519,27 @@ static void mtk_pcie_enable_msi(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) writel(val, port->base + PCIE_INT_MASK); } -static void mtk_pcie_irq_teardown(struct mtk_pcie *pcie) +static void mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) { - struct mtk_pcie_port *port, *tmp; + irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(port->irq, NULL, NULL); - list_for_each_entry_safe(port, tmp, &pcie->ports, list) { - irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(port->irq, NULL, NULL); + if (port->irq_domain) + irq_domain_remove(port->irq_domain); - if (port->irq_domain) - irq_domain_remove(port->irq_domain); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_MSI)) { + if (port->inner_domain) + irq_domain_remove(port->inner_domain); + } - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI_MSI)) { - if (port->inner_domain) - irq_domain_remove(port->inner_domain); - } + irq_dispose_mapping(port->irq); +} - irq_dispose_mapping(port->irq); - } +static void mtk_pcie_irq_teardown(struct mtk_pcie *pcie) +{ + struct mtk_pcie_port *port, *tmp; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(port, tmp, &pcie->ports, list) + mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(port); } static int mtk_pcie_intx_map(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int irq, @@ -823,7 +827,7 @@ static int mtk_pcie_startup_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) return 0; } -static void mtk_pcie_enable_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) +static int mtk_pcie_enable_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) { struct mtk_pcie *pcie = port->pcie; struct device *dev = pcie->dev; @@ -832,7 +836,7 @@ static void mtk_pcie_enable_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) err = clk_prepare_enable(port->sys_ck); if (err) { dev_err(dev, "failed to enable sys_ck%d clock\n", port->slot); - goto err_sys_clk; + return err; } err = clk_prepare_enable(port->ahb_ck); @@ -880,11 +884,15 @@ static void mtk_pcie_enable_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) goto err_phy_on; } - if (!pcie->soc->startup(port)) - return; + err = pcie->soc->startup(port); + if (err) { + dev_info(dev, "Port%d link down\n", port->slot); + goto err_soc_startup; + } - dev_info(dev, "Port%d link down\n", port->slot); + return 0; +err_soc_startup: phy_power_off(port->phy); err_phy_on: phy_exit(port->phy); @@ -900,8 +908,8 @@ static void mtk_pcie_enable_port(struct mtk_pcie_port *port) clk_disable_unprepare(port->ahb_ck); err_ahb_clk: clk_disable_unprepare(port->sys_ck); -err_sys_clk: - mtk_pcie_port_free(port); + + return err; } static int mtk_pcie_parse_port(struct mtk_pcie *pcie, @@ -1067,8 +1075,13 @@ static int mtk_pcie_setup(struct mtk_pcie *pcie) return err; /* enable each port, and then check link status */ - list_for_each_entry_safe(port, tmp, &pcie->ports, list) - mtk_pcie_enable_port(port); + list_for_each_entry_safe(port, tmp, &pcie->ports, list) { + err = mtk_pcie_enable_port(port); + if (err) { + mtk_pcie_irq_teardown_port(port); + mtk_pcie_port_free(port); + } + } /* power down PCIe subsys if slots are all empty (link down) */ if (list_empty(&pcie->ports)) @@ -1167,14 +1180,18 @@ static int mtk_pcie_resume_noirq(struct device *dev) { struct mtk_pcie *pcie = dev_get_drvdata(dev); struct mtk_pcie_port *port, *tmp; + int err; if (list_empty(&pcie->ports)) return 0; clk_prepare_enable(pcie->free_ck); - list_for_each_entry_safe(port, tmp, &pcie->ports, list) - mtk_pcie_enable_port(port); + list_for_each_entry_safe(port, tmp, &pcie->ports, list) { + err = mtk_pcie_enable_port(port); + if (err) + mtk_pcie_port_free(port); + } /* In case of EP was removed while system suspend. */ if (list_empty(&pcie->ports)) From 1115680bca1d748ce887ec4b0ad1012714231479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yadu M G Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 17:54:18 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 253/607] PCI: qcom: Initialize DWC MSI lock for firmware-managed ECAM hosts commit e0779713a1e2f891aeec53e629dbbd33f423c629 upstream. A lockdep warning is observed during boot on a Qcom firmware-managed platform: INFO: trying to register non-static key. The code is fine but needs lockdep annotation, or maybe you didn't initialize this object before use? turning off the locking correctness validator. ... Call trace: register_lock_class+0x128/0x4d8 __lock_acquire+0x110/0x1db0 lock_acquire+0x278/0x3d8 _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x6c/0xc0 dw_pcie_irq_domain_alloc+0x48/0x190 irq_domain_alloc_irqs_parent+0x2c/0x48 msi_domain_alloc+0x90/0x160 ... dw_pcie_irq_domain_alloc() takes pp->lock while allocating MSI interrupts. pp->lock is normally initialized by dw_pcie_host_init(), but Qcom firmware-managed hosts use the ECAM init path instead: pci_host_common_ecam_create() pci_ecam_create() qcom_pcie_ecam_host_init() dw_pcie_msi_host_init() dw_pcie_allocate_domains() That path constructs a fresh struct dw_pcie_rp and calls dw_pcie_msi_host_init() directly, without going through dw_pcie_host_init(). As a result, pp->lock was not initialized, which triggers the warning. Initialize pp->lock in qcom_pcie_ecam_host_init() before registering the MSI domains so the firmware-managed ECAM path matches the normal DWC host initialization sequence. Fixes: 7d944c0f1469 ("PCI: qcom: Add support for Qualcomm SA8255p based PCIe Root Complex") Signed-off-by: Yadu M G [mani: added fixes tag and CCed stable] Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604122418.727274-1-yadu.mg@oss.qualcomm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c index 789cc0e3c10da..a70911a956753 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-qcom.c @@ -1626,6 +1626,12 @@ static int qcom_pcie_ecam_host_init(struct pci_config_window *cfg) pci->dbi_base = cfg->win; pp->num_vectors = MSI_DEF_NUM_VECTORS; + /* + * dw_pcie_msi_host_init() is called directly here, bypassing + * dw_pcie_host_init() where pp->lock is normally initialized. + */ + raw_spin_lock_init(&pp->lock); + ret = dw_pcie_msi_host_init(pp); if (ret) return ret; From b77524621250407386f44c6eea7e5e4619ada1ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marco Nenciarini Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2026 15:24:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 254/607] PCI/IOV: Skip VF Resizable BAR restore on read error commit f34f1712229d71ce4286440fef12526fd4590b37 upstream. sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() uses the VF Resizable BAR Control register to decide how many VF BARs to restore (nbars) and which VF BAR each iteration addresses (bar_idx). bar_idx indexes into dev->sriov->barsz[], which has only PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS (6) entries. When a device does not respond, config reads typically return PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE (~0). Both fields are 3 bits wide, so nbars and bar_idx both evaluate to 7. The barsz[] access then goes out of bounds. UBSAN reports this as: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/pci/iov.c:948:51 index 7 is out of range for type 'resource_size_t [6]' Observed on an NVIDIA RTX PRO 1000 GPU (GB207GLM) that stopped responding during a failed GC6 power state exit. The subsequent pci_restore_state() invoked sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() while config reads returned 0xffffffff, triggering the splat. Bail out if any VF Resizable BAR Control read returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE. No further VF BARs are touched, which is safe because a config read that returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE indicates the device is unreachable and restoration is pointless. This mirrors the guard in pci_restore_rebar_state(). Fixes: 5a8f77e24a30 ("PCI/IOV: Restore VF resizable BAR state after reset") Signed-off-by: Marco Nenciarini Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/44a4ae53ec2825816b816c85cd378430d9a95cc6.1776429882.git.mnencia@kcore.it Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/iov.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/iov.c b/drivers/pci/iov.c index c6dc1b44bf602..8bda4e202f56d 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/iov.c +++ b/drivers/pci/iov.c @@ -938,12 +938,18 @@ static void sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state(struct pci_dev *dev) return; pci_read_config_dword(dev, pos + PCI_VF_REBAR_CTRL, &ctrl); + if (PCI_POSSIBLE_ERROR(ctrl)) + return; + nbars = FIELD_GET(PCI_VF_REBAR_CTRL_NBAR_MASK, ctrl); for (i = 0; i < nbars; i++, pos += 8) { int bar_idx, size; pci_read_config_dword(dev, pos + PCI_VF_REBAR_CTRL, &ctrl); + if (PCI_POSSIBLE_ERROR(ctrl)) + return; + bar_idx = FIELD_GET(PCI_VF_REBAR_CTRL_BAR_IDX, ctrl); size = pci_rebar_bytes_to_size(dev->sriov->barsz[bar_idx]); ctrl &= ~PCI_VF_REBAR_CTRL_BAR_SIZE; From 657646c08c94ef7b9dbe468fe7828032216f9841 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 19:21:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 255/607] tcp: restore RCU grace period in tcp_ao_destroy_sock commit 8bc4d43bccbd60efe85d0a44d5bf41762f2f0c30 upstream. Commit 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU") removed the call_rcu() callback from tcp_ao_destroy_sock(), arguing that "the destruction of info/keys is delayed until the socket destructor" and therefore "no one can discover it anymore". That argument does not hold for the call site in tcp_connect() (net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4327-4332). At that point the socket is in TCP_SYN_SENT, has already been inserted into the inet ehash by inet_hash_connect() in tcp_v4_connect(), and is therefore very much discoverable: any softirq running tcp_v4_rcv() on another CPU can take the socket out of the ehash, walk into tcp_inbound_hash(), and load tp->ao_info via implicit RCU before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken on the destroying CPU. The reader path then enters __tcp_ao_do_lookup() (net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c:208) which re-loads tp->ao_info via rcu_dereference_check(); the re-load can still observe the (about-to-be-freed) pointer because there is no synchronize_rcu() between rcu_assign_pointer(tp->ao_info, NULL) and tcp_ao_info_free() in tcp_ao_destroy_sock(). The captured pointer is then walked at line 223: hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &ao->head, node, ...) The writer's synchronous kfree() is free to complete between the line 218 re-fetch and the line 223 hlist iteration. The slab is reused (or simply LIST_POISON1-stamped if not yet reused) and the iteration walks attacker-controlled or poison memory in softirq context. Reproducer (no debug shim, stock x86_64 v7.1-rc2 SMP+KASAN, QEMU+KVM): an unprivileged uid=1000 process inside CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWNET installs TCP_MD5SIG + TCP_AO_ADD_KEY on a TCP socket, sprays forged TCP-AO segments toward its eventual 4-tuple via raw sockets, then calls connect(). The md5-wins reconciliation in tcp_connect() fires tcp_ao_destroy_sock(); the softirq backlog reader on the loopback NAPI path crashes on the freed ao->head.first walk: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xfbd59c000000002f KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000178-0xdead00000000017f] CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 100 Comm: repro_userns RIP: 0010:__tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0 Call Trace: __tcp_ao_do_lookup+0x107/0x1c0 tcp_ao_inbound_lookup.constprop.0+0x12a/0x200 tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x5ea/0x1520 tcp_inbound_hash+0x7ce/0x1240 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1e7a/0x3e10 ... Restore the RCU grace period: re-add struct rcu_head to tcp_ao_info and replace the synchronous tcp_ao_info_free() with a call_rcu() callback. Readers that captured tp->ao_info before rcu_assign_pointer NULLed it now see the object remain valid until rcu_read_unlock(). With the patch applied the reproducer runs cleanly for 2000 iterations on the same kernel build. Fixes: 51e547e8c89c ("tcp: Free TCP-AO/TCP-MD5 info/keys without RCU") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.18+ Reviewed-by: Dmitry Safonov Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-tcp-md5-connect-v3-1-1fd313d6c1e0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/tcp_ao.h | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp_ao.h b/include/net/tcp_ao.h index 1e9e27d6e06ba..df655ce6987d3 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_ao.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_ao.h @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ struct tcp_ao_info { u32 snd_sne; u32 rcv_sne; refcount_t refcnt; /* Protects twsk destruction */ + struct rcu_head rcu; }; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c index 46eb5b4683bb5..a7b1fe194fb1e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c @@ -270,8 +270,9 @@ static void tcp_ao_key_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) kfree_sensitive(key); } -static void tcp_ao_info_free(struct tcp_ao_info *ao) +static void tcp_ao_info_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) { + struct tcp_ao_info *ao = container_of(head, struct tcp_ao_info, rcu); struct tcp_ao_key *key; struct hlist_node *n; @@ -311,7 +312,7 @@ void tcp_ao_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk, bool twsk) if (!twsk) tcp_ao_sk_omem_free(sk, ao); - tcp_ao_info_free(ao); + call_rcu(&ao->rcu, tcp_ao_info_free_rcu); } void tcp_ao_time_wait(struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw, struct tcp_sock *tp) From 9c8f31eaae6140ecadec0c07320498a944556de2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: SeongJae Park Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 06:58:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 256/607] mm/damon/ops-common: handle extreme intervals in damon_hot_score() commit 35d4a3cf70a855b50e53189ac2f8463e20a02046 upstream. Fix three issues in damon_hot_score() that comes from wrong handling of extreme (zero or too high) monitoring intervals user setup. When the user sets sampling interval zero, damon_max_nr_accesses(), which is called from damon_hot_score(), causes a divide-by-zero. Needless to say, it is a problem. When the user sets the aggregation interval zero, the function returns zero. It is wrong, since the real maximum nr_acceses in the setup should be one. Worse yet, it can cause another divide-by-zero from its caller, damon_hot_score(), since it uses damon_max_nr_accesses() return value as a denominator. When the user sets the aggregation interval very high, damon_hot_score() could return a value out of [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] range. Since the return value is used as an index to the regions_score_histogram array, which is DAMOS_MAX_SCORE+1 size, it causes out of bounds array access. The issues can be relatively easily reproduced like below. The sysfs write permission is required, though. # ./damo start --damos_action lru_prio --damos_quota_space 100M \ --damos_quota_interval 1s # cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0 # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/sample_us # echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/aggr_us # echo commit > state # dmesg [...] [ 131.329762] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] [ 131.336089] RIP: 0010:damon_hot_score+0x27/0xd0 [...] Fix the divide-by-zero intervals problems by explicitly handling the zero intervals in damon_max_nr_accesses(). Fix the out-of-bound array access by applying [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] bounds before returning from damon_hot_score(). The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260623135834.67189-1-sj@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260619202459.145010-1-sj@kernel.org [1] Fixes: 198f0f4c58b9 ("mm/damon/vaddr,paddr: support pageout prioritization") Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park Cc: # 5.16.x Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/damon.h | 8 ++++++-- mm/damon/ops-common.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/damon.h b/include/linux/damon.h index d902381950908..bb4dd13984d39 100644 --- a/include/linux/damon.h +++ b/include/linux/damon.h @@ -939,9 +939,13 @@ static inline bool damon_target_has_pid(const struct damon_ctx *ctx) static inline unsigned int damon_max_nr_accesses(const struct damon_attrs *attrs) { - /* {aggr,sample}_interval are unsigned long, hence could overflow */ - return min(attrs->aggr_interval / attrs->sample_interval, + unsigned long sample_interval; + unsigned long max_nr_accesses; + + sample_interval = attrs->sample_interval ? : 1; + max_nr_accesses = min(attrs->aggr_interval / sample_interval, (unsigned long)UINT_MAX); + return max_nr_accesses ? : 1; } diff --git a/mm/damon/ops-common.c b/mm/damon/ops-common.c index 37dba4276d44e..512ea62e29abd 100644 --- a/mm/damon/ops-common.c +++ b/mm/damon/ops-common.c @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ int damon_hot_score(struct damon_ctx *c, struct damon_region *r, * Transform it to fit in [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] */ hotness = hotness * DAMOS_MAX_SCORE / DAMON_MAX_SUBSCORE; + hotness = max(min(hotness, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE), 0); return hotness; } From 81d54c766337b923eec26da0a13406760b091093 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiang Mei Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 18:00:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 257/607] netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize commit 7cd9103283b26b917360ec99d7d2f2d761bcf1ab upstream. The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw() of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section. A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index into it, causing a use-after-free. The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex(). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150 Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325) netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976) sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159) __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315) ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x02d6...d0-0x02d6...d7] RIP: 0010:ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1698) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Fixes: 8a02bdd50b2e ("netfilter: ipset: Fix calling ip_set() macro at dumping") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Weiming Shi Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c index a4e1d7951b2c6..94157104d85a9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c @@ -1480,7 +1480,11 @@ ip_set_dump_done(struct netlink_callback *cb) struct ip_set_net *inst = (struct ip_set_net *)cb->args[IPSET_CB_NET]; ip_set_id_t index = (ip_set_id_t)cb->args[IPSET_CB_INDEX]; - struct ip_set *set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index); + struct ip_set *set; + + rcu_read_lock(); + set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index); + rcu_read_unlock(); if (set->variant->uref) set->variant->uref(set, cb, false); @@ -1685,7 +1689,9 @@ ip_set_dump_do(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) release_refcount: /* If there was an error or set is done, release set */ if (ret || !cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0]) { + rcu_read_lock(); set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index); + rcu_read_unlock(); if (set->variant->uref) set->variant->uref(set, cb, false); pr_debug("release set %s\n", set->name); From 075bc3c779e1ea7294afabdcb7e0a49536959b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ammar Faizi Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 21:18:08 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 258/607] virtio_pci: fix vq info pointer lookup via wrong index commit f7d380fb525c13bdd114369a1979c80c346e6abc upstream. Unbinding a virtio balloon device: echo virtio0 > /sys/bus/virtio/drivers/virtio_balloon/unbind triggers a NULL pointer dereference. The dmesg says: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [...] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x5/0xf0 Call Trace: vp_del_vqs+0x121/0x230 remove_common+0x135/0x150 virtballoon_remove+0xee/0x100 virtio_dev_remove+0x3b/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x187/0x2c0 unbind_store+0xb9/0xe0 kernfs_fop_write_iter.llvm.11660790530567441834+0xf6/0x180 vfs_write+0x2a9/0x3b0 ksys_write+0x5c/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x29/0x31 [...] The virtio_balloon device registers 5 queues (inflate, deflate, stats, free_page, reporting) but only the first two are unconditional. The stats, free_page and reporting queues are each conditional on their respective feature bits. When any of these features are absent, the corresponding vqs_info entry has name == NULL, creating holes in the array. The root cause is an indexing mismatch introduced when vq info storage was changed to be passed as an argument. vp_find_vqs_msix() and vp_find_vqs_intx() store the info pointer at vp_dev->vqs[i], where 'i' is the caller's sparse array index. However, the virtqueue itself gets vq->index assigned from queue_idx, a dense index that skips NULL entries. When holes exist, 'i' and queue_idx diverge. Later, vp_del_vqs() looks up info via vp_dev->vqs[vq->index] using the dense index into the sparsely-populated array, and hits NULL. Fix this by storing info at vp_dev->vqs[queue_idx] instead of vp_dev->vqs[i], so the store index matches the lookup index (vq->index). Apply the fix to both the MSIX and INTX paths. Cc: Yichun Zhang Cc: Jiri Pirko Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.11+ Tested-by: Yuka Fixes: 89a1c435aec2 ("virtio_pci: pass vq info as an argument to vp_setup_vq()") Signed-off-by: Ammar Faizi Message-Id: <20260315141808.547081-1-ammarfaizi2@openresty.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c index d6d79af44569b..30c6627a5ce4d 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c @@ -426,10 +426,11 @@ static int vp_find_vqs_msix(struct virtio_device *vdev, unsigned int nvqs, vqs[i] = NULL; continue; } - vqs[i] = vp_find_one_vq_msix(vdev, queue_idx++, vqi->callback, + vqs[i] = vp_find_one_vq_msix(vdev, queue_idx, vqi->callback, vqi->name, vqi->ctx, false, &allocated_vectors, vector_policy, - &vp_dev->vqs[i]); + &vp_dev->vqs[queue_idx]); + queue_idx++; if (IS_ERR(vqs[i])) { err = PTR_ERR(vqs[i]); goto error_find; @@ -488,9 +489,10 @@ static int vp_find_vqs_intx(struct virtio_device *vdev, unsigned int nvqs, vqs[i] = NULL; continue; } - vqs[i] = vp_setup_vq(vdev, queue_idx++, vqi->callback, + vqs[i] = vp_setup_vq(vdev, queue_idx, vqi->callback, vqi->name, vqi->ctx, - VIRTIO_MSI_NO_VECTOR, &vp_dev->vqs[i]); + VIRTIO_MSI_NO_VECTOR, &vp_dev->vqs[queue_idx]); + queue_idx++; if (IS_ERR(vqs[i])) { err = PTR_ERR(vqs[i]); goto out_del_vqs; From 65e93ec592f5b1eb0e9dec47d44011c3fd4938e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 16:37:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 259/607] virtio-mmio: fix device release warning on module unload commit c687bc35694698ec4c7f92bf929c3d659f0cecb8 upstream. Driver core expects devices to be allocated dynamically and complains loudly when a device that lacks a release function is freed. Use __root_device_register() to allocate and register the root device instead of open coding using a static device. Note that root_device_register(), which also creates a link to the module, cannot be used as the device is registered when parsing the module parameters which happens before the module kobject has been set up. Fixes: 81a054ce0b46 ("virtio-mmio: Devices parameter parsing") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5 Cc: Pawel Moll Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Message-ID: <20260427143710.14702-1-johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c index b152a1eca05ad..4832c9835dff9 100644 --- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c +++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c @@ -662,9 +662,7 @@ static void virtio_mmio_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) #if defined(CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO_CMDLINE_DEVICES) -static struct device vm_cmdline_parent = { - .init_name = "virtio-mmio-cmdline", -}; +static struct device *vm_cmdline_parent; static int vm_cmdline_parent_registered; static int vm_cmdline_id; @@ -672,7 +670,6 @@ static int vm_cmdline_id; static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - int err; struct resource resources[2] = {}; char *str; long long base, size; @@ -704,11 +701,10 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device, resources[1].start = resources[1].end = irq; if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) { - err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent); - if (err) { - put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent); + vm_cmdline_parent = __root_device_register("virtio-mmio-cmdline", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(vm_cmdline_parent)) { pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n"); - return err; + return PTR_ERR(vm_cmdline_parent); } vm_cmdline_parent_registered = 1; } @@ -719,7 +715,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device, (unsigned long long)resources[0].end, (int)resources[1].start); - pdev = platform_device_register_resndata(&vm_cmdline_parent, + pdev = platform_device_register_resndata(vm_cmdline_parent, "virtio-mmio", vm_cmdline_id++, resources, ARRAY_SIZE(resources), NULL, 0); @@ -743,8 +739,12 @@ static int vm_cmdline_get_device(struct device *dev, void *data) static int vm_cmdline_get(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { buffer[0] = '\0'; - device_for_each_child(&vm_cmdline_parent, buffer, - vm_cmdline_get_device); + + if (vm_cmdline_parent_registered) { + device_for_each_child(vm_cmdline_parent, buffer, + vm_cmdline_get_device); + } + return strlen(buffer) + 1; } @@ -766,9 +766,9 @@ static int vm_unregister_cmdline_device(struct device *dev, static void vm_unregister_cmdline_devices(void) { if (vm_cmdline_parent_registered) { - device_for_each_child(&vm_cmdline_parent, NULL, + device_for_each_child(vm_cmdline_parent, NULL, vm_unregister_cmdline_device); - device_unregister(&vm_cmdline_parent); + root_device_unregister(vm_cmdline_parent); vm_cmdline_parent_registered = 0; } } From 285e17c44e3873a73460f294acbd64018ff64385 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 10:22:51 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 260/607] hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() commit e3046eeada299f917a8ad883af4434bfb86556b1 upstream. random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64). A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng. Concrete impact is inside the guest: - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20) Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport. With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request. Fixes: f7f510ec1957 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin Message-ID: <20260531142251.2792061-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c index dd998f4fe4f23..2933f8cb769e4 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -66,8 +67,26 @@ static void request_entropy(struct virtrng_info *vi) static unsigned int copy_data(struct virtrng_info *vi, void *buf, unsigned int size) { - size = min_t(unsigned int, size, vi->data_avail); - memcpy(buf, vi->data + vi->data_idx, size); + unsigned int idx, avail; + + /* + * vi->data_avail was set from the device-reported used.len and + * vi->data_idx was advanced by previous copy_data() calls. A + * malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can drive either past + * sizeof(vi->data). Clamp at point of use and harden the index + * with array_index_nospec() so the memcpy() below cannot be + * steered into adjacent slab memory, including under + * speculation. + */ + avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data)); + if (vi->data_idx >= avail) { + vi->data_avail = 0; + request_entropy(vi); + return 0; + } + size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx); + idx = array_index_nospec(vi->data_idx, sizeof(vi->data)); + memcpy(buf, vi->data + idx, size); vi->data_idx += size; vi->data_avail -= size; if (vi->data_avail == 0) From 2a52d55c86a429dac47886b8424e67f90b001e67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alan Stern Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 13:37:36 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 261/607] USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release() commit abf76d3239dee97b66e7241ad04811f1ce562e28 upstream. The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine. If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406) __dynamic_dev_dbg (lib/dynamic_debug.c:906) chaoskey_release (drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:323) __fput (fs/file_table.c:510) fput_close_sync (fs/file_table.c:615) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1507 fs/open.c:1492 fs/open.c:1492) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) The driver's last reference to the interface structure is dropped in the chaoskey_free() routine, so the code must not use the interface -- even in a debugging statement -- after that routine returns. (Exception: If we know that another reference is held by someone else, such as the device core while the disconnect routine runs, there's no problem. Thanks to Johan Hovold for pointing this out.) Since the bad access is part of an unimportant debugging statement, we can fix the problem simply by removing the whole statement. Reported-by: Shuangpeng Bai Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20EC9664-054E-438B-B411-2145D347F97B@gmail.com/ Tested-by: Shuangpeng Bai Signed-off-by: Alan Stern Fixes: 66e3e591891d ("usb: Add driver for Altus Metrum ChaosKey device (v2)") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://patch.msgid.link/bb5b1dc6-eb59-43e1-8d26-51e658e88bbe@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c b/drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c index 45cff32656c6e..1524e4770a46c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c @@ -320,7 +320,6 @@ static int chaoskey_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); destruction: mutex_unlock(&chaoskey_list_lock); - usb_dbg(interface, "release success"); return rv; } From c4e232bd07fe2b69a6e5c380db41dd36b95e0524 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 13:20:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 262/607] usb: dwc3: run gadget disconnect from sleepable suspend context commit 010382937fb69892b3469ac4d30af072262f59e8 upstream. dwc3_gadget_suspend() takes dwc->lock with IRQs disabled and then calls dwc3_disconnect_gadget(). For async callbacks that helper only uses plain spin_unlock()/spin_lock(), so the gadget ->disconnect() callback still runs with IRQs disabled and any sleepable callback trips Lockdep. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the dwc3_gadget_suspend() -> dwc3_disconnect_gadget() -> gadget_driver->disconnect() chain, and Lockdep reported: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context gadget_disconnect+0x21/0x39 [vuln_msv] dwc3_gadget_suspend.constprop.0+0x2b/0x42 [vuln_msv] Keep the disconnect callback selection in one common helper, but add a sleepable suspend-side wrapper which snapshots the callback under dwc->lock and then runs it after spin_unlock_irqrestore(). The regular event path still uses the existing spin_unlock()/spin_lock() window. Fixes: c8540870af4c ("usb: dwc3: gadget: Improve dwc3_gadget_suspend() and dwc3_gadget_resume()") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Acked-by: Thinh Nguyen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612052005.3849659-1-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 89963cd77daaa..ea8487d4bbb3c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -3934,15 +3934,48 @@ static void dwc3_endpoint_interrupt(struct dwc3 *dwc, } } +static bool dwc3_prepare_disconnect_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc, + struct usb_gadget_driver **driver, + struct usb_gadget **gadget) +{ + if (!dwc->async_callbacks || !dwc->gadget_driver || + !dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect) + return false; + + *driver = dwc->gadget_driver; + *gadget = dwc->gadget; + + return true; +} + static void dwc3_disconnect_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc) { - if (dwc->async_callbacks && dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect) { + struct usb_gadget_driver *driver; + struct usb_gadget *gadget; + + if (dwc3_prepare_disconnect_gadget(dwc, &driver, &gadget)) { spin_unlock(&dwc->lock); - dwc->gadget_driver->disconnect(dwc->gadget); + driver->disconnect(gadget); spin_lock(&dwc->lock); } } +static void dwc3_disconnect_gadget_sleepable(struct dwc3 *dwc) +{ + struct usb_gadget_driver *driver; + struct usb_gadget *gadget; + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); + if (!dwc3_prepare_disconnect_gadget(dwc, &driver, &gadget)) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); + return; + } + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); + driver->disconnect(gadget); +} + static void dwc3_suspend_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc) { if (dwc->async_callbacks && dwc->gadget_driver->suspend) { @@ -4836,7 +4869,6 @@ void dwc3_gadget_exit(struct dwc3 *dwc) int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc) { - unsigned long flags; int ret; ret = dwc3_gadget_soft_disconnect(dwc); @@ -4850,10 +4882,7 @@ int dwc3_gadget_suspend(struct dwc3 *dwc) return -EAGAIN; } - spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags); - if (dwc->gadget_driver) - dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags); + dwc3_disconnect_gadget_sleepable(dwc); return 0; } From c40090f8d19b415e2925b22be964b5d1f695666f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Cen Zhang Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 20:40:29 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 263/607] usb: misc: usbio: fix disconnect UAF in client teardown commit 0bfeec21984fedd32987f4e4c0cde34b445af404 upstream. usbio_disconnect() walks usbio->cli_list in reverse and uninitializes each auxiliary device. auxiliary_device_uninit() drops the device reference, and for an unbound child that can run usbio_auxdev_release() and free the containing struct usbio_client. list_for_each_entry_reverse() advances after the loop body by reading client->link.prev. If the current client is freed by auxiliary_device_uninit(), the iterator dereferences freed memory. Use list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse() so the previous client is cached before the body can drop the final reference. This preserves reverse teardown order while keeping the next iterator cursor independent of the current client's lifetime. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x320 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x400 really_probe+0x316/0x660 __driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240 driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __device_attach+0x133/0x2a0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70 bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 device_add+0x9b9/0xc10 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? usb_enable_lpm+0x3c/0x260 usb_set_configuration+0xb64/0xf20 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x5f/0x90 usb_probe_device+0x71/0x1b0 really_probe+0x46b/0x660 __driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240 driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __device_attach+0x133/0x2a0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70 bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 device_add+0x9b9/0xc10 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? add_device_randomness+0xb7/0xf0 usb_new_device+0x492/0x870 hub_event+0x1b10/0x29c0 ? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_acquire+0x187/0x300 ? process_one_work+0x475/0xb90 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 process_one_work+0x4d7/0xb90 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0 ? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: 121a0f839dbb ("usb: misc: Add Intel USBIO bridge driver") Cc: stable Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Acked-by: Sakari Ailus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618124029.3704089-1-zzzccc427@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c b/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c index 64815f8410acd..759af25313b0f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int usbio_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) static void usbio_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) { struct usbio_device *usbio = usb_get_intfdata(intf); - struct usbio_client *client; + struct usbio_client *client, *next; /* Wakeup any clients waiting for a reply */ usbio->rxdat_len = 0; @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static void usbio_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) usb_kill_urb(usbio->urb); usb_free_urb(usbio->urb); - list_for_each_entry_reverse(client, &usbio->cli_list, link) { + list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(client, next, &usbio->cli_list, link) { auxiliary_device_delete(&client->auxdev); auxiliary_device_uninit(&client->auxdev); } From 0beccbcf50de125be5520d0ffc59af4bb8655482 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yizhou Zhao Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 16:00:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 264/607] 6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path commit 1720db928e5a58ca7d75ac1d514c3b73fd7061a7 upstream. lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error path drops the lock before printing nhc->name. lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive path. This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path, another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name for the warning. With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220 Read of size 8 lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression lowpan_header_decompress Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP. Fixes: 92aa7c65d295 ("6lowpan: add generic nhc layer interface") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yizhou Zhao Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang Reported-by: Ao Wang Reported-by: Xuewei Feng Reported-by: Qi Li Reported-by: Ke Xu Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao Acked-by: Alexander Aring Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609080054.4541-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/6lowpan/nhc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/6lowpan/nhc.c b/net/6lowpan/nhc.c index 7b374595328de..a4dde85664f2f 100644 --- a/net/6lowpan/nhc.c +++ b/net/6lowpan/nhc.c @@ -117,9 +117,9 @@ int lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression(struct sk_buff *skb, return ret; } } else { - spin_unlock_bh(&lowpan_nhc_lock); netdev_warn(dev, "received nhc id for %s which is not implemented.\n", nhc->name); + spin_unlock_bh(&lowpan_nhc_lock); return -ENOTSUPP; } } else { From 2de42e268174766cb2e2b90721afdfdff70e0d8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Page Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:38:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 265/607] tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks commit 2b66974a1b6134a4bbc3bfed181f7418f688eb54 upstream. A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state. Fixes: d7626b5acff9 ("tipc: introduce Gap ACK blocks for broadcast link") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Samuel Page Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625143815.1525412-1-sam@bynar.io Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/tipc/bcast.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- net/tipc/bcast.h | 2 +- net/tipc/node.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.c b/net/tipc/bcast.c index 114fef65f92ea..4ae097cfcd2dc 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bcast.c +++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c @@ -497,12 +497,13 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, */ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - struct sk_buff_head *retrq) + struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid) { struct sk_buff_head *inputq = &tipc_bc_base(net)->inputq; struct tipc_gap_ack_blks *ga; struct sk_buff_head xmitq; int rc = 0; + u16 glen; __skb_queue_head_init(&xmitq); @@ -510,13 +511,18 @@ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, if (msg_type(hdr) != STATE_MSG) { tipc_link_bc_init_rcv(l, hdr); } else if (!msg_bc_ack_invalid(hdr)) { - tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false); - if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni) - retrq = &xmitq; - rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr), - msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq, - retrq); - rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq); + glen = tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false); + if (glen > msg_data_sz(hdr)) { + /* Malformed Gap ACK blocks; caller drops the msg */ + *valid = false; + } else { + if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni) + retrq = &xmitq; + rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr), + msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq, + retrq); + rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq); + } } tipc_bcast_unlock(net); diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.h b/net/tipc/bcast.h index 2d9352dc7b0e6..55d17b5413e16 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bcast.h +++ b/net/tipc/bcast.h @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr); int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - struct sk_buff_head *retrq); + struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid); int tipc_nl_add_bc_link(struct net *net, struct tipc_nl_msg *msg, struct tipc_link *bcl); int tipc_nl_bc_link_set(struct net *net, struct nlattr *attrs[]); diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index a07fb073368ca..8dca9b1f4168a 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -1831,12 +1831,15 @@ static void tipc_node_mcast_rcv(struct tipc_node *n) } static void tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(struct tipc_node *n, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq) + int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq, + bool *valid) { struct tipc_link *ucl; int rc; - rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq); + rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq, valid); + if (!*valid) + return; if (rc & TIPC_LINK_DOWN_EVT) { tipc_node_reset_links(n); @@ -2140,12 +2143,18 @@ void tipc_rcv(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b) /* Ensure broadcast reception is in synch with peer's send state */ if (unlikely(usr == LINK_PROTOCOL)) { + bool valid = true; + if (unlikely(skb_linearize(skb))) { tipc_node_put(n); goto discard; } hdr = buf_msg(skb); - tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq); + tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq, &valid); + if (!valid) { + tipc_node_put(n); + goto discard; + } } else if (unlikely(tipc_link_acked(n->bc_entry.link) != bc_ack)) { tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr); } From e99f2df433c63c86c93de1e5f08f16e404388756 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Tautschnig Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 13:47:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 266/607] staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size commit 9f32f38265014fac7f5dc9490fb01a638ce6e121 upstream. The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68 _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user] vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0 ksys_write+0xb8/0x150 Fixes: f00a86d98a1e ("Staging: vme: add VME userspace driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Michael Tautschnig Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618114709.72499-1-tautschn@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c index 5829a4141561e..97400b4a12596 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_user.c @@ -156,6 +156,17 @@ static ssize_t buffer_to_user(unsigned int minor, char __user *buf, { void *image_ptr; + /* + * The slave window (image_size) can exceed the fixed kern_buf + * (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE), so bound the copy to kern_buf. + * *ppos is >= 0 here (checked by the caller), so the + * subtraction below cannot wrap. + */ + if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf) + return 0; + if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos) + count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos; + image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos; if (copy_to_user(buf, image_ptr, (unsigned long)count)) return -EFAULT; @@ -168,6 +179,17 @@ static ssize_t buffer_from_user(unsigned int minor, const char __user *buf, { void *image_ptr; + /* + * The slave window (image_size) can exceed the fixed kern_buf + * (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE), so bound the copy to kern_buf. + * *ppos is >= 0 here (checked by the caller), so the + * subtraction below cannot wrap. + */ + if (*ppos >= image[minor].size_buf) + return 0; + if (count > image[minor].size_buf - *ppos) + count = image[minor].size_buf - *ppos; + image_ptr = image[minor].kern_buf + *ppos; if (copy_from_user(image_ptr, buf, (unsigned long)count)) return -EFAULT; From ceb875a375dedbf51c9425c1d13a2d7a8435c08c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shoichiro Miyamoto Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 20:23:58 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 267/607] smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area commit 53b7c271f06be4dd5cfc8c6ef552a8355c891a7f upstream. smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]"). This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0] overlap byte when no data area is present. However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, yet smb2_check_message() still accepts it. The subsequent decoder then reads past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established. The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting against a non-conforming server; both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the NTLMSSP challenge decoders are affected: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880084d67c0 by task mount.cifs/81 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 decode_negTokenInit+0x19/0x30 SMB2_negotiate+0x31d9/0x4c90 cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x1f2/0x3f0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x93f/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task 85: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 448-byte region [ffff8880084d6600, ffff8880084d67c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 Read of size 329 at addr ffff88800726c678 by task mount.cifs/89 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: mount.cifs Tainted: G B 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 decode_ntlmssp_challenge+0x457/0x680 SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate+0x6f0/0xcb0 SMB2_sess_setup+0x219/0x4f0 cifs_setup_session+0x248/0xaf0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0xf79/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task 93: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of allocated 448-byte region [ffff88800726c600, ffff88800726c7c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 Restrict the +1 exemption to responses that have no data area, so that it still covers the bcc[0] omission it was meant for. When a data area is present, the +1 discrepancy instead means the reported data length overruns the received buffer, so the response must be rejected. Fixes: 093b2bdad322 ("CIFS: Make demultiplex_thread work with SMB2 code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shoichiro Miyamoto Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c index 0b37bc2a7f1c3..005a820946da1 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include "nterr.h" #include "cached_dir.h" +static unsigned int __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data); + static int check_smb2_hdr(struct smb2_hdr *shdr, __u64 mid) { @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int len, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) int command; __u32 calc_len; /* calculated length */ __u64 mid; + bool have_data; /* If server is a channel, select the primary channel */ pserver = SERVER_IS_CHAN(server) ? server->primary_server : server; @@ -227,7 +230,8 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int len, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) } } - calc_len = smb2_calc_size(buf); + have_data = false; + calc_len = __smb2_calc_size(buf, &have_data); /* For SMB2_IOCTL, OutputOffset and OutputLength are optional, so might * be 0, and not a real miscalculation */ @@ -246,8 +250,13 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int len, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) /* Windows 7 server returns 24 bytes more */ if (calc_len + 24 == len && command == SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE) return 0; - /* server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0] */ - if (calc_len == len + 1) + /* + * Server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]. + * Allow it only when there is no data area; if data_length > 0 + * the +1 gap indicates an overreported data length rather than + * the bcc[0] omission. + */ + if (calc_len == len + 1 && !have_data) return 0; /* @@ -408,14 +417,17 @@ smb2_get_data_area_len(int *off, int *len, struct smb2_hdr *shdr) /* * Calculate the size of the SMB message based on the fixed header * portion, the number of word parameters and the data portion of the message. + * If have_data is non-NULL, it is set to true when a non-empty data area was + * found (data_length > 0), allowing callers to distinguish the implied bcc[0] + * case (no data area) from an overreported data length. */ -unsigned int -smb2_calc_size(void *buf) +static unsigned int +__smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data) { struct smb2_pdu *pdu = buf; struct smb2_hdr *shdr = &pdu->hdr; int offset; /* the offset from the beginning of SMB to data area */ - int data_length; /* the length of the variable length data area */ + int data_length = 0; /* the length of the variable length data area */ /* Structure Size has already been checked to make sure it is 64 */ int len = le16_to_cpu(shdr->StructureSize); @@ -448,9 +460,17 @@ smb2_calc_size(void *buf) } calc_size_exit: cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2 len %d\n", len); + if (have_data) + *have_data = (data_length > 0); return len; } +unsigned int +smb2_calc_size(void *buf) +{ + return __smb2_calc_size(buf, NULL); +} + /* Note: caller must free return buffer */ __le16 * cifs_convert_path_to_utf16(const char *from, struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb) From a9214863139751c291f691a64161cd11b1d8af0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao-Qun Huang Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 14:58:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 268/607] staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in fake bridge commit e8422d89e8af41d87f0e9db564be8e2634f4c602 upstream. fake_init() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into fake_bridge->lm_resources. The init error path frees this list, but fake_exit() only frees the slave and master resource lists. Loading and unloading the module therefore triggers a kmemleak warning: unreferenced object 0xffff8b8b82aebe40 (size 64): comm "init", pid 1, jiffies 4294894572 backtrace (crc c1e013ef): kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0x90 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x338/0x430 0xffffffffc0602246 do_one_initcall+0x4f/0x320 do_init_module+0x68/0x270 load_module+0x2a3b/0x2d90 Free the lm_resources list in fake_exit() as well, before fake_bridge is freed. Fixes: 658bcdae9c67 ("vme: Adding Fake VME driver") Cc: stable Cc: Martyn Welch Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Hao-Qun Huang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704065817.403111-1-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c index c6a7c0c69f16e..d0e7ba204c3e1 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_fake.c @@ -1239,6 +1239,7 @@ static void __exit fake_exit(void) { struct list_head *pos = NULL; struct list_head *tmplist; + struct vme_lm_resource *lm; struct vme_master_resource *master_image; struct vme_slave_resource *slave_image; int i; @@ -1268,6 +1269,13 @@ static void __exit fake_exit(void) vme_unregister_bridge(fake_bridge); fake_crcsr_exit(fake_bridge); + /* resources are stored in link list */ + list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &fake_bridge->lm_resources) { + lm = list_entry(pos, struct vme_lm_resource, list); + list_del(pos); + kfree(lm); + } + /* resources are stored in link list */ list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &fake_bridge->slave_resources) { slave_image = list_entry(pos, struct vme_slave_resource, list); From e3ceafa6d8ee6b3a0f7fabe7a551fda909edbd46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao-Qun Huang Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 14:58:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 269/607] staging: vme_user: fix location monitor leak in tsi148 bridge commit 151edde741f8bc7f2931c5f44ab376d32b0c8beb upstream. tsi148_probe() allocates a location monitor resource and links it into tsi148_bridge->lm_resources. The probe error path frees this list, but tsi148_remove() only frees the dma, slave and master resource lists, so the location monitor resource is leaked on device unbind or module unload. Free the lm_resources list in tsi148_remove() as well, before tsi148_bridge is freed. Fixes: d22b8ed9a3b0 ("Staging: vme: add Tundra TSI148 VME-PCI Bridge driver") Cc: stable Cc: Martyn Welch Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5 Signed-off-by: Hao-Qun Huang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704065817.403111-2-alvinhuang0603@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c index 733594dde9ae9..58f9286c13540 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vme_user/vme_tsi148.c @@ -2536,6 +2536,7 @@ static void tsi148_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct list_head *pos = NULL; struct list_head *tmplist; + struct vme_lm_resource *lm; struct vme_master_resource *master_image; struct vme_slave_resource *slave_image; struct vme_dma_resource *dma_ctrlr; @@ -2592,6 +2593,13 @@ static void tsi148_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) tsi148_crcsr_exit(tsi148_bridge, pdev); + /* resources are stored in link list */ + list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &tsi148_bridge->lm_resources) { + lm = list_entry(pos, struct vme_lm_resource, list); + list_del(pos); + kfree(lm); + } + /* resources are stored in link list */ list_for_each_safe(pos, tmplist, &tsi148_bridge->dma_resources) { dma_ctrlr = list_entry(pos, struct vme_dma_resource, list); From b4ba13dafa13ca54d8a5ca8ce6f9ee95ce59c6c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ricardo Ribalda Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 20:58:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 270/607] media: staging: ipu3-imgu: Add range check for imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe commit c32fe4c4918c9aa49f61359e3b42619c4d8686de upstream. If the driver's stripe information is invalid it can result in an integer underflow. Add a range check to avoid this kind of error. This patch fixes the following smatch error: drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c:1792 imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe() warn: 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0]->width - 2 * f' 4294967168 can't fit into 65535 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1]->offset' Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e11110a5b744 ("media: staging/intel-ipu3: css: Compute and program ccs") Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c b/drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c index 2c48d57a3180f..92cce31e35c5d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c +++ b/drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c @@ -1770,6 +1770,8 @@ static int imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe(struct imgu_css *css, unsigned int pipe, acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width = ALIGN(css_pipe->rect[IPU3_CSS_RECT_BDS].width, f); } else { + u32 offset; + /* Image processing is divided into two stripes */ acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width = acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].width = @@ -1788,8 +1790,10 @@ static int imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe(struct imgu_css *css, unsigned int pipe, acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].width += f; } /* Overlap between stripes is IPU3_UAPI_ISP_VEC_ELEMS * 4 */ - acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].offset = - acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width - 2 * f; + offset = acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width - 2 * f; + if (offset > 65535) + return -EINVAL; + acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].offset = offset; } acc->stripe.effective_stripes[0].height = From 1ca4f310c6b1fba9ac1fc791323d073a3b961ba8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 13:59:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 271/607] staging: media: atomisp: reduce load_primary_binaries() stack usage commit f4d51e55dd47ef467fbe37d8575e20eee41b092d upstream. The load_primary_binaries() function is overly complex and has som large variables on the stack, which can cause warnings depending on CONFIG_FRAME_WARN setting: drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c: In function 'load_primary_binaries': drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c:5260:1: error: the frame size of 1560 bytes is larger than 1536 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=] Half of the stack usage is for the prim_descr[] array, but only one member of the array is used at any given time. Reduce the stack usage by turning the array into a single structure. Fixes: a49d25364dfb ("staging/atomisp: Add support for the Intel IPU v2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c b/drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c index 73bd87f43a8c2..cd5719dc16467 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c +++ b/drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c @@ -5021,7 +5021,6 @@ static int load_primary_binaries( struct ia_css_capture_settings *mycs; unsigned int i; bool need_extra_yuv_scaler = false; - struct ia_css_binary_descr prim_descr[MAX_NUM_PRIMARY_STAGES]; IA_CSS_ENTER_PRIVATE(""); assert(pipe); @@ -5191,15 +5190,16 @@ static int load_primary_binaries( /* Primary */ for (i = 0; i < mycs->num_primary_stage; i++) { + struct ia_css_binary_descr prim_descr; struct ia_css_frame_info *local_vf_info = NULL; if (pipe->enable_viewfinder[IA_CSS_PIPE_OUTPUT_STAGE_0] && (i == mycs->num_primary_stage - 1)) local_vf_info = &vf_info; - ia_css_pipe_get_primary_binarydesc(pipe, &prim_descr[i], + ia_css_pipe_get_primary_binarydesc(pipe, &prim_descr, &prim_in_info, &prim_out_info, local_vf_info, i); - err = ia_css_binary_find(&prim_descr[i], &mycs->primary_binary[i]); + err = ia_css_binary_find(&prim_descr, &mycs->primary_binary[i]); if (err) { IA_CSS_LEAVE_ERR_PRIVATE(err); return err; From b5ddc7257bee71f5b8cf9083e2b0ac0427e9fbb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 17:12:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 272/607] staging: media: ipu7: fix double-free and use-after-free in error paths commit d3a9a8cf2d7fd61a2f63df61f6cbc0a9bb007cc0 upstream. In both ipu7_isys_init() and ipu7_psys_init(), pdata is allocated and then passed to ipu7_bus_initialize_device(), which stores it in adev->pdata. The ipu7_bus_release() function frees adev->pdata when the device's reference count drops to zero. Two error paths incorrectly call kfree(pdata) after the device teardown has already freed it: 1. When ipu7_mmu_init() fails: put_device() is called, which drops the reference count to zero and triggers ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is a double-free. 2. When ipu7_bus_add_device() fails: it calls auxiliary_device_uninit() internally, which calls put_device() -> ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is again a double-free. Note that the kfree(pdata) when ipu7_bus_initialize_device() itself fails is correct, because in that case auxiliary_device_init() failed and the release function was never set up, so pdata must be freed manually. Additionally, the error code was not saved before calling put_device(), causing ERR_CAST() to dereference the already-freed adev pointer when constructing the return value. Fix this by saving the error from dev_err_probe() before put_device() and returning ERR_PTR() instead. Remove the redundant kfree(pdata) calls and fix the use-after-free in the return values of the two affected error paths. Fixes: b7fe4c0019b1 ("media: staging/ipu7: add Intel IPU7 PCI device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ipu7.c | 22 ++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ipu7.c b/drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ipu7.c index fa5a1867626f8..8ec571c6bd07f 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ipu7.c +++ b/drivers/staging/media/ipu7/ipu7.c @@ -2169,21 +2169,18 @@ ipu7_isys_init(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct device *parent, isys_adev->mmu = ipu7_mmu_init(dev, base, ISYS_MMID, &ipdata->hw_variant); if (IS_ERR(isys_adev->mmu)) { - dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(isys_adev->mmu), - "ipu7_mmu_init(isys_adev->mmu) failed\n"); + ret = dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(isys_adev->mmu), + "ipu7_mmu_init(isys_adev->mmu) failed\n"); put_device(&isys_adev->auxdev.dev); - kfree(pdata); - return ERR_CAST(isys_adev->mmu); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } isys_adev->mmu->dev = &isys_adev->auxdev.dev; isys_adev->subsys = IPU_IS; ret = ipu7_bus_add_device(isys_adev); - if (ret) { - kfree(pdata); + if (ret) return ERR_PTR(ret); - } return isys_adev; } @@ -2216,21 +2213,18 @@ ipu7_psys_init(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct device *parent, psys_adev->mmu = ipu7_mmu_init(&pdev->dev, base, PSYS_MMID, &ipdata->hw_variant); if (IS_ERR(psys_adev->mmu)) { - dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(psys_adev->mmu), - "ipu7_mmu_init(psys_adev->mmu) failed\n"); + ret = dev_err_probe(&pdev->dev, PTR_ERR(psys_adev->mmu), + "ipu7_mmu_init(psys_adev->mmu) failed\n"); put_device(&psys_adev->auxdev.dev); - kfree(pdata); - return ERR_CAST(psys_adev->mmu); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } psys_adev->mmu->dev = &psys_adev->auxdev.dev; psys_adev->subsys = IPU_PS; ret = ipu7_bus_add_device(psys_adev); - if (ret) { - kfree(pdata); + if (ret) return ERR_PTR(ret); - } return psys_adev; } From b9c4bf133c3c47e23baf4f5403b98a953bf58606 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 273/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie() commit 5a752a616e756844388a1a45404db9fc29fec655 upstream. supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and WPA2 IE copy paths use: memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2); where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255, wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into the adjacent last_mic_err_time field. rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255 when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently. Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the supplicant_ie buffer. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-4-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c index 5d28dbf8b50ef..73fc1d4f92e6c 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c @@ -1446,6 +1446,10 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pie, size_t iel pwpa = rtw_get_wpa_ie(buf, &wpa_ielen, ielen); if (pwpa && wpa_ielen > 0) { + if (wpa_ielen + 2 > sizeof(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } if (rtw_parse_wpa_ie(pwpa, wpa_ielen + 2, &group_cipher, &pairwise_cipher, NULL) == _SUCCESS) { padapter->securitypriv.dot11AuthAlgrthm = dot11AuthAlgrthm_8021X; padapter->securitypriv.ndisauthtype = Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK; @@ -1455,6 +1459,10 @@ static int rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pie, size_t iel pwpa2 = rtw_get_wpa2_ie(buf, &wpa2_ielen, ielen); if (pwpa2 && wpa2_ielen > 0) { + if (wpa2_ielen + 2 > sizeof(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto exit; + } if (rtw_parse_wpa2_ie(pwpa2, wpa2_ielen + 2, &group_cipher, &pairwise_cipher, NULL) == _SUCCESS) { padapter->securitypriv.dot11AuthAlgrthm = dot11AuthAlgrthm_8021X; padapter->securitypriv.ndisauthtype = Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK; From 64ec4192d9c10e96922245d4a6747304cc76b19d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:46:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 274/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() commit a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 upstream. OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004605.1039209-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index 72eb48d554a35..df9a5dc887013 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -703,6 +703,9 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) if ((pmlmeinfo->state&0x03) != WIFI_FW_AP_STATE) return _FAIL; + if (len < WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN) + return _FAIL; + sa = GetAddr2Ptr(pframe); auth_mode = psecuritypriv->dot11AuthAlgrthm; @@ -714,6 +717,9 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) prxattrib->hdrlen = WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN; prxattrib->encrypt = _WEP40_; + if (len < WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 8) + return _FAIL; + iv = pframe+prxattrib->hdrlen; prxattrib->key_index = ((iv[3]>>6)&0x3); @@ -818,7 +824,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 4 + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&ie_len, len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_ - 4); - if (!p || ie_len <= 0) { + if (!p || ie_len != 128) { status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL; goto auth_fail; } From 04f612dc03427e0b1ac80a2611b5ac0ba93ac446 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 275/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop commit f9654207e92283e0acac5d64fe5f8835383b5a23 upstream. The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index df9a5dc887013..dd6a707d7c3a7 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -1430,7 +1430,11 @@ unsigned int OnAssocRsp(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) /* to handle HT, WMM, rate adaptive, update MAC reg */ /* for not to handle the synchronous IO in the tasklet */ for (i = (6 + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN); i < pkt_len;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pkt_len) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pframe + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pkt_len) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: From 69f174a0673b6b7a29b851adb60bc450cdc0ecc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 276/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop commit ed51de4a86e173c3b0ef78e039c2e49e08b11f16 upstream. The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len. When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len. Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-2-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c index 1def9758852cd..2ac90dcd08259 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c @@ -1288,7 +1288,11 @@ void update_beacon_info(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pframe, uint pkt_len, stru len = pkt_len - (_BEACON_IE_OFFSET_ + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN); for (i = 0; i < len;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > len) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pframe + (_BEACON_IE_OFFSET_ + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN) + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > len) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: @@ -1313,7 +1317,7 @@ void update_beacon_info(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pframe, uint pkt_len, stru break; } - i += (pIE->length + 2); + i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length; } } From c38d16b1ffac385c9e4b38447cd5c46af1114b58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 277/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() commit ef61d628dfad38fead1fd2e08979ae9126d011d5 upstream. Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-3-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index dd6a707d7c3a7..9060b63eb424d 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -2972,7 +2972,11 @@ void issue_assocreq(struct adapter *padapter) /* vendor specific IE, such as WPA, WMM, WPS */ for (i = sizeof(struct ndis_802_11_fix_ie); i < pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pmlmeinfo->network.ies + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: @@ -5370,7 +5374,11 @@ u8 join_cmd_hdl(struct adapter *padapter, u8 *pbuf) /* sizeof(struct ndis_802_11_fix_ie) */ for (i = _FIXED_IE_LENGTH_; i < pnetwork->ie_length;) { + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pnetwork->ie_length) + break; pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pnetwork->ies + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pnetwork->ie_length) + break; switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:/* Get WMM IE. */ From a6105ea8ca6ebbc04beaf3bcbf7dbb5985f5d395 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:30 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 278/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in is_ap_in_tkip() IE loop commit 3bf39f711ff27c64be8680a8938bcc5001982e81 upstream. The loop in is_ap_in_tkip() iterates over IEs without verifying that enough bytes remain before dereferencing the IE header or its payload: - pIE->element_id and pIE->length are read without checking that i + sizeof(*pIE) <= ie_length, so a truncated IE at the end of the buffer causes an OOB read. - For WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC the code compares pIE->data + 12, which requires pIE->length >= 16. For WLAN_EID_RSN it compares pIE->data + 8, requiring pIE->length >= 12. Neither requirement is checked. Add the missing IE header and payload bounds checks and guard each data access with an explicit pIE->length minimum, matching the pattern established in update_beacon_info(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-7-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c index 2ac90dcd08259..c1fdc5d677354 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c @@ -1333,15 +1333,23 @@ unsigned int is_ap_in_tkip(struct adapter *padapter) for (i = sizeof(struct ndis_802_11_fix_ie); i < pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length;) { pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pmlmeinfo->network.ies + i); + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; + if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pmlmeinfo->network.ie_length) + break; + switch (pIE->element_id) { case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC: - if ((!memcmp(pIE->data, RTW_WPA_OUI, 4)) && (!memcmp((pIE->data + 12), WPA_TKIP_CIPHER, 4))) + if (pIE->length >= 16 && + !memcmp(pIE->data, RTW_WPA_OUI, 4) && + !memcmp((pIE->data + 12), WPA_TKIP_CIPHER, 4)) return true; break; case WLAN_EID_RSN: - if (!memcmp((pIE->data + 8), RSN_TKIP_CIPHER, 4)) + if (pIE->length >= 12 && + !memcmp((pIE->data + 8), RSN_TKIP_CIPHER, 4)) return true; break; @@ -1349,7 +1357,7 @@ unsigned int is_ap_in_tkip(struct adapter *padapter) break; } - i += (pIE->length + 2); + i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length; } return false; From 6f91621fc45025ad3c0be796b70e6e4cee22fc69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:45:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 279/607] staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() commit f8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0 upstream. HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE. Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-5-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c index c1fdc5d677354..656a1b49ad20c 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_wlan_util.c @@ -935,7 +935,8 @@ void HT_caps_handler(struct adapter *padapter, struct ndis_80211_var_ie *pIE) pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1; - for (i = 0; i < (pIE->length); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < umin(pIE->length, + sizeof(pmlmeinfo->HT_caps.u.HT_cap)); i++) { if (i != 2) { /* Commented by Albert 2010/07/12 */ /* Got the endian issue here. */ From 84a00be9b736aa5dce902a290f62cbbbdcfab9ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dawei Feng Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 12:24:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 280/607] crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe() commit 6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c upstream. When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path. meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker(). Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1, using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_report+0xcb/0x5e0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kasan_report+0xca/0x100 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0 meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto] platform_probe+0x99/0x140 really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310 ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100 driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320 bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220 device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0 bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130 device_add+0xcfd/0x1430 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590 ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro] do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450 ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50 ? __create_object+0x59/0x80 ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0 ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0 ? kfree+0x32c/0x510 ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0 load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0 ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10 ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40 ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0 ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0 ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10 ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0 init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180 ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10 ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0 ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610 ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290 ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x4b/0x220 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220 idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x610 ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x10/0x10 ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x385/0x520 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f7d6d31690d Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f3 b4 0f 00 f7 d8 > RSP: 002b:00007fffc027ac68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055f7b81967c0 RCX: 00007f7d6d31690d RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055f79a0d6cd2 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055f79a0d6cd2 R13: 000055f7b8196790 R14: 000055f79a0d5888 R15: 000055f7b81968e0 Fixes: 48fe583fe541 ("crypto: amlogic - Add crypto accelerator for amlogic GXL") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c index 1c18a5b8470e0..6cb33949915fe 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c @@ -291,8 +291,8 @@ static int meson_crypto_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) return 0; error_alg: meson_unregister_algs(mc); -error_flow: meson_free_chanlist(mc, MAXFLOW - 1); +error_flow: clk_disable_unprepare(mc->busclk); return err; } From ef6feb77e2d91761427c5b773edc9c97e1b706ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 19:24:55 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 281/607] crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc commit 6c9dddeb582fde005360f4fe02c760d45ca05fb5 upstream. krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL completion callback and treat any negative return from crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the worker dereferences the freed slab on completion. KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend bound to krb5->encrypt_name: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7 The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing crypto_wait_req() through every call site. Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to the krb5 enctype name. Fixes: 00244da40f78 ("crypto/krb5: Implement the Kerberos5 rfc3961 encrypt and decrypt functions") Fixes: 6c3c0e86c2ac ("crypto/krb5: Implement the AES enctypes from rfc8009") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Herbert Xu Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c b/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c index c7ea40f900a77..03395b89cc61e 100644 --- a/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c +++ b/crypto/krb5/krb5_api.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ struct crypto_aead *krb5_prepare_encryption(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5, struct crypto_aead *ci = NULL; int ret = -ENOMEM; - ci = crypto_alloc_aead(krb5->encrypt_name, 0, 0); + ci = crypto_alloc_aead(krb5->encrypt_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(ci)) { ret = PTR_ERR(ci); if (ret == -ENOENT) From 94083db751930b1540ddff2b54d4677549c57f81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gil Portnoy Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 19:53:14 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 282/607] ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on SMB2_CLOSE then SMB2_CANCEL commit 10f293a07f9e10e988b0ae44e2e99c631f5a68e0 upstream. Commit f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL") made smb2_cancel() skip a work whose state is KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, so its cancel_fn cannot be fired a second time. But KSMBD_WORK has three states (ACTIVE, CANCELLED, CLOSED), and the same freeing producer path is reached for CLOSED too: SMB2_CLOSE on the locking handle -> set_close_state_blocked_works() sets the deferred work's state to KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED and wakes the smb2_lock() worker. The worker takes the non-ACTIVE early-exit, locks_free_lock()s the file_lock and, because the state is not KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, takes the STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED branch with "goto out2" -- which, like the cancelled branch, skips release_async_work(). The work stays on conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock pointing at the freed file_lock. A subsequent SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId then passes the KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED-only guard (its state is KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED), so smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn again over the freed file_lock -- the same use-after-free fixed, via SMB2_CLOSE instead of a first SMB2_CANCEL: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block __locks_delete_block locks_delete_block ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock smb2_remove_blocked_lock smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn handle_ksmbd_work Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (non-ACTIVE early-exit) ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192 Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 (which already contains f580d27e8928) with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client; the double-SMB2_CANCEL control is silent on that kernel, so the splat is attributable to the CLOSE trigger. Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn fired: both terminal states (CANCELLED and CLOSED) reach the smb2_lock() early-exit that frees the file_lock and skips release_async_work(). Guard on KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE so any non-active work is skipped. Fixes: f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index c012c5a93cc61..fd1c3a7d21601 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -7334,14 +7334,14 @@ int smb2_cancel(struct ksmbd_work *work) continue; /* - * A cancelled deferred byte-range lock frees its - * file_lock and takes the smb2_lock() early-exit that - * skips release_async_work(), so the work stays on - * conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing - * at the freed file_lock. Re-firing it on a second - * SMB2_CANCEL is a use-after-free. + * Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn + * fired. A CANCELLED or CLOSED work already took the + * smb2_lock() non-ACTIVE early-exit that frees the + * file_lock and skips release_async_work(), so it is + * still on conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn + * pointing at the freed file_lock. */ - if (iter->state == KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED) + if (iter->state != KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE) break; ksmbd_debug(SMB, From e8417353cbd078d10531ba3928e609c84ab09e6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zijing Yin Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 07:44:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 283/607] net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states commit d129c3177d7b1138fd5066fcc63a698b3ba415b0 upstream. pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by allocating x->calg and copying only the algorithm name: x->calg = kmalloc_obj(*x->calg); if (!x->calg) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name); x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt; Unlike the authentication (x->aalg) and encryption (x->ealg) branches of the same function, the compression branch never initializes calg->alg_key_len. IPComp carries no key and the allocation only reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field is left containing uninitialized slab data. calg->alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE: xfrm_state_migrate() xfrm_state_clone_and_setup() x->calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig->calg); kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig)); where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8. With a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the 68-byte calg object. Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 print_report+0xf7/0x600 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 xfrm_state_migrate+0x70a/0x1da0 xfrm_migrate+0x753/0x18a0 xfrm_do_migrate+0xb47/0xf10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x411/0xb50 netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x71/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x584/0x850 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b0/0xdc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9f7/0xb90 ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task 9287: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 pfkey_add+0x2652/0x2ea0 pfkey_process+0x6d0/0x830 pfkey_sendmsg+0x42c/0x850 __sys_sendto+0x461/0x4b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ff11000025a74980 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 68-byte region [ff11000025a74980, ff11000025a749c4) Depending on the uninitialized value the same field can instead request an oversized kmemdup() allocation and make the migration clone fail. The XFRM netlink path is not affected: verify_one_alg() rejects an XFRMA_ALG_COMP attribute shorter than xfrm_alg_len(), so a calg added via XFRM_MSG_NEWSA is always self-consistent. Initialize calg->alg_key_len to 0, matching the aalg/ealg branches. Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zijing Yin Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/key/af_key.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index 96fdeadf46e31..a2534e1ad6861 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -1218,6 +1218,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state * pfkey_msg2xfrm_state(struct net *net, goto out; } strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name); + x->calg->alg_key_len = 0; x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt; } else { int keysize = 0; From fe997a84a385f840b593ead92e575503a5046cee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chi Wang Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 15:42:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 284/607] audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit c9a71daaecb2fb1d8c704545cc0b1c920b9bf5d7 upstream. Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE() protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races. All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites: - kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition - audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment) - audit_receive() backlog check - audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_warn() KCSAN reports the following conflicting access pattern (one example): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in audit_log_start / skb_dequeue write (marked) to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 661 on cpu 57: skb_dequeue+0x70/0xf0 kauditd_send_queue+0x71/0x220 kauditd_thread+0x1cb/0x430 kthread+0x1c2/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x162/0x1a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 read to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 36586 on cpu 1: audit_log_start+0x2a0/0x6b0 audit_core_dumps+0x64/0xa0 do_coredump+0x14b/0x1260 get_signal+0xeb2/0xf70 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x41/0x170 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa2/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0 value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== Resolve the race by switching to lockless helper skb_queue_len_lockless(), which internally uses READ_ONCE() and properly pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() write accesses already present on the writer side. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3197542482df ("audit: rework audit_log_start()") Signed-off-by: Chi Wang Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina [PM: line length tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/audit.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 7bbd05cc3d6a5..0594897ce1595 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy) * do the multicast send and rotate records from the * main queue to the retry/hold queues */ wait_event_freezable(kauditd_wait, - (skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) ? 1 : 0)); + (skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue) ? 1 : 0)); } return 0; @@ -1279,7 +1279,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, s.rate_limit = audit_rate_limit; s.backlog_limit = audit_backlog_limit; s.lost = atomic_read(&audit_lost); - s.backlog = skb_queue_len(&audit_queue); + s.backlog = skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue); s.feature_bitmap = AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL; s.backlog_wait_time = audit_backlog_wait_time; s.backlog_wait_time_actual = atomic_read(&audit_backlog_wait_time_actual); @@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff *skb) /* can't block with the ctrl lock, so penalize the sender now */ if (audit_backlog_limit && - (skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) { + (skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) { DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); /* wake kauditd to try and flush the queue */ @@ -1928,7 +1928,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, long stime = audit_backlog_wait_time; while (audit_backlog_limit && - (skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) { + (skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) { /* wake kauditd to try and flush the queue */ wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait); @@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, } else { if (audit_rate_check() && printk_ratelimit()) pr_warn("audit_backlog=%d > audit_backlog_limit=%d\n", - skb_queue_len(&audit_queue), + skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue), audit_backlog_limit); audit_log_lost("backlog limit exceeded"); return NULL; From d3b739db5dc6f688a60d56da872fabaf65246032 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marco Elver Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 16:23:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 285/607] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref commit b66774b48dd98f07254951f74ea6f513efe7ff8b upstream. l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan->conn. If the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending, chan->conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer worker attempts to lock conn->lock: | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318 | Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83 | | CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full) | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 | Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout | Call Trace: | | instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline] | atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline] | __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline] | mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318 | l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422 | process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline] | process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 | worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490 | kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436 | ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 | ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 | | | Allocated by task 320: | l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075 | l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452 | hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline] | hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760 | hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline] | hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847 | hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040 | process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline] | process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 | worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490 | kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436 | ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 | ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 | | Freed by task 322: | hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline] | hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736 | hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405 | hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline] | hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679 | vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690 | __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510 | task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233 | get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810 | arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 | __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline] | exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98 | do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 | entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f | | The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400 | which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 | The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of | freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600) Fix it by having chan->conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn remains alive as long as the channel exists. A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the channel has been deleted from its connection. l2cap_chan_del() atomically sets this flag using test_and_set_bit() instead of setting chan->conn to NULL. All asynchronous workers (l2cap_chan_timeout, l2cap_ack_timeout, l2cap_monitor_timeout, l2cap_retrans_timeout) and l2cap_chan_send() check FLAG_DEL to determine whether the channel has been torn down, rather than testing chan->conn for NULL. Fixes: 8c8e620467a7 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen()") Cc: Cc: Siwei Zhang Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Reported-by: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260521021249.3258069-1-oss%40fourdim.xyz Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h index e0a1f2293679a..6578da0048fb4 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h @@ -748,6 +748,7 @@ enum { FLAG_ECRED_CONN_REQ_SENT, FLAG_PENDING_SECURITY, FLAG_HOLD_HCI_CONN, + FLAG_DEL, }; /* Lock nesting levels for L2CAP channels. We need these because lockdep diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 58c05a9aa96dd..26fbf61f6e332 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static void l2cap_chan_timeout(struct work_struct *work) BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state)); - if (!conn) { + if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) { l2cap_chan_put(chan); return; } @@ -422,6 +422,9 @@ static void l2cap_chan_timeout(struct work_struct *work) */ l2cap_chan_lock(chan); + if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) + goto unlock; + if (chan->state == BT_CONNECTED || chan->state == BT_CONFIG) reason = ECONNREFUSED; else if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT && @@ -434,10 +437,10 @@ static void l2cap_chan_timeout(struct work_struct *work) chan->ops->close(chan); +unlock: l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); - l2cap_chan_put(chan); - mutex_unlock(&conn->lock); + l2cap_chan_put(chan); } struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_chan_create(void) @@ -490,6 +493,9 @@ static void l2cap_chan_destroy(struct kref *kref) list_del(&chan->global_l); write_unlock(&chan_list_lock); + if (chan->conn) + l2cap_conn_put(chan->conn); + kfree(chan); } @@ -593,7 +599,7 @@ void __l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan) conn->disc_reason = HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM; - chan->conn = conn; + chan->conn = l2cap_conn_get(conn); switch (chan->chan_type) { case L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED: @@ -648,30 +654,26 @@ void l2cap_chan_add(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_chan *chan) void l2cap_chan_del(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) { - struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn; - __clear_chan_timer(chan); - BT_DBG("chan %p, conn %p, err %d, state %s", chan, conn, err, + BT_DBG("chan %p, err %d, state %s", chan, err, state_to_string(chan->state)); chan->ops->teardown(chan, err); - if (conn) { + if (!test_and_set_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) { /* Delete from channel list */ list_del(&chan->list); l2cap_chan_put(chan); - chan->conn = NULL; - /* Reference was only held for non-fixed channels or * fixed channels that explicitly requested it using the * FLAG_HOLD_HCI_CONN flag. */ if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_FIXED || test_bit(FLAG_HOLD_HCI_CONN, &chan->flags)) - hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon); + hci_conn_drop(chan->conn->hcon); } if (test_bit(CONF_NOT_COMPLETE, &chan->conf_state)) @@ -1903,7 +1905,7 @@ static void l2cap_monitor_timeout(struct work_struct *work) l2cap_chan_lock(chan); - if (!chan->conn) { + if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) { l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); l2cap_chan_put(chan); return; @@ -1924,7 +1926,7 @@ static void l2cap_retrans_timeout(struct work_struct *work) l2cap_chan_lock(chan); - if (!chan->conn) { + if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) { l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); l2cap_chan_put(chan); return; @@ -2565,7 +2567,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_send(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int err; struct sk_buff_head seg_queue; - if (!chan->conn) + if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) return -ENOTCONN; /* Connectionless channel */ @@ -3160,12 +3162,16 @@ static void l2cap_ack_timeout(struct work_struct *work) l2cap_chan_lock(chan); + if (test_bit(FLAG_DEL, &chan->flags)) + goto unlock; + frames_to_ack = __seq_offset(chan, chan->buffer_seq, chan->last_acked_seq); if (frames_to_ack) l2cap_send_rr_or_rnr(chan, 0); +unlock: l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); l2cap_chan_put(chan); } From b346efa825b5e4386f19bc63f81141652d496ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Page Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 16:09:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 286/607] Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix UAF of hci_conn_params in add_device_complete commit fa85d985f614bc3feb343000f14a1072e99b0df1 upstream. add_device_complete() runs from the hci_cmd_sync_work kworker, which holds only hci_req_sync_lock and *not* hci_dev_lock. It calls hci_conn_params_lookup() and then dereferences the returned object (params->flags) without taking hci_dev_lock: params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, le_addr_type(cp->addr.type)); ... device_flags_changed(NULL, hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type, hdev->conn_flags, params ? params->flags : 0); hci_conn_params_lookup() walks hdev->le_conn_params and is documented to require hdev->lock. A concurrent MGMT_OP_REMOVE_DEVICE (remove_device()), which does run under hci_dev_lock, can call hci_conn_params_free() to list_del() and kfree() the very object the lookup returned, so the subsequent params->flags read touches freed memory [0]. Hold hci_dev_lock() across the hci_conn_params_lookup() and the read of params->flags (and the matching event emission) so the lookup result cannot be freed by a concurrent remove_device() before it is used, honouring the locking contract of hci_conn_params_lookup(). [0]: (trailing page/memory-state dump trimmed) BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671 Read of size 1 at addr ffff000017ab26c1 by task kworker/u9:8/388 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 388 Comm: kworker/u9:8 Not tainted 7.0.11 #20 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:499 (C) __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0xd4 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x118/0x5d8 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xb0/0xf4 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378 add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x14c/0x240 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334 process_one_work+0x628/0xd38 kernel/workqueue.c:3289 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3372 [inline] worker_thread+0x7a8/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3453 kthread+0x39c/0x444 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 Allocated by task 3401: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:570 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1b0/0x458 mm/slub.c:5385 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:950 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] hci_conn_params_add+0x10c/0x4b0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2279 hci_conn_params_set net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5162 [inline] add_device+0x5b4/0xa54 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7755 hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1721 [inline] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x10b4/0x1dd0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1841 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x128 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x250/0x390 net/socket.c:1195 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x66c/0xab0 fs/read_write.c:688 ksys_write+0x1fc/0x24c fs/read_write.c:740 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:751 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:748 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa4 fs/read_write.c:748 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x84/0x2a8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x294 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x38/0xac arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:724 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:743 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596 Freed by task 3740: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x74 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x88/0xb8 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2685 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:6170 [inline] kfree+0x14c/0x458 mm/slub.c:6488 hci_conn_params_free+0x288/0x484 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2312 remove_device+0x4b0/0x968 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7919 hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1721 [inline] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x10b4/0x1dd0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1841 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x128 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x250/0x390 net/socket.c:1195 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x66c/0xab0 fs/read_write.c:688 ksys_write+0x1fc/0x24c fs/read_write.c:740 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:751 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:748 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa4 fs/read_write.c:748 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x84/0x2a8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x294 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x38/0xac arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:724 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:743 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596 Fixes: 1e2e3044c1bc ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix MGMT_OP_ADD_DEVICE invalid device flags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Bynario AI Signed-off-by: Samuel Page Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index c87ec0138c430..90da285a00cdf 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -7641,6 +7641,8 @@ static void add_device_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) if (!err) { struct hci_conn_params *params; + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, le_addr_type(cp->addr.type)); @@ -7649,6 +7651,7 @@ static void add_device_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) device_flags_changed(NULL, hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type, hdev->conn_flags, params ? params->flags : 0); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); } mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_ADD_DEVICE, From cbb684ef39e9f292464da133be622f9734bb6f49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 00:52:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 287/607] coresight: etb10: restore atomic_t for shared reading state commit fa09f08ede3db3050ae16ae1ed92c902d0cada23 upstream. The etb10 miscdevice uses drvdata->reading as a shared exclusivity gate for userspace buffer access. etb_open() claims that gate with local_cmpxchg(), and etb_release() clears it with local_set(). That gate is shared per-device state rather than CPU-local state. A running system can reach it whenever /dev/ is opened, closed, and reopened by different tasks while the device remains registered, so the same drvdata->reading variable may be claimed on one CPU and later cleared on another. This code used to use atomic_t for the same gate, but commit 27b10da8fff2 ("coresight: etb10: moving to local atomic operations") changed it to local_t even though the access pattern remained cross-task and cross-CPU. Restore atomic_t together with atomic_cmpxchg() and atomic_set() so the exclusivity gate again uses a primitive intended for shared state. The issue was found on Linux v6.18.21 by our static analysis tool while scanning surviving local_t-on-shared-state sites, and then manually reviewed against the live etb10 file-op path. It was runtime-validated with a reproducible QEMU no-device KCSAN PoC that kept the same report-local contract: 1. use one shared struct etb_drvdata carrier and its drvdata->reading gate; 2. call etb_open() and etb_release() sequentially on that gate to confirm the original claim/clear path; 3. bind the open side to CPU0 and the release side to CPU1 for the same gate to show cross-CPU ownership; 4. run bound workers that repeatedly race etb_open() and etb_release() on the same gate until KCSAN reports a target hit. The harness recorded: L1 passed open=1 release=1 reading_after_open=1 reading_after_release=0 L2 passed open_cpu=0 release_cpu=1 cross_cpu_release=1 reading_after=0 open_ret=0 Representative KCSAN excerpt from the no-device validation run: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in etb_open.constprop.0.isra.0 [vuln_msv] write to 0xffffffffc0003810 of 4 bytes by task 216 on cpu 1: etb_open.constprop.0.isra.0+0x38/0x80 [vuln_msv] l3_worker_thread_fn+0x4f/0xf0 [vuln_msv] kthread+0x17e/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 read to 0xffffffffc0003810 of 4 bytes by task 215 on cpu 0: etb_open.constprop.0.isra.0+0x18/0x80 [vuln_msv] l3_worker_thread_fn+0x4f/0xf0 [vuln_msv] kthread+0x17e/0x1c0 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 215 Comm: etb10_l3_a Tainted: G O 6.1.66 #2 This no-device harness is not a real ETB10 hardware end-to-end run, but it preserves the same shared drvdata->reading gate and the same etb_open()/etb_release() claim/clear contract. No real ETB10 hardware was available for runtime testing. Build-tested with: make olddefconfig make -j"$(nproc)" drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.o Fixes: 27b10da8fff2 ("coresight: etb10: moving to local atomic operations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Reviewed-by: James Clark Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260528165201.319452-1-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c index 35db1b6093d15..98269ea6f7ae3 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etb10.c @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct etb_drvdata { struct coresight_device *csdev; struct miscdevice miscdev; raw_spinlock_t spinlock; - local_t reading; + atomic_t reading; pid_t pid; u8 *buf; u32 buffer_depth; @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static int etb_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct etb_drvdata *drvdata = container_of(file->private_data, struct etb_drvdata, miscdev); - if (local_cmpxchg(&drvdata->reading, 0, 1)) + if (atomic_cmpxchg(&drvdata->reading, 0, 1)) return -EBUSY; dev_dbg(&drvdata->csdev->dev, "%s: successfully opened\n", __func__); @@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ static int etb_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct etb_drvdata *drvdata = container_of(file->private_data, struct etb_drvdata, miscdev); - local_set(&drvdata->reading, 0); + atomic_set(&drvdata->reading, 0); dev_dbg(&drvdata->csdev->dev, "%s: released\n", __func__); return 0; From c00164c9e7fa6145886ad666806cb5347895de5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 16:47:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 288/607] debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable commit b81dde13cc163450dcb402dcc915ef13ba241e01 upstream. syzbot reported a puzzling splat: WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20 stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup. Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the following a few seconds before the splat: ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug objects and freed the shadow objects: debug_object_assert_init() if (!debug_objects_enabled) return; obj = alloc(); if (!obj) { // Out of memory debug_objects_enabled = false; free_objects(); obj = lookup_or_alloc(); // The lookup failed because the other side // removed the objects, so this returns // an error code as the object in question // is not statically initialized if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj)) return; if (!obj) { debug_oom(); return; } print(...) if (!debug_objects_enabled) return; fixup(...) The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false, but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer disfunctional. This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow object. Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before invoking the print and fixup function in those two places. Fixes: b84d435cc228 ("debugobjects: Extend to assert that an object is initialized") Reported-by: syzbot+5e8dda76ca21dae314b6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/874iiwlzlb.ffs@fw13 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/debugobjects.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c index 17f116247bb42..0149411096fa4 100644 --- a/lib/debugobjects.c +++ b/lib/debugobjects.c @@ -894,6 +894,14 @@ int debug_object_activate(void *addr, const struct debug_obj_descr *descr) } raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&db->lock, flags); + + /* + * lookup_object_or_alloc() might have raced with a concurrent + * allocation failure which disabled debug objects. + */ + if (!debug_objects_enabled) + return 0; + debug_print_object(&o, "activate"); switch (o.state) { @@ -1071,6 +1079,15 @@ void debug_object_assert_init(void *addr, const struct debug_obj_descr *descr) return; } + /* + * lookup_object_or_alloc() might have raced with a concurrent + * allocation failure which disabled debug objects. Don't run the fixup + * as it might turn a valid object useless. See for example + * hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(). + */ + if (!debug_objects_enabled) + return; + /* Object is neither tracked nor static. It's not initialized. */ debug_print_object(&o, "assert_init"); debug_object_fixup(descr->fixup_assert_init, addr, ODEBUG_STATE_NOTAVAILABLE); From cf28fc1658463d768657cf1c27a83980d4ba7ef2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yunpeng Tian Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 07:19:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 289/607] fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns commit 57382ec6ac63b63dce2789e835fded28b698ae79 upstream. In the analysis pass of $LogFile journal replay, log_replay() copies LCNs from each action log record into an existing Dirty Page Table (DPT) entry without bounding the destination index. A crafted NTFS image with DPT entry lcns_follow=1 and an action log record with lcns_follow=2 produces a kernel slab out-of-bounds write at mount time: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in log_replay+0x654c/0xdb60 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880095e1040 by task mount Two attacker-controlled fields can drive j+i past the allocated page_lcns[] array: 1. dp->lcns_follow (capacity) can be smaller than lrh->lcns_follow. 2. lrh->target_vcn may be smaller than dp->vcn, making the u64 subtraction wrap to a huge size_t. Validate target VCN delta and per-record LCN count against the DPT entry capacity, bail via the existing out: cleanup label with -EINVAL. This mirrors the bounds-check pattern added in commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") and commit 0ca0485e4b2e ("fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check"). Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Reported-by: Yunpeng Tian Reported-by: Mingda Zhang Reported-by: Gongming Wang Reported-by: Peiyuan Xu Reported-by: Qinrun Dai Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yunpeng Tian Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c index 90d1de22fee68..5d9a2e1159af9 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -4546,11 +4546,21 @@ int log_replay(struct ntfs_inode *ni, bool *initialized) * whole routine a loop, case Lcns do not fit below. */ t16 = le16_to_cpu(lrh->lcns_follow); - for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { - size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - - le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); - dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; - } + t32 = le32_to_cpu(dp->lcns_follow); + if (le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) < le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + for (i = 0; i < t16; i++) { + size_t j = (size_t)(le64_to_cpu(lrh->target_vcn) - + le64_to_cpu(dp->vcn)); + if (j >= t32 || i >= t32 - j) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + dp->page_lcns[j + i] = lrh->page_lcns[i]; + } goto next_log_record_analyze; From f71e8d9875069fa73e335f63f02ec6e52e3aaa51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Koichiro Den Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 17:30:28 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 290/607] NTB: epf: Avoid calling pci_irq_vector() from hardirq context commit 4dcddc1c794d1c65eda68f1f8dd04a0fecc0870f upstream. ntb_epf_vec_isr() calls pci_irq_vector() in hardirq context to derive the vector number. pci_irq_vector() calls msi_get_virq() that takes a mutex and can therefore trigger "scheduling while atomic" splats: BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u33:0/55/0x00010001 ... Call trace: ... schedule+0x38/0x110 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x50 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x848/0x908 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x18/0x30 mutex_lock+0x4c/0x60 msi_domain_get_virq+0xe8/0x138 pci_irq_vector+0x2c/0x60 ntb_epf_vec_isr+0x28/0x120 [ntb_hw_epf] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x3a8 handle_irq_event+0x48/0x100 handle_edge_irq+0x100/0x1c8 ... Cache the Linux IRQ number for vector 0 when vectors are allocated and use it as a base in the ISR. Running the ISR in a threaded IRQ handler would also avoid the problem, but that would be unnecessary here. Fixes: 812ce2f8d14e ("NTB: Add support for EPF PCI Non-Transparent Bridge") Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304083028.1391068-3-den@valinux.co.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c index 9935da48a52ea..8aaf8f9bc69c9 100644 --- a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c +++ b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ struct ntb_epf_dev { int db_val; u64 db_valid_mask; + int irq_base; }; #define ntb_ndev(__ntb) container_of(__ntb, struct ntb_epf_dev, ntb) @@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ static irqreturn_t ntb_epf_vec_isr(int irq, void *dev) struct ntb_epf_dev *ndev = dev; int irq_no; - irq_no = irq - pci_irq_vector(ndev->ntb.pdev, 0); + irq_no = irq - ndev->irq_base; ndev->db_val = irq_no + 1; if (irq_no == 0) @@ -350,6 +351,7 @@ static int ntb_epf_init_isr(struct ntb_epf_dev *ndev, int msi_min, int msi_max) argument &= ~MSIX_ENABLE; } + ndev->irq_base = pci_irq_vector(pdev, 0); for (i = 0; i < irq; i++) { ret = request_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), ntb_epf_vec_isr, 0, "ntb_epf", ndev); From 4750909a40da9016185e0ac991510a278cecb1e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:40:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 291/607] gpio: eic-sprd: use raw_spinlock_t in the irq startup path commit 90f0109019e6817eb40a486671b7722d1544ae29 upstream. sprd_eic_irq_unmask() enables the GPIO IRQ and then updates controller state through sprd_eic_update(), which takes sprd_eic->lock with spin_lock_irqsave(). The callback can be reached from irq_startup() while setting up a requested IRQ. That path is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the request_threaded_irq() -> __setup_irq() -> irq_startup() -> sprd_eic_irq_unmask() -> sprd_eic_update() carrier and used the original spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock) edge. Lockdep reported: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context hardirqs last disabled at ... __setup_irq.constprop.0 ... [vuln_msv] sprd_rt_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x30 [vuln_msv] sprd_eic_update.constprop.0+0x48/0x90 [vuln_msv] sprd_eic_irq_unmask.constprop.0+0x35/0x50 [vuln_msv] __setup_irq.constprop.0+0xd/0x30 [vuln_msv] Convert the Spreadtrum EIC controller lock to raw_spinlock_t. The locked section only serializes MMIO register updates and does not contain sleepable operations, so keeping it non-sleeping is appropriate for the irqchip callbacks. Fixes: 25518e024e3a ("gpio: Add Spreadtrum EIC driver support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617154035.1199948-3-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c index 50fafeda8d7e2..3b7ebcf12fe7f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ struct sprd_eic { struct notifier_block irq_nb; void __iomem *base[SPRD_EIC_MAX_BANK]; enum sprd_eic_type type; - spinlock_t lock; + raw_spinlock_t lock; int irq; }; @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static void sprd_eic_update(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int offset, unsigned long flags; u32 tmp; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock, flags); tmp = readl_relaxed(base + reg); if (val) @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static void sprd_eic_update(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int offset, tmp &= ~BIT(SPRD_EIC_BIT(offset)); writel_relaxed(tmp, base + reg); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sprd_eic->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sprd_eic->lock, flags); } static int sprd_eic_read(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int offset, u16 reg) @@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static int sprd_eic_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!sprd_eic) return -ENOMEM; - spin_lock_init(&sprd_eic->lock); + raw_spin_lock_init(&sprd_eic->lock); sprd_eic->type = pdata->type; sprd_eic->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); From 4508366ab7dd0c2917a51a9c2e23cc1b9d35157a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:40:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 292/607] gpio: sch: use raw_spinlock_t in the irq startup path commit 286533cb14a3c8a8bd39ff64ea2fc8e1aa0f638b upstream. sch_irq_unmask() enables the GPIO IRQ and then updates the controller state through sch_irq_mask_unmask(), which takes sch->lock with spin_lock_irqsave(). The callback can be reached from irq_startup() while setting up a requested IRQ. That path is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the request_threaded_irq() -> __setup_irq() -> irq_startup() -> sch_irq_unmask() -> sch_irq_mask_unmask() carrier and used the original spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock) edge. Lockdep reported: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context hardirqs last disabled at ... __setup_irq.constprop.0 ... [vuln_msv] sch_rt_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x30 [vuln_msv] sch_irq_mask_unmask.constprop.0+0x31/0x70 [vuln_msv] __setup_irq.constprop.0+0xd/0x30 [vuln_msv] Convert the SCH controller lock to raw_spinlock_t. The same lock is also used by the GPIO direction and value callbacks, but those critical sections only update MMIO-backed GPIO registers and do not contain sleepable operations. Keeping this register lock non-sleeping is therefore appropriate for the irqchip callbacks and does not change the GPIO-side locking contract. Fixes: 7a81638485c1 ("gpio: sch: Add edge event support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617154035.1199948-2-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpio/gpio-sch.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-sch.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-sch.c index 966d16a6d5157..5e361742a11ad 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-sch.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-sch.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct sch_gpio { struct gpio_chip chip; void __iomem *regs; - spinlock_t lock; + raw_spinlock_t lock; unsigned short resume_base; /* GPE handling */ @@ -104,9 +104,9 @@ static int sch_gpio_direction_in(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int gpio_num) struct sch_gpio *sch = gpiochip_get_data(gc); unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GIO, 1); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); return 0; } @@ -122,9 +122,9 @@ static int sch_gpio_set(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int gpio_num, int val) struct sch_gpio *sch = gpiochip_get_data(gc); unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GLV, val); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); return 0; } @@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ static int sch_gpio_direction_out(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned int gpio_num, struct sch_gpio *sch = gpiochip_get_data(gc); unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GIO, 0); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); /* * according to the datasheet, writing to the level register has no @@ -196,14 +196,14 @@ static int sch_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type) return -EINVAL; } - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GTPE, rising); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GTNE, falling); irq_set_handler_locked(d, handle_edge_irq); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); return 0; } @@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ static void sch_irq_ack(struct irq_data *d) irq_hw_number_t gpio_num = irqd_to_hwirq(d); unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GTS, 1); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); } static void sch_irq_mask_unmask(struct gpio_chip *gc, irq_hw_number_t gpio_num, int val) @@ -225,9 +225,9 @@ static void sch_irq_mask_unmask(struct gpio_chip *gc, irq_hw_number_t gpio_num, struct sch_gpio *sch = gpiochip_get_data(gc); unsigned long flags; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); sch_gpio_reg_set(sch, gpio_num, GGPE, val); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); } static void sch_irq_mask(struct irq_data *d) @@ -268,12 +268,12 @@ static u32 sch_gpio_gpe_handler(acpi_handle gpe_device, u32 gpe, void *context) int offset; u32 ret; - spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sch->lock, flags); core_status = ioread32(sch->regs + CORE_BANK_OFFSET + GTS); resume_status = ioread32(sch->regs + RESUME_BANK_OFFSET + GTS); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sch->lock, flags); pending = (resume_status << sch->resume_base) | core_status; for_each_set_bit(offset, &pending, sch->chip.ngpio) @@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int sch_gpio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) sch->regs = regs; - spin_lock_init(&sch->lock); + raw_spin_lock_init(&sch->lock); sch->chip = sch_gpio_chip; sch->chip.label = dev_name(dev); sch->chip.parent = dev; From 722869fcff598fad20d5ab79c305897a7534708b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasileios Almpanis Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 16:45:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 293/607] io_uring/nop: fix file reference leak with IOSQE_FIXED_FILE commit 2564ca2e31bd8ee8348362941af2ee4671e487ca upstream. NOP file-acquisition support choses between a fixed (registered) file and a normal fget()'d file based on its own IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE flag in sqe->nop_flags. However, a request's REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is set independently from the generic IOSQE_FIXED_FILE sqe flag during request init, before the issue handler runs. If a NOP is submitted with IOSQE_FIXED_FILE set (so REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is set) but without IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE, io_nop() takes the normal path and grabs a real reference via io_file_get_normal(). On completion, io_put_file() only drops the reference when REQ_F_FIXED_FILE is clear, so the fget()'d file is never released and leaks: BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff88800f42c240 (size 176): kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x358/0x440 alloc_empty_file+0x57/0x180 path_openat+0x44/0x1e50 do_file_open+0x121/0x200 do_sys_openat2+0xa7/0x150 __x64_sys_openat+0x82/0xf0 Decide between fixed and normal file acquisition from REQ_F_FIXED_FILE, the same way io_assign_file() does for every other opcode, and fold IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE into REQ_F_FIXED_FILE at prep time. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a85f31052bce ("io_uring/nop: add support for testing registered files and buffers") Reported-by: syzbot+2cd473471e77bda12b0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=879092631b98f73a28ea405adacfa5bb34a14a25 Signed-off-by: Vasileios Almpanis Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260615144619.482749-1-vasilisalmpanis@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- io_uring/nop.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/io_uring/nop.c b/io_uring/nop.c index f5c9969e7f64a..2f9aa48832619 100644 --- a/io_uring/nop.c +++ b/io_uring/nop.c @@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int io_nop_prep(struct io_kiocb *req, const struct io_uring_sqe *sqe) nop->fd = READ_ONCE(sqe->fd); else nop->fd = -1; + if (nop->flags & IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE) + req->flags |= REQ_F_FIXED_FILE; if (nop->flags & IORING_NOP_FIXED_BUFFER) req->buf_index = READ_ONCE(sqe->buf_index); if (nop->flags & IORING_NOP_CQE32) { @@ -60,12 +62,10 @@ int io_nop(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags) int ret = nop->result; if (nop->flags & IORING_NOP_FILE) { - if (nop->flags & IORING_NOP_FIXED_FILE) { + if (req->flags & REQ_F_FIXED_FILE) req->file = io_file_get_fixed(req, nop->fd, issue_flags); - req->flags |= REQ_F_FIXED_FILE; - } else { + else req->file = io_file_get_normal(req, nop->fd); - } if (!req->file) { ret = -EBADF; goto done; From 1636d85dc139b07c0449308f2bb5e0c7a2e0da99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 01:22:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 294/607] io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item commit 29bef9934b2521f787bb15dd1985d4c0d12ae02a upstream. commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one level too early. io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue running after exit has begun. Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close the ring. Exit then takes a long time. Fixes: 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527172203.2043962-1-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- io_uring/io-wq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/io_uring/io-wq.c b/io_uring/io-wq.c index bd47d32f71c25..af00f942a75fa 100644 --- a/io_uring/io-wq.c +++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c @@ -601,7 +601,6 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct io_wq_acct *acct, struct io_wq *wq = worker->wq; do { - bool do_kill = test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state); struct io_wq_work *work; /* @@ -637,6 +636,7 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct io_wq_acct *acct, /* handle a whole dependent link */ do { + bool do_kill = test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state); struct io_wq_work *next_hashed, *linked; unsigned int work_flags = atomic_read(&work->flags); unsigned int hash = __io_wq_is_hashed(work_flags) From f090acf881a262a51a3347f7e98991011c329ec4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Wigham Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 23:52:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 295/607] io_uring/rw: preserve partial result for iopoll commit c554246ff4c68abf71b61a89c6e39d3cf94f523e upstream. A partial read will store the completed byte count in io->bytes_done. The regular completion path applies io_fixup_rw_res() so that, when the following operation reaches EOF, the number of bytes already read is returned. The iopoll completion path does not apply this fixup to the return value and can return zero instead. Use the fixup result when updating the CQE, and the raw result for the reissue check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4d9cb92ca41d ("io_uring/rw: fix short rw error handling") Signed-off-by: Michael Wigham Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613225240.34032-1-michael@wigham.net Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- io_uring/rw.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/io_uring/rw.c b/io_uring/rw.c index d7388a4a3ea5e..1a5dee8fe619f 100644 --- a/io_uring/rw.c +++ b/io_uring/rw.c @@ -611,15 +611,15 @@ static void io_complete_rw_iopoll(struct kiocb *kiocb, long res) { struct io_rw *rw = container_of(kiocb, struct io_rw, kiocb); struct io_kiocb *req = cmd_to_io_kiocb(rw); + int final_res = io_fixup_rw_res(req, res); if (kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_WRITE) io_req_end_write(req); - if (unlikely(res != req->cqe.res)) { - if (res == -EAGAIN && io_rw_should_reissue(req)) - req->flags |= REQ_F_REISSUE | REQ_F_BL_NO_RECYCLE; - else - req->cqe.res = res; - } + + if (res == -EAGAIN && io_rw_should_reissue(req)) + req->flags |= REQ_F_REISSUE | REQ_F_BL_NO_RECYCLE; + else if (unlikely(final_res != req->cqe.res)) + req->cqe.res = final_res; /* order with io_iopoll_complete() checking ->iopoll_completed */ smp_store_release(&req->iopoll_completed, 1); From a33f37f8d079da7236ed7b7e2aed2a34ab81e7cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Breno Leitao Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 05:03:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 296/607] netpoll: fix a use-after-free on shutdown path commit 45f1458a85017a023f138b22ac5c76abd477db42 upstream. There is a use-after-free error on netpoll, which is clearly detected by KASAN. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3b/0x80 Read of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/9:1 Workqueue: events queue_process Call Trace: skb_dequeue+0x1e/0xb0 queue_process+0x2c/0x600 process_scheduled_works+0x4b6/0x850 worker_thread+0x414/0x5a0 Allocated by task 242: __netpoll_setup+0x201/0x4a0 netpoll_setup+0x249/0x550 enabled_store+0x32f/0x380 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1b7/0x540 rcu_core+0x3f8/0x7a0 The problem happens when there is a pending TX worker running in parallel with the cleanup path. This is what happens on netpoll shutdown path: 1) __netpoll_cleanup() is called 2) set dev->npinfo to NULL 3) call_rcu() with rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() 3.1) rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() tries to cancel all workers with cancel_delayed_work(), but doesn't wait for the worker to finish 4) and kfree(npinfo); Because 3.1) doesn't really cancel the work, as the comment says "we can't call cancel_delayed_work_sync here, as we are in softirq", the TX worker can run after 4). Tl;DR: queue_process() is not an RCU reader, it reaches npinfo through the work item via container_of(). Use disable_delayed_work_sync() to ensure the worker is completely stopped and prevent any future re-arming attempts. Once npinfo is set to NULL, senders will bail out and not queue new work. The disable flag ensures any in-flight re-arming attempts also fail silently. In the future, we can do the cleanup inline here without needing the npinfo->rcu rcu_head, but that is net-next material. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 38e6bc185d95 ("netpoll: make __netpoll_cleanup non-block") Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625-netpoll_rcu_fix-v2-1-0748ffac1e98@debian.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/netpoll.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/netpoll.c b/net/core/netpoll.c index 854e37c41653b..9ef344a6932f9 100644 --- a/net/core/netpoll.c +++ b/net/core/netpoll.c @@ -812,14 +812,6 @@ static void rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info(struct rcu_head *rcu_head) container_of(rcu_head, struct netpoll_info, rcu); skb_queue_purge(&npinfo->txq); - - /* we can't call cancel_delayed_work_sync here, as we are in softirq */ - cancel_delayed_work(&npinfo->tx_work); - - /* clean after last, unfinished work */ - __skb_queue_purge(&npinfo->txq); - /* now cancel it again */ - cancel_delayed_work(&npinfo->tx_work); kfree(npinfo); } @@ -843,6 +835,7 @@ static void __netpoll_cleanup(struct netpoll *np) ops->ndo_netpoll_cleanup(np->dev); RCU_INIT_POINTER(np->dev->npinfo, NULL); + disable_delayed_work_sync(&npinfo->tx_work); call_rcu(&npinfo->rcu, rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info); } From 2ca18df1c2611f70eb3eb487e02ae85eb703b284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuyang Huang Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 08:50:14 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 297/607] ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction commit 7993211bde166471dffac074dc965489f86531f8 upstream. When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 Fixes: e9897071350b ("igmp: hash a hash table to speedup ip_check_mc_rcu()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yuyang Huang Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701235014.73505-1-yuyanghuang@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c index 0adc993c211d7..449cb4ba6153e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c @@ -1904,6 +1904,7 @@ void ip_mc_destroy_dev(struct in_device *in_dev) #endif while ((i = rtnl_dereference(in_dev->mc_list)) != NULL) { + ip_mc_hash_remove(in_dev, i); in_dev->mc_list = i->next_rcu; in_dev->mc_count--; ip_mc_clear_src(i); From bbae351c0f32f7c200249e4aa6561b2b419dcf69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wyatt Feng Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 18:31:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 298/607] net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes commit efb8763d7bbb40cff4cc55a6b62c3095a038149c upstream. Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the `u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap to large values. With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the `tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through `proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require `tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot become negative either. When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate `extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the `tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's `tcp_max_reordering`. Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`. This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through signed integer overflow. Fixes: 91cc17c0e5e5 ("[TCP]: MTUprobe: receiver window & data available checks fixed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1a5b7e1ef4d70fbad8c8ee0b82d8405f3c964a3d.1781395200.git.bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 10 ++++++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index ce9b077343cac..afcbb9d48cfa2 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -1040,7 +1040,9 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, + .extra2 = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, }, { .procname = "tcp_retries1", @@ -1275,7 +1277,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = { .data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, }, { .procname = "tcp_dsack", @@ -1640,6 +1643,9 @@ static __net_init int ipv4_sysctl_init_net(struct net *net) */ table[i].mode &= ~0222; } + if (table[i].extra2 >= (void *)&init_net.ipv4 && + table[i].extra2 < (void *)(&init_net.ipv4 + 1)) + table[i].extra2 += (void *)net - (void *)&init_net; } } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 6937b2b03ef93..318d548b606e5 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk) struct sk_buff *skb, *nskb, *next; struct net *net = sock_net(sk); int probe_size; - int size_needed; + u64 size_needed; int copy, len; int mss_now; int interval; @@ -2628,7 +2628,7 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk) mss_now = tcp_current_mss(sk); probe_size = tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, (icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high + icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low) >> 1); - size_needed = probe_size + (tp->reordering + 1) * tp->mss_cache; + size_needed = probe_size + (tp->reordering + 1) * (u64)tp->mss_cache; interval = icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high - icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low; /* When misfortune happens, we are reprobing actively, * and then reprobe timer has expired. We stick with current From b5f41d5bf08e7b1b14fa0bd640975e6d78dc006d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrei Kuchynski Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 13:17:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 299/607] mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success commit 8b2c1d41bc36c100b38ce5ee6def246c527eaf8a upstream. If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set, sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released. Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available once all initialization steps have succeeded. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec' Call trace: sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44 device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c device_add+0xf0/0x50c ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 ... BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230 Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe] Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __memcpy+0x44/0x230 cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto] cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1c1d152cc5ac ("platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - utilize new cdev_device_add helper function") Co-developed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Signed-off-by: Andrei Kuchynski Reviewed-by: Benson Leung Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260427131721.1165078-1-akuchynski@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Lee Jones Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c b/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c index dc80a272726bb..afd5e33647f07 100644 --- a/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c +++ b/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c @@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ static int ec_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!ec) return retval; - dev_set_drvdata(dev, ec); ec->ec_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent); ec->dev = dev; ec->cmd_offset = ec_platform->cmd_offset; @@ -237,6 +236,8 @@ static int ec_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (retval) goto failed; + dev_set_drvdata(dev, ec); + /* check whether this EC is a sensor hub. */ if (cros_ec_get_sensor_count(ec) > 0) { retval = mfd_add_hotplug_devices(ec->dev, From 560e21e8ccff813e84d05f6500907c549a3d6985 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shakeel Butt Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:20:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 300/607] mm/shrinker: do not hold RCU lock in shrinker_debugfs_count_show() commit b902890c62d200b3509cb5e09cf1e0a66553c128 upstream. Reading the debugfs "count" file of a memcg-aware shrinker can sleep inside an RCU read-side critical section: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/cgroup/rstat.c:421 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 css_rstat_flush mem_cgroup_flush_stats zswap_shrinker_count shrinker_debugfs_count_show shrinker_debugfs_count_show() invokes the ->count_objects() callback under rcu_read_lock(). The zswap callback flushes memcg stats via css_rstat_flush(), which may sleep, so it must not run under RCU. The RCU lock is not needed here. mem_cgroup_iter() takes RCU internally and returns a memcg holding a css reference (dropped on the next iteration or by mem_cgroup_iter_break()), so the memcg stays alive without it. The shrinker is kept alive by the open debugfs file: shrinker_free() removes the debugfs entries via debugfs_remove_recursive(), which waits for in-flight readers to drain, before call_rcu(..., shrinker_free_rcu_cb). The sibling "scan" handler already invokes the sleeping ->scan_objects() callback with no RCU section. Drop the rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260610232048.62930-1-shakeel.butt@linux.dev Fixes: 5035ebc644ae ("mm: shrinkers: introduce debugfs interface for memory shrinkers") Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt Reported-by: Zenghui Yu Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c052a064-cddb-494f-a0d8-f8a10b4b1c4d@linux.dev/ Suggested-by: Nhat Pham Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park Reviewed-by: Qi Zheng Tested-by: Zenghui Yu (Huawei) Reviewed-by: Nhat Pham Acked-by: Muchun Song Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin Cc: Dave Chinner Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/shrinker_debug.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shrinker_debug.c b/mm/shrinker_debug.c index 20eaee3e97f7a..5fa71476b1ee8 100644 --- a/mm/shrinker_debug.c +++ b/mm/shrinker_debug.c @@ -57,8 +57,6 @@ static int shrinker_debugfs_count_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (!count_per_node) return -ENOMEM; - rcu_read_lock(); - memcg_aware = shrinker->flags & SHRINKER_MEMCG_AWARE; memcg = mem_cgroup_iter(NULL, NULL, NULL); @@ -88,8 +86,6 @@ static int shrinker_debugfs_count_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } while ((memcg = mem_cgroup_iter(NULL, memcg, NULL)) != NULL); - rcu_read_unlock(); - kfree(count_per_node); return ret; } From 6465ff3ce65131c774a312d450abe10f4b9f3875 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qi Zheng Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:56:58 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 301/607] mm: shrinker: fix shrinker_info teardown race with expansion commit 65476d31d8056e859c48580f82295ce159196ffe upstream. expand_shrinker_info() iterates all visible memcgs under shrinker_mutex, including memcgs that have not finished ->css_online() yet. Once pn->shrinker_info has been published, teardown must stay serialized with expand_shrinker_info() until that memcg is either fully online or no longer visible to iteration. Today alloc_shrinker_info() breaks that rule by dropping shrinker_mutex before freeing a partially initialized shrinker_info array, which may cause the following race: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== css_create --> list_add_tail_rcu(&css->sibling, &parent_css->children); online_css --> mem_cgroup_css_online --> alloc_shrinker_info --> alloc node0 info rcu_assign_pointer(C->node0->shrinker_info, old0) alloc node1 info -> FAIL -> goto err mutex_unlock(shrinker_mutex) shrinker_alloc() --> shrinker_memcg_alloc --> mutex_lock(shrinker_mutex) expand_shrinker_info --> mem_cgroup_iter see the memcg expand_one_shrinker_info --> old0 = C->node0->shrinker_info memcpy(new->unit, old0->unit, ...); free_shrinker_info --> kvfree(old0); /* double free !! */ kvfree_rcu(old0, rcu); The same problem exists later in mem_cgroup_css_online(). If alloc_shrinker_info() succeeds but a subsequent objcg allocation fails, the free_objcg -> free_shrinker_info() unwind path tears down the already published pn->shrinker_info arrays without shrinker_mutex. The expand_one_shrinker_info() can race with that teardown in the same way, leading to use-after-free or double-free of the old shrinker_info. Fix this by serializing shrinker_info teardown with shrinker_mutex, and by keeping alloc_shrinker_info() error cleanup inside the locked section. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260617085658.27096-1-qi.zheng@linux.dev Fixes: 307bececcd12 ("mm: shrinker: add a secondary array for shrinker_info::{map, nr_deferred}") Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng Acked-by: Muchun Song Cc: Dave Chinner Cc: Qi Zheng Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/shrinker.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shrinker.c b/mm/shrinker.c index 4a93fd433689a..cf730374fbc0c 100644 --- a/mm/shrinker.c +++ b/mm/shrinker.c @@ -59,12 +59,14 @@ static inline int shrinker_unit_alloc(struct shrinker_info *new, return 0; } -void free_shrinker_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) +static void __free_shrinker_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) { struct mem_cgroup_per_node *pn; struct shrinker_info *info; int nid; + lockdep_assert_held(&shrinker_mutex); + for_each_node(nid) { pn = memcg->nodeinfo[nid]; info = rcu_dereference_protected(pn->shrinker_info, true); @@ -74,6 +76,13 @@ void free_shrinker_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) } } +void free_shrinker_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) +{ + mutex_lock(&shrinker_mutex); + __free_shrinker_info(memcg); + mutex_unlock(&shrinker_mutex); +} + int alloc_shrinker_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) { int nid, ret = 0; @@ -98,8 +107,8 @@ int alloc_shrinker_info(struct mem_cgroup *memcg) return ret; err: + __free_shrinker_info(memcg); mutex_unlock(&shrinker_mutex); - free_shrinker_info(memcg); return -ENOMEM; } From 006467ab932698612398f853344a7405164541f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qi Zheng Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 17:00:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 302/607] mm: shrinker: fix NULL pointer dereference in debugfs commit e30453c61e185e914fde83c650e268067b140218 upstream. shrinker_debugfs_add() creates both "count" and "scan" debugfs files unconditionally. That assumes every shrinker implements both count_objects() and scan_objects(), which is not guaranteed. For example, the xen-backend shrinker sets count_objects() but leaves scan_objects() NULL, so writing to its scan file calls through a NULL function pointer and panics the kernel: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. Call Trace: shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x12e/0x270 full_proxy_write+0x5f/0x90 vfs_write+0xde/0x420 ? filp_flush+0x75/0x90 ? filp_close+0x1d/0x30 ? do_dup2+0xb8/0x120 ksys_write+0x68/0xf0 ? filp_flush+0x75/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xb3/0x5b0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The count path has the same issue in principle if a shrinker omits count_objects(). To fix it, only create "count" and "scan" debugfs files when the corresponding callbacks are present. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260617090052.27325-1-qi.zheng@linux.dev Fixes: bbf535fd6f06 ("mm: shrinkers: add scan interface for shrinker debugfs") Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng Reviewed-by: Muchun Song Cc: Dave Chinner Cc: Qi Zheng Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/shrinker_debug.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shrinker_debug.c b/mm/shrinker_debug.c index 5fa71476b1ee8..5de59e853b070 100644 --- a/mm/shrinker_debug.c +++ b/mm/shrinker_debug.c @@ -182,10 +182,12 @@ int shrinker_debugfs_add(struct shrinker *shrinker) } shrinker->debugfs_entry = entry; - debugfs_create_file("count", 0440, entry, shrinker, - &shrinker_debugfs_count_fops); - debugfs_create_file("scan", 0220, entry, shrinker, - &shrinker_debugfs_scan_fops); + if (shrinker->count_objects) + debugfs_create_file("count", 0440, entry, shrinker, + &shrinker_debugfs_count_fops); + if (shrinker->scan_objects) + debugfs_create_file("scan", 0220, entry, shrinker, + &shrinker_debugfs_scan_fops); return 0; } From b415c00bf23df577a4a95673d00ae76687bcc1d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Jose Fernandez (Anthropic)" Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 12:55:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 303/607] mm: swap_cgroup: fix NULL deref in lookup_swap_cgroup_id on swapless host commit 63b02a9409cb5180398491b093e48bcb5315f5fb upstream. lookup_swap_cgroup_id() passes swap_cgroup_ctrl[type].map to __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() without checking that the type was ever registered via swap_cgroup_swapon(). On a swapless host every ctrl->map is NULL, so __swap_cgroup_id_lookup() dereferences NULL + a scaled swp_offset(). Since commit bea67dcc5eea ("mm: attempt to batch free swap entries for zap_pte_range()"), zap_pte_range() -> swap_pte_batch() calls lookup_swap_cgroup_id() on any non-present, non-none PTE that decodes as a real swap entry, without first validating it against swap_info[]. A single PTE corrupted into a type-0 swap entry takes the host down at process exit. We hit this in production on a swapless 6.12.58 host: ~1s of "get_swap_device: Bad swap file entry 3f800204222bb" (do_swap_page() being correctly defensive about the same entry) followed by BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000003f800204220 RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x2b/0x60 Call Trace: swap_pte_batch+0xbf/0x230 zap_pte_range+0x4c8/0x780 unmap_page_range+0x190/0x3e0 exit_mmap+0xd9/0x3c0 do_exit+0x20c/0x4b0 syzbot has reported the identical stack. The source of the PTE corruption is a separate bug; this change makes the teardown path as robust as the fault path already is. Every other caller of lookup_swap_cgroup_id() is downstream of a get_swap_device() that has already validated the entry, so the new branch is cold. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260504-swap-cgroup-fix-7-0-v1-1-f53ff41ee553@linux.dev Fixes: bea67dcc5eea ("mm: attempt to batch free swap entries for zap_pte_range()") Signed-off-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) Reported-by: syzbot+e12bd9ca48157add237a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/69859728.050a0220.3b3015.0033.GAE@google.com Assisted-by: Claude:unspecified Cc: Barry Song Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Hugh Dickins Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Kairui Song Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Muchun Song Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Shakeel Butt Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/swap_cgroup.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/swap_cgroup.c b/mm/swap_cgroup.c index de779fed8c210..95c38e54dd587 100644 --- a/mm/swap_cgroup.c +++ b/mm/swap_cgroup.c @@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ unsigned short lookup_swap_cgroup_id(swp_entry_t ent) return 0; ctrl = &swap_cgroup_ctrl[swp_type(ent)]; + if (unlikely(!ctrl->map)) + return 0; return __swap_cgroup_id_lookup(ctrl->map, swp_offset(ent)); } From 69c0e6246575b780ae0d3f411c749bcf13c221f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zijiang Huang Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 21:09:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 304/607] mm/swap: add cond_resched() in swap_reclaim_full_clusters to prevent softlockup commit 66366d291f666ddeda5f8c84f253e308de3e6b55 upstream. We hit a real softlockup in an internal stress test environment. The workload was LTP memory/swap stress on a large arm64 machine, with 320 CPUs, about 1TB memory and an 8.6GB swap device. The system was under heavy load and the swap device had a large number of full clusters. The softlockup was triggered during a stress test after about 3 days. So, add periodic cond_resched() calls during large full_clusters reclaim operations to prevent softlockup issues. Detailed call trace as follow: PID: 3817773 TASK: ffff0883bb28b780 CPU: 48 COMMAND: "kworker/48:7" #0 [ffff800080183d10] __crash_kexec at ffffa4c1361e5de4 #1 [ffff800080183d90] panic at ffffa4c1360d5e9c #2 [ffff800080183e20] watchdog_timer_fn at ffffa4c136231fa8 ... #16 [ffff8000c4ad3cb0] swap_cache_del_folio at ffffa4c1363e1614 #17 [ffff8000c4ad3ce0] __try_to_reclaim_swap at ffffa4c1363e4bfc #18 [ffff8000c4ad3d40] swap_reclaim_full_clusters at ffffa4c1363e5474 #19 [ffff8000c4ad3da0] swap_reclaim_work at ffffa4c1363e550c #20 [ffff8000c4ad3dc0] process_one_work at ffffa4c136102edc #21 [ffff8000c4ad3e10] worker_thread at ffffa4c136103398 #22 [ffff8000c4ad3e70] kthread at ffffa4c13610d95c Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260506130919.2298807-1-kerayhuang@tencent.com Fixes: 5168a68eb78f ("mm, swap: avoid over reclaim of full clusters") Signed-off-by: Zijiang Huang Reviewed-by: Kairui Song Reviewed-by: Hao Peng Reviewed-by: albinwyang Reviewed-by: Baoquan He Acked-by: Chris Li Cc: Barry Song Cc: Kairui Song Cc: Kemeng Shi Cc: Nhat Pham Cc: Youngjun Park Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/swapfile.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c index ca0298a840cdd..28e522e72c3cb 100644 --- a/mm/swapfile.c +++ b/mm/swapfile.c @@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ static void swap_reclaim_full_clusters(struct swap_info_struct *si, bool force) swap_cluster_unlock(ci); if (to_scan <= 0) break; + cond_resched(); } } From a8f03a3793289337eba31dba3a5f263f0d8ea3bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pratham Gupta Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 22:11:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 305/607] netfilter: ctnetlink: use nf_ct_exp_net() in expectation dump commit a7f57320bbbc67e347bf5fff4b4a9bab980d5956 upstream. Commit 02a3231b6d82 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: store netns and zone in expectation") introduced exp->net so RCU-only expectation paths no longer need to dereference exp->master for netns lookups. Commit 3db5647984de ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: skip expectations in other netns via proc") updated the proc path accordingly, but ctnetlink_exp_dump_table() still compares against nf_ct_net(exp->master). Use nf_ct_exp_net(exp) here as well so the netlink dump path matches the rest of the March 2026 expectation netns/RCU cleanup. Fixes: 02a3231b6d82 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: store netns and zone in expectation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pratham Gupta Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c index fbe9e3f1036f8..c8fe284b86db4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -3159,7 +3159,7 @@ ctnetlink_exp_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) if (l3proto && exp->tuple.src.l3num != l3proto) continue; - if (!net_eq(nf_ct_net(exp->master), net)) + if (!net_eq(nf_ct_exp_net(exp), net)) continue; if (cb->args[1]) { From fc5bfe63bacf8a3ae307b62b34206406ca733354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 15:29:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 306/607] netfilter: handle unreadable frags commit da5b58478a9c1b85608c9e40a3b8432d071b409e upstream. sashiko reports: When an skb with unreadable fragments (such as from devmem TCP, where skb_frags_readable(skb) returns false) is processed by the u32 module, skb_copy_bits() will safely return a negative error code [..] xt_u32: bail out with hotdrop in this case. gather_frags: return -1, just as if we had no fragment header. nfnetlink_queue: restrict to the linear part. nfnetlink_log: restrict to the linear part. v2: - skb_zerocopy helpers don't copy readable flag, i.e. nfnetlink_queue is broken too xt_u32 shouldn't return true if hotdrop was set. Fixes: 65249feb6b3d ("net: add support for skbs with unreadable frags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Mina Almasry Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++--------- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 16 +++++++++++---- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 16 ++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c index 64ab23ff559bb..7edca05dbfc93 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c @@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ find_prev_fhdr(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *prevhdrp, int *prevhoff, int *fhoff) return -1; } if (skb_copy_bits(skb, start, &hdr, sizeof(hdr))) - BUG(); + return -1; if (nexthdr == NEXTHDR_AUTH) hdrlen = ipv6_authlen(&hdr); else diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c index 25a30bf722c69..a6989966d80d5 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_log.c @@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ __build_packet_message(struct nfnl_log_net *log, goto nla_put_failure; if (skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, nla_data(nla), data_len)) - BUG(); + goto nla_put_failure; } nlh->nlmsg_len = inst->skb->tail - old_tail; @@ -690,6 +690,21 @@ static const struct nf_loginfo default_loginfo = { }, }; +static unsigned int nfulnl_get_copy_len(const struct nf_loginfo *li, + const struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int copy_len) +{ + unsigned int len = skb->len; + + if ((li->u.ulog.flags & NF_LOG_F_COPY_LEN) && + li->u.ulog.copy_len < copy_len) + copy_len = li->u.ulog.copy_len; + if (!skb_frags_readable(skb)) + len = skb_headlen(skb); + + return min(len, copy_len); +} + /* log handler for internal netfilter logging api */ static void nfulnl_log_packet(struct net *net, @@ -782,14 +797,7 @@ nfulnl_log_packet(struct net *net, break; case NFULNL_COPY_PACKET: - data_len = inst->copy_range; - if ((li->u.ulog.flags & NF_LOG_F_COPY_LEN) && - (li->u.ulog.copy_len < data_len)) - data_len = li->u.ulog.copy_len; - - if (data_len > skb->len) - data_len = skb->len; - + data_len = nfulnl_get_copy_len(li, skb, inst->copy_range); size += nla_total_size(data_len); break; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c index 0a5aa6b90fc27..aa870e29b5004 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c @@ -676,6 +676,17 @@ static int nfqnl_put_master_ifindex(struct sk_buff *nlskb, int attr, } #endif +static unsigned int nfqnl_get_data_len(const struct sk_buff *entskb, + unsigned int copy_range) +{ + unsigned int data_len = entskb->len; + + if (!skb_frags_readable(entskb)) + data_len = skb_headlen(entskb); + + return min(data_len, copy_range); +} + static struct sk_buff * nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, struct nf_queue_entry *entry, @@ -741,10 +752,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, nf_queue_checksum_help(entskb)) return NULL; - data_len = READ_ONCE(queue->copy_range); - if (data_len > entskb->len) - data_len = entskb->len; - + data_len = nfqnl_get_data_len(entskb, READ_ONCE(queue->copy_range)); hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(entskb); hlen = min_t(unsigned int, hlen, data_len); size += sizeof(struct nlattr) + hlen; diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 117d4615d6684..1ae7f926b0df7 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ #include #include -static bool u32_match_it(const struct xt_u32 *data, - const struct sk_buff *skb) +static int u32_match_it(const struct xt_u32 *data, + const struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct xt_u32_test *ct; unsigned int testind; @@ -40,7 +40,8 @@ static bool u32_match_it(const struct xt_u32 *data, return false; if (skb_copy_bits(skb, pos, &n, sizeof(n)) < 0) - BUG(); + return -1; + val = ntohl(n); nnums = ct->nnums; @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static bool u32_match_it(const struct xt_u32 *data, if (skb_copy_bits(skb, at + pos, &n, sizeof(n)) < 0) - BUG(); + return -1; val = ntohl(n); break; } @@ -90,9 +91,14 @@ static bool u32_match_it(const struct xt_u32 *data, static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) { const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; - bool ret; + int ret; ret = u32_match_it(data, skb); + if (ret < 0) { + par->hotdrop = true; + return false; + } + return ret ^ data->invert; } From 9f74d28e903fa4fdf82f870d0aeadddc8196e41c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 10:23:31 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 307/607] netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array commit cbfe53599eebffd188938ab6774cc41794f6f9d5 upstream. sashiko reports: looking at ebtables table translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer free? If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible, but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on newinfo->chainstack[1]. Not a real-world bug, such allocation isn't expected to fail in the first place. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index ecd7baa25d726..f0fffb6a18d09 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -921,8 +921,7 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, * if an error occurs */ newinfo->chainstack = - vmalloc_array(nr_cpu_ids, - sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack))); + vcalloc(nr_cpu_ids, sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack))); if (!newinfo->chainstack) return -ENOMEM; for_each_possible_cpu(i) { From 13a5f532e3a4fc75c33060a026def1572c208643 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 12:05:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 308/607] netfilter: ebtables: module names must be null-terminated commit 084d23f818321390509e9738a0b08bbf46df6425 upstream. We need to explicitly check the length, else we may pass non-null terminated string to request_module(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bcf493428840 ("netfilter: ebtables: Fix extension lookup with identical name") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index f0fffb6a18d09..d0aa6a28f7a77 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -403,6 +403,9 @@ ebt_check_match(struct ebt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par, left - sizeof(struct ebt_entry_match) < m->match_size) return -EINVAL; + if (strnlen(m->u.name, XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) == XT_EXTENSION_MAXNAMELEN) + return -EINVAL; + match = xt_find_match(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, m->u.name, m->u.revision); if (IS_ERR(match) || match->family != NFPROTO_BRIDGE) { if (!IS_ERR(match)) From 6fe8d3cecd20bfaaaf440db3a06ba674d2f2e322 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiang Mei Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2026 14:58:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 309/607] netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock() commit a622d2e9608c9dff47fc2e5759ac7aa3a836b45d upstream. update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied 32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., "%s%s", "ebtable_", name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the stack object until it hits a zero byte. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730) Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730) vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945) __request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150) do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380) update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440) do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573) nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101) ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424) raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847) __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393) ... compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already terminate the name after the copy. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Fixes: 81e675c227ec ("netfilter: ebtables: add CONFIG_COMPAT support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Weiming Shi Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index d0aa6a28f7a77..96176aa881117 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -1436,6 +1436,8 @@ static int update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len) if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp))) return -EFAULT; + hlp.name[sizeof(hlp.name) - 1] = '\0'; + if (len != sizeof(hlp) + hlp.num_counters * sizeof(struct ebt_counter)) return -EINVAL; @@ -2275,6 +2277,8 @@ static int compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(struct ebt_replace *repl, memcpy(repl, &tmp, offsetof(struct ebt_replace, hook_entry)); + repl->name[sizeof(repl->name) - 1] = '\0'; + /* starting with hook_entry, 32 vs. 64 bit structures are different */ for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) repl->hook_entry[i] = compat_ptr(tmp.hook_entry[i]); @@ -2397,6 +2401,8 @@ static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp))) return -EFAULT; + hlp.name[sizeof(hlp.name) - 1] = '\0'; + /* try real handler in case userland supplied needed padding */ if (len != sizeof(hlp) + hlp.num_counters * sizeof(struct ebt_counter)) return update_counters(net, arg, len); From 81a5971cbe18b474b49c651e32f2194b2fb171fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adrian Bente Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 10:08:51 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 310/607] netfilter: flowtable: fix offloaded ct timeout never being extended commit 53b3e60edb674b442b2b3bbdba484667b0f47a5d upstream. OpenWrt has recently migrated many platforms to kernel 6.18. On the MediaTek platform, which supports hardware network offloading, WiFi connections accelerated via the WED path were observed to drop after roughly 300 seconds. After several debugging sessions, assisted by the Claude LLM, the problem was narrowed down as follows: nf_flow_table_extend_ct_timeout() extends ct->timeout for offloaded flows using: cmpxchg(&ct->timeout, expires, new_timeout); 'expires' comes from nf_ct_expires(ct) and is a relative value, while ct->timeout holds an absolute timestamp. The two are never equal, so the cmpxchg always fails and the timeout is never extended. This goes unnoticed for most flows, but a long-lived hardware (WED) offloaded flow on MediaTek MT7986 eventually has ct->timeout decay to zero, the conntrack entry is reaped and the connection breaks. Open-code the relative value from a single READ_ONCE(ct->timeout) snapshot and compare against that same absolute snapshot in the cmpxchg, so the timeout extension actually takes effect while the datapath remains authoritative if it updates ct->timeout concurrently. Fixes: 03428ca5cee9 ("netfilter: conntrack: rework offload nf_conn timeout extension logic") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Adrian Bente Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c index 9441ac3d8c1a2..d3104816b7f71 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_core.c @@ -500,8 +500,13 @@ static u32 nf_flow_table_tcp_timeout(const struct nf_conn *ct) */ static void nf_flow_table_extend_ct_timeout(struct nf_conn *ct) { - static const u32 min_timeout = 5 * 60 * HZ; - u32 expires = nf_ct_expires(ct); + static const s32 min_timeout = 5 * 60 * HZ; + u32 ct_timeout = READ_ONCE(ct->timeout); + s32 expires; + + expires = ct_timeout - nfct_time_stamp; + if (expires <= 0) /* already expired */ + return; /* normal case: large enough timeout, nothing to do. */ if (likely(expires >= min_timeout)) @@ -519,7 +524,7 @@ static void nf_flow_table_extend_ct_timeout(struct nf_conn *ct) if (nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) && test_bit(IPS_OFFLOAD_BIT, &ct->status)) { u8 l4proto = nf_ct_protonum(ct); - u32 new_timeout = true; + u32 new_timeout = 1; switch (l4proto) { case IPPROTO_UDP: @@ -544,7 +549,7 @@ static void nf_flow_table_extend_ct_timeout(struct nf_conn *ct) */ if (new_timeout) { new_timeout += nfct_time_stamp; - cmpxchg(&ct->timeout, expires, new_timeout); + cmpxchg(&ct->timeout, ct_timeout, new_timeout); } } From 0039bdde36b23ccf1196635f1d52c5490481544d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergey Senozhatsky Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 21:10:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 311/607] Bluetooth: btmtksdio: fix infinite loop in btmtksdio_txrx_work() commit a257407e2bbbb099ed427719a50563f67fa366d8 upstream. Every once in a while we see a hung btmtksdio_flush() task: INFO: task kworker/u17:0:189 blocked for more than 122 seconds. __cancel_work_timer+0x3f4/0x460 cancel_work_sync+0x1c/0x2c btmtksdio_flush+0x2c/0x40 hci_dev_open_sync+0x10c4/0x2190 [..] It all boils down to incorrect time_is_before_jiffies() usage in btmtksdio_txrx_work(). The btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop is expected to be terminated if running for longer than 5*HZ. However the timeout check is twisted: time_is_before_jiffies(old_jiffies + 5*HZ) evaluates to true when old_jiffies + 5*HZ is in the past i.e. when a timeout has occurred. Using OR with time_is_before_jiffies(txrx_timeout) means that: - before the 5-second timeout: the condition is `int_status || false`, so it loops as long as there are pending interrupts. - after the 5-second timeout: the condition becomes `int_status || true`, which is always true. When the loop becomes infinite btmtksdio_txrx_work() loop never terminates and never releases the SDIO host. Fix loop termination condition to actually enforce a 5*HZ timeout. Fixes: 26270bc189ea4 ("Bluetooth: btmtksdio: move interrupt service to work") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky Reviewed-by: Sean Wang Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btmtksdio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtksdio.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtksdio.c index 62db31bd65928..d2583bc742632 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btmtksdio.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btmtksdio.c @@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ static void btmtksdio_txrx_work(struct work_struct *work) if (btmtksdio_rx_packet(bdev, rx_size) < 0) bdev->hdev->stat.err_rx++; } - } while (int_status || time_is_before_jiffies(txrx_timeout)); + } while (int_status && time_is_after_jiffies(txrx_timeout)); /* Enable interrupt */ if (bdev->func->irq_handler) From a6b22dbd80926556290ad2243be25218d6956a19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yousef Alhouseen Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 02:50:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 312/607] Bluetooth: bnep: pin L2CAP connection during netdev registration commit bb067a99a0356196c0b89a95721985485ebce5a5 upstream. bnep_add_connection() reads the L2CAP connection without holding the channel lock, then passes its HCI device to register_netdev(). Controller teardown can clear and release that connection concurrently, leaving the network device registration path to dereference a freed parent device. Take a reference to the L2CAP connection while holding the channel lock. Retain it until register_netdev() has taken the parent device reference. Fixes: 65f53e9802db ("Bluetooth: Access BNEP session addresses through L2CAP channel") Reported-by: syzbot+fed5dce4553262f3b35c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fed5dce4553262f3b35c Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c b/net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c index 5c5f53ff30e8e..ed3ca38d8a6e1 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c @@ -562,14 +562,18 @@ static int bnep_session(void *arg) return 0; } -static struct device *bnep_get_device(struct bnep_session *session) +static struct l2cap_conn *bnep_get_conn(struct bnep_session *session) { - struct l2cap_conn *conn = l2cap_pi(session->sock->sk)->chan->conn; + struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(session->sock->sk)->chan; + struct l2cap_conn *conn; - if (!conn || !conn->hcon) - return NULL; + l2cap_chan_lock(chan); + conn = chan->conn; + if (conn) + l2cap_conn_get(conn); + l2cap_chan_unlock(chan); - return &conn->hcon->dev; + return conn; } static const struct device_type bnep_type = { @@ -581,6 +585,7 @@ int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock) u32 valid_flags = BIT(BNEP_SETUP_RESPONSE); struct net_device *dev; struct bnep_session *s, *ss; + struct l2cap_conn *conn = NULL; u8 dst[ETH_ALEN], src[ETH_ALEN]; int err; @@ -640,10 +645,18 @@ int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock) bnep_set_default_proto_filter(s); #endif - SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, bnep_get_device(s)); + conn = bnep_get_conn(s); + if (!conn) { + err = -ENOTCONN; + goto failed; + } + + SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &conn->hcon->dev); SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &bnep_type); err = register_netdev(dev); + l2cap_conn_put(conn); + conn = NULL; if (err) goto failed; @@ -665,6 +678,8 @@ int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock) return 0; failed: + if (conn) + l2cap_conn_put(conn); up_write(&bnep_session_sem); free_netdev(dev); return err; From 2a68a773089204af1c8581dc79668b775418c5ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:36:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 313/607] Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix out-of-bounds firmware read in nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() commit badff6c3bed8923a1257a853f137d447976eec30 upstream. During the v3 firmware download the controller sends a v3_data_req with a 32 bit offset and a 16 bit len. nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() checks only the lower bound of the offset and then sends firmware from that offset. nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset = offset - nxpdev->fw_v3_offset_correction; serdev_device_write_buf(nxpdev->serdev, nxpdev->fw->data + nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset, len); Nothing checks that fw_dnld_v3_offset + len stays within nxpdev->fw->size, so a controller that asks for an offset or length past the firmware image makes the driver read past the end of nxpdev->fw->data and send that memory back over UART. nxp_recv_fw_req_v1() already bounds the same write. Add the equivalent check to the v3 path, reject the request when it falls outside the firmware image, and zero len on the error path so the fw_v3_prev_sent bookkeeping at free_skb stays consistent. Fixes: 689ca16e5232 ("Bluetooth: NXP: Add protocol support for NXP Bluetooth chipsets") Suggested-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale Reviewed-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c b/drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c index 3b1e9224e9657..970da4f84e60f 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/btnxpuart.c @@ -1267,6 +1267,12 @@ static int nxp_recv_fw_req_v3(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) } nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset = offset - nxpdev->fw_v3_offset_correction; + if (nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset >= nxpdev->fw->size || + len > nxpdev->fw->size - nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset) { + bt_dev_err(hdev, "FW download out of bounds, ignoring request"); + len = 0; + goto free_skb; + } serdev_device_write_buf(nxpdev->serdev, nxpdev->fw->data + nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset, len); From 26168db1ce5a9766cde021b18e590a101c056614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yousef Alhouseen Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 02:23:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 314/607] Bluetooth: fix UAF in bt_accept_dequeue() commit 4bd0b274054f2679f28b70222b607bb0afc3ab9a upstream. bt_accept_get() takes a temporary reference before dropping the accept queue lock. bt_accept_dequeue() currently drops that reference before bt_accept_unlink(), leaving only the queue reference. bt_accept_unlink() drops the queue reference. The subsequent sock_hold() therefore accesses freed memory if it was the final reference, as observed by KASAN during listening L2CAP socket cleanup. Retain the temporary queue-walk reference through unlink and hand it to the caller on success. Drop it explicitly on the closed and not-yet-connected paths. Fixes: ab1513597c6c ("Bluetooth: fix UAF in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs l2cap_conn_del()") Reported-by: syzbot+674ff7e4d7fdfd572afc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=674ff7e4d7fdfd572afc Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c | 17 +++-------------- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c index 70e35e1980753..6a72ddcd3d704 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) restart: for (sk = bt_accept_get(parent, NULL); sk; sk = next) { - /* Prevent early freeing of sk due to unlink and sock_kill */ + /* The reference from bt_accept_get() keeps sk alive. */ lock_sock(sk); /* Check sk has not already been unlinked via @@ -324,13 +324,11 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) next = bt_accept_get(parent, sk); - /* sk is safely in the parent list so reduce reference count */ - sock_put(sk); - /* FIXME: Is this check still needed */ if (sk->sk_state == BT_CLOSED) { bt_accept_unlink(sk); release_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); continue; } @@ -340,16 +338,6 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) if (newsock) sock_graft(sk, newsock); - /* Hand the caller a reference taken while sk is - * still locked. bt_accept_unlink() just dropped - * the accept-queue reference; without this hold a - * concurrent teardown (e.g. l2cap_conn_del() -> - * l2cap_sock_kill()) could free sk between - * release_sock() and the caller using it. Every - * caller drops this with sock_put() when done. - */ - sock_hold(sk); - release_sock(sk); if (next) sock_put(next); @@ -357,6 +345,7 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock) } release_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); } return NULL; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index 506c8c0b4d75d..f2fa3130fd41b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1464,8 +1464,8 @@ static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent) /* Close not yet accepted channels. * - * bt_accept_dequeue() now returns sk with an extra reference held - * (taken while sk was still locked) so a concurrent l2cap_conn_del() + * bt_accept_dequeue() returns sk with its temporary queue-walk + * reference held, so a concurrent l2cap_conn_del() * -> l2cap_sock_kill() cannot free sk under us. * * cleanup_listen() runs under the parent sk lock, so unlike From 61701912c58a05f6a043f097cc177a964abef348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Siwei Zhang Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 11:33:05 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 315/607] Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix null ptr deref in hci_abort_conn() commit 12917f591cea1af36087dba5b9ec888652f0b42a upstream. hci_abort_conn() read hci_skb_event(hdev->sent_cmd) when a connection was pending, but hdev->sent_cmd can be NULL while req_status is still HCI_REQ_PEND, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and a general protection fault from the hci_rx_work() receive path. Instead of inspecting hdev->sent_cmd, track the in-flight create connection command with a new per-connection HCI_CONN_CREATE flag and route all cancellation through hci_cancel_connect_sync(), which dispatches to a dedicated per-type cancel function. The create command is in exactly one of two states: still queued, or in flight. The cancel function holds cmd_sync_work_lock across the whole decision: the worker takes this lock to dequeue every entry, so while it is held a queued command cannot start running and an in-flight command cannot complete and let the next command become pending. This keeps the flag test and hci_cmd_sync_cancel() atomic with respect to the worker, so a queued command is simply dequeued, and an in-flight command owned by this connection is cancelled without the risk of cancelling an unrelated command that became pending in the meantime. CIS uses the same flag mechanism via HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS but cannot be dequeued per-connection. hci_acl_create_conn_sync() and hci_le_create_conn_sync() clear HCI_CONN_CREATE after the create command completes, but the command status handler can free conn via hci_conn_del() (for example when the controller rejects the connection) while the worker is still blocked on the connection complete event. Hold a reference on conn across the create command so the flag can be cleared without a use-after-free. Fixes: a13f316e90fd ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Consolidate code for aborting connections") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: XIAO WU Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Siwei Zhang Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c | 21 +---- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 0cb87687837f7..b5640980fbf4e 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -984,6 +984,7 @@ enum { HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, HCI_CONN_PER_ADV, HCI_CONN_BIG_CREATED, + HCI_CONN_CREATE, HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, HCI_CONN_CREATE_BIG_SYNC, HCI_CONN_BIG_SYNC, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c index 3be7ee6438059..ceeb19158a36c 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c @@ -2979,26 +2979,11 @@ int hci_abort_conn(struct hci_conn *conn, u8 reason) conn->abort_reason = reason; - /* If the connection is pending check the command opcode since that - * might be blocking on hci_cmd_sync_work while waiting its respective - * event so we need to hci_cmd_sync_cancel to cancel it. - * - * hci_connect_le serializes the connection attempts so only one - * connection can be in BT_CONNECT at time. + /* Cancel the connect attempt. A return of 0 means the create command + * was still queued and got dequeued, so there is nothing to disconnect. */ - if (conn->state == BT_CONNECT && READ_ONCE(hdev->req_status) == HCI_REQ_PEND) { - switch (hci_skb_event(hdev->sent_cmd)) { - case HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE: - case HCI_EV_LE_CONN_COMPLETE: - case HCI_EV_LE_ENHANCED_CONN_COMPLETE: - case HCI_EVT_LE_CIS_ESTABLISHED: - hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); - break; - } - /* Cancel connect attempt if still queued/pending */ - } else if (!hci_cancel_connect_sync(hdev, conn)) { + if (!hci_cancel_connect_sync(hdev, conn)) return 0; - } /* Run immediately if on cmd_sync_work since this may be called * as a result to MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT/MGMT_OP_UNPAIR which does diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 10b8c24a3fbed..a8404027724de 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -6556,6 +6556,11 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "conn %p", conn); + /* Hold a reference so conn stays valid for the HCI_CONN_CREATE + * clear_bit() at done. + */ + hci_conn_get(conn); + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_SCANNING, &conn->flags); conn->state = BT_CONNECT; @@ -6568,6 +6573,7 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) hdev->le_scan_type == LE_SCAN_ACTIVE && !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_SIMULTANEOUS_ROLES)) { hci_conn_del(conn); + hci_conn_put(conn); return -EBUSY; } @@ -6613,6 +6619,12 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) &own_addr_type); if (err) goto done; + + /* Mark create connection in flight so hci_cancel_connect_sync() can + * cancel it while blocking on the connection complete event. + */ + set_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + /* Send command LE Extended Create Connection if supported */ if (use_ext_conn(hdev)) { err = hci_le_ext_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn, own_addr_type); @@ -6648,11 +6660,14 @@ static int hci_le_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) conn->conn_timeout, NULL); done: + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) hci_le_connect_cancel_sync(hdev, conn, 0x00); /* Re-enable advertising after the connection attempt is finished. */ hci_resume_advertising_sync(hdev); + hci_conn_put(conn); return err; } @@ -6927,10 +6942,25 @@ static int hci_acl_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data) else cp.role_switch = 0x00; - return __hci_cmd_sync_status_sk(hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN, - sizeof(cp), &cp, - HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE, - conn->conn_timeout, NULL); + /* Hold a reference so conn stays valid for the HCI_CONN_CREATE + * clear_bit() below. + */ + hci_conn_get(conn); + + /* Mark create connection in flight so hci_cancel_connect_sync() can + * cancel it while blocking on the connection complete event. + */ + set_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + + err = __hci_cmd_sync_status_sk(hdev, HCI_OP_CREATE_CONN, + sizeof(cp), &cp, + HCI_EV_CONN_COMPLETE, + conn->conn_timeout, NULL); + + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags); + hci_conn_put(conn); + + return err; } int hci_connect_acl_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) @@ -6976,22 +7006,97 @@ int hci_connect_le_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) create_le_conn_complete); } -int hci_cancel_connect_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) +static int hci_acl_cancel_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct hci_conn *conn) { - if (conn->state != BT_OPEN) - return -EINVAL; + struct hci_cmd_sync_work_entry *entry; + int err = -EBUSY; + + /* cmd_sync_work_lock makes the HCI_CONN_CREATE test and the cancel + * atomic against the worker, which takes this lock to dequeue every + * entry: while it is held no other command can become pending, so + * hci_cmd_sync_cancel() cannot cancel an unrelated command. + */ + mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + + /* In flight: this connection owns the pending request, cancel it. */ + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags)) { + hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); + goto unlock; + } + + /* Still queued: a successful dequeue means it never started, so there + * is nothing to disconnect. + */ + entry = _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry(hdev, hci_acl_create_conn_sync, conn, + NULL); + if (entry) { + _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry(hdev, entry, -ECANCELED); + err = 0; + } + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + return err; +} + +static int hci_le_cancel_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct hci_conn *conn) +{ + struct hci_cmd_sync_work_entry *entry; + int err = -EBUSY; + /* cmd_sync_work_lock keeps the HCI_CONN_CREATE test and the cancel + * atomic against the cmd_sync worker. + */ + mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE, &conn->flags)) { + hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); + goto unlock; + } + + entry = _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry(hdev, hci_le_create_conn_sync, conn, + create_le_conn_complete); + if (entry) { + _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry(hdev, entry, -ECANCELED); + err = 0; + } + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + return err; +} + +static int hci_cis_cancel_create_conn_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, + struct hci_conn *conn) +{ + /* LE Create CIS is shared by the whole CIG and cannot be dequeued + * per-connection, so only an in-flight command can be cancelled. + * cmd_sync_work_lock keeps the test and the cancel atomic against the + * cmd_sync worker. + */ + mutex_lock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + + if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_CREATE_CIS, &conn->flags)) + hci_cmd_sync_cancel(hdev, ECANCELED); + + mutex_unlock(&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock); + return -EBUSY; +} + +int hci_cancel_connect_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn) +{ switch (conn->type) { case ACL_LINK: - return !hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once(hdev, - hci_acl_create_conn_sync, - conn, NULL); + return hci_acl_cancel_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn); case LE_LINK: - return !hci_cmd_sync_dequeue_once(hdev, hci_le_create_conn_sync, - conn, create_le_conn_complete); + return hci_le_cancel_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn); + case CIS_LINK: + return hci_cis_cancel_create_conn_sync(hdev, conn); + default: + return -ENOENT; } - - return -ENOENT; } int hci_le_conn_update_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct hci_conn *conn, From b9dd39cf1667e378b25a082ca796d495d578c5d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pauli Virtanen Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 21:43:37 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 316/607] Bluetooth: hci_uart: clear HCI_UART_SENDING when write_work is canceled commit 1b0d946d6f08bd39211385bc703a440911b41e46 upstream. HCI_UART_SENDING bit in tx_state means write_work is pending and blocks queueing it again. Currently this bit is not cleared when canceling the work in hci_uart_close(), which blocks future writes when device is reopened later if write_work was pending. Fix by clearing HCI_UART_SENDING when canceling the work. Also make clearing of tx_skb safe by using disable_work_sync + enable_work instead of just cancel_work_sync. hci_uart_flush() purges the proto tx queue so we can cancel the pending write_work there, instead of doing it just in hci_uart_close(). Re-enable and possibly requeue the work after queue flush. Fixes: c1bb9336ae6b ("Bluetooth: hci_uart: fix UAFs and race conditions in close and init paths") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-bluetooth/07e0a28650773abec711ee492fdb1bf5d21a6c98.camel@iki.fi/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pauli Virtanen Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c index 10e936b87cc8e..c27413a371c2d 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c @@ -239,6 +239,8 @@ static int hci_uart_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev) BT_DBG("hdev %p tty %p", hdev, tty); + disable_work_sync(&hu->write_work); + if (hu->tx_skb) { kfree_skb(hu->tx_skb); hu->tx_skb = NULL; } @@ -254,6 +256,14 @@ static int hci_uart_flush(struct hci_dev *hdev) percpu_up_read(&hu->proto_lock); + /* Resume TX. Also reschedule in case work was queued concurrently; + * this may schedule write_work although there's nothing to do. + */ + enable_work(&hu->write_work); + clear_bit(HCI_UART_SENDING, &hu->tx_state); + if (test_bit(HCI_UART_TX_WAKEUP, &hu->tx_state)) + hci_uart_tx_wakeup(hu); + return 0; } @@ -271,12 +281,8 @@ static int hci_uart_open(struct hci_dev *hdev) /* Close device */ static int hci_uart_close(struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct hci_uart *hu = hci_get_drvdata(hdev); - BT_DBG("hdev %p", hdev); - cancel_work_sync(&hu->write_work); - hci_uart_flush(hdev); hdev->flush = NULL; return 0; From b84eeb7636d6962dd882d5e0b31475e4f404313c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 21:23:05 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 317/607] Bluetooth: ISO: avoid NULL deref of conn in iso_conn_big_sync() commit d5541eb148da72d5e0a1bca8ecd171f9fc8b366f upstream. iso_conn_big_sync() drops the socket lock to call hci_get_route() and then re-acquires it, but dereferences iso_pi(sk)->conn->hcon afterwards without re-checking that conn is still valid. While the lock is dropped, the connection can be torn down under the same socket lock: iso_disconn_cfm() -> iso_conn_del() -> iso_chan_del() sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL (and the broadcast teardown path can also clear conn->hcon on its own). When iso_conn_big_sync() re-acquires the lock and reads conn->hcon, conn may be NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference (hcon is the first member of struct iso_conn). This path is reached from iso_sock_recvmsg() for a PA-sync broadcast sink socket (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP | BT_SK_PA_SYNC), so the dropped-lock window can race with connection teardown driven by controller events. Re-validate iso_pi(sk)->conn and its hcon after re-acquiring the socket lock and bail out if the connection went away, as already done in the sibling iso_sock_rebind_bc(). Fixes: 7a17308c17880d ("Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_conn_big_sync") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/iso.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/iso.c b/net/bluetooth/iso.c index c1e3015a6630d..f2ff10ae76e22 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/iso.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/iso.c @@ -1515,6 +1515,7 @@ static void iso_conn_big_sync(struct sock *sk) { int err; struct hci_dev *hdev; + struct iso_conn *conn; bdaddr_t src, dst; u8 src_type; @@ -1537,8 +1538,17 @@ static void iso_conn_big_sync(struct sock *sk) hci_dev_lock(hdev); lock_sock(sk); + /* The socket lock was dropped for hci_get_route(), so the connection + * may have been torn down meanwhile: iso_chan_del() clears conn and + * the broadcast teardown path can clear conn->hcon on its own. Check + * both before dereferencing conn->hcon. + */ + conn = iso_pi(sk)->conn; + if (!conn || !conn->hcon) + goto unlock; + if (!test_and_set_bit(BT_SK_BIG_SYNC, &iso_pi(sk)->flags)) { - err = hci_conn_big_create_sync(hdev, iso_pi(sk)->conn->hcon, + err = hci_conn_big_create_sync(hdev, conn->hcon, &iso_pi(sk)->qos, iso_pi(sk)->sync_handle, iso_pi(sk)->bc_num_bis, @@ -1547,6 +1557,7 @@ static void iso_conn_big_sync(struct sock *sk) bt_dev_err(hdev, "hci_big_create_sync: %d", err); } +unlock: release_sock(sk); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); hci_dev_put(hdev); From d5616beb3355b5fca2280d796c1cf7ada4ee6551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Runyu Xiao Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:36:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 318/607] Bluetooth: L2CAP: cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock commit 2641a9e0a1dd4af2e21995470a21d55dd35e5203 upstream. l2cap_conn_del() takes conn->lock and then calls cancel_work_sync() for pending_rx_work. process_pending_rx() takes the same mutex, so teardown can deadlock against the worker it is flushing. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the l2cap_conn_ready() -> queue_work(..., &conn->pending_rx_work) submit path, the l2cap_conn_del() -> cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work) teardown path, and the process_pending_rx() -> mutex_lock(&conn->lock) worker edge. Lockdep reported: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected process_pending_rx+0x21/0x2a [vuln_msv] l2cap_conn_del.constprop.0+0x3f/0x4e [vuln_msv] *** DEADLOCK *** Cancel pending_rx_work before taking conn->lock, matching the existing lock-before-drain ordering used for the two delayed works in the same teardown path. The pending_rx queue is still purged after the work has been cancelled and conn->lock has been acquired. Fixes: 7ab56c3a6ecc ("Bluetooth: Fix deadlock in l2cap_conn_del()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 26fbf61f6e332..4e54bdde4b6e5 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -1778,19 +1778,13 @@ static void l2cap_conn_del(struct hci_conn *hcon, int err) disable_delayed_work_sync(&conn->info_timer); disable_delayed_work_sync(&conn->id_addr_timer); + cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work); + mutex_lock(&conn->lock); kfree_skb(conn->rx_skb); skb_queue_purge(&conn->pending_rx); - - /* We can not call flush_work(&conn->pending_rx_work) here since we - * might block if we are running on a worker from the same workqueue - * pending_rx_work is waiting on. - */ - if (work_pending(&conn->pending_rx_work)) - cancel_work_sync(&conn->pending_rx_work); - ida_destroy(&conn->tx_ida); l2cap_unregister_all_users(conn); From 73abbaf91aa33da87c008fb62c148ade561bb606 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 00:56:35 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 319/607] Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value commit 687617555cedfb74c9e3cb85d759b908dcb17856 upstream. l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length. Fixes: 7c9cbd0b5e38 ("Bluetooth: Verify that l2cap_get_conf_opt provides large enough buffer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c index 4e54bdde4b6e5..908198959e3bc 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c @@ -3048,13 +3048,24 @@ static struct sk_buff *l2cap_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, return NULL; } -static inline int l2cap_get_conf_opt(void **ptr, int *type, int *olen, - unsigned long *val) +static inline int l2cap_get_conf_opt(void **ptr, void *end, int *type, + int *olen, unsigned long *val) { struct l2cap_conf_opt *opt = *ptr; int len; + /* opt->len is attacker-controlled. Validate that the full option + * (header + value) actually fits in the buffer before touching + * opt->val, otherwise the switch below reads past the end of the + * caller's buffer. + */ + if (end - *ptr < L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + len = L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len; + if (end - *ptr < len) + return -EINVAL; + *ptr += len; *type = opt->type; @@ -3426,6 +3437,7 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data void *ptr = rsp->data; void *endptr = data + data_size; void *req = chan->conf_req; + void *req_end = req + chan->conf_len; int len = chan->conf_len; int type, hint, olen; unsigned long val; @@ -3439,9 +3451,11 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_req(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *data, size_t data BT_DBG("chan %p", chan); while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) { - len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&req, &type, &olen, &val); - if (len < 0) + int ret = l2cap_get_conf_opt(&req, req_end, &type, &olen, &val); + + if (ret < 0) break; + len -= ret; hint = type & L2CAP_CONF_HINT; type &= L2CAP_CONF_MASK; @@ -3669,6 +3683,7 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len, struct l2cap_conf_req *req = data; void *ptr = req->data; void *endptr = data + size; + void *rsp_end = rsp + len; int type, olen; unsigned long val; struct l2cap_conf_rfc rfc = { .mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC }; @@ -3677,9 +3692,11 @@ static int l2cap_parse_conf_rsp(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len, BT_DBG("chan %p, rsp %p, len %d, req %p", chan, rsp, len, data); while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) { - len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, &type, &olen, &val); - if (len < 0) + int ret = l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, rsp_end, &type, &olen, &val); + + if (ret < 0) break; + len -= ret; switch (type) { case L2CAP_CONF_MTU: @@ -3930,6 +3947,7 @@ static void l2cap_conf_rfc_get(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len) { int type, olen; unsigned long val; + void *rsp_end = rsp + len; /* Use sane default values in case a misbehaving remote device * did not send an RFC or extended window size option. */ @@ -3948,9 +3966,11 @@ static void l2cap_conf_rfc_get(struct l2cap_chan *chan, void *rsp, int len) return; while (len >= L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE) { - len -= l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, &type, &olen, &val); - if (len < 0) + int ret = l2cap_get_conf_opt(&rsp, rsp_end, &type, &olen, &val); + + if (ret < 0) break; + len -= ret; switch (type) { case L2CAP_CONF_RFC: From 4718007870547e1efebbdd6745d9fce58f008fef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Baolu Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2026 09:48:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 320/607] iommu/vt-d: Fix race condition during PASID entry replacement MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit c3b1edea3791fa91ab7032faa90355913ad9451b upstream. The Intel VT-d PASID table entry is 512 bits (64 bytes). When replacing an active PASID entry (e.g., during domain replacement), the current implementation calculates a new entry on the stack and copies it to the table using a single structure assignment. struct pasid_entry *pte, new_pte; pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid); pasid_pte_config_first_level(iommu, &new_pte, ...); *pte = new_pte; Because the hardware may fetch the 512-bit PASID entry in multiple 128-bit chunks, updating the entire entry while it is active (Present bit set) risks a "torn" read. In this scenario, the IOMMU hardware could observe an inconsistent state — partially new data and partially old data — leading to unpredictable behavior or spurious faults. Fix this by removing the unsafe "replace" helpers and following the "clear-then-update" flow, which ensures the Present bit is cleared and the required invalidation handshake is completed before the new configuration is applied. Fixes: 7543ee63e811 ("iommu/vt-d: Add pasid replace helpers") Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Reviewed-by: Samiullah Khawaja Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260120061816.2132558-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel [vineeth: adjusted for 6.18.y: the removed intel_pasid_replace_second_level() in 6.18 still computed pgd/pgd_val locally and used the older pasid_pte_config_second_level() signature; since the function is deleted entirely, the resolution only affects removed lines. The prerequisite "Clear Present bit" patches are already in 6.18.y. Built and tested on 6.18.38: PASID replace, iommufd RID replace and DMA sanity on QEMU VT-d in scalable mode (FS and SS), no regressions.] Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai (Google) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 29 +++--- drivers/iommu/intel/nested.c | 9 +- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 190 ----------------------------------- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 14 --- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c index 79676188f60f3..db0cf436c8395 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c @@ -1734,12 +1734,10 @@ int __domain_setup_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, ioasid_t pasid, u16 did, phys_addr_t fsptptr, int flags, struct iommu_domain *old) { - if (!old) - return intel_pasid_setup_first_level(iommu, dev, fsptptr, pasid, - did, flags); - return intel_pasid_replace_first_level(iommu, dev, fsptptr, pasid, did, - iommu_domain_did(old, iommu), - flags); + if (old) + intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(iommu, dev, pasid, false); + + return intel_pasid_setup_first_level(iommu, dev, fsptptr, pasid, did, flags); } static int domain_setup_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, @@ -1747,23 +1745,20 @@ static int domain_setup_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, ioasid_t pasid, struct iommu_domain *old) { - if (!old) - return intel_pasid_setup_second_level(iommu, domain, - dev, pasid); - return intel_pasid_replace_second_level(iommu, domain, dev, - iommu_domain_did(old, iommu), - pasid); + if (old) + intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(iommu, dev, pasid, false); + + return intel_pasid_setup_second_level(iommu, domain, dev, pasid); } static int domain_setup_passthrough(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, ioasid_t pasid, struct iommu_domain *old) { - if (!old) - return intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(iommu, dev, pasid); - return intel_pasid_replace_pass_through(iommu, dev, - iommu_domain_did(old, iommu), - pasid); + if (old) + intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(iommu, dev, pasid, false); + + return intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(iommu, dev, pasid); } static int domain_setup_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/nested.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/nested.c index e91b07475fb84..a909ab1a665a3 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/nested.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/nested.c @@ -141,11 +141,10 @@ static int domain_setup_nested(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, ioasid_t pasid, struct iommu_domain *old) { - if (!old) - return intel_pasid_setup_nested(iommu, dev, pasid, domain); - return intel_pasid_replace_nested(iommu, dev, pasid, - iommu_domain_did(old, iommu), - domain); + if (old) + intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(iommu, dev, pasid, false); + + return intel_pasid_setup_nested(iommu, dev, pasid, domain); } static int intel_nested_set_dev_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c index 7a64a55fb5887..787897e61efa3 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c @@ -417,50 +417,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, return 0; } -int intel_pasid_replace_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct device *dev, phys_addr_t fsptptr, - u32 pasid, u16 did, u16 old_did, - int flags) -{ - struct pasid_entry *pte, new_pte; - - if (!ecap_flts(iommu->ecap)) { - pr_err("No first level translation support on %s\n", - iommu->name); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if ((flags & PASID_FLAG_FL5LP) && !cap_fl5lp_support(iommu->cap)) { - pr_err("No 5-level paging support for first-level on %s\n", - iommu->name); - return -EINVAL; - } - - pasid_pte_config_first_level(iommu, &new_pte, fsptptr, did, flags); - - spin_lock(&iommu->lock); - pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid); - if (!pte) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -ENODEV; - } - - if (!pasid_pte_is_present(pte)) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -EINVAL; - } - - WARN_ON(old_did != pasid_get_domain_id(pte)); - - *pte = new_pte; - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - - intel_pasid_flush_present(iommu, dev, pasid, old_did, pte); - intel_iommu_drain_pasid_prq(dev, pasid); - - return 0; -} - /* * Set up the scalable mode pasid entry for second only translation type. */ @@ -528,57 +484,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, return 0; } -int intel_pasid_replace_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct dmar_domain *domain, - struct device *dev, u16 old_did, - u32 pasid) -{ - struct pasid_entry *pte, new_pte; - struct dma_pte *pgd; - u64 pgd_val; - u16 did; - - /* - * If hardware advertises no support for second level - * translation, return directly. - */ - if (!ecap_slts(iommu->ecap)) { - pr_err("No second level translation support on %s\n", - iommu->name); - return -EINVAL; - } - - pgd = domain->pgd; - pgd_val = virt_to_phys(pgd); - did = domain_id_iommu(domain, iommu); - - pasid_pte_config_second_level(iommu, &new_pte, pgd_val, - domain->agaw, did, - domain->dirty_tracking); - - spin_lock(&iommu->lock); - pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid); - if (!pte) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -ENODEV; - } - - if (!pasid_pte_is_present(pte)) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -EINVAL; - } - - WARN_ON(old_did != pasid_get_domain_id(pte)); - - *pte = new_pte; - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - - intel_pasid_flush_present(iommu, dev, pasid, old_did, pte); - intel_iommu_drain_pasid_prq(dev, pasid); - - return 0; -} - /* * Set up dirty tracking on a second only or nested translation type. */ @@ -691,38 +596,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, return 0; } -int intel_pasid_replace_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct device *dev, u16 old_did, - u32 pasid) -{ - struct pasid_entry *pte, new_pte; - u16 did = FLPT_DEFAULT_DID; - - pasid_pte_config_pass_through(iommu, &new_pte, did); - - spin_lock(&iommu->lock); - pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid); - if (!pte) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -ENODEV; - } - - if (!pasid_pte_is_present(pte)) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -EINVAL; - } - - WARN_ON(old_did != pasid_get_domain_id(pte)); - - *pte = new_pte; - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - - intel_pasid_flush_present(iommu, dev, pasid, old_did, pte); - intel_iommu_drain_pasid_prq(dev, pasid); - - return 0; -} - /* * Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. */ @@ -853,69 +726,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_nested(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, return 0; } -int intel_pasid_replace_nested(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct device *dev, u32 pasid, - u16 old_did, struct dmar_domain *domain) -{ - struct iommu_hwpt_vtd_s1 *s1_cfg = &domain->s1_cfg; - struct dmar_domain *s2_domain = domain->s2_domain; - u16 did = domain_id_iommu(domain, iommu); - struct pasid_entry *pte, new_pte; - - /* Address width should match the address width supported by hardware */ - switch (s1_cfg->addr_width) { - case ADDR_WIDTH_4LEVEL: - break; - case ADDR_WIDTH_5LEVEL: - if (!cap_fl5lp_support(iommu->cap)) { - dev_err_ratelimited(dev, - "5-level paging not supported\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } - break; - default: - dev_err_ratelimited(dev, "Invalid stage-1 address width %d\n", - s1_cfg->addr_width); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if ((s1_cfg->flags & IOMMU_VTD_S1_SRE) && !ecap_srs(iommu->ecap)) { - pr_err_ratelimited("No supervisor request support on %s\n", - iommu->name); - return -EINVAL; - } - - if ((s1_cfg->flags & IOMMU_VTD_S1_EAFE) && !ecap_eafs(iommu->ecap)) { - pr_err_ratelimited("No extended access flag support on %s\n", - iommu->name); - return -EINVAL; - } - - pasid_pte_config_nestd(iommu, &new_pte, s1_cfg, s2_domain, did); - - spin_lock(&iommu->lock); - pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid); - if (!pte) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -ENODEV; - } - - if (!pasid_pte_is_present(pte)) { - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - return -EINVAL; - } - - WARN_ON(old_did != pasid_get_domain_id(pte)); - - *pte = new_pte; - spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); - - intel_pasid_flush_present(iommu, dev, pasid, old_did, pte); - intel_iommu_drain_pasid_prq(dev, pasid); - - return 0; -} - /* * Interfaces to setup or teardown a pasid table to the scalable-mode * context table entry: diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h index 637373995be80..0296ca55ea5e6 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h @@ -315,20 +315,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, u32 pasid); int intel_pasid_setup_nested(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, u32 pasid, struct dmar_domain *domain); -int intel_pasid_replace_first_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct device *dev, phys_addr_t fsptptr, - u32 pasid, u16 did, u16 old_did, int flags); -int intel_pasid_replace_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct dmar_domain *domain, - struct device *dev, u16 old_did, - u32 pasid); -int intel_pasid_replace_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct device *dev, u16 old_did, - u32 pasid); -int intel_pasid_replace_nested(struct intel_iommu *iommu, - struct device *dev, u32 pasid, - u16 old_did, struct dmar_domain *domain); - void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu, struct device *dev, u32 pasid, bool fault_ignore); From 38cbb1feebcf56ed67c8683e6746ed5cdd16bbac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Komarov Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2025 22:57:46 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 321/607] fs/ntfs3: rename ni_readpage_cmpr into ni_read_folio_cmpr [ Upstream commit 4248f563f0b76f3fb74b2a28ee068bf66fcbbedf ] The old "readpage" naming is still used in ni_readpage_cmpr(), even though the vfs has transitioned to the folio-based read_folio() API. This patch performs a straightforward renaming of the helper: ni_readpage_cmpr() -> ni_read_folio_cmpr(). Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Stable-dep-of: d7ea8495fd30 ("fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ntfs3/frecord.c | 8 ++++---- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 2 +- fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c b/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c index 295f6936a3e58..480f2ed518a78 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c @@ -2046,18 +2046,18 @@ static struct page *ntfs_lock_new_page(struct address_space *mapping, } /* - * ni_readpage_cmpr + * ni_read_folio_cmpr * * When decompressing, we typically obtain more than one page per reference. * We inject the additional pages into the page cache. */ -int ni_readpage_cmpr(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct folio *folio) +int ni_read_folio_cmpr(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct folio *folio) { int err; struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi = ni->mi.sbi; struct address_space *mapping = folio->mapping; - pgoff_t index = folio->index; - u64 frame_vbo, vbo = (u64)index << PAGE_SHIFT; + pgoff_t index; + u64 frame_vbo, vbo = folio_pos(folio); struct page **pages = NULL; /* Array of at most 16 pages. stack? */ u8 frame_bits; CLST frame; diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c index 205baa791f998..0cf2898334f33 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c @@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ static int ntfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio) if (is_compressed(ni)) { ni_lock(ni); - err = ni_readpage_cmpr(ni, folio); + err = ni_read_folio_cmpr(ni, folio); ni_unlock(ni); return err; } diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h b/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h index 2649fbe16669d..a4466e9641f65 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h +++ b/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h @@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ int ni_write_inode(struct inode *inode, int sync, const char *hint); #define _ni_write_inode(i, w) ni_write_inode(i, w, __func__) int ni_fiemap(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, __u64 vbo, __u64 len); -int ni_readpage_cmpr(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct folio *folio); +int ni_read_folio_cmpr(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct folio *folio); int ni_decompress_file(struct ntfs_inode *ni); int ni_read_frame(struct ntfs_inode *ni, u64 frame_vbo, struct page **pages, u32 pages_per_frame); From 764e6f76fdbd495bf383639495db50e604772139 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Komarov Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 14:12:18 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 322/607] fs/ntfs3: fsync files by syncing parent inodes [ Upstream commit dcd9d6a47199565d83d61a11bbf91fa2ade4d676 ] Some xfstests expect fsync() on a file or directory to also persist directory metadata up the parent chain. Using generic_file_fsync() is not sufficient for ntfs, because parent directories are not explicitly written out. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Stable-dep-of: d7ea8495fd30 ("fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ntfs3/dir.c | 2 +- fs/ntfs3/file.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ntfs3/frecord.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/dir.c b/fs/ntfs3/dir.c index 460df046482c7..d41d02372c747 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/dir.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/dir.c @@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ const struct file_operations ntfs_dir_operations = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, .read = generic_read_dir, .iterate_shared = ntfs_readdir, - .fsync = generic_file_fsync, + .fsync = ntfs_file_fsync, .open = ntfs_file_open, .unlocked_ioctl = ntfs_ioctl, #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/file.c b/fs/ntfs3/file.c index 5042eb321eb89..6a19bb0422080 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/file.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/file.c @@ -1378,13 +1378,37 @@ static ssize_t ntfs_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, /* * ntfs_file_fsync - file_operations::fsync */ -static int ntfs_file_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) +int ntfs_file_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - if (unlikely(ntfs3_forced_shutdown(inode->i_sb))) + struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb; + struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi = sb->s_fs_info; + int err, ret; + + if (unlikely(ntfs3_forced_shutdown(sb))) return -EIO; - return generic_file_fsync(file, start, end, datasync); + ret = file_write_and_wait_range(file, start, end); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = write_inode_now(inode, !datasync); + + if (!ret) { + ret = ni_write_parents(ntfs_i(inode), !datasync); + } + + if (!ret) { + ntfs_set_state(sbi, NTFS_DIRTY_CLEAR); + ntfs_update_mftmirr(sbi, false); + } + + err = sync_blockdev(sb->s_bdev); + if (unlikely(err && !ret)) + ret = err; + if (!ret) + blkdev_issue_flush(sb->s_bdev); + return ret; } // clang-format off diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c b/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c index 480f2ed518a78..e904c5da91922 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/frecord.c @@ -3090,6 +3090,57 @@ bool ni_is_dirty(struct inode *inode) return false; } +/* + * ni_write_parents + * + * Helper function for ntfs_file_fsync. + */ +int ni_write_parents(struct ntfs_inode *ni, int sync) +{ + int err = 0; + struct ATTRIB *attr = NULL; + struct ATTR_LIST_ENTRY *le = NULL; + struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi = ni->mi.sbi; + struct super_block *sb = sbi->sb; + + while ((attr = ni_find_attr(ni, attr, &le, ATTR_NAME, NULL, 0, NULL, + NULL))) { + struct inode *dir; + struct ATTR_FILE_NAME *fname; + + fname = resident_data_ex(attr, SIZEOF_ATTRIBUTE_FILENAME); + if (!fname) + continue; + + /* Check simple case when parent inode equals current inode. */ + if (ino_get(&fname->home) == ni->vfs_inode.i_ino) { + if (MFT_REC_ROOT != ni->vfs_inode.i_ino) { + ntfs_set_state(sbi, NTFS_DIRTY_ERROR); + err = -EINVAL; + } + continue; + } + + dir = ntfs_iget5(sb, &fname->home, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(dir)) { + ntfs_inode_warn( + &ni->vfs_inode, + "failed to open parent directory r=%lx to write", + (long)ino_get(&fname->home)); + continue; + } + + if (!is_bad_inode(dir)) { + int err2 = write_inode_now(dir, sync); + if (!err) + err = err2; + } + iput(dir); + } + + return err; +} + /* * ni_update_parent * diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h b/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h index a4466e9641f65..7fb08bff02549 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h +++ b/fs/ntfs3/ntfs_fs.h @@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ int ntfs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, int ntfs_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); int ntfs_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, __u64 start, __u64 len); +int ntfs_file_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync); long ntfs_ioctl(struct file *filp, u32 cmd, unsigned long arg); long ntfs_compat_ioctl(struct file *filp, u32 cmd, unsigned long arg); extern const struct inode_operations ntfs_special_inode_operations; @@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ int ni_rename(struct ntfs_inode *dir_ni, struct ntfs_inode *new_dir_ni, struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct NTFS_DE *de, struct NTFS_DE *new_de); bool ni_is_dirty(struct inode *inode); +int ni_write_parents(struct ntfs_inode *ni, int sync); /* Globals from fslog.c */ bool check_index_header(const struct INDEX_HDR *hdr, size_t bytes); From 6dd58c56ab864431eb292de1507615c4e19b5857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Komarov Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2025 14:38:10 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 323/607] fs/ntfs3: zero-fill folios beyond i_valid in ntfs_read_folio() [ Upstream commit 356fa248168be90109b66f32a61b8eaedc98424a ] Handle ntfs_read_folio() early when the folio offset is beyond i_valid by zero-filling the folio and marking it uptodate. This avoids needless I/O and locking, improves read performance. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Stable-dep-of: d7ea8495fd30 ("fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c index 0cf2898334f33..1b7bb924fc002 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c @@ -723,6 +723,19 @@ static int ntfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio) struct address_space *mapping = folio->mapping; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ntfs_inode *ni = ntfs_i(inode); + loff_t vbo = folio_pos(folio); + + if (unlikely(is_bad_ni(ni))) { + folio_unlock(folio); + return -EIO; + } + + if (ni->i_valid <= vbo) { + folio_zero_range(folio, 0, folio_size(folio)); + folio_mark_uptodate(folio); + folio_unlock(folio); + return 0; + } if (is_resident(ni)) { ni_lock(ni); From 08fad5d5a26cc55c0ecb68ac59ba3be5e31f4147 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Deepanshu Kartikey Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2026 13:15:46 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 324/607] fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked() [ Upstream commit d7ea8495fd307b58f8867acd81a1b40075b1d3ba ] When a compressed or sparse attribute has its clusters frame-aligned, vcn is rounded down to the frame start using cmask, which can result in vcn != vcn0. In this case, vcn and vcn0 may reside in different attribute segments. The code already handles the case where vcn is in a different segment by loading its runs before allocation. However, it fails to load runs for vcn0 when vcn0 resides in a different segment than vcn. This causes run_lookup_entry() to return SPARSE_LCN for vcn0 since its segment was never loaded into the in-memory run list, triggering the WARN_ON(1). Fix this by adding a missing check for vcn0 after the existing vcn segment check. If vcn0 falls outside the current segment range [svcn, evcn1), find and load the attribute segment containing vcn0 before performing the run lookup. The following scenario triggers the bug: attr_data_get_block_locked() vcn = vcn0 & cmask <- vcn != vcn0 after frame alignment load runs for vcn segment <- vcn0 segment not loaded! attr_allocate_clusters() <- allocation succeeds run_lookup_entry(vcn0) <- vcn0 not in run -> SPARSE_LCN WARN_ON(1) <- bug fires here! Reported-by: syzbot+c1e9aedbd913fadad617@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c1e9aedbd913fadad617 Fixes: c380b52f6c57 ("fs/ntfs3: Change new sparse cluster processing") Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ntfs3/attrib.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c b/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c index 5a7675112e7b8..501f2ec153ab8 100644 --- a/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/attrib.c @@ -1045,6 +1045,20 @@ int attr_data_get_block(struct ntfs_inode *ni, CLST vcn, CLST clen, CLST *lcn, if (err) goto out; } + + if (vcn0 < svcn || evcn1 <= vcn0) { + struct ATTRIB *attr2; + + attr2 = ni_find_attr(ni, attr_b, &le_b, ATTR_DATA, NULL, + 0, &vcn0, &mi); + if (!attr2) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + err = attr_load_runs(attr2, ni, run, NULL); + if (err) + goto out; + } } if (vcn + to_alloc > asize) From 661a019ac0413ecec9e5d1dfcc12fbca8e78d5fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junrui Luo Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 15:34:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 325/607] coresight: ultrasoc-smb: Fix OOB write in smb_sync_perf_buffer() commit 98495b5a4d77dd22e106f462b76e1093a55b29a7 upstream. When the SMB sink is used as a perf AUX sink, smb_update_buffer() calls smb_sync_perf_buffer() to copy hardware trace data into the perf AUX ring buffer pages. It derives pg_idx = head >> PAGE_SHIFT from @head, which is handle->head, and indexes dst_pages[pg_idx]. The pg_idx %= nr_pages normalization is only applied after the first loop iteration. This leaves the initial page index underived from the buffer size, which can result in an out-of-bounds write past dst_pages[] when head exceeds the AUX buffer size. Normalize head modulo the AUX buffer size before deriving the page index and offset, mirroring tmc_etr_sync_perf_buffer(). Fixes: 06f5c2926aaa ("drivers/coresight: Add UltraSoc System Memory Buffer driver") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/SYBPR01MB788156B3380A36835DB22290AF102@SYBPR01MB7881.ausprd01.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/ultrasoc-smb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/ultrasoc-smb.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/ultrasoc-smb.c index 26cfc939e5bd8..780329250aca6 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/ultrasoc-smb.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/ultrasoc-smb.c @@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ static void smb_sync_perf_buffer(struct smb_drv_data *drvdata, unsigned long to_copy; long pg_idx, pg_offset; + head %= (unsigned long)buf->nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT; pg_idx = head >> PAGE_SHIFT; pg_offset = head & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); From 91b8a58c6ac15c7db6518f696389933282f88da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 20:11:49 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 326/607] smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations commit ec457f9afe5ae9538bdcd58fd4cb442b9787e183 upstream. cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration's cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons for the same net/share name share one registration id. A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through swnreg->tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock order. Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex, then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -> tc_lock order. The notification path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done. Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the idr entry and frees the stable identity strings. This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register. Fixes: fed979a7e082 ("cifs: Set witness notification handler for messages from userspace daemon") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/cifs_swn.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- fs/smb/client/trace.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 262 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifs_swn.c b/fs/smb/client/cifs_swn.c index 68a1f87c446d0..12b0420d9bdc1 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifs_swn.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifs_swn.c @@ -28,10 +28,54 @@ struct cifs_swn_reg { bool net_name_notify; bool share_name_notify; bool ip_notify; +}; - struct cifs_tcon *tcon; +struct cifs_swn_reg_info { + int id; + unsigned int ref_count; + const char *net_name; + const char *share_name; + bool net_name_notify; + bool share_name_notify; + bool ip_notify; }; +static void cifs_swn_snapshot_reg(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg, + struct cifs_swn_reg_info *info) +{ + info->id = swnreg->id; + info->ref_count = kref_read(&swnreg->ref_count); + info->net_name = swnreg->net_name; + info->share_name = swnreg->share_name; + info->net_name_notify = swnreg->net_name_notify; + info->share_name_notify = swnreg->share_name_notify; + info->ip_notify = swnreg->ip_notify; +} + +static int cifs_swn_dup_reg(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg, + struct cifs_swn_reg_info *info) +{ + cifs_swn_snapshot_reg(swnreg, info); + + info->net_name = kstrdup(swnreg->net_name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info->net_name) + return -ENOMEM; + + info->share_name = kstrdup(swnreg->share_name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info->share_name) { + kfree(info->net_name); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void cifs_swn_free_reg_info(struct cifs_swn_reg_info *info) +{ + kfree(info->net_name); + kfree(info->share_name); +} + static int cifs_swn_auth_info_krb(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct sk_buff *skb) { int ret; @@ -73,7 +117,8 @@ static int cifs_swn_auth_info_ntlm(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct sk_buff *skb) * The authentication information to connect to the witness service is bundled * into the message. */ -static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) +static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg_info *swnreg, + struct cifs_tcon *tcon) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct genlmsghdr *hdr; @@ -109,10 +154,10 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) * told to switch to it (client move message). In these cases we unregister from the * server address and register to the new address when we receive the notification. */ - if (swnreg->tcon->ses->server->use_swn_dstaddr) - addr = &swnreg->tcon->ses->server->swn_dstaddr; + if (tcon->ses->server->use_swn_dstaddr) + addr = &tcon->ses->server->swn_dstaddr; else - addr = &swnreg->tcon->ses->server->dstaddr; + addr = &tcon->ses->server->dstaddr; ret = nla_put(skb, CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_IP, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), addr); if (ret < 0) @@ -136,10 +181,10 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) goto nlmsg_fail; } - authtype = cifs_select_sectype(swnreg->tcon->ses->server, swnreg->tcon->ses->sectype); + authtype = cifs_select_sectype(tcon->ses->server, tcon->ses->sectype); switch (authtype) { case Kerberos: - ret = cifs_swn_auth_info_krb(swnreg->tcon, skb); + ret = cifs_swn_auth_info_krb(tcon, skb); if (ret < 0) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed to get kerberos auth info: %d\n", __func__, ret); goto nlmsg_fail; @@ -147,7 +192,7 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) break; case NTLMv2: case RawNTLMSSP: - ret = cifs_swn_auth_info_ntlm(swnreg->tcon, skb); + ret = cifs_swn_auth_info_ntlm(tcon, skb); if (ret < 0) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed to get NTLM auth info: %d\n", __func__, ret); goto nlmsg_fail; @@ -176,7 +221,8 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_register_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) /* * Sends an uregister message to the userspace daemon based on the registration */ -static int cifs_swn_send_unregister_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) +static int cifs_swn_send_unregister_message(struct cifs_swn_reg_info *swnreg, + struct cifs_tcon *tcon) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct genlmsghdr *hdr; @@ -205,7 +251,7 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_unregister_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) goto nlmsg_fail; ret = nla_put(skb, CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_IP, sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), - &swnreg->tcon->ses->server->dstaddr); + &tcon->ses->server->dstaddr); if (ret < 0) goto nlmsg_fail; @@ -241,6 +287,88 @@ static int cifs_swn_send_unregister_message(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) return ret; } +/* + * Allocation-free mirror of extract_hostname() + extract_sharename() from + * fs/smb/client/unc.c. Those helpers kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL); this runs under + * cifs_tcp_ses_lock and tcon->tc_lock, both spinlocks, so we mirror their + * parsing in place against the caller's stable net_name/share_name strings. + * Keep in sync with unc.c. + */ +static bool cifs_swn_tcon_matches(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, + const char *net_name, + const char *share_name) +{ + const char *unc = tcon->tree_name; + const char *host, *share, *delim; + size_t host_len, share_len; + + if (!tcon->use_witness) + return false; + + /* extract_hostname: require strlen(unc) >= 3 */ + if (strnlen(unc, 3) < 3) + return false; + /* extract_hostname: skip all leading '\' characters */ + for (host = unc; *host == '\\'; host++) + ; + if (!*host) + return false; + delim = strchr(host, '\\'); + if (!delim) + return false; + host_len = delim - host; + if (strlen(net_name) != host_len || + strncasecmp(host, net_name, host_len)) + return false; + + /* extract_sharename: start at unc + 2, then first '\' onward */ + share = unc + 2; + delim = strchr(share, '\\'); + if (!delim) + return false; + share = delim + 1; + share_len = strlen(share); + + return strlen(share_name) == share_len && + !strncasecmp(share, share_name, share_len); +} + +/* + * One SWN registration id represents one net/share name pair. Multiple + * mounted tcons can therefore share the id. Pick a live representative at + * use time instead of caching the first tcon pointer in the registration. + */ +static struct cifs_tcon *cifs_swn_get_tcon(struct cifs_swn_reg_info *swnreg) +{ + struct TCP_Server_Info *server; + struct cifs_ses *ses; + struct cifs_tcon *tcon; + + spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); + list_for_each_entry(server, &cifs_tcp_ses_list, tcp_ses_list) { + list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) { + list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) { + spin_lock(&tcon->tc_lock); + if (tcon->status == TID_EXITING || + !cifs_swn_tcon_matches(tcon, swnreg->net_name, + swnreg->share_name)) { + spin_unlock(&tcon->tc_lock); + continue; + } + ++tcon->tc_count; + trace_smb3_tcon_ref(tcon->debug_id, + tcon->tc_count, + netfs_trace_tcon_ref_get_swn_notify); + spin_unlock(&tcon->tc_lock); + spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); + return tcon; + } + } + } + spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock); + return NULL; +} + /* * Try to find a matching registration for the tcon's server name and share name. * Calls to this function must be protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. @@ -347,8 +475,6 @@ static struct cifs_swn_reg *cifs_get_swn_reg(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) reg->net_name_notify = true; reg->share_name_notify = true; reg->ip_notify = (tcon->capabilities & SMB2_SHARE_CAP_SCALEOUT); - - reg->tcon = tcon; unlock: mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); @@ -368,11 +494,6 @@ static struct cifs_swn_reg *cifs_get_swn_reg(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) static void cifs_swn_reg_release(struct kref *ref) { struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg = container_of(ref, struct cifs_swn_reg, ref_count); - int ret; - - ret = cifs_swn_send_unregister_message(swnreg); - if (ret < 0) - cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed to send unregister message: %d\n", __func__, ret); idr_remove(&cifs_swnreg_idr, swnreg->id); kfree(swnreg->net_name); @@ -380,23 +501,33 @@ static void cifs_swn_reg_release(struct kref *ref) kfree(swnreg); } -static void cifs_put_swn_reg(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg) +static void cifs_put_swn_reg_locked(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg, + struct cifs_tcon *tcon) { - mutex_lock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); + if (kref_read(&swnreg->ref_count) == 1) { + struct cifs_swn_reg_info swnreg_info; + int ret; + + cifs_swn_snapshot_reg(swnreg, &swnreg_info); + ret = cifs_swn_send_unregister_message(&swnreg_info, tcon); + if (ret < 0) + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed to send unregister message: %d\n", + __func__, ret); + } + kref_put(&swnreg->ref_count, cifs_swn_reg_release); - mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); } -static int cifs_swn_resource_state_changed(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg, const char *name, int state) +static int cifs_swn_resource_state_changed(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, const char *name, int state) { switch (state) { case CIFS_SWN_RESOURCE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE: cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: resource name '%s' become unavailable\n", __func__, name); - cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect(swnreg->tcon->ses->server, true); + cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect(tcon->ses->server, true); break; case CIFS_SWN_RESOURCE_STATE_AVAILABLE: cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: resource name '%s' become available\n", __func__, name); - cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect(swnreg->tcon->ses->server, true); + cifs_signal_cifsd_for_reconnect(tcon->ses->server, true); break; case CIFS_SWN_RESOURCE_STATE_UNKNOWN: cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: resource name '%s' changed to unknown state\n", __func__, name); @@ -502,7 +633,7 @@ static int cifs_swn_reconnect(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct sockaddr_storage *a return ret; } -static int cifs_swn_client_move(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg, struct sockaddr_storage *addr) +static int cifs_swn_client_move(struct cifs_tcon *tcon, struct sockaddr_storage *addr) { struct sockaddr_in *ipv4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr; struct sockaddr_in6 *ipv6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; @@ -512,14 +643,17 @@ static int cifs_swn_client_move(struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg, struct sockaddr_sto else if (addr->ss_family == AF_INET6) cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: move to %pI6\n", __func__, &ipv6->sin6_addr); - return cifs_swn_reconnect(swnreg->tcon, addr); + return cifs_swn_reconnect(tcon, addr); } int cifs_swn_notify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) { struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg; + struct cifs_swn_reg_info swnreg_info; + struct cifs_tcon *tcon; char name[256]; int type; + int ret = 0; if (info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_REGISTRATION_ID]) { int swnreg_id; @@ -527,21 +661,34 @@ int cifs_swn_notify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) swnreg_id = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_REGISTRATION_ID]); mutex_lock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); swnreg = idr_find(&cifs_swnreg_idr, swnreg_id); - mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); if (swnreg == NULL) { + mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: registration id %d not found\n", __func__, swnreg_id); return -EINVAL; } + ret = cifs_swn_dup_reg(swnreg, &swnreg_info); + mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); + if (ret) + return ret; } else { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: missing registration id attribute\n", __func__); return -EINVAL; } + tcon = cifs_swn_get_tcon(&swnreg_info); + if (!tcon) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: registration id %d has no live tcon\n", + __func__, swnreg_info.id); + ret = -ENODEV; + goto free_info; + } + if (info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_NOTIFICATION_TYPE]) { type = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_NOTIFICATION_TYPE]); } else { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: missing notification type attribute\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } switch (type) { @@ -553,15 +700,18 @@ int cifs_swn_notify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) sizeof(name)); } else { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: missing resource name attribute\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } if (info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_RESOURCE_STATE]) { state = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_RESOURCE_STATE]); } else { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: missing resource state attribute\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } - return cifs_swn_resource_state_changed(swnreg, name, state); + ret = cifs_swn_resource_state_changed(tcon, name, state); + break; } case CIFS_SWN_NOTIFICATION_CLIENT_MOVE: { struct sockaddr_storage addr; @@ -570,28 +720,36 @@ int cifs_swn_notify(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) nla_memcpy(&addr, info->attrs[CIFS_GENL_ATTR_SWN_IP], sizeof(addr)); } else { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: missing IP address attribute\n", __func__); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } - return cifs_swn_client_move(swnreg, &addr); + ret = cifs_swn_client_move(tcon, &addr); + break; } default: cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: unknown notification type %d\n", __func__, type); break; } - return 0; +out: + cifs_put_tcon(tcon, netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_swn_notify); +free_info: + cifs_swn_free_reg_info(&swnreg_info); + return ret; } int cifs_swn_register(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) { struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg; + struct cifs_swn_reg_info swnreg_info; int ret; swnreg = cifs_get_swn_reg(tcon); if (IS_ERR(swnreg)) return PTR_ERR(swnreg); - ret = cifs_swn_send_register_message(swnreg); + cifs_swn_snapshot_reg(swnreg, &swnreg_info); + ret = cifs_swn_send_register_message(&swnreg_info, tcon); if (ret < 0) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Failed to send swn register message: %d\n", __func__, ret); /* Do not put the swnreg or return error, the echo task will retry */ @@ -612,35 +770,68 @@ int cifs_swn_unregister(struct cifs_tcon *tcon) return PTR_ERR(swnreg); } + cifs_put_swn_reg_locked(swnreg, tcon); mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); - cifs_put_swn_reg(swnreg); - return 0; } -void cifs_swn_dump(struct seq_file *m) +/* + * Snapshot one registration under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex and return. Callers + * intentionally do the per-registration network/genlmsg work without the + * mutex held, both to keep the critical section short and to avoid nesting + * cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex inside the higher tc_lock when a live tcon is then + * pinned for the send. + */ +static int cifs_swn_get_next_reg_info(int *id, struct cifs_swn_reg_info *info) { struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg; + int ret = 0; + + mutex_lock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); + swnreg = idr_get_next(&cifs_swnreg_idr, id); + if (swnreg) { + ret = cifs_swn_dup_reg(swnreg, info); + if (!ret) { + *id = swnreg->id + 1; + ret = 1; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); + + return ret; +} + +void cifs_swn_dump(struct seq_file *m) +{ + struct cifs_swn_reg_info swnreg_info; + struct cifs_tcon *tcon; struct sockaddr_in *sa; struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; - int id; + int id = 0; + int ret; seq_puts(m, "Witness registrations:"); - mutex_lock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); - idr_for_each_entry(&cifs_swnreg_idr, swnreg, id) { + while ((ret = cifs_swn_get_next_reg_info(&id, &swnreg_info)) > 0) { seq_printf(m, "\nId: %u Refs: %u Network name: '%s'%s Share name: '%s'%s Ip address: ", - id, kref_read(&swnreg->ref_count), - swnreg->net_name, swnreg->net_name_notify ? "(y)" : "(n)", - swnreg->share_name, swnreg->share_name_notify ? "(y)" : "(n)"); - switch (swnreg->tcon->ses->server->dstaddr.ss_family) { + swnreg_info.id, swnreg_info.ref_count, + swnreg_info.net_name, swnreg_info.net_name_notify ? "(y)" : "(n)", + swnreg_info.share_name, swnreg_info.share_name_notify ? "(y)" : "(n)"); + + tcon = cifs_swn_get_tcon(&swnreg_info); + if (!tcon) { + seq_puts(m, "(no live tcon)"); + goto next; + } + + switch (tcon->ses->server->dstaddr.ss_family) { case AF_INET: - sa = (struct sockaddr_in *) &swnreg->tcon->ses->server->dstaddr; + sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)&tcon->ses->server->dstaddr; seq_printf(m, "%pI4", &sa->sin_addr.s_addr); break; case AF_INET6: - sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &swnreg->tcon->ses->server->dstaddr; + sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&tcon->ses->server->dstaddr; seq_printf(m, "%pI6", &sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr); if (sa6->sin6_scope_id) seq_printf(m, "%%%u", sa6->sin6_scope_id); @@ -648,23 +839,38 @@ void cifs_swn_dump(struct seq_file *m) default: seq_puts(m, "(unknown)"); } - seq_printf(m, "%s", swnreg->ip_notify ? "(y)" : "(n)"); + cifs_put_tcon(tcon, netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_swn_notify); +next: + seq_printf(m, "%s", swnreg_info.ip_notify ? "(y)" : "(n)"); + cifs_swn_free_reg_info(&swnreg_info); } - mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); + if (ret < 0) + seq_printf(m, "\nFailed to snapshot witness registration: %d", ret); seq_puts(m, "\n"); } void cifs_swn_check(void) { - struct cifs_swn_reg *swnreg; - int id; + struct cifs_swn_reg_info swnreg_info; + struct cifs_tcon *tcon; + int id = 0; int ret; - mutex_lock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); - idr_for_each_entry(&cifs_swnreg_idr, swnreg, id) { - ret = cifs_swn_send_register_message(swnreg); + while ((ret = cifs_swn_get_next_reg_info(&id, &swnreg_info)) > 0) { + tcon = cifs_swn_get_tcon(&swnreg_info); + if (!tcon) { + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: registration id %d has no live tcon\n", + __func__, swnreg_info.id); + goto free_info; + } + + ret = cifs_swn_send_register_message(&swnreg_info, tcon); if (ret < 0) cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Failed to send register message: %d\n", __func__, ret); + cifs_put_tcon(tcon, netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_swn_notify); +free_info: + cifs_swn_free_reg_info(&swnreg_info); } - mutex_unlock(&cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex); + if (ret < 0) + cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Failed to snapshot registration: %d\n", __func__, ret); } diff --git a/fs/smb/client/trace.h b/fs/smb/client/trace.h index 79a246af664d2..dbed7c082af32 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/trace.h +++ b/fs/smb/client/trace.h @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_get_find, "GET Find ") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_get_find_sess_tcon, "GET FndSes") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_get_reconnect_server, "GET Reconn") \ + EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_get_swn_notify, "GET SwnNot") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_new, "NEW ") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_new_ipc, "NEW Ipc ") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_new_reconnect_server, "NEW Reconn") \ @@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_mnt_ctx, "PUT MntCtx") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_dfs_refer, "PUT DfsRfr") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_reconnect_server, "PUT Reconn") \ + EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_swn_notify, "PUT SwnNot") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_put_tlink, "PUT Tlink ") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_see_cancelled_close, "SEE Cn-Cls") \ EM(netfs_trace_tcon_ref_see_fscache_collision, "SEE FV-CO!") \ From a187883cc1dc784a4d32537f5d316f1b7b9ad76f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 10:35:28 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 327/607] smb/client: Fix error code in smb2_aead_req_alloc() commit 61f28012e5650c619223decdb7970e0d3162e949 upstream. The "*num_sgs" variable is a u32 so "ERR_PTR(*num_sgs)" doesn't work. We would have to do something similar to the previous line where it's cast to int and then long. However, it's simpler to store the return in an int ret variable. This bug would eventually result in a crash when dereference the invalid error pointer. Fixes: d08089f649a0 ("cifs: Change the I/O paths to use an iterator rather than a page list") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c index e1a9e89cb85fe..0b52f07003338 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c @@ -4314,11 +4314,13 @@ static void *smb2_aead_req_alloc(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const struct smb_rqst unsigned int req_size = sizeof(**req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm); unsigned int iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm); unsigned int len; + int ret; u8 *p; - *num_sgs = cifs_get_num_sgs(rqst, num_rqst, sig); - if (IS_ERR_VALUE((long)(int)*num_sgs)) - return ERR_PTR(*num_sgs); + ret = cifs_get_num_sgs(rqst, num_rqst, sig); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + *num_sgs = ret; len = iv_size; len += crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm) & ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1); From baae7b39673ec21073a25e3d14f8feaada01d5df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gil Portnoy Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 07:15:38 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 328/607] ksmbd: add permission checks for FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE commit 388e4139db27a9e3612c9d356b826f5b1ff6a9e3 upstream. The FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE arm of smb2_ioctl() overwrites the destination file's data via vfs_clone_file_range() with neither the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE check nor a per-handle fp->daccess check that the other write-bearing arms carry. A client can overwrite destination data on a read-only share, or from a handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES (which still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp). FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only destination handle overwrote the file's data via the clone. Add both checks, matching the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE permission fix; require FILE_WRITE_DATA since this writes data. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index fd1c3a7d21601..30fffe3f31a00 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -8563,6 +8563,17 @@ int smb2_ioctl(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto dup_ext_out; } + if (!test_tree_conn_flag(work->tcon, + KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE)) { + ret = -EACCES; + goto dup_ext_out; + } + + if (!(fp_out->daccess & FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE)) { + ret = -EACCES; + goto dup_ext_out; + } + src_off = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->SourceFileOffset); dst_off = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->TargetFileOffset); length = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->ByteCount); From 57f2042fd87d7ce8fc3ac8b6c176e554df68b1a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gil Portnoy Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 20:07:04 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 329/607] ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA commit 3320ba068198adc144c89d6661b805acce01735b upstream. FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -> vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only the missing fp->daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to (6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied). This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE"). Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require FILE_WRITE_DATA. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 30fffe3f31a00..b173700774fd3 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -8488,6 +8488,12 @@ int smb2_ioctl(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto out; } + if (!(fp->daccess & FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE)) { + ksmbd_fd_put(work, fp); + ret = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + ret = ksmbd_vfs_zero_data(work, fp, off, len); ksmbd_fd_put(work, fp); if (ret < 0) From a1d5d31cad593ea5e1b637f2f39c9ef6d09d1199 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 08:00:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 330/607] ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file commit be6d26bf27499977c746abc163659915082348d8 upstream. smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free. Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state, readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-30527 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 ++++ fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c | 1 + fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index b173700774fd3..6f80796f884b6 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -4472,6 +4472,8 @@ int smb2_query_dir(struct ksmbd_work *work) ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Search pattern is %s\n", srch_ptr); } + mutex_lock(&dir_fp->readdir_lock); + if (srch_flag & SMB2_REOPEN || srch_flag & SMB2_RESTART_SCANS) { ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Restart directory scan\n"); generic_file_llseek(dir_fp->filp, 0, SEEK_SET); @@ -4576,6 +4578,7 @@ int smb2_query_dir(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out; } + mutex_unlock(&dir_fp->readdir_lock); kfree(srch_ptr); ksmbd_fd_put(work, dir_fp); ksmbd_revert_fsids(work); @@ -4583,6 +4586,7 @@ int smb2_query_dir(struct ksmbd_work *work) err_out: pr_err("error while processing smb2 query dir rc = %d\n", rc); + mutex_unlock(&dir_fp->readdir_lock); kfree(srch_ptr); err_out2: diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c index 7293b7effbc14..58dc9a1383e81 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c @@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ struct ksmbd_file *ksmbd_open_fd(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct file *filp) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fp->lock_list); spin_lock_init(&fp->f_lock); + mutex_init(&fp->readdir_lock); atomic_set(&fp->refcount, 1); fp->filp = filp; diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h index 866f32c10d4dd..6fcb7791f275f 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h +++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ struct ksmbd_file { /* if ls is happening on directory, below is valid*/ struct ksmbd_readdir_data readdir_data; + struct mutex readdir_lock; int dot_dotdot[2]; unsigned int f_state; bool reserve_lease_break; From 5aa1cb01155f96824003baf7997cdf1f150caba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Davide Ornaghi Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 16:11:04 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 331/607] ksmbd: fix UAF of struct file_lock in SMB2_LOCK deferred-lock cancellation commit d20d1c8ba5765d1d12eefc0aee6385ab3f240e1e upstream. When a blocking byte-range lock request is deferred in the FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED path, ksmbd registers the asynchronous work into the connection's async_requests list via setup_async_work(). The cancel callback smb2_remove_blocked_lock() holds a reference to the flock. If the lock waiter is subsequently woken up but the work state is no longer KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE (e.g., due to a concurrent cancellation), the cleanup path calls locks_free_lock(flock) without dequeuing the work from the async_requests list. Concurrently, smb2_cancel() walks the list under conn->request_lock and invokes the cancel callback, which then dereferences the already freed 'flock'. This leads to a slab-use-after-free inside __wake_up_common. Fix this by restructuring the cleanup logic after the worker returns from ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_wait(). Move list_del(&smb_lock->llist) and release_async_work(work) to the top of the cleanup block. This guarantees that the async work is completely dequeued and serialized under conn->request_lock before locks_free_lock(flock) is called, rendering the flock unreachable for any concurrent smb2_cancel(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Davide Ornaghi Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 6f80796f884b6..933a1e42db4b6 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -7747,29 +7747,27 @@ int smb2_lock(struct ksmbd_work *work) list_del(&work->fp_entry); spin_unlock(&fp->f_lock); - if (work->state != KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE) { - list_del(&smb_lock->llist); - locks_free_lock(flock); + list_del(&smb_lock->llist); + release_async_work(work); - if (work->state == KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED) { - rsp->hdr.Status = - STATUS_CANCELLED; - kfree(smb_lock); - smb2_send_interim_resp(work, - STATUS_CANCELLED); - work->send_no_response = 1; - goto out; - } + if (work->state == KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE) + goto retry; + + locks_free_lock(flock); - rsp->hdr.Status = - STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED; + if (work->state == KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED) { + rsp->hdr.Status = STATUS_CANCELLED; kfree(smb_lock); - goto out2; + smb2_send_interim_resp(work, + STATUS_CANCELLED); + work->send_no_response = 1; + goto out; } - list_del(&smb_lock->llist); - release_async_work(work); - goto retry; + rsp->hdr.Status = + STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED; + kfree(smb_lock); + goto out2; } else if (!rc) { list_add(&smb_lock->llist, &rollback_list); spin_lock(&work->conn->llist_lock); From db231af842868268839f9f9619c68cb27830d8be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 22:00:02 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 332/607] ksmbd: require source read access for duplicate extents commit cedff600f1642aa982178503552f0d007bc829c8 upstream. FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE passes the source file directly to vfs_clone_file_range() or vfs_copy_file_range() without checking the SMB access mask granted to the source handle. A handle opened with attribute access can consequently be used to copy file contents into an attacker-readable destination. Require FILE_READ_DATA on the source handle before either VFS operation, matching other ksmbd data-copy paths. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Musaab Khan Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 933a1e42db4b6..bf4488182dfa7 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -8581,6 +8581,10 @@ int smb2_ioctl(struct ksmbd_work *work) ret = -EACCES; goto dup_ext_out; } + if (!(fp_in->daccess & FILE_READ_DATA_LE)) { + ret = -EACCES; + goto dup_ext_out; + } src_off = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->SourceFileOffset); dst_off = le64_to_cpu(dup_ext->TargetFileOffset); From f56535db508ead8dec1c481ad93d7d8acd8f8f1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gil Portnoy Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 333/607] ksmbd: add a WRITE_DAC/WRITE_OWNER check to SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 44df157a1183a7f746caa970c169255da5ac61f8 upstream. commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE") added a fp->daccess gate to fsctl_set_sparse and noted that "similar handle-level checks exist in other functions but are missing here." The SMB2 SET_INFO SECURITY arm is one of the missing ones, and the most security-relevant: smb2_set_info_sec() calls set_info_sec() with no per-handle access check. set_info_sec() (fs/smb/server/smbacl.c) re-permissions the file: it rewrites owner/group/mode via notify_change(), rewrites the POSIX ACL via set_posix_acl(), and on KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_ACL_XATTR shares removes and rewrites the Windows security descriptor via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(). Every other persistent-mutation arm of the sibling handler smb2_set_info_file() checks fp->daccess first (FILE_WRITE_DATA / FILE_DELETE / FILE_WRITE_EA / FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES); the SECURITY arm — which mutates the access control itself — is the only one with no gate. A client can therefore open a handle with FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES only (no FILE_WRITE_DAC / FILE_WRITE_OWNER) and use SMB2_SET_INFO with InfoType SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY to rewrite the file's DACL and owner, granting itself access the handle's daccess never carried. Unlike the FSCTL data arms this is a metadata/xattr operation, so there is no FMODE_WRITE VFS backstop — the missing fp->daccess check is the entire gate. Setting a security descriptor is the WRITE_DAC / WRITE_OWNER operation, so require at least one of those on the handle before re-permissioning the file. -EACCES is mapped to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED by smb2_set_info(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index bf4488182dfa7..5f847d28746fb 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -6623,6 +6623,9 @@ static int smb2_set_info_sec(struct ksmbd_file *fp, int addition_info, fp->saccess |= FILE_SHARE_DELETE_LE; + if (!(fp->daccess & (FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE | FILE_WRITE_OWNER_LE))) + return -EACCES; + return set_info_sec(fp->conn, fp->tcon, &fp->filp->f_path, pntsd, buf_len, false, true); } From 20ee516a62989a8d505ee432f9e59525ea23984e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 22:00:01 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 334/607] ksmbd: run set info with opener credentials commit b383bcad3d2fe634b26efbce53e22bbb5753a520 upstream. SMB2 SET_INFO handlers call path-based VFS helpers after checking the access mask granted to the SMB handle. Those helpers perform their owner, inode permission and LSM checks using the current ksmbd worker credentials. Run the complete SET_INFO dispatch with the credentials captured when the handle was opened. This also removes the separate security information credential setup and keeps all SET_INFO classes under one credential scope. Direct override_creds() is used because it can nest with the request credential overrides already used by rename and link helpers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Musaab Khan Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 5f847d28746fb..3b69b28950770 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -6638,6 +6638,7 @@ static int smb2_set_info_sec(struct ksmbd_file *fp, int addition_info, */ int smb2_set_info(struct ksmbd_work *work) { + const struct cred *saved_cred; struct smb2_set_info_req *req; struct smb2_set_info_rsp *rsp; struct ksmbd_file *fp = NULL; @@ -6679,6 +6680,7 @@ int smb2_set_info(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out; } + saved_cred = override_creds(fp->filp->f_cred); switch (req->InfoType) { case SMB2_O_INFO_FILE: ksmbd_debug(SMB, "GOT SMB2_O_INFO_FILE\n"); @@ -6686,19 +6688,15 @@ int smb2_set_info(struct ksmbd_work *work) break; case SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY: ksmbd_debug(SMB, "GOT SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY\n"); - if (ksmbd_override_fsids(work)) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto err_out; - } rc = smb2_set_info_sec(fp, le32_to_cpu(req->AdditionalInformation), (char *)req + le16_to_cpu(req->BufferOffset), le32_to_cpu(req->BufferLength)); - ksmbd_revert_fsids(work); break; default: rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; } + revert_creds(saved_cred); if (rc < 0) goto err_out; From 2ca82bfff49c84709d8736fb5040e00867bf3028 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gil Portnoy Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 22:59:51 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 335/607] ksmbd: enforce FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES on SMB_FIND_FILE_POSIX_INFORMATION commit 20c8442dc1003f9f7bb522d3dcd81d09ea59a79e upstream. find_file_posix_info() in smb2_query_info() returns file metadata (owner uid, group gid, mode, inode, size, allocation size, hard-link count and all four timestamps) but performs no per-handle access check. Every sibling query handler gates on the handle's granted access first -- get_file_basic_info(), get_file_all_info(), get_file_network_open_info() and get_file_attribute_tag_info() all reject a handle lacking FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES_LE with -EACCES. The POSIX handler is gated only by the connection-scoped tcon->posix_extensions flag, which is not a per-handle authorization, so a handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_DATA is correctly denied FileBasicInformation yet is allowed the strict-superset POSIX info. Mirror the FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES_LE gate the sibling info handlers already use. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 3b69b28950770..d2173a308adb9 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -5339,6 +5339,12 @@ static int find_file_posix_info(struct smb2_query_info_rsp *rsp, int out_buf_len = sizeof(struct smb311_posix_qinfo) + 32; int ret; + if (!(fp->daccess & FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES_LE)) { + pr_err("no right to read the attributes : 0x%x\n", + fp->daccess); + return -EACCES; + } + ret = vfs_getattr(&fp->filp->f_path, &stat, STATX_BASIC_STATS, AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT); if (ret) From df501c0f320b5e2446712f339e2729f750906ee7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gil Portnoy Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 20:13:51 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 336/607] ksmbd: add per-handle permission check to FILE_LINK_INFORMATION commit 13f3942f2bf45856bb751faed2f0c4618f41ca20 upstream. The FILE_LINK_INFORMATION arm of smb2_set_info_file() calls smb2_create_link() with no per-handle fp->daccess check. On the ReplaceIfExists path smb2_create_link() unlinks an existing file at the target name (ksmbd_vfs_remove_file) and creates a hardlink (ksmbd_vfs_link); neither helper checks daccess. A handle opened with FILE_READ_DATA only (no FILE_DELETE, no FILE_WRITE_DATA) can therefore delete an arbitrary file in the share and plant a hardlink over its name. The sibling delete/move arms in the same switch already gate: FILE_RENAME_INFORMATION and FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION both require FILE_DELETE_LE; FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION requires FILE_WRITE_EA_LE. Gate the link arm the same way as its closest analogue (rename), since it mutates the namespace and, on replace, deletes an existing entry. This is a sibling of commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE"). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index d2173a308adb9..50e36050f9ea3 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -6572,6 +6572,11 @@ static int smb2_set_info_file(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct ksmbd_file *fp, } case FILE_LINK_INFORMATION: { + if (!(fp->daccess & FILE_DELETE_LE)) { + pr_err("no right to delete : 0x%x\n", fp->daccess); + return -EACCES; + } + if (buf_len < sizeof(struct smb2_file_link_info)) return -EINVAL; From e72c15085b6d86f45d224d98aa75b5cace4aaab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 22:00:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 337/607] ksmbd: use opener credentials for delete-on-close commit 52e2f21911158ec961cd5aae19c56460db382af0 upstream. Delete-on-close can be completed by deferred or durable handle teardown, where no request work is available. Both the base-file unlink and the ADS xattr removal consequently run with the ksmbd worker credentials and can bypass filesystem permission checks. Run both operations with the credentials captured in struct file when the handle was opened. This preserves the authenticated user's fsuid, fsgid, supplementary groups and capability restrictions at final close. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Musaab Khan Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/vfs.c | 7 +++++-- fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs.c b/fs/smb/server/vfs.c index 90e693e4e4149..db7ce7671363d 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/vfs.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs.c @@ -1078,13 +1078,15 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_remove_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, int ksmbd_vfs_unlink(struct file *filp) { + const struct cred *saved_cred; int err = 0; struct dentry *dir, *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry; struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(filp); + saved_cred = override_creds(filp->f_cred); err = mnt_want_write(filp->f_path.mnt); if (err) - return err; + goto out_revert; dir = dget_parent(dentry); err = ksmbd_vfs_lock_parent(dir, dentry); @@ -1104,7 +1106,8 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_unlink(struct file *filp) out: dput(dir); mnt_drop_write(filp->f_path.mnt); - +out_revert: + revert_creds(saved_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c index 58dc9a1383e81..a1f59a8e16e28 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c @@ -292,10 +292,14 @@ static void __ksmbd_inode_close(struct ksmbd_file *fp) up_write(&ci->m_lock); if (remove_stream_xattr) { + const struct cred *saved_cred; + + saved_cred = override_creds(filp->f_cred); err = ksmbd_vfs_remove_xattr(file_mnt_idmap(filp), &filp->f_path, fp->stream.name, true); + revert_creds(saved_cred); if (err) pr_err("remove xattr failed : %s\n", fp->stream.name); From 2b4592cea214683de0f2ce6f8c22c097fb0ea1ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 22:00:03 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 338/607] ksmbd: use opener credentials for ADS I/O commit baa5e094886fffa7e6272edcb5e08be5ce28262c upstream. Alternate data streams are stored as xattrs. Unlike regular file I/O, their read and write paths therefore call VFS xattr helpers which recheck inode permissions and LSM policy using the current task credentials. Run ADS I/O with the credentials captured when the SMB handle was opened. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Musaab Khan Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/vfs.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/vfs.c b/fs/smb/server/vfs.c index db7ce7671363d..babdecc5a01ff 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/vfs.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs.c @@ -278,17 +278,20 @@ static ssize_t ksmbd_vfs_getcasexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, static int ksmbd_vfs_stream_read(struct ksmbd_file *fp, char *buf, loff_t *pos, size_t count) { + const struct cred *saved_cred; ssize_t v_len; char *stream_buf = NULL; ksmbd_debug(VFS, "read stream data pos : %llu, count : %zd\n", *pos, count); + saved_cred = override_creds(fp->filp->f_cred); v_len = ksmbd_vfs_getcasexattr(file_mnt_idmap(fp->filp), fp->filp->f_path.dentry, fp->stream.name, fp->stream.size, &stream_buf); + revert_creds(saved_cred); if ((int)v_len <= 0) return (int)v_len; @@ -411,6 +414,7 @@ int ksmbd_vfs_read(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct ksmbd_file *fp, size_t count, static int ksmbd_vfs_stream_write(struct ksmbd_file *fp, char *buf, loff_t *pos, size_t count) { + const struct cred *saved_cred; char *stream_buf = NULL, *wbuf; struct mnt_idmap *idmap = file_mnt_idmap(fp->filp); size_t size; @@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ static int ksmbd_vfs_stream_write(struct ksmbd_file *fp, char *buf, loff_t *pos, count = XATTR_SIZE_MAX - *pos; } + saved_cred = override_creds(fp->filp->f_cred); v_len = ksmbd_vfs_getcasexattr(idmap, fp->filp->f_path.dentry, fp->stream.name, @@ -439,14 +444,14 @@ static int ksmbd_vfs_stream_write(struct ksmbd_file *fp, char *buf, loff_t *pos, if (v_len < 0) { pr_err("not found stream in xattr : %zd\n", v_len); err = v_len; - goto out; + goto out_revert; } if (v_len < size) { wbuf = kvzalloc(size, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP); if (!wbuf) { err = -ENOMEM; - goto out; + goto out_revert; } if (v_len > 0) @@ -464,6 +469,8 @@ static int ksmbd_vfs_stream_write(struct ksmbd_file *fp, char *buf, loff_t *pos, size, 0, true); +out_revert: + revert_creds(saved_cred); if (err < 0) goto out; else From 00b0fa425941438b664950a8ee65dfba2def4336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Henrique Carvalho Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:34:38 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 339/607] smb: client: fix query directory replay double-free commit 9647492b5e41954be59d5157eddbcd4cdc1656f7 upstream. A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_query_directory_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index fa77dd31a39cc..ba488138e0498 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -5668,6 +5668,8 @@ send_set_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); From f1add4acb656f5a82806a1ab0e63fed3d8b1bfca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Henrique Carvalho Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:34:36 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 340/607] smb: client: fix query_info() replay double-free commit 2a88561d66eb855813cf004a0abe648bbb17de5e upstream. A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_query_info_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index ba488138e0498..d9b1f38ddc754 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -3821,6 +3821,8 @@ query_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; allocated = false; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); From 276c8efbc49f9303ac76d0d4deab7128581b0f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Henrique Carvalho Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:34:34 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 341/607] smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_ioctl() replay commit f9bbadb6c94583e3b4af1afc449bfceb1d1ddec9 upstream. A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_ioctl_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index d9b1f38ddc754..486aa302ad0cd 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -3425,6 +3425,8 @@ SMB2_ioctl(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); From 52af1975f0dfae990c5a0e85872cc41be0e88a68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Henrique Carvalho Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:34:37 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 342/607] smb: client: fix change notify replay double-free commit 145f820dcbb2cced374f2532f8a61a44dce4a615 upstream. A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_notify_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index 486aa302ad0cd..e6c4b5498f9e6 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -4010,6 +4010,8 @@ SMB2_change_notify(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); From 3407240cde132a4b72d6429a2625a09a2f78adaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Zhang Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 23:28:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 343/607] smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_flush() replay commit 4be31c943a3a27a5a0251dbb8f5cb89059ec3d5a upstream. SMB2_flush() keeps its response buffer bookkeeping across replay attempts. If a replayable flush response is received and the retry then fails before cifs_send_recv() stores a replacement response, flush_exit will free the stale response pointer a second time. Reinitialize resp_buftype and rsp_iov at the top of the replay loop so cleanup only acts on response state produced by the current attempt. This fixes a double-free without changing replay handling for successful requests. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4 Acked-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index e6c4b5498f9e6..9534923f35d63 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -4351,6 +4351,8 @@ SMB2_flush(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); From 14498ff5ce0f272ce0ef988721413e06b7038972 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Henrique Carvalho Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:34:33 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 344/607] smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_open() replay commit b55e182f2324bc6a604c21a47aa6c448f719a532 upstream. A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_open_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index 9534923f35d63..d30b1470013dc 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -3205,6 +3205,8 @@ SMB2_open(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_open_parms *oparms, __le16 *path, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); oparms->replay = !!(retries); From d15d83125007f673aec4323e1bbbaaffbe87ea13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Henrique Carvalho Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 17:34:35 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 345/607] smb: client: fix double-free in SMB2_close() replay commit f96e1cdcb63ed3321142ff2fcdf784e32cda8fee upstream. A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its response buffer. If SMB2_close_init() fails before the next send, cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again. Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free. Fixes: 4f1fffa23769 ("cifs: commands that are retried should have replay flag set") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index d30b1470013dc..063f4623ec8a1 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -3617,6 +3617,8 @@ __SMB2_close(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, replay_again: /* reinitialize for possible replay */ + resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER; + memset(&rsp_iov, 0, sizeof(rsp_iov)); flags = 0; query_attrs = false; server = cifs_pick_channel(ses); From 297243e365fc9fe2f8e9b7dd535a65d922cd108b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoxiang Li Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 09:45:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 346/607] smb: client: Fix next buffer leak in receive_encrypted_standard() commit 1c6267a1d5cf4c73b656f8181b310cbbb3e4767b upstream. receive_encrypted_standard() allocates next_buffer before checking whether the number of compound PDUs already reached MAX_COMPOUND. If the limit check fails, the function returns immediately and the newly allocated next_buffer is not assigned to server->smallbuf/server->bigbuf, making it leaked. Move the MAX_COMPOUND check before allocating next_buffer. Fixes: b24df3e30cbf ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c index 0b52f07003338..9c2a6fb423fc4 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c @@ -5096,6 +5096,12 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, one_more: shdr = (struct smb2_hdr *)buf; next_cmd = le32_to_cpu(shdr->NextCommand); + + if (*num_mids >= MAX_COMPOUND) { + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "too many PDUs in compound\n"); + return -1; + } + if (next_cmd) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next_cmd > pdu_length)) return -1; @@ -5119,10 +5125,6 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, mid_entry->resp_buf_size = server->pdu_size; } - if (*num_mids >= MAX_COMPOUND) { - cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "too many PDUs in compound\n"); - return -1; - } bufs[*num_mids] = buf; mids[(*num_mids)++] = mid_entry; From 3d89ae65ef78a7958ff5efab6ad7a46eb4b38333 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zihan Xi Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:23:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 347/607] smb: client: use unaligned reads in parse_posix_ctxt() commit b86467cd2691192ad4809a5a6e922fc24b8e9839 upstream. The server controls create-context DataOffset, so the POSIX context data pointer may be misaligned on strict-alignment architectures. Use get_unaligned_le32() when reading nlink, reparse_tag, and mode. Fixes: 69dda3059e7a ("cifs: add SMB2_open() arg to return POSIX data") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index 063f4623ec8a1..8b74025acda37 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -2297,9 +2297,9 @@ parse_posix_ctxt(struct create_context *cc, struct smb2_file_all_info *info, memset(posix, 0, sizeof(*posix)); - posix->nlink = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(beg + 0)); - posix->reparse_tag = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(beg + 4)); - posix->mode = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)(beg + 8)); + posix->nlink = get_unaligned_le32(beg); + posix->reparse_tag = get_unaligned_le32(beg + 4); + posix->mode = get_unaligned_le32(beg + 8); sid = beg + 12; sid_len = posix_info_sid_size(sid, end); From 86c5d470f5d42e61123b2f4b4f0b91f4eee5b980 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zihan Xi Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 17:19:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 348/607] smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing commit 7ad2bcf2441430bb2e918fb3ef9a90d775a6e422 upstream. posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count, but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely. Fixes: 349e13ad30b4 ("cifs: add smb2 POSIX info level") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Reported-by: Xin Liu Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c index 8b74025acda37..4828cff55fb7f 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c @@ -5230,7 +5230,7 @@ int posix_info_sid_size(const void *beg, const void *end) size_t subauth; int total; - if (beg + 1 > end) + if (beg + 2 > end) return -1; subauth = *(u8 *)(beg+1); From 157c67a657a7da1a31ab22c1fd0b2d9e5968ebd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Rao Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 21:30:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 349/607] smb: client: fix atime clamp check in read completion commit 0b043279e73880bee21d3b1f221bafda5af1b27e upstream. cifs_rreq_done() updates the inode atime to current_time(inode) after a netfs read. It then preserves the CIFS rule that atime should not be older than mtime, because some applications break if atime is less than mtime. That rule only requires clamping when atime < mtime. The current check uses the raw non-zero result of timespec64_compare(). It therefore takes the clamp path for both atime < mtime and atime > mtime. The latter is the normal case when reading an older file: the newly recorded atime is newer than the file mtime. The completion handler then immediately moves atime back to mtime, losing the access time that was just recorded. Userspace tools that rely on atime, such as stat, find -atime, backup tools or cold-data classifiers, can therefore see a recently read CIFS file as not recently accessed. This is easy to miss because the bug is silent: read I/O still succeeds, no error is reported, and many systems either do not check atime after reads or mount with policies such as relatime/noatime. It becomes visible when a CIFS file has an mtime older than the current time, the file is read, and the local inode atime is inspected before a later revalidation replaces the cached timestamps. Clamp only when atime is actually older than mtime. This matches the same atime/mtime rule used when applying CIFS inode attributes. Fixes: 69c3c023af25 ("cifs: Implement netfslib hooks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xu Rao Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/file.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/file.c b/fs/smb/client/file.c index f0e7a8f69e8b8..b0dc071a9de4f 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/file.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/file.c @@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static void cifs_rreq_done(struct netfs_io_request *rreq) /* we do not want atime to be less than mtime, it broke some apps */ atime = inode_set_atime_to_ts(inode, current_time(inode)); mtime = inode_get_mtime(inode); - if (timespec64_compare(&atime, &mtime)) + if (timespec64_compare(&atime, &mtime) < 0) inode_set_atime_to_ts(inode, inode_get_mtime(inode)); } From c6c484a7d5bff6b929a86d7ed5130f29834c6a0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Norbert Manthey Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 15:54:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 350/607] smb: client: mask server-provided mode to 07777 in modefromsid commit e3d9c7160d483fc8f9e225aafad8ecbbc43f3151 upstream. When modefromsid is active, parse_dacl() applies the server-provided sub_auth[2] value from the NFS mode SID to cf_mode without masking to 07777. Apply the correct masking, same as in the read path. Fixes: e2f8fbfb8d09c ("cifs: get mode bits from special sid on stat") Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey Assisted-by: Kiro:claude-opus-4.6 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c index d17912beb28ec..92ee03cd01b39 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ static void parse_dacl(struct smb_acl *pdacl, char *end_of_acl, */ fattr->cf_mode &= ~07777; fattr->cf_mode |= - le32_to_cpu(ppace[i]->sid.sub_auth[2]); + le32_to_cpu(ppace[i]->sid.sub_auth[2]) & 07777; break; } else { if (compare_sids(&(ppace[i]->sid), pownersid) == 0) { From 685fc15a410885b6d4dee64de0dce721b9428b12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baokun Li Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 17:50:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 351/607] writeback: fix race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs() commit cba38ec4cbd3a7b8b942a8d52531a05be8a9ff0d upstream. When a container exits, the following BUG_ON() is occasionally triggered: ================================================================== VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of sdb (ext4) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:695! CPU: 3 PID: 6 Comm: containerd-shim Tainted: G OE K 6.6 #1 pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 lr : generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 Call trace: generic_shutdown_super+0xf0/0x100 kill_block_super+0x20/0x48 ext4_kill_sb+0x28/0x60 deactivate_locked_super+0x54/0x130 deactivate_super+0x84/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0xa4/0x140 __cleanup_mnt+0x18/0x28 task_work_run+0x78/0xe0 do_notify_resume+0x204/0x240 ================================================================== The root cause is a race between cgroup_writeback_umount() and inode_switch_wbs()/cleanup_offline_cgwb(). There is a window between inode_prepare_wbs_switch() returning true and the subsequent wb_queue_isw() call. Following is the process that triggers the issue: CPU A (umount) | CPU B (writeback) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ inode_switch_wbs/cleanup_offline_cgwb atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight) inode_prepare_wbs_switch -> passes SB_ACTIVE check __iget(inode) generic_shutdown_super sb->s_flags &= ~SB_ACTIVE cgroup_writeback_umount(sb) smp_mb() atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight) rcu_barrier() -> no pending RCU callbacks flush_workqueue(isw_wq) -> nothing queued, returns evict_inodes(sb) -> Inode skipped as isw still holds a ref. sop->put_super(sb) /* destroys percpu counters */ -> VFS: Busy inodes after unmount! wb_queue_isw() queue_work(isw_wq, ...) /* later in work function */ inode_switch_wbs_work_fn process_inode_switch_wbs iput() -> evict percpu_counter_dec() // UAF! Fix this by extending the RCU read-side critical section in inode_switch_wbs() and cleanup_offline_cgwb() to cover from inode_prepare_wbs_switch() through wb_queue_isw(). Since there is no sleep in this window, rcu_read_lock() can be used. Then add a synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount() before the existing rcu_barrier(), so that all in-flight switchers that have passed the SB_ACTIVE check have completed queue_work() before flush_workqueue() is called. The existing rcu_barrier() is intentionally retained so this fix can be backported unchanged to stable kernels (5.10.y, 6.6.y, ...) that still queue switches via queue_rcu_work(). It is a no-op on current mainline (since commit e1b849cfa6b6 ("writeback: Avoid contention on wb->list_lock when switching inodes")) and is removed in a follow-up patch. Fixes: a1a0e23e4903 ("writeback: flush inode cgroup wb switches instead of pinning super_block") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Jan Kara Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/mxnjq2l6guusfchvauxr3v7c4bwjasybxlleqbbh4efloeqspz@iqylk76ohufz Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Baokun Li Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521095016.2791354-2-libaokun@linux.alibaba.com Acked-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fs-writeback.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fs-writeback.c b/fs/fs-writeback.c index 5d43bbaf37b16..99d0658b49a22 100644 --- a/fs/fs-writeback.c +++ b/fs/fs-writeback.c @@ -650,12 +650,19 @@ static void inode_switch_wbs(struct inode *inode, int new_wb_id) atomic_inc(&isw_nr_in_flight); - /* find and pin the new wb */ + /* + * Paired with synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount(): + * holding rcu_read_lock across inode_prepare_wbs_switch() + * (covering the SB_ACTIVE check and the inode grab) and + * wb_queue_isw() ensures synchronize_rcu() cannot return until + * the work is queued, so the subsequent flush_workqueue() will + * wait for the switch. + */ rcu_read_lock(); + /* find and pin the new wb */ memcg_css = css_from_id(new_wb_id, &memory_cgrp_subsys); if (memcg_css && !css_tryget(memcg_css)) memcg_css = NULL; - rcu_read_unlock(); if (!memcg_css) goto out_free; @@ -671,9 +678,11 @@ static void inode_switch_wbs(struct inode *inode, int new_wb_id) trace_inode_switch_wbs_queue(inode->i_wb, new_wb, 1); wb_queue_isw(new_wb, isw); + rcu_read_unlock(); return; out_free: + rcu_read_unlock(); atomic_dec(&isw_nr_in_flight); if (new_wb) wb_put(new_wb); @@ -732,6 +741,14 @@ bool cleanup_offline_cgwb(struct bdi_writeback *wb) new_wb = &wb->bdi->wb; /* wb_get() is noop for bdi's wb */ nr = 0; + /* + * Paired with synchronize_rcu() in cgroup_writeback_umount(). + * Holding rcu_read_lock across the SB_ACTIVE check, the inode grab + * and wb_queue_isw() ensures synchronize_rcu() cannot return until + * the work is queued, so the subsequent flush_workqueue() will wait + * for the switch. + */ + rcu_read_lock(); spin_lock(&wb->list_lock); /* * In addition to the inodes that have completed writeback, also switch @@ -749,6 +766,7 @@ bool cleanup_offline_cgwb(struct bdi_writeback *wb) /* no attached inodes? bail out */ if (nr == 0) { + rcu_read_unlock(); atomic_dec(&isw_nr_in_flight); wb_put(new_wb); kfree(isw); @@ -757,6 +775,7 @@ bool cleanup_offline_cgwb(struct bdi_writeback *wb) trace_inode_switch_wbs_queue(wb, new_wb, nr); wb_queue_isw(new_wb, isw); + rcu_read_unlock(); return restart; } @@ -1210,6 +1229,14 @@ void cgroup_writeback_umount(struct super_block *sb) smp_mb(); if (atomic_read(&isw_nr_in_flight)) { + /* + * Paired with rcu_read_lock() in inode_switch_wbs() and + * cleanup_offline_cgwb(). synchronize_rcu() waits for any + * in-flight switcher that already passed the SB_ACTIVE check + * to finish queueing its work, so flush_workqueue() below + * will then drain it. + */ + synchronize_rcu(); /* * Use rcu_barrier() to wait for all pending callbacks to * ensure that all in-flight wb switches are in the workqueue. From a277489337c7d4630a277f125fd824d9a90b2500 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Abdun Nihaal Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 12:12:11 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 352/607] OPP: of: Fix potential memory leak in opp_parse_supplies() commit 69f888381d2ecbe18ed9f112c096f8fd3623db98 upstream. The memory allocated for microvolt, microamp and microwatt is not freed in one of the paths in opp_parse_supplies() which returns directly. Fix that by adding a goto to the error unwind ladder. Fixes: 2eedf62e66c2 ("OPP: decouple dt properties in opp_parse_supplies()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Abdun Nihaal Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/opp/of.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/opp/of.c b/drivers/opp/of.c index 505d79821584e..7b4b7deb5ac6f 100644 --- a/drivers/opp/of.c +++ b/drivers/opp/of.c @@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ static int opp_parse_supplies(struct dev_pm_opp *opp, struct device *dev, */ if (unlikely(opp_table->regulator_count == -1)) { opp_table->regulator_count = 0; - return 0; + goto free_microwatt; } for (i = 0, j = 0; i < opp_table->regulator_count; i++) { @@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ static int opp_parse_supplies(struct dev_pm_opp *opp, struct device *dev, opp->supplies[i].u_watt = microwatt[i]; } +free_microwatt: kfree(microwatt); free_microamp: kfree(microamp); From e904961332801c87355f5d11c65bb433e717c489 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guangshuo Li Date: Sat, 2 May 2026 03:00:05 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 353/607] cpufreq: qcom-cpufreq-hw: Fix possible double free commit bcb8889c4981fdde42d4fd2c29a77d510fe21da2 upstream. qcom_cpufreq.data is allocated with devm_kzalloc() in probe() as an array of per-domain data. qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_init() stores a pointer to one element of this array in policy->driver_data. qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_exit() currently calls kfree() on policy->driver_data. This is not valid because the memory is devm-managed. For the first domain, this can free the devm-managed allocation while the devres entry is still active, leading to a possible double free when the platform device is later detached. For other domains, the pointer may refer to an element inside the array rather than the allocation base. Remove the kfree(data) call and let devres release qcom_cpufreq.data. This issue was found by a static analysis tool I am developing. Fixes: 054a3ef683a1 ("cpufreq: qcom-hw: Allocate qcom_cpufreq_data during probe") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li Reviewed-by: Zhongqiu Han Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-hw.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-hw.c b/drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-hw.c index 8422704a3b10f..4f14573e88a4d 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-hw.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/qcom-cpufreq-hw.c @@ -578,7 +578,6 @@ static void qcom_cpufreq_hw_cpu_exit(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) dev_pm_opp_of_cpumask_remove_table(policy->related_cpus); qcom_cpufreq_hw_lmh_exit(data); kfree(policy->freq_table); - kfree(data); } static void qcom_cpufreq_ready(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) From 92f41769e5fd16bcd9ba97500d0517332e0a5b45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guangshuo Li Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 17:12:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 354/607] firmware_loader: fix device reference leak in firmware_upload_register() commit 896df22ee57648b0c505bd76ddbc6b2341834696 upstream. firmware_upload_register() -> fw_create_instance() -> device_initialize() After fw_create_instance() succeeds, the lifetime of the embedded struct device is expected to be managed through the device core reference counting, since fw_create_instance() has already called device_initialize(). In firmware_upload_register(), if alloc_lookup_fw_priv() fails after fw_create_instance() succeeds, the code reaches free_fw_sysfs and frees fw_sysfs directly instead of releasing the device reference with put_device(). This may leave the reference count of the embedded struct device unbalanced, resulting in a refcount leak. The issue was identified by a static analysis tool I developed and confirmed by manual review. Fix this by using put_device(fw_dev) in the failure path and letting fw_dev_release() handle the final cleanup, instead of freeing the instance directly from the error path. Fixes: 97730bbb242c ("firmware_loader: Add firmware-upload support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260505091231.607089-1-lgs201920130244@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/base/firmware_loader/sysfs_upload.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/sysfs_upload.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/sysfs_upload.c index 829270067d163..cab79e7fcfcf8 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/sysfs_upload.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/sysfs_upload.c @@ -341,7 +341,6 @@ firmware_upload_register(struct module *module, struct device *parent, goto free_fw_upload_priv; } fw_upload->priv = fw_sysfs; - fw_sysfs->fw_upload_priv = fw_upload_priv; fw_dev = &fw_sysfs->dev; ret = alloc_lookup_fw_priv(name, &fw_cache, &fw_priv, NULL, 0, 0, @@ -349,10 +348,12 @@ firmware_upload_register(struct module *module, struct device *parent, if (ret != 0) { if (ret > 0) ret = -EINVAL; - goto free_fw_sysfs; + put_device(fw_dev); + goto free_fw_upload_priv; } fw_priv->is_paged_buf = true; fw_sysfs->fw_priv = fw_priv; + fw_sysfs->fw_upload_priv = fw_upload_priv; ret = device_add(fw_dev); if (ret) { @@ -363,9 +364,6 @@ firmware_upload_register(struct module *module, struct device *parent, return fw_upload; -free_fw_sysfs: - kfree(fw_sysfs); - free_fw_upload_priv: kfree(fw_upload_priv); From b9d45d328fcda4f0d3d281b7d6f12d3f181d9381 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Hubbard Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 19:53:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 355/607] libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo() commit 6de2aeffabaafaeda819e60ec8d04f199711e11a upstream. Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 ("anon_inode: rework assertions"), path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap'd from a superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel: WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50 do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240 __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70 init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets them by default instead of each caller setting them. SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable. Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y: make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system Fixes: 1e7ab6f67824 ("anon_inode: rework assertions") Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: John Hubbard Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604025315.245910-2-jhubbard@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/libfs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c index 6be233c787fd8..96551deff8e50 100644 --- a/fs/libfs.c +++ b/fs/libfs.c @@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ struct pseudo_fs_context *init_pseudo(struct fs_context *fc, fc->fs_private = ctx; fc->ops = &pseudo_fs_context_ops; fc->sb_flags |= SB_NOUSER; + fc->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV; fc->global = true; } return ctx; From 59626d0d29217a5a0b89609725e7bc3453f6b802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zide Chen Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 07:49:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 356/607] perf/x86/intel/uncore: Defer ADL global PMON enable to enable_box() commit 9a0bb848a37150aeccc10088e141339917d995dc upstream. On some Raptor Cove CPUs, enabling uncore PMON globally at driver init may increase power consumption even when no perf events are in use. Drop adl_uncore_msr_init_box() and defer programming the global control register to enable_box(), so it is only set when a box is actually used. IMC and IMC freerunning counters use a separate control path and are unaffected. Fixes: 772ed05f3c5c ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Alder Lake support") Signed-off-by: Zide Chen Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602144908.263680-5-zide.chen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c index 807e582b8f17d..600328e30367c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c @@ -539,12 +539,6 @@ void tgl_uncore_cpu_init(void) skl_uncore_msr_ops.init_box = rkl_uncore_msr_init_box; } -static void adl_uncore_msr_init_box(struct intel_uncore_box *box) -{ - if (box->pmu->pmu_idx == 0) - wrmsrq(ADL_UNC_PERF_GLOBAL_CTL, SNB_UNC_GLOBAL_CTL_EN); -} - static void adl_uncore_msr_enable_box(struct intel_uncore_box *box) { wrmsrq(ADL_UNC_PERF_GLOBAL_CTL, SNB_UNC_GLOBAL_CTL_EN); @@ -563,7 +557,6 @@ static void adl_uncore_msr_exit_box(struct intel_uncore_box *box) } static struct intel_uncore_ops adl_uncore_msr_ops = { - .init_box = adl_uncore_msr_init_box, .enable_box = adl_uncore_msr_enable_box, .disable_box = adl_uncore_msr_disable_box, .exit_box = adl_uncore_msr_exit_box, From f77e55baeeb8c8bd63f8a6e3f4f9674d1c4a4e54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fushuai Wang Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 11:21:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 357/607] cpufreq: intel_pstate: Sync policy->cur during CPU offline commit bcbdaa1086c25a8a5d48e04e1b82fdfb0682b681 upstream. When a CPU goes offline with HWP disabled, intel_pstate_set_min_pstate() sets the MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL to minimum frequency to prevent SMT siblings from being restricted. However, the policy->cur value was not updated, leaving it at the previous value. When the CPU comes back online, governor->limits() checks if target_freq equals policy->cur and skips the frequency adjustment if they match. Since policy->cur still holds the previous value, the governor does not call cpufreq_driver->target to update MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL. Fix this by synchronizing policy->cur with the hardware state when setting minimum pstate during CPU offline. Fixes: bb18008f8086 ("intel_pstate: Set core to min P state during core offline") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.15+ Suggested-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Signed-off-by: Fushuai Wang [ rjw: Subject refinement ] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260520032119.30615-1-fushuai.wang@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c b/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c index 7fb6412b5f193..532e85ab0619b 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c @@ -3016,10 +3016,12 @@ static int intel_cpufreq_cpu_offline(struct cpufreq_policy *policy) * from getting to lower performance levels, so force the minimum * performance on CPU offline to prevent that from happening. */ - if (hwp_active) + if (hwp_active) { intel_pstate_hwp_offline(cpu); - else + } else { intel_pstate_set_min_pstate(cpu); + policy->cur = cpu->pstate.min_freq; + } intel_pstate_exit_perf_limits(policy); From 4bd0da48fbc1dbef6774175129107fbbdd353e26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Steven Rostedt Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 10:37:40 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 358/607] sched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT commit dd29c017aed628076e915fe4cdfb5392fd4c5cab upstream. RT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high priority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there's any RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher priority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will pull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead. Normally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto) which contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are waiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their CPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the rq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU's runqueue to the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task. This caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task at the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of the CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will get that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock and see there's nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of CPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what PREEMPT_RT is to allow. The solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU wanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the overloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU, and that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push instead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with overloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this process, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process has already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs continue again. The RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause a new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded context on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT. If an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the current CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of doing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq was also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the softirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded as there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it. A live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic on a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it would also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be constantly executed. When a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running yet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would send an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are of higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule that CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could schedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs would slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could return back to task context, it would execute another softirq never allowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU. As RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if PREEMPT_RT is not enabled. Fixes: b6366f048e0c ("sched/rt: Use IPI to trigger RT task push migration instead of pulling") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260506235716.2530720-1-tj@kernel.org/ Reported-by: Tejun Heo Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515103740.25ccbed8@gandalf.local.home Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/sched/features.h | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/features.h b/kernel/sched/features.h index 136a6584be797..659c0970cf2cd 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/features.h +++ b/kernel/sched/features.h @@ -103,8 +103,16 @@ SCHED_FEAT(WARN_DOUBLE_CLOCK, false) * rq lock and possibly create a large contention, sending an * IPI to that CPU and let that CPU push the RT task to where * it should go may be a better scenario. + * + * This is best for PREEMPT_RT, but for non-RT it can cause issues + * when preemption is disabled for long periods of time. Have + * it only default enabled for PREEMPT_RT. */ +# ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT SCHED_FEAT(RT_PUSH_IPI, true) +# else +SCHED_FEAT(RT_PUSH_IPI, false) +# endif #endif SCHED_FEAT(RT_RUNTIME_SHARE, false) From 6e175c00c62dca3d91b987015808b5d52e8db2b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianxiang Chen Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 22:19:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 359/607] cpufreq: Fix hotplug-suspend race during reboot commit a9029dd55696c651ee46912afa2a166fa456bb3e upstream. During system reboot, cpufreq_suspend() is called via the kernel_restart() -> device_shutdown() path. Unlike the normal system suspend path, the reboot path does not call freeze_processes(), so userspace processes and kernel threads remain active. This allows CPU hotplug operations to run concurrently with cpufreq_suspend(). The original code has no synchronization with CPU hotplug, leading to a race condition where governor_data can be freed by the hotplug path while cpufreq_suspend() is still accessing it, resulting in a null pointer dereference: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference Call Trace: do_kernel_fault+0x28/0x3c cpufreq_suspend+0xdc/0x160 device_shutdown+0x18/0x200 kernel_restart+0x40/0x80 arm64_sys_reboot+0x1b0/0x200 Fix this by adding cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() to cpufreq_suspend() to block CPU hotplug operations while suspend is in progress. Fixes: 65650b35133f ("cpufreq: Avoid cpufreq_suspend() deadlock on system shutdown") Signed-off-by: Tianxiang Chen Reviewed-by: Zhongqiu Han Cc: All applicable [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408141914.35281-1-nanmu@xiaomi.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c index 1ed528e34bab4..a70df77f9b7d1 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/cpufreq.c @@ -1973,6 +1973,7 @@ void cpufreq_suspend(void) if (!cpufreq_driver) return; + cpus_read_lock(); if (!has_target() && !cpufreq_driver->suspend) goto suspend; @@ -1992,6 +1993,7 @@ void cpufreq_suspend(void) suspend: cpufreq_suspended = true; + cpus_read_unlock(); } /** From 6ba6f6783be2ffeb2cbcdc9321c4b9f708f796f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuho Choi Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 10:46:21 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 360/607] cpufreq: pcc: fix use-after-free and double free in _OSC evaluation commit 266d3dd8b757b48a576e90f018b51f7b7563cc32 upstream. pcc_cpufreq_do_osc() calls acpi_evaluate_object() twice for the two-phase _OSC negotiation. Between the two calls it freed output.pointer but left output.length unchanged. Since acpi_evaluate_object() treats a non-zero length with a non-NULL pointer as an existing buffer to write into, the second call wrote into freed memory (use-after-free). The subsequent kfree(output.pointer) at out_free then freed the same pointer a second time (double free). Reset output.pointer to NULL and output.length to ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER after freeing the first result, so ACPICA allocates a fresh buffer for each phase independently. Fixes: 0f1d683fb35d ("[CPUFREQ] Processor Clocking Control interface driver") Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi Reviewed-by: Zhongqiu Han Cc: All applicable Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260416144621.93964-1-dbgh9129@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c index ac2e90a65f0c4..a355ec4f3dd4c 100644 --- a/drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c +++ b/drivers/cpufreq/pcc-cpufreq.c @@ -352,6 +352,8 @@ static int __init pcc_cpufreq_do_osc(acpi_handle *handle) } kfree(output.pointer); + output.pointer = NULL; + output.length = ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER; capabilities[0] = 0x0; capabilities[1] = 0x1; From 7776f9226e99eb49d97492b0b445027cfcb189da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WenTao Liang Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 00:17:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 361/607] posix-cpu-timers: Fix pid refcount leak in do_cpu_nanosleep() error path commit 87bd2ad568e15b90d5f7d4bcd70342d05dad649c upstream. In do_cpu_nanosleep(), posix_cpu_timer_create() takes a pid reference via get_pid() and stores it in timer.it.cpu.pid. If the subsequent posix_cpu_timer_set() call fails, the function returns immediately without calling posix_cpu_timer_del() to release the pid reference, causing a leak. Fix it by calling posix_cpu_timer_del() before the unlock-and-return on the error path, consistent with the other exit paths in the same function. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: WenTao Liang Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260611161738.97043-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c b/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c index 2e5b89d7d8660..d6ccd9fbf5b96 100644 --- a/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c +++ b/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c @@ -1504,6 +1504,7 @@ static int do_cpu_nanosleep(const clockid_t which_clock, int flags, spin_lock_irq(&timer.it_lock); error = posix_cpu_timer_set(&timer, flags, &it, NULL); if (error) { + posix_cpu_timer_del(&timer); spin_unlock_irq(&timer.it_lock); return error; } From cd25e9819620aa1325897912cfb4dd89303325fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 17:14:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 362/607] time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage commit f24df84cbe05e4471c04ac4b921fc0340bbc7752 upstream. Teddy reported that a XEN HVM has a long boot delay, which was bisected to the recent enhancements to the negative motion detection. It turned out that the jiffies clocksource is used in early boot before it is registered, which leaves the max_delta_raw field at zero. That causes the read out to be clamped to the max delta of 0, which means time is not making progress. Cure it by ensuring that it is initialized before its first usage in timekeeping_init(). Fixes: 76031d9536a0 ("clocksource: Make negative motion detection more robust") Reported-by: Teddy Astie Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-by: Teddy Astie Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/87y0gn3fve.ffs@fw13 Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1780914594.8631fc262581453bbf619ec5b2062170.19ea6c8227b000701b@vates.tech Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/time/jiffies.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/time/jiffies.c b/kernel/time/jiffies.c index 34eeacac22539..e34a0623e7ada 100644 --- a/kernel/time/jiffies.c +++ b/kernel/time/jiffies.c @@ -61,15 +61,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_jiffies_64); EXPORT_SYMBOL(jiffies); -static int __init init_jiffies_clocksource(void) -{ - return __clocksource_register(&clocksource_jiffies); -} - -core_initcall(init_jiffies_clocksource); +static bool cs_jiffies_registered __initdata; struct clocksource * __init __weak clocksource_default_clock(void) { + if (!cs_jiffies_registered) { + __clocksource_register(&clocksource_jiffies); + cs_jiffies_registered = true; + } return &clocksource_jiffies; } From 2421a7b24f9c8f3c3677fd5dacc9ddcfb3554637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kartik Rajput Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 21:15:54 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 363/607] clocksource/drivers/timer-tegra186: Fix support for multiple watchdog instances commit ca57bf46e7a94f8c53d05c376df9fcfdcb482100 upstream. Tegra SoCs support multiple watchdogs; currently only one (WDT0) is used. When multiple watchdogs are registered, tegra186_wdt_enable() overwrites the TKEIE(x) register, discarding any existing watchdog interrupt enable bits. As a result, enabling one watchdog inadvertently disables interrupts for the others. Fix this by preserving the existing TKEIE(x) value and updating it using a read-modify-write sequence. Fixes: 42cee19a9f83 ("clocksource: Add Tegra186 timers support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kartik Rajput Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Reviewed-by: Jon Hunter Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507154557.2082697-2-kkartik@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/clocksource/timer-tegra186.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/timer-tegra186.c b/drivers/clocksource/timer-tegra186.c index 355558893e5f3..bfe16d2d5104e 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/timer-tegra186.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/timer-tegra186.c @@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ static void tegra186_wdt_enable(struct tegra186_wdt *wdt) u32 value; /* unmask hardware IRQ, this may have been lost across powergate */ - value = TKEIE_WDT_MASK(wdt->index, 1); + value = readl(tegra->regs + TKEIE(wdt->tmr->hwirq)); + value |= TKEIE_WDT_MASK(wdt->index, 1); writel(value, tegra->regs + TKEIE(wdt->tmr->hwirq)); /* clear interrupt */ From be79d285bea70d0edd5015bd487311bfa8cbebc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiko Carstens Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:37:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 364/607] s390: Revert support for DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS commit 37540b8c287fc817bdbd0c62bb75ad6eab0e5d03 upstream. load_unaligned_zeropad() reads eight bytes from unaligned addresses and may cross page boundaries. It handles exceptions which may happen if reading from the second page results in an exception. For pages which are donated to the Ultravisor for secure execution purposes the do_secure_storage_access() exception handler however does not handle such exceptions correctly. Such an exception may result in an endless exception loop which will never be resolved. An attempt to fix this [1] turned out to be not sufficient. For now revert load_unaligned_zeropad() until this problem has been resolved in a proper way. Note that the implementation of load_unaligned_zeropad() itself is correct. The revert is just a temporary workaround until there is complete fix for secure storage access exceptions. [1] commit b00be77302d7 ("s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory") Fixes: 802ba53eefc5 ("s390: add support for DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/include/asm/asm-extable.h | 4 ---- arch/s390/include/asm/word-at-a-time.h | 22 ---------------------- arch/s390/mm/extable.c | 18 ------------------ 4 files changed, 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig index e60d2b823e091..f43a6570fd6f7 100644 --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig @@ -161,7 +161,6 @@ config S390 select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP select BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT select CLONE_BACKWARDS2 - select DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS if !KMSAN select DYNAMIC_FTRACE if FUNCTION_TRACER select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_8B if CC_IS_GCC select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B if !CC_IS_GCC diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/asm-extable.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/asm-extable.h index d23ea0c94e4ea..99748c20e7671 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/asm-extable.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/asm-extable.h @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ #define EX_TYPE_UA_FAULT 3 #define EX_TYPE_UA_LOAD_REG 5 #define EX_TYPE_UA_LOAD_REGPAIR 6 -#define EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD 7 #define EX_TYPE_FPC 8 #define EX_TYPE_UA_MVCOS_TO 9 #define EX_TYPE_UA_MVCOS_FROM 10 @@ -80,9 +79,6 @@ #define EX_TABLE_UA_LOAD_REGPAIR(_fault, _target, _regerr, _regzero) \ __EX_TABLE(__ex_table, _fault, _target, EX_TYPE_UA_LOAD_REGPAIR, _regerr, _regzero, 0) -#define EX_TABLE_ZEROPAD(_fault, _target, _regdata, _regaddr) \ - __EX_TABLE(__ex_table, _fault, _target, EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD, _regdata, _regaddr, 0) - #define EX_TABLE_FPC(_fault, _target) \ __EX_TABLE(__ex_table, _fault, _target, EX_TYPE_FPC, __stringify(%%r0), __stringify(%%r0), 0) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/word-at-a-time.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/word-at-a-time.h index eaa19dee76994..e9287036392d0 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/word-at-a-time.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/word-at-a-time.h @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ #include #include -#include #include struct word_at_a_time { @@ -41,25 +40,4 @@ static inline unsigned long zero_bytemask(unsigned long data) return ~1UL << data; } -/* - * Load an unaligned word from kernel space. - * - * In the (very unlikely) case of the word being a page-crosser - * and the next page not being mapped, take the exception and - * return zeroes in the non-existing part. - */ -static inline unsigned long load_unaligned_zeropad(const void *addr) -{ - unsigned long data; - - asm_inline volatile( - "0: lg %[data],0(%[addr])\n" - "1: nopr %%r7\n" - EX_TABLE_ZEROPAD(0b, 1b, %[data], %[addr]) - EX_TABLE_ZEROPAD(1b, 1b, %[data], %[addr]) - : [data] "=d" (data) - : [addr] "a" (addr), "m" (*(unsigned long *)addr)); - return data; -} - #endif /* _ASM_WORD_AT_A_TIME_H */ diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/extable.c b/arch/s390/mm/extable.c index 7498e858c4019..063b4346742d9 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/extable.c @@ -50,22 +50,6 @@ static bool ex_handler_ua_load_reg(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, return true; } -static bool ex_handler_zeropad(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - unsigned int reg_addr = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_ADDR, ex->data); - unsigned int reg_data = FIELD_GET(EX_DATA_REG_ERR, ex->data); - unsigned long data, addr, offset; - - addr = regs->gprs[reg_addr]; - offset = addr & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1); - addr &= ~(sizeof(unsigned long) - 1); - data = *(unsigned long *)addr; - data <<= BITS_PER_BYTE * offset; - regs->gprs[reg_data] = data; - regs->psw.addr = extable_fixup(ex); - return true; -} - static bool ex_handler_fpc(const struct exception_table_entry *ex, struct pt_regs *regs) { fpu_sfpc(0); @@ -134,8 +118,6 @@ bool fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs) return ex_handler_ua_load_reg(ex, false, regs); case EX_TYPE_UA_LOAD_REGPAIR: return ex_handler_ua_load_reg(ex, true, regs); - case EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD: - return ex_handler_zeropad(ex, regs); case EX_TYPE_FPC: return ex_handler_fpc(ex, regs); case EX_TYPE_UA_MVCOS_TO: From 28390912740a2d23119ae7d3ec60ce69e11d1778 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Robin Murphy Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 15:33:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 365/607] perf/arm-cmn: Fix DVM node events commit 5936245125f78d896fdb1bbc2ae79213e28a6579 upstream. The new DVM node events added in CMN-700 also apply to CMN S3; fix the model encoding so that we can expose the aliases and handle occupancy filtering on newer CMNs too. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0dc2f4963f7e ("perf/arm-cmn: Support CMN S3") Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/perf/arm-cmn.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm-cmn.c b/drivers/perf/arm-cmn.c index 4fbafc4b79843..8924f482806ba 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/arm-cmn.c +++ b/drivers/perf/arm-cmn.c @@ -197,13 +197,14 @@ enum cmn_model { CMN600 = 1, CMN650 = 2, - CMN700 = 4, - CI700 = 8, + CI700 = 4, + CMN700 = 8, CMNS3 = 16, /* ...and then we can use bitmap tricks for commonality */ CMN_ANY = -1, NOT_CMN600 = -2, - CMN_650ON = CMN650 | CMN700 | CMNS3, + CMN_700ON = ~(CMN700 - 1), + CMN_650ON = CMN_700ON | CMN650, }; /* Actual part numbers and revision IDs defined by the hardware */ @@ -919,14 +920,14 @@ static struct attribute *arm_cmn_event_attrs[] = { CMN_EVENT_DVM(NOT_CMN600, txsnp_stall, 0x0a), CMN_EVENT_DVM(NOT_CMN600, trkfull, 0x0b), CMN_EVENT_DVM_OCC(NOT_CMN600, trk_occupancy, 0x0c), - CMN_EVENT_DVM_OCC(CMN700, trk_occupancy_cxha, 0x0d), - CMN_EVENT_DVM_OCC(CMN700, trk_occupancy_pdn, 0x0e), - CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN700, trk_alloc, 0x0f), - CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN700, trk_cxha_alloc, 0x10), - CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN700, trk_pdn_alloc, 0x11), - CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN700, txsnp_stall_limit, 0x12), - CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN700, rxsnp_stall_starv, 0x13), - CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN700, txsnp_sync_stall_op, 0x14), + CMN_EVENT_DVM_OCC(CMN_700ON, trk_occupancy_cxha, 0x0d), + CMN_EVENT_DVM_OCC(CMN_700ON, trk_occupancy_pdn, 0x0e), + CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN_700ON, trk_alloc, 0x0f), + CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN_700ON, trk_cxha_alloc, 0x10), + CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN_700ON, trk_pdn_alloc, 0x11), + CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN_700ON, txsnp_stall_limit, 0x12), + CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN_700ON, rxsnp_stall_starv, 0x13), + CMN_EVENT_DVM(CMN_700ON, txsnp_sync_stall_op, 0x14), CMN_EVENT_HNF(CMN_ANY, cache_miss, 0x01), CMN_EVENT_HNF(CMN_ANY, slc_sf_cache_access, 0x02), From 18d90dc05d98bd5579ee38dba37c1e4132e765db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Wunner Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 08:55:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 366/607] X.509: Fix validation of ASN.1 certificate header commit 3b626ba431c4501512ad07549310685e07fe4706 upstream. x509_load_certificate_list() seeks to enforce that a certificate starts with 0x30 0x82 (ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag followed by a length of more than 256 and less than 65535 bytes). But it only enforces that *either* of those two byte values are present, instead of checking for the *conjunction* of the two values. Fix it. Fixes: 631cc66eb9ea ("MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel") Reported-by: Sashiko Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260508033917.B5873C2BCB0@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7+ Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c index a417413269989..0d516c77cc26a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_loader.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int x509_load_certificate_list(const u8 cert_list[], */ if (end - p < 4) goto dodgy_cert; - if (p[0] != 0x30 && + if (p[0] != 0x30 || p[1] != 0x82) goto dodgy_cert; plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; From 2382971aaaef5bf85a651234c64906f59580b8be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)" Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:40:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 367/607] mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled commit 648927ceb84021a25a0fbd5673740956f318d534 upstream. When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees. But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size. However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract. Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact check for whether the requested size is tracked. We don't need to care if red zoning is also enabled or not. Also update and expand the comment accordingly. Fixes: 9ce67395f5a0 ("mm/slub: only zero requested size of buffer for kzalloc when debug enabled") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610-slab_alloc_flags-v2-1-7190909db118@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Harry Yoo (Oracle) Reviewed-by: Hao Li Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/slub.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index 5fdec3b837060..71e09c675047d 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -5004,15 +5004,17 @@ bool slab_post_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, struct list_lru *lru, gfp_t init_flags = flags & gfp_allowed_mask; /* - * For kmalloc object, the allocated memory size(object_size) is likely - * larger than the requested size(orig_size). If redzone check is - * enabled for the extra space, don't zero it, as it will be redzoned - * soon. The redzone operation for this extra space could be seen as a - * replacement of current poisoning under certain debug option, and - * won't break other sanity checks. + * For kmalloc object, the allocated size (object_size) can be larger + * than the requested size (orig_size). We however need to zero the + * whole object_size to handle possible later krealloc() with + *__GFP_ZERO properly. + * + * But if we keep track of the requested size, krealloc() uses that + * information. Additionally if red zoning is enabled, the extra space + * is also red zone, so we should not overwrite it. So limit zeroing to + * orig_size if we track it. */ - if (kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_STORE_USER | SLAB_RED_ZONE) && - (s->flags & SLAB_KMALLOC)) + if (slub_debug_orig_size(s)) zero_size = orig_size; /* From e0eec7497bcc7f61d70cb37c69d1382f76e2db74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xuewen Wang Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 14:21:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 368/607] tools/mm/slabinfo: Fix trace disable logic inversion commit 235ab68d67eadbef1fdbfb771f21f5bacc77a2ae upstream. The disable trace path in slab_debug() had a logic error where it would set trace=1 instead of trace=0. This made trace functionality permanently enabled once turned on for any slab cache. Fixes: a87615b8f9e2 ("SLUB: slabinfo upgrade") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park Signed-off-by: Xuewen Wang WARNING: From:/Signed-off-by: email address mismatch: 'From: wangxuewen <18810879172@163.com>' != 'Signed-off-by: wangxuewen ' Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518062159.80664-2-wangxuewen@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/mm/slabinfo.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/mm/slabinfo.c b/tools/mm/slabinfo.c index 80cdbd3db82df..7c51d283504d9 100644 --- a/tools/mm/slabinfo.c +++ b/tools/mm/slabinfo.c @@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ static void slab_debug(struct slabinfo *s) fprintf(stderr, "%s can only enable trace for one slab at a time\n", s->name); } if (!tracing && s->trace) - set_obj(s, "trace", 1); + set_obj(s, "trace", 0); } static void totals(void) From abf07f5c3584f453e81b3d85a3b2712a4319d373 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yichong Chen Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 15:13:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 369/607] tools/mm/slabinfo: fix total_objects attribute name commit 892a7864730775c3dbee2a39e9ead4fa8d4256e7 upstream. SLUB exports the total_objects sysfs attribute, but slabinfo tries to read objects_total. As a result, the lookup fails and the field remains zero. Use the correct attribute name and rename the corresponding structure member to match. Fixes: 205ab99dd103 ("slub: Update statistics handling for variable order slabs") Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen Cc: Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park Link: https://patch.msgid.link/96556748872BB47E+20260612071359.649946-1-chenyichong@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/mm/slabinfo.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/mm/slabinfo.c b/tools/mm/slabinfo.c index 7c51d283504d9..2c1c052067c6f 100644 --- a/tools/mm/slabinfo.c +++ b/tools/mm/slabinfo.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct slabinfo { unsigned int hwcache_align, object_size, objs_per_slab; unsigned int sanity_checks, slab_size, store_user, trace; int order, poison, reclaim_account, red_zone; - unsigned long partial, objects, slabs, objects_partial, objects_total; + unsigned long partial, objects, slabs, objects_partial, total_objects; unsigned long alloc_fastpath, alloc_slowpath; unsigned long free_fastpath, free_slowpath; unsigned long free_frozen, free_add_partial, free_remove_partial; @@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static void read_slab_dir(void) slab->object_size = get_obj("object_size"); slab->objects = get_obj("objects"); slab->objects_partial = get_obj("objects_partial"); - slab->objects_total = get_obj("objects_total"); + slab->total_objects = get_obj("total_objects"); slab->objs_per_slab = get_obj("objs_per_slab"); slab->order = get_obj("order"); slab->partial = get_obj("partial"); From dae1d000ddfd5c2140b036e47fff0c497ae9c64b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianchu Chen Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 13:42:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 370/607] HID: hid-goodix-spi: validate report size to prevent stack buffer overflow commit db0a0768d09273aadadeb76730cd658d720333a4 upstream. goodix_hid_set_raw_report() builds a protocol frame in a 128-byte stack buffer (tmp_buf), writing an 11-12 byte header followed by the caller-supplied report data. The HID core caps report size at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, while the driver does not set hid_ll_driver.max_buffer_size and performs no bounds checking before copying the payload: memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, buf, len); A hidraw SET_REPORT ioctl with a report larger than ~116 bytes overflows the stack buffer. Add a size check after constructing the header, rejecting reports that would exceed the buffer capacity. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: 75e16c8ce283 ("HID: hid-goodix: Add Goodix HID-over-SPI driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-goodix-spi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-goodix-spi.c b/drivers/hid/hid-goodix-spi.c index 80c0288a3a38b..288cb827e9d6d 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-goodix-spi.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-goodix-spi.c @@ -520,6 +520,9 @@ static int goodix_hid_set_raw_report(struct hid_device *hid, memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, args, args_len); tx_len += args_len; + if (tx_len + len > sizeof(tmp_buf)) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, buf, len); tx_len += len; From 7ce2c7dd28ab8586cfa494e166ddb397f153562b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Llamas Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 18:15:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 371/607] HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report() commit 63a694c51bf120a37550890b8e7736b4888985e9 upstream. Commit 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()"), added a check in hid_report_raw_event() to reject reports if the received data size is smaller than expected. This was intended to prevent OOB errors by no longer allowing zeroing-out of shorter reports due to the lack of buffer size information. However, this leads to regressions in hid_report_raw_event(), where shorter than expected reports are rejected, even though their buffers are sufficiently large to be zero-padded. To solve this issue, Benjamin introduced a safer alternative in commit 206342541fc8 ("HID: core: introduce hid_safe_input_report()"), which forwards the buffer size and allows hid_report_raw_event() to safely zero-pad the data. Convert uhid to use hid_safe_input_report() and pass UHID_DATA_MAX as the buffer size. This prevents the reported regressions [1], allowing hid core to zero-pad the shorter reports safely as expected. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0a3fe972a7cb ("HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ahsh0UtTX6e0ZeHa@google.com/ [1] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Reviewed-by: Lee Jones Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ahsh0UtTX6e0ZeHa@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/uhid.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c index 21a70420151e4..d16667207b9f9 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c @@ -595,8 +595,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev) if (!READ_ONCE(uhid->running)) return -EINVAL; - hid_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input.data, - min_t(size_t, ev->u.input.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0); + hid_safe_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input.data, UHID_DATA_MAX, + min_t(size_t, ev->u.input.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0); return 0; } @@ -606,8 +606,8 @@ static int uhid_dev_input2(struct uhid_device *uhid, struct uhid_event *ev) if (!READ_ONCE(uhid->running)) return -EINVAL; - hid_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input2.data, - min_t(size_t, ev->u.input2.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0); + hid_safe_input_report(uhid->hid, HID_INPUT_REPORT, ev->u.input2.data, UHID_DATA_MAX, + min_t(size_t, ev->u.input2.size, UHID_DATA_MAX), 0); return 0; } From 416095e9a6037b4b39fcadd0d2bd77a8852211ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Myeonghun Pak Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 13:56:58 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 372/607] HID: wacom: stop hardware after post-start probe failures commit ec2612b8ad9e642596db011dd8b6568ef1edeaa1 upstream. wacom_parse_and_register() starts HID hardware before registering inputs and initializing pad LEDs/remotes. Those later steps can fail, but their error paths currently release Wacom resources without stopping the HID hardware. Route post-hid_hw_start() failures through hid_hw_stop() before releasing driver resources. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. Fixes: c1d6708bf0d3 ("HID: wacom: Do not register input devices until after hid_hw_start") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Myeonghun Pak Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c index 63b5fed9415d8..e9bead4f61878 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c @@ -2462,16 +2462,16 @@ static int wacom_parse_and_register(struct wacom *wacom, bool wireless) error = wacom_register_inputs(wacom); if (error) - goto fail; + goto fail_hw_stop; if (wacom->wacom_wac.features.device_type & WACOM_DEVICETYPE_PAD) { error = wacom_initialize_leds(wacom); if (error) - goto fail; + goto fail_hw_stop; error = wacom_initialize_remotes(wacom); if (error) - goto fail; + goto fail_hw_stop; } if (!wireless) { @@ -2485,14 +2485,14 @@ static int wacom_parse_and_register(struct wacom *wacom, bool wireless) cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wacom->init_work); _wacom_query_tablet_data(wacom); error = -ENODEV; - goto fail_quirks; + goto fail_hw_stop; } if (features->device_type & WACOM_DEVICETYPE_WL_MONITOR) { error = hid_hw_open(hdev); if (error) { hid_err(hdev, "hw open failed\n"); - goto fail_quirks; + goto fail_hw_stop; } } @@ -2501,7 +2501,7 @@ static int wacom_parse_and_register(struct wacom *wacom, bool wireless) return 0; -fail_quirks: +fail_hw_stop: hid_hw_stop(hdev); fail: wacom_release_resources(wacom); From cb90a01e478c220c7fa710fd883377750d0e1d9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleg Makarenko Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 19:00:27 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 373/607] HID: pidff: Use correct effect type in effect update MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit b251598b8bf37300510868f739a79e07800d41ce upstream. When updating an existing effect, the effect type from the last created effect was sent to the device instead of the updated one. This caused incorrect reports when a game creates multiple different effects and updates only one that is not the last created. Fixes FFB in multiple games that create multiple simultaneous effects (Forza Horizon 5/6). Fixes: 224ee88fe395 ("Input: add force feedback driver for PID devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Oliver Roundtree Co-developed-by: Ryno Kotzé Signed-off-by: Ryno Kotzé Signed-off-by: Oleg Makarenko Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c index c06b1913f5baf..7eb9e28c0d909 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c +++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-pidff.c @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static void pidff_set_effect_report(struct pidff_device *pidff, pidff->set_effect[PID_EFFECT_BLOCK_INDEX].value[0] = pidff->block_load[PID_EFFECT_BLOCK_INDEX].value[0]; pidff->set_effect_type->value[0] = - pidff->create_new_effect_type->value[0]; + pidff_get_effect_type_id(pidff, effect); pidff_set_duration(&pidff->set_effect[PID_DURATION], effect->replay.length); From ca899a926c11a59211b764b0155d9a1cdcc32b81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jinmo Yang Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 02:59:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 374/607] HID: wacom: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in wacom_wac_queue_insert commit 6b3014ec0e9a390ca563030b2d7689921f0daef5 upstream. wacom_wac_queue_insert() calls kfifo_skip() in a loop when the kfifo doesn't have enough space for the incoming report. If the kfifo is empty, kfifo_skip() reads stale data left in the kmalloc'd buffer via __kfifo_peek_n() and interprets it as a record length, advancing fifo->out by that garbage value. This corrupts the internal kfifo state, causing kfifo_unused() to return a value much larger than the actual buffer size, which bypasses __kfifo_in_r()'s guard: if (len + recsize > kfifo_unused(fifo)) return 0; kfifo_copy_in() then performs an out-of-bounds memcpy, writing up to 3842 bytes past the 256-byte buffer. Add a !kfifo_is_empty() condition to the while loop so kfifo_skip() is never called on an empty fifo, and check the return value of kfifo_in() to reject reports that are too large for the fifo. Suggested-by: Dmitry Torokhov Fixes: 5e013ad20689 ("HID: wacom: Remove static WACOM_PKGLEN_MAX limit") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jinmo Yang Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c index e9bead4f61878..61ad3e40a7477 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static void wacom_wac_queue_insert(struct hid_device *hdev, { bool warned = false; - while (kfifo_avail(fifo) < size) { + while (kfifo_avail(fifo) < size && !kfifo_is_empty(fifo)) { if (!warned) hid_warn(hdev, "%s: kfifo has filled, starting to drop events\n", __func__); warned = true; @@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ static void wacom_wac_queue_insert(struct hid_device *hdev, kfifo_skip(fifo); } - kfifo_in(fifo, raw_data, size); + if (!kfifo_in(fifo, raw_data, size)) + hid_warn_ratelimited(hdev, "%s: report is too large (%d)\n", + __func__, size); } static void wacom_wac_queue_flush(struct hid_device *hdev, From bbe1e55629bfaabd4b2e8125b48dd3503d74ac8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jinmo Yang Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 22:41:23 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 375/607] HID: wacom: use GFP_ATOMIC in wacom_wac_queue_flush() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 55f1ad573e34abf9a0443c34bc5a63d74edba7d7 upstream. wacom_wac_queue_flush() is called via the .raw_event callback (wacom_raw_event → wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce → wacom_wac_queue_flush). For USB HID devices, this callback is invoked from hid_irq_in(), which is a URB completion handler running in atomic context. Using GFP_KERNEL in this path can sleep, leading to a "scheduling while atomic" bug. Use GFP_ATOMIC instead. The existing code already handles allocation failure by skipping the fifo entry and continuing. Reported-by: Sashiko-bot Fixes: 5e013ad20689 ("HID: wacom: Remove static WACOM_PKGLEN_MAX limit") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Jinmo Yang Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c index 61ad3e40a7477..e298ed9b502af 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void wacom_wac_queue_flush(struct hid_device *hdev, unsigned int count; int err; - buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!buf) { kfifo_skip(fifo); continue; From 3eca1a8165b5e7996e699e9df76cb4645e184d42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manish Khadka Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 22:27:00 +0545 Subject: [PATCH 376/607] HID: letsketch: fix UAF on inrange_timer at driver unbind commit 46c8beeccd8ab2c863827254a85ea877654a3534 upstream. letsketch_driver does not provide a .remove callback, but letsketch_probe() arms a per-device timer: timer_setup(&data->inrange_timer, letsketch_inrange_timeout, 0); The timer is re-armed from letsketch_raw_event() with a 100 ms timeout on every pen-in-range report, and its callback dereferences data->input_tablet to deliver a synthetic BTN_TOOL_PEN release. letsketch_data is allocated with devm_kzalloc(), and its input_dev fields are devm-allocated via letsketch_setup_input_tablet(). On device unbind (USB unplug or rmmod), the HID core runs its default teardown and devm cleanup frees both letsketch_data and the input devices. Because no .remove callback exists, nothing drains the timer first: if raw_event armed it within ~100 ms of the unbind, the pending timer fires on freed memory. This is a UAF read of data and of data->input_tablet, followed by input_report_key() / input_sync() into the freed input_dev. The same problem can occur on the probe error path: if hid_hw_start() enabled I/O on an always-poll-quirk device and then failed, raw_event may have armed the timer before devm releases data. Fix by adding a .remove callback that calls hid_hw_stop() first. hid_hw_stop() synchronously kills the URBs that deliver raw_event(), so once it returns no path can re-arm the timer. timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. Apply the same timer_shutdown_sync() in the probe error path so the timer is guaranteed not to outlive data. Fixes: 33a5c2793451 ("HID: Add new Letsketch tablet driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manish Khadka Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-letsketch.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-letsketch.c b/drivers/hid/hid-letsketch.c index 11e21f9887232..b52e93a91ae54 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-letsketch.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-letsketch.c @@ -296,13 +296,42 @@ static int letsketch_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, const struct hid_device_id * ret = letsketch_setup_input_tablet(data); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_shutdown_timer; ret = letsketch_setup_input_tablet_pad(data); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_shutdown_timer; + + ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW); + if (ret) + goto err_shutdown_timer; - return hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW); + return 0; + +err_shutdown_timer: + /* + * Drain any pending callback and permanently disable the timer + * before devm releases data: if hid_hw_start() enabled I/O on an + * always-poll-quirk device and then failed, raw_event may have + * armed the timer already. + */ + timer_shutdown_sync(&data->inrange_timer); + return ret; +} + +static void letsketch_remove(struct hid_device *hdev) +{ + struct letsketch_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); + + /* + * hid_hw_stop() synchronously kills the URBs that deliver + * raw_event(), so once it returns no path can re-arm + * inrange_timer. timer_shutdown_sync() then drains any + * in-flight callback and permanently disables further + * mod_timer() calls before devm releases data. + */ + hid_hw_stop(hdev); + timer_shutdown_sync(&data->inrange_timer); } static const struct hid_device_id letsketch_devices[] = { @@ -315,6 +344,7 @@ static struct hid_driver letsketch_driver = { .name = "letsketch", .id_table = letsketch_devices, .probe = letsketch_probe, + .remove = letsketch_remove, .raw_event = letsketch_raw_event, }; module_hid_driver(letsketch_driver); From 37daa8c96bd563d03150e23f094cb60703594a6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Trung Nguyen Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 00:13:19 +0700 Subject: [PATCH 377/607] HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags commit 8813b0612275cc61fe9e6603d0ee019247ade6be upstream. mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(), mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by BITS_PER_LONG. As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts() runs for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++) clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags); with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received). The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID multitouch device; no local privileges are required. Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots, and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two "mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts). Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned long on 32-bit. Fixes: 46f781e0d151 ("HID: multitouch: fix sticky fingers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Trung Nguyen Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c index a543d48221070..1959481dc7820 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ * [1] https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libevdev/hid-tools */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -96,8 +97,7 @@ enum report_mode { TOUCHPAD_REPORT_ALL = TOUCHPAD_REPORT_BUTTONS | TOUCHPAD_REPORT_CONTACTS, }; -#define MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK GENMASK(7, 0) /* reserve first 8 bits for slot tracking */ -#define MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING 32 +#define MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING 0 static const bool mtrue = true; /* default for true */ static const bool mfalse; /* default for false */ @@ -173,10 +173,9 @@ struct mt_device { struct timer_list release_timer; /* to release sticky fingers */ struct hid_haptic_device *haptic; /* haptic related configuration */ struct hid_device *hdev; /* hid_device we're attached to */ - unsigned long mt_io_flags; /* mt flags (MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING) - * first 8 bits are reserved for keeping the slot - * states, this is fine because we only support up - * to 250 slots (MT_MAX_MAXCONTACT) + unsigned long mt_io_flags; /* mt flags (MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING) */ + unsigned long *active_slots; /* bitmap of slots with an active + * contact, sized for maxcontacts */ __u8 inputmode_value; /* InputMode HID feature value */ __u8 maxcontacts; @@ -1025,7 +1024,7 @@ static void mt_release_pending_palms(struct mt_device *td, for_each_set_bit(slotnum, app->pending_palm_slots, td->maxcontacts) { clear_bit(slotnum, app->pending_palm_slots); - clear_bit(slotnum, &td->mt_io_flags); + clear_bit(slotnum, td->active_slots); input_mt_slot(input, slotnum); input_mt_report_slot_inactive(input); @@ -1236,9 +1235,9 @@ static int mt_process_slot(struct mt_device *td, struct input_dev *input, input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MAJOR, major); input_event(input, EV_ABS, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MINOR, minor); - set_bit(slotnum, &td->mt_io_flags); + set_bit(slotnum, td->active_slots); } else { - clear_bit(slotnum, &td->mt_io_flags); + clear_bit(slotnum, td->active_slots); } return 0; @@ -1373,7 +1372,7 @@ static void mt_touch_report(struct hid_device *hid, * defect. */ if (app->quirks & MT_QUIRK_STICKY_FINGERS) { - if (td->mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK) + if (!bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts)) mod_timer(&td->release_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(100)); else @@ -1430,6 +1429,15 @@ static int mt_touch_input_configured(struct hid_device *hdev, if (td->is_buttonpad) __set_bit(INPUT_PROP_BUTTONPAD, input->propbit); + if (!td->active_slots) { + td->active_slots = devm_kcalloc(&td->hdev->dev, + BITS_TO_LONGS(td->maxcontacts), + sizeof(long), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!td->active_slots) + return -ENOMEM; + } + app->pending_palm_slots = devm_kcalloc(&hi->input->dev, BITS_TO_LONGS(td->maxcontacts), sizeof(long), @@ -1907,7 +1915,7 @@ static void mt_release_contacts(struct hid_device *hid) for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++) { input_mt_slot(input_dev, i); input_mt_report_slot_inactive(input_dev); - clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags); + clear_bit(i, td->active_slots); } input_mt_sync_frame(input_dev); input_sync(input_dev); @@ -1930,7 +1938,7 @@ static void mt_expired_timeout(struct timer_list *t) */ if (test_and_set_bit_lock(MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING, &td->mt_io_flags)) return; - if (td->mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK) + if (!bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts)) mt_release_contacts(hdev); clear_bit_unlock(MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING, &td->mt_io_flags); } From b363d964ca829c1761c9f04188dfa28f90b0f2d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Manish Khadka Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 23:17:52 +0545 Subject: [PATCH 378/607] HID: appleir: fix UAF on pending key_up_timer in remove() commit 75fe87e19d8aff81eb2c64d15d244ab8da4de945 upstream. appleir_remove() runs hid_hw_stop() before timer_delete_sync(). hid_hw_stop() synchronously unregisters the HID input device via hid_disconnect() -> hidinput_disconnect() -> input_unregister_device(), which drops the last reference and frees the underlying input_dev when no userspace handle holds it open. key_up_tick() reads appleir->input_dev and calls input_report_key() / input_sync() on it. The timer is armed from appleir_raw_event() with a HZ/8 (~125 ms) timeout on every keydown and key-repeat report. If a key was pressed shortly before the device is disconnected, the timer can fire after hid_hw_stop() has freed input_dev but before the teardown drains it. A simple reorder is not sufficient. Putting the timer drain first still leaves a window where a USB URB completion (raw_event) running during hid_hw_stop() can call mod_timer() and re-arm the timer, which then fires after hidinput_disconnect() has freed input_dev. The same URB-completion window also lets raw_event() reach key_up(), key_down() and battery_flat() directly, all of which dereference appleir->input_dev. Introduce a 'removing' flag on struct appleir, gated by the existing spinlock. appleir_remove() sets the flag under the lock and then shuts down the timer with timer_shutdown_sync(), which both drains any in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls. appleir_raw_event() and key_up_tick() bail out early if the flag is set, so no path can arm or run the timer, or dereference appleir->input_dev, after remove() has started tearing down. The keyrepeat and flatbattery branches of appleir_raw_event() previously called into the input layer without holding the spinlock; take it now so the flag check is well-defined. This incidentally closes a pre-existing read-side race on appleir->current_key in the keyrepeat branch. This bug is structurally a sibling of commit 4db2af929279 ("HID: appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path") and has been present since the driver was introduced. Fixes: 9a4a5574ce42 ("HID: appleir: add support for Apple ir devices") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Manish Khadka Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c b/drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c index 5e8ced7bc05a3..adaa44a858edd 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-appleir.c @@ -109,9 +109,10 @@ struct appleir { struct hid_device *hid; unsigned short keymap[ARRAY_SIZE(appleir_key_table)]; struct timer_list key_up_timer; /* timer for key up */ - spinlock_t lock; /* protects .current_key */ + spinlock_t lock; /* protects .current_key, .removing */ int current_key; /* the currently pressed key */ int prev_key_idx; /* key index in a 2 packets message */ + bool removing; /* set during teardown; gates input_dev access */ }; static int get_key(int data) @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ static void key_up_tick(struct timer_list *t) unsigned long flags; spin_lock_irqsave(&appleir->lock, flags); - if (appleir->current_key) { + if (!appleir->removing && appleir->current_key) { key_up(hid, appleir, appleir->current_key); appleir->current_key = 0; } @@ -195,6 +196,10 @@ static int appleir_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *report, int index; spin_lock_irqsave(&appleir->lock, flags); + if (appleir->removing) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&appleir->lock, flags); + goto out; + } /* * If we already have a key down, take it up before marking * this one down @@ -229,17 +234,25 @@ static int appleir_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *report, appleir->prev_key_idx = 0; if (!memcmp(data, keyrepeat, sizeof(keyrepeat))) { - key_down(hid, appleir, appleir->current_key); - /* - * Remote doesn't do key up, either pull them up, in the test - * above, or here set a timer which pulls them up after 1/8 s - */ - mod_timer(&appleir->key_up_timer, jiffies + HZ / 8); + spin_lock_irqsave(&appleir->lock, flags); + if (!appleir->removing) { + key_down(hid, appleir, appleir->current_key); + /* + * Remote doesn't do key up, either pull them up, in + * the test above, or here set a timer which pulls them + * up after 1/8 s + */ + mod_timer(&appleir->key_up_timer, jiffies + HZ / 8); + } + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&appleir->lock, flags); goto out; } if (!memcmp(data, flatbattery, sizeof(flatbattery))) { - battery_flat(appleir); + spin_lock_irqsave(&appleir->lock, flags); + if (!appleir->removing) + battery_flat(appleir); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&appleir->lock, flags); /* Fall through */ } @@ -318,8 +331,20 @@ static int appleir_probe(struct hid_device *hid, const struct hid_device_id *id) static void appleir_remove(struct hid_device *hid) { struct appleir *appleir = hid_get_drvdata(hid); + unsigned long flags; + + /* + * Mark the driver as tearing down so that any concurrent raw_event + * (e.g. from a USB URB completion that hid_hw_stop() has not yet + * killed) and the key_up_timer softirq stop touching input_dev + * before hid_hw_stop() frees it via hidinput_disconnect(). + */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&appleir->lock, flags); + appleir->removing = true; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&appleir->lock, flags); + + timer_shutdown_sync(&appleir->key_up_timer); hid_hw_stop(hid); - timer_delete_sync(&appleir->key_up_timer); } static const struct hid_device_id appleir_devices[] = { From 4d0d51bc12d246accbfbb94de05d729c68c9b8fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:06:35 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 379/607] HID: lg-g15: cancel pending work on remove to fix a use-after-free commit 7705b4140d188ce22656f6e541ae7ef834c7e11a upstream. lg_g15_data is allocated with devm and holds a work item. The report handlers schedule that work straight from device input. lg_g15_event() and lg_g15_v2_event() do it on the backlight cycle key, and lg_g510_leds_event() does it too. The worker dereferences the lg_g15_data back through container_of. The driver had no remove callback and never cancelled the work. So if a report scheduled the work and the keyboard was then unplugged, devres freed lg_g15_data while the work was still pending or running, and the worker touched freed memory. This is a use-after-free. It is reachable as a race on device unplug. Add a remove callback that cancels the work before devres frees the state. g15->work is only initialized for the models that schedule it (G15, G15 v2, G510). The G13 and Z-10 leave it zeroed, so guard the cancel on g15->work.func to avoid cancelling a work that was never set up. The g15 NULL test mirrors the one already in lg_g15_raw_event(). Fixes: 97b741aba918 ("HID: lg-g15: Add keyboard and LCD backlight control") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-lg-g15.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-lg-g15.c b/drivers/hid/hid-lg-g15.c index f8605656257bb..4a3131cb28f21 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-lg-g15.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-lg-g15.c @@ -929,11 +929,27 @@ static const struct hid_device_id lg_g15_devices[] = { }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, lg_g15_devices); +static void lg_g15_remove(struct hid_device *hdev) +{ + struct lg_g15_data *g15 = hid_get_drvdata(hdev); + + /* + * g15->work is only initialized for the models that schedule it + * (G15, G15 v2, G510). The G13 and Z-10 leave it zeroed, so only + * cancel it when it was set up. + */ + if (g15 && g15->work.func) + cancel_work_sync(&g15->work); + + hid_hw_stop(hdev); +} + static struct hid_driver lg_g15_driver = { .name = "lg-g15", .id_table = lg_g15_devices, .raw_event = lg_g15_raw_event, .probe = lg_g15_probe, + .remove = lg_g15_remove, }; module_hid_driver(lg_g15_driver); From c63bc6308da716098833fe3185481cb9905dde79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Srinivas Pandruvada Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:29:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 380/607] HID: sensor-hub: Add sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values() for multi-byte reads commit f784fcea450617055d2d12eec5b2f6e0e38bf878 upstream. sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value() is limited to returning a single 32-bit value, which is insufficient for sensors that report data larger than 32 bits, such as a quaternion with four s16 elements. Add sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values() that accepts a caller-provided buffer and accumulates incoming data until the buffer is full. The two paths are distinguished in sensor_hub_raw_event() by pending.max_raw_size being non-zero, preserving backward compatibility. Signed-off-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Co-developed-by: Zhang Lixu Signed-off-by: Zhang Lixu Acked-by: Jiri Kosina Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h | 25 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c index 4c94c03cb5739..1b725c8796506 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c @@ -286,6 +286,54 @@ int sensor_hub_get_feature(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, u32 report_id, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sensor_hub_get_feature); +int sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, + u32 usage_id, u32 attr_usage_id, + u32 report_id, + enum sensor_hub_read_flags flag, + u32 buffer_size, u8 *buffer) +{ + struct sensor_hub_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hsdev->hdev); + struct hid_report *report; + unsigned long flags; + long cycles; + int ret; + + report = sensor_hub_report(report_id, hsdev->hdev, HID_INPUT_REPORT); + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; + + mutex_lock(hsdev->mutex_ptr); + if (flag == SENSOR_HUB_SYNC) { + memset(&hsdev->pending, 0, sizeof(hsdev->pending)); + init_completion(&hsdev->pending.ready); + hsdev->pending.usage_id = usage_id; + hsdev->pending.attr_usage_id = attr_usage_id; + hsdev->pending.max_raw_size = buffer_size; + hsdev->pending.raw_data = buffer; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&data->lock, flags); + hsdev->pending.status = true; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data->lock, flags); + } + mutex_lock(&data->mutex); + hid_hw_request(hsdev->hdev, report, HID_REQ_GET_REPORT); + mutex_unlock(&data->mutex); + ret = 0; + if (flag == SENSOR_HUB_SYNC) { + cycles = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&hsdev->pending.ready, + HZ * 5); + if (cycles == 0) + ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + else if (cycles < 0) + ret = cycles; + + hsdev->pending.status = false; + } + mutex_unlock(hsdev->mutex_ptr); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values); int sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, u32 usage_id, @@ -480,6 +528,8 @@ static int sensor_hub_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev, struct hid_collection *collection = NULL; void *priv = NULL; struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev = NULL; + u32 copy_size; + u32 avail; hid_dbg(hdev, "sensor_hub_raw_event report id:0x%x size:%d type:%d\n", report->id, size, report->type); @@ -520,12 +570,27 @@ static int sensor_hub_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev, hsdev->pending.attr_usage_id == report->field[i]->logical)) { hid_dbg(hdev, "data was pending ...\n"); - hsdev->pending.raw_data = kmemdup(ptr, sz, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (hsdev->pending.raw_data) - hsdev->pending.raw_size = sz; - else - hsdev->pending.raw_size = 0; - complete(&hsdev->pending.ready); + if (hsdev->pending.max_raw_size) { + if (hsdev->pending.index < hsdev->pending.max_raw_size) { + avail = hsdev->pending.max_raw_size - hsdev->pending.index; + copy_size = clamp(sz, 0U, avail); + + memcpy(hsdev->pending.raw_data + hsdev->pending.index, + ptr, copy_size); + hsdev->pending.index += copy_size; + if (hsdev->pending.index >= hsdev->pending.max_raw_size) { + hsdev->pending.raw_size = hsdev->pending.index; + complete(&hsdev->pending.ready); + } + } + } else { + hsdev->pending.raw_data = kmemdup(ptr, sz, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (hsdev->pending.raw_data) + hsdev->pending.raw_size = sz; + else + hsdev->pending.raw_size = 0; + complete(&hsdev->pending.ready); + } } if (callback->capture_sample) { if (report->field[i]->logical) diff --git a/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h b/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h index e710565531085..ab5cc8db3fbb3 100644 --- a/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h +++ b/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ struct hid_sensor_hub_attribute_info { * @attr_usage_id: Usage Id of a field, e.g. X-axis for a gyro. * @raw_size: Response size for a read request. * @raw_data: Place holder for received response. + * @index: Current write index into raw_data for multi-byte reads. + * @max_raw_size: Total buffer size for multi-byte reads; 0 for single-value reads. */ struct sensor_hub_pending { bool status; @@ -51,6 +53,8 @@ struct sensor_hub_pending { u32 attr_usage_id; int raw_size; u8 *raw_data; + u32 index; + u32 max_raw_size; }; /** @@ -183,6 +187,27 @@ int sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, bool is_signed ); +/** + * sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values() - Synchronous multi-byte read request + * @hsdev: Hub device instance. + * @usage_id: Attribute usage id of parent physical device as per spec + * @attr_usage_id: Attribute usage id as per spec + * @report_id: Report id to look for + * @flag: Synchronous or asynchronous read + * @buffer_size: Size of the buffer in bytes + * @buffer: Buffer to store the read data + * + * Issues a synchronous or asynchronous read request for an input attribute, + * accumulating data into the provided buffer until it is full. + * Return: 0 on success, -ETIMEDOUT if the device did not respond, or a + * negative error code. + */ +int sensor_hub_input_attr_read_values(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, + u32 usage_id, u32 attr_usage_id, + u32 report_id, + enum sensor_hub_read_flags flag, + u32 buffer_size, u8 *buffer); + /** * sensor_hub_set_feature() - Feature set request * @hsdev: Hub device instance. From f3461b84a4865d9b5e70fbb71da72ae044a3bcd2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tristan Madani Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 11:12:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 381/607] hfs/hfsplus: zero-initialize buffer in hfs_bnode_read commit d67aadee19ffdf3cc8520c5a4f4d5b2916d30baf upstream. hfs_bnode_read() can return early without writing to the output buffer when is_bnode_offset_valid() fails or when check_and_correct_requested_ length() corrects the length to zero. Callers such as hfs_bnode_read_ u16() and hfs_bnode_read_u8() pass stack-allocated buffers and use the result unconditionally, leading to KMSAN uninit-value reports. Rather than initializing at each individual call site, zero the buffer at the start of hfs_bnode_read() before any validation checks. This ensures all callers in both hfs and hfsplus get a deterministic zero value regardless of which early-return path is taken. Reported-by: syzbot+217eb327242d08197efb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=217eb327242d08197efb Tested-by: syzbot+217eb327242d08197efb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: a431930c9bac ("hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260505111300.3592757-3-tristmd@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/hfs/bnode.c | 2 ++ fs/hfsplus/bnode.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c index fcfffe75d84e7..c5ebff5f68875 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c +++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c @@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len) int bytes_read; int bytes_to_read; + memset(buf, 0, len); + if (!is_bnode_offset_valid(node, off)) return; diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c b/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c index 8e60e04c427bd..76dea3bc5fffe 100644 --- a/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c +++ b/fs/hfsplus/bnode.c @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len) struct page **pagep; int l; + memset(buf, 0, len); + if (!is_bnode_offset_valid(node, off)) return; From 223463c488b0554212a94de971ea538eb2805fc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Deepanshu Kartikey Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 13:33:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 382/607] nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers commit 0e7a690fe435f8d5ea3feb7c1d8d73ba7e8b8aa9 upstream. Syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin() where multiple tasks performing chmod() on a nilfs2 mount blocked for over 143 seconds waiting to acquire ns_segctor_sem for read: INFO: task syz.0.17:5918 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Call Trace: schedule+0x164/0x360 rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x6d9/0x940 down_read+0x99/0x2e0 nilfs_transaction_begin+0x364/0x710 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:221 nilfs_setattr+0x124/0x2c0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:921 notify_change+0xc1a/0xf40 chmod_common+0x273/0x4a0 do_fchmodat+0x12d/0x230 The writer holding ns_segctor_sem was a concurrent NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS caller, stuck inside printk while emitting per-element warnings from nilfs_sufile_updatev(): __nilfs_msg+0x373/0x450 fs/nilfs2/super.c:78 nilfs_sufile_updatev+0x21c/0x6d0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:186 nilfs_sufile_freev fs/nilfs2/sufile.h:93 [inline] nilfs_free_segments fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1140 [inline] nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1261 [inline] nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x1f55/0x76c0 nilfs_clean_segments+0x3bd/0xa50 nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:922 [inline] nilfs_ioctl+0x261f/0x2780 The root cause is that user-supplied segment numbers are not validated before nilfs_clean_segments() begins doing work; the range check on each segnum is performed deep inside the call chain by nilfs_sufile_updatev(), which emits a nilfs_warn() per invalid entry while still holding the segctor lock and the sufile mi_sem. Under load (repeated invocations across multiple mounts saturating the global printk path), the cumulative printk latency keeps ns_segctor_sem held long enough to trip the hung_task watchdog, blocking concurrent operations such as chmod() that need ns_segctor_sem for read. Fix by validating the contents of kbufs[4] in nilfs_clean_segments() immediately after acquiring ns_segctor_sem via nilfs_transaction_lock(). Holding ns_segctor_sem serializes the check against nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments, so the validation uses a consistent value. Out-of-range segment numbers are rejected with -EINVAL before any segment-cleaning work begins, so the bad entries never reach the per-element diagnostic path inside nilfs_sufile_updatev(). Reported-by: syzbot+62f0f99d2f2bb8e3bbd7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62f0f99d2f2bb8e3bbd7 Tested-by: syzbot+62f0f99d2f2bb8e3bbd7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey Fixes: 071cb4b81987 ("nilfs2: eliminate removal list of segments") Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c index deee16bc9d4eb..0bc1f0f02f31d 100644 --- a/fs/nilfs2/segment.c +++ b/fs/nilfs2/segment.c @@ -2512,12 +2512,33 @@ int nilfs_clean_segments(struct super_block *sb, struct nilfs_argv *argv, struct nilfs_sc_info *sci = nilfs->ns_writer; struct nilfs_transaction_info ti; int err; + size_t i, nfreesegs = argv[4].v_nmembs; + __u64 *segnumv = kbufs[4]; if (unlikely(!sci)) return -EROFS; nilfs_transaction_lock(sb, &ti, 1); + /* + * Validate segment numbers under ns_segctor_sem (held for write + * by nilfs_transaction_lock above) so the check is serialized + * against nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments. + * Rejecting bad input here, before any segment-cleaning work + * begins, avoids the per-element diagnostic path inside + * nilfs_sufile_updatev() that would otherwise run under this + * same lock and stall concurrent readers. + */ + for (i = 0; i < nfreesegs; i++) { + if (segnumv[i] >= nilfs->ns_nsegments) { + nilfs_err(sb, + "Segment number %llu to be freed is out of range", + (unsigned long long)segnumv[i]); + err = -EINVAL; + goto bail_unlock; + } + } + err = nilfs_mdt_save_to_shadow_map(nilfs->ns_dat); if (unlikely(err)) goto out_unlock; @@ -2558,6 +2579,7 @@ int nilfs_clean_segments(struct super_block *sb, struct nilfs_argv *argv, sci->sc_freesegs = NULL; sci->sc_nfreesegs = 0; nilfs_mdt_clear_shadow_map(nilfs->ns_dat); + bail_unlock: nilfs_transaction_unlock(sb); return err; } From 973408ceab14555a8548b97c8cc7b54208c3f251 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Louis-Alexis Eyraud Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2026 11:44:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 383/607] media: mtk-jpeg: cancel workqueue on release for supported platforms only commit b1845a227fda37b2fe5327df3ca0015d7e290235 upstream. Since a recent fix the mtk_jpeg_release function cancels any pending or running work present in the driver workqueue using cancel_work_sync function. Currently, only the multicore based variants use this workqueue and they have the jpeg_worker platform data field initialized with a workqueue callback function. For the others, this field value remain NULL by default. The cancel_work_sync function is unconditionally called in mtk_jpeg_release function, even for the variants that do not use the workqueue. This call generates a WARN_ON print in __flush_work because the workqueue callback function presence check fails in __flush_work function (used by cancel_work_sync). So, to avoid these warnings, call cancel_work_sync only if a workqueue callback is defined in platform data. Fixes: 34c519feef3e ("media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Louis-Alexis Eyraud Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dufresne Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dufresne Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c b/drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c index a2518793c685a..5a9ba04d3d480 100644 --- a/drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c +++ b/drivers/media/platform/mediatek/jpeg/mtk_jpeg_core.c @@ -1209,7 +1209,8 @@ static int mtk_jpeg_release(struct file *file) struct mtk_jpeg_dev *jpeg = video_drvdata(file); struct mtk_jpeg_ctx *ctx = mtk_jpeg_file_to_ctx(file); - cancel_work_sync(&ctx->jpeg_work); + if (jpeg->variant->jpeg_worker) + cancel_work_sync(&ctx->jpeg_work); mutex_lock(&jpeg->lock); v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(ctx->fh.m2m_ctx); v4l2_ctrl_handler_free(&ctx->ctrl_hdl); From 1cd54e217c6e2cdb794a897b2f855e13ffcee586 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 11:49:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 384/607] serial: 8250_mid: Disable DMA for selected platforms commit b1b4efea05a56c0995e4702a86d6624b4fdff32f upstream. In accordance with Errata (specification updates) HSUART May Stop Functioning when DMA is Active. - Denverton document #572409, rev 3.4, DNV60 - Ice Lake Xeon D document #714070, ICXD65 - Snowridge document #731931, SNR44 For a quick fix just disable the respective callbacks during the device probe. Depending on the future development we might remove them completely. Reported-by: micas-opensource Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-serial/20250625031409.2404219-1-opensource@ruijie.com.cn/ Fixes: 6ede6dcd87aa ("serial: 8250_mid: add support for DMA engine handling from UART MMIO") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260626094937.561776-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_mid.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_mid.c b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_mid.c index 8ec03863606e4..f88809ff370b7 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_mid.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_mid.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -368,8 +369,16 @@ static const struct mid8250_board dnv_board = { .freq = 133333333, .base_baud = 115200, .bar = 1, - .setup = dnv_setup, - .exit = dnv_exit, + /* + * Errata: + * HSUART May Stop Functioning when DMA is Active. + * + * - Denverton document #572409, rev 3.4, DNV60 + * - Ice Lake Xeon D document #714070, ICXD65 + * - Snowridge document #731931, SNR44 + */ + .setup = PTR_IF(false, dnv_setup), + .exit = PTR_IF(false, dnv_exit), }; static const struct pci_device_id pci_ids[] = { From 200794d0354cdcad9464c611b96e2e5b1fef09d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yousef Alhouseen Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:06:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 385/607] xfs: use null daddr for unset first bad log block commit cc9af5e461ea5f6e37738f3f1e41c45a9b7f45d6 upstream. xlog_do_recovery_pass() may return before setting first_bad. The caller must distinguish that case from an error at a valid log block, including block zero after the log wraps. Initialize first_bad to XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL and test it explicitly before treating the error as a torn write. Fixes: 7088c4136fa1 ("xfs: detect and trim torn writes during log recovery") Suggested-by: Darrick J. Wong Reported-by: syzbot+b7dfbed0c6c2b5e9fd34@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b7dfbed0c6c2b5e9fd34 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.5 Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c index 549d60959aee5..cc5ffa8e4bc2a 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c @@ -1028,7 +1028,7 @@ xlog_verify_head( { struct xlog_rec_header *tmp_rhead; char *tmp_buffer; - xfs_daddr_t first_bad; + xfs_daddr_t first_bad = XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL; xfs_daddr_t tmp_rhead_blk; int found; int error; @@ -1057,7 +1057,8 @@ xlog_verify_head( */ error = xlog_do_recovery_pass(log, *head_blk, tmp_rhead_blk, XLOG_RECOVER_CRCPASS, &first_bad); - if ((error == -EFSBADCRC || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) && first_bad) { + if ((error == -EFSBADCRC || error == -EFSCORRUPTED) && + first_bad != XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL) { /* * We've hit a potential torn write. Reset the error and warn * about it. @@ -3582,4 +3583,3 @@ xlog_recover_cancel( if (xlog_recovery_needed(log)) xlog_recover_cancel_intents(log); } - From 936618643591c6e6f6a3e4f9dbbc9e44ac1d6dea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yingjie Gao Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 21:16:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 386/607] xfs: release dquot buffer after dqflush failure commit 0c1b3a823a22af623d55f225fe2ac7e8b9052821 upstream. xfs_qm_dqpurge() gets a locked buffer from xfs_dquot_use_attached_buf(). If xfs_qm_dqflush() fails, the error path skips xfs_buf_relse() and then calls xfs_dquot_detach_buf(), which tries to lock the same buffer again. Release the buffer after xfs_qm_dqflush() returns so the error path drops the caller hold and unlocks the buffer before the dquot is detached, matching the other dqflush callers. Fixes: a40fe30868ba ("xfs: separate dquot buffer reads from xfs_dqflush") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13+ Signed-off-by: Yingjie Gao Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/xfs_qm.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_qm.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_qm.c index 18a19947bbdba..48a5a294f0a13 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_qm.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_qm.c @@ -163,10 +163,9 @@ xfs_qm_dqpurge( * does it on success. */ error = xfs_qm_dqflush(dqp, bp); - if (!error) { + if (!error) error = xfs_bwrite(bp); - xfs_buf_relse(bp); - } + xfs_buf_relse(bp); xfs_dqflock(dqp); } xfs_dquot_detach_buf(dqp); From dd8d0665cdabfc07543661fe6197c87ea5f1bdb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Nepomnyashih Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 20:41:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 387/607] xfs: fix unreachable BIGTIME check in dquot flush validation commit 03866d130ed33ab68cc7faaf4bf2c4abef96d42e upstream. The dqp->q_id == 0 check inside the XFS_DQTYPE_BIGTIME block is unreachable because root dquots return successfully earlier. Reject root dquots with XFS_DQTYPE_BIGTIME before that early return, preserving the intended validation and removing the unreachable condition. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 4ea1ff3b4968 ("xfs: widen ondisk quota expiration timestamps to handle y2038+") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Alexey Nepomnyashih Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Reviewed-by: Allison Henderson Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c index 92a8863bee36c..896ff8080b75b 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_dquot.c @@ -1241,6 +1241,14 @@ xfs_qm_dqflush_check( type != XFS_DQTYPE_PROJ) return __this_address; + /* bigtime flag should never be set on root dquots */ + if (dqp->q_type & XFS_DQTYPE_BIGTIME) { + if (!xfs_has_bigtime(dqp->q_mount)) + return __this_address; + if (dqp->q_id == 0) + return __this_address; + } + if (dqp->q_id == 0) return NULL; @@ -1256,14 +1264,6 @@ xfs_qm_dqflush_check( !dqp->q_rtb.timer) return __this_address; - /* bigtime flag should never be set on root dquots */ - if (dqp->q_type & XFS_DQTYPE_BIGTIME) { - if (!xfs_has_bigtime(dqp->q_mount)) - return __this_address; - if (dqp->q_id == 0) - return __this_address; - } - return NULL; } From 55e4d8413fb5442c11fbbf484f1bfad9db3499e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 21:57:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 388/607] xfs: fix pointer arithmetic error on 32-bit systems commit 84eec3f7fc73144d1a230c9e8ad92721e37dcaab upstream. The translation of the old XFS_BMBT_KEY_ADDR macro into a static function is not correct on 32-bit systems because the sizeof() argument went from being a xfs_bmbt_key_t (i.e. a struct) to a (struct xfs_bmbt_key *) (i.e. a pointer to the same struct). On 64-bit systems this turns out ok because they are the same size, but on 32-bit systems this is catastrophic because they are not the same size. So far there have been no complaints, most likely because the xfs developers urge against running it on 32-bit systems. But this needs fixing asap. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.12 Fixes: 79124b37400635 ("xfs: replace shouty XFS_BM{BT,DR} macros") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.h b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.h index b238d559ab036..e0c870beaf670 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.h +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap_btree.h @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ xfs_bmbt_key_addr( { return (struct xfs_bmbt_key *) ((char *)block + xfs_bmbt_block_len(mp) + - (index - 1) * sizeof(struct xfs_bmbt_key *)); + (index - 1) * sizeof(struct xfs_bmbt_key)); } static inline xfs_bmbt_ptr_t * From a62ef2d13d6e7270dd5e88c6082bf2d0edcd5112 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yingjie Gao Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 20:03:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 389/607] xfs: fix exchmaps reservation limit check commit 0a5213bbff62b51c7d4999ac8c7e11ea57d00d45 upstream. xfs_exchmaps_estimate_overhead() adds the bmbt and rmapbt overhead to a local resblks variable, but the final UINT_MAX check still tests req->resblks. That is the reservation value from before the overhead was added. The computed value is stored back in req->resblks and later passed to xfs_trans_alloc(), whose block reservation argument is unsigned int. Check the computed reservation so the existing limit applies to the value that will be used. Fixes: 966ceafc7a43 ("xfs: create deferred log items for file mapping exchanges") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10 Signed-off-by: Yingjie Gao Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_exchmaps.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_exchmaps.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_exchmaps.c index 932ee4619e9ea..f021fe3c9cb64 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_exchmaps.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_exchmaps.c @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ xfs_exchmaps_estimate_overhead( return -ENOSPC; /* Can't actually reserve more than UINT_MAX blocks. */ - if (req->resblks > UINT_MAX) + if (resblks > UINT_MAX) return -ENOSPC; req->resblks = resblks; From c3d3d2212c2966973dd7d603c6c6e6ed6fc7fbe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dawei Feng Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2026 14:04:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 390/607] xfs: fix memory leak in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create() commit 45de375b25060edf46e20abb36521ba530336ceb upstream. If xfs_metadir_create() fails in xfs_dqinode_metadir_create(), the current code returns directly, leaking the allocated update and transaction state. If the subsequent commit fails, the caller-owned inode reference is left behind. Fix this memory leak by routing the create failure path through xfs_metadir_cancel(). For both create and commit failures, finish and release any inode returned to the caller, mirroring the unwind pattern in xfs_metadir_mkdir(). The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1.1. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. Runtime validation used kprobe fault injection during `mount -o uquota` on a metadir XFS image. Injecting xfs_metadir_create() reproduced the old active-update path that left mount stuck later in mount setup; after this change, the same injection reported cancel_hits=1 and irele_hits=1. Injecting xfs_metadir_commit() exercised the old inode-reference leak path; after this change, it reported irele_hits=1. Fixes: e80fbe1ad8ef ("xfs: use metadir for quota inodes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13 Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c index dceef2abd4e2a..785f422dfedbb 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dquot_buf.c @@ -436,17 +436,27 @@ xfs_dqinode_metadir_create( error = xfs_metadir_create(&upd, S_IFREG); if (error) - return error; + goto out_cancel; xfs_trans_log_inode(upd.tp, upd.ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE); error = xfs_metadir_commit(&upd); if (error) - return error; + goto out_irele; xfs_finish_inode_setup(upd.ip); *ipp = upd.ip; return 0; + +out_cancel: + xfs_metadir_cancel(&upd, error); +out_irele: + /* Have to finish setting up the inode to ensure it's deleted. */ + if (upd.ip) { + xfs_finish_inode_setup(upd.ip); + xfs_irele(upd.ip); + } + return error; } #ifndef __KERNEL__ From a9bb2d9c798cb62a4050a991c27b752770c33afe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhao Zhang Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 16:43:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 391/607] bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit aa496720618f1a6054f1c870bf10b4f6c99bf656 upstream. Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last destination. For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data, while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds access during frame return. Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone(). Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast support aligned between native and generic XDP. Fixes: e624d4ed4aa8 ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/21c2d153dd25603d359069a02bf06779b51f6423.1780385378.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c index cc0a43ebab6b9..5b9eac5342a90 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/devmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/devmap.c @@ -581,6 +581,10 @@ static int dev_map_enqueue_clone(struct bpf_dtab_netdev *obj, { struct xdp_frame *nxdpf; + /* Frags live outside the linear frame and cannot be cloned safely. */ + if (unlikely(xdp_frame_has_frags(xdpf))) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + nxdpf = xdpf_clone(xdpf); if (!nxdpf) return -ENOMEM; @@ -726,6 +730,9 @@ static int dev_map_redirect_clone(struct bpf_dtab_netdev *dst, struct sk_buff *nskb; int err; + if (unlikely(skb_is_nonlinear(skb))) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!nskb) return -ENOMEM; From d94ab0e91d3ff7577cd0306a47270a6dcb82f76c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dawei Feng Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 18:53:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 392/607] bpf: Restore sysctl new-value from 1 to 0 commit 2566c3b24219c5b30e35205cba029ff34ff7c78b upstream. Commit 4e63acdff864 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value helpers") changed the success return value to 0, but failed to update the corresponding check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since bpf_prog_run_array_cg() now returns 0 on success, the legacy ret == 1 condition is never satisfied. As a result, the modified value is ignored, and bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() fails to replace the write buffer. Fix this by checking for a return value of 0 instead, so cgroup/sysctl programs can correctly replace the pending sysctl buffer. This bug was discovered during a manual code review. Tested via a cgroup/sysctl BPF reproducer overriding writes to a target sysctl. Pre-fix, bpf_sysctl_set_new_value("foo") was silently ignored: the write returned 8192 and the value remained "600". Post-fix, the BPF replacement buffer properly propagates: the write returns 3 and the value updates to "foo". Fixes: f10d05966196 ("bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err instead of allow boolean") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Yonghong Song Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen Acked-by: Xu Kuohai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-4-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index 159e29e809362..d5eed35b376ab 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -1939,7 +1939,7 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(struct ctl_table_header *head, kfree(ctx.cur_val); - if (ret == 1 && ctx.new_updated) { + if (!ret && ctx.new_updated) { kvfree(*buf); *buf = ctx.new_val; *pcount = ctx.new_len; From cd407de2ef5dc70f1970b343ffaa16186340fdfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moses Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 23:43:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 393/607] bpf: Validate BTF repeated field counts before expansion commit b9452b594fd3aecbfd4aa0a6a1f741330a37dab7 upstream. btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD, and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields(). The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the array. Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields and reject impossible counts. Fixes: 797d73ee232d ("bpf: Check the remaining info_cnt before repeating btf fields") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moses Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260605234301.1109063-1-p@1g4.org Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 75a5df36f9170..7a4618c054075 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -3550,7 +3550,7 @@ static int btf_get_field_type(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_type *var_ static int btf_repeat_fields(struct btf_field_info *info, int info_cnt, u32 field_cnt, u32 repeat_cnt, u32 elem_size) { - u32 i, j; + u32 i, j, total_cnt, total_repeats; u32 cur; /* Ensure not repeating fields that should not be repeated. */ @@ -3568,10 +3568,9 @@ static int btf_repeat_fields(struct btf_field_info *info, int info_cnt, } } - /* The type of struct size or variable size is u32, - * so the multiplication will not overflow. - */ - if (field_cnt * (repeat_cnt + 1) > info_cnt) + if (check_add_overflow(repeat_cnt, 1, &total_repeats) || + check_mul_overflow(field_cnt, total_repeats, &total_cnt) || + total_cnt > (u32)info_cnt) return -E2BIG; cur = field_cnt; From e24eb271061db384a3c3ef6f107fe515e68ef222 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 16:01:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 394/607] net: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup() commit 47b6bcef6e679593d2e86e04ee72c46a4e2f7139 upstream. kalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 * KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that skb->len is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can deliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb->len in the 6 to 11 range, or leave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case underflows usb_packet_length to about 65530. That bypasses the usb_packet_length < ether_packet_length truncation path. The device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from header_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and skb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10, which is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read. Require both the start and end framing headers to be present before subtracting them, on every loop iteration. Fixes: d40261236e8e ("net/usb: Add Samsung Kalmia driver for Samsung GT-B3730") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Link: https://patch.msgid.link/178211531778.2216480.12637613349790980750@maoyixie.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/kalmia.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/kalmia.c b/drivers/net/usb/kalmia.c index ee9c48f7f68f9..0dd0a30c3db41 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/kalmia.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/kalmia.c @@ -276,6 +276,14 @@ kalmia_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) "Received header: %6phC. Package length: %i\n", header_start, skb->len - KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH); + /* both framing headers must be present before we subtract + * them, otherwise usb_packet_length underflows and the + * device-supplied ether_packet_length drives an out of bounds + * access below + */ + if (skb->len < 2 * KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) + return 0; + /* subtract start header and end header */ usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 * KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH); ether_packet_length = get_unaligned_le16(&header_start[2]); From e22f044b0b20df5304e017912483d065047a12df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jared Baldridge Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 18:19:48 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 395/607] usb: cdc_acm: Add quirk for Uniden BC125AT scanner commit 6eba58568f6cc3ff8515a00b05e258d8cfb72b72 upstream. Uniden BC125AT radio scanner has a USB interface which fails to work with the cdc_acm driver: usb 1-1: new full-speed USB device number 2 using uhci_hcd cdc_acm 1-1:1.0: Zero length descriptor references cdc_acm 1-1:1.0: probe with driver cdc_acm failed with error -22 usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_acm Adding the NO_UNION_NORMAL quirk for the device fixes the issue: usb 1-1: new full-speed USB device number 2 using uhci_hcd cdc_acm 1-1:1.0: ttyACM0: USB ACM device usbcore: registered new interface driver cdc_acm `lsusb -v` of the device: Bus 001 Device 002: ID 1965:0017 Uniden Corporation BC125AT Negotiated speed: Full Speed (12Mbps) Device Descriptor: bLength 18 bDescriptorType 1 bcdUSB 2.00 bDeviceClass 2 Communications bDeviceSubClass 0 [unknown] bDeviceProtocol 0 bMaxPacketSize0 64 idVendor 0x1965 Uniden Corporation idProduct 0x0017 BC125AT bcdDevice 0.01 iManufacturer 1 Uniden America Corp. iProduct 2 BC125AT iSerial 3 0001 bNumConfigurations 1 Configuration Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 2 wTotalLength 0x0030 bNumInterfaces 2 bConfigurationValue 1 iConfiguration 0 bmAttributes 0x80 (Bus Powered) MaxPower 500mA Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 0 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 1 bInterfaceClass 2 Communications bInterfaceSubClass 2 Abstract (modem) bInterfaceProtocol 0 iInterface 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x87 EP 7 IN bmAttributes 3 Transfer Type Interrupt Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0008 1x 8 bytes bInterval 10 Interface Descriptor: bLength 9 bDescriptorType 4 bInterfaceNumber 1 bAlternateSetting 0 bNumEndpoints 2 bInterfaceClass 10 CDC Data bInterfaceSubClass 0 [unknown] bInterfaceProtocol 0 iInterface 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x81 EP 1 IN bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes bInterval 0 Endpoint Descriptor: bLength 7 bDescriptorType 5 bEndpointAddress 0x02 EP 2 OUT bmAttributes 2 Transfer Type Bulk Synch Type None Usage Type Data wMaxPacketSize 0x0040 1x 64 bytes bInterval 0 Device Status: 0x0000 (Bus Powered) Signed-off-by: Jared Baldridge Cc: stable Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530221959.612526-1-jrb@expunge.us Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c index 730ea34cb7449..12f9fe62199ba 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c @@ -1810,6 +1810,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x1901, 0x0006), /* GE Healthcare Patient Monitor UI Controller */ .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, /* DISABLE ECHO in termios flag */ }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x1965, 0x0017), /* Uniden BC125AT */ + .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */ + }, { USB_DEVICE(0x1965, 0x0018), /* Uniden UBC125XLT */ .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */ }, From c00826e87bb75e14e0381b05da5f18ffd0241ab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoxiang Li Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 13:26:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 396/607] usb: cdnsp: fix stream context array leak in cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() commit 3348f444a4ce43dd5c2d1aa41634cb6eff33aa64 upstream. cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() allocates stream_info->stream_ctx_array with cdnsp_alloc_stream_ctx(). If a later stream ring allocation or stream mapping update fails, the error path frees the allocated stream rings and stream_rings array, but leaves stream_ctx_array allocated. Free the stream context array before falling through to the stream_rings cleanup path. Fixes: 3d82904559f4 ("usb: cdnsp: cdns3 Add main part of Cadence USBSSP DRD Driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li Acked-by: Peter Chen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622052627.696373-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/cdns3/cdnsp-mem.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/cdns3/cdnsp-mem.c b/drivers/usb/cdns3/cdnsp-mem.c index 97866bfb2da9d..3f35c8af271e0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/cdns3/cdnsp-mem.c +++ b/drivers/usb/cdns3/cdnsp-mem.c @@ -632,6 +632,8 @@ int cdnsp_alloc_stream_info(struct cdnsp_device *pdev, } } + cdnsp_free_stream_ctx(pdev, pep); + cleanup_stream_rings: kfree(pep->stream_info.stream_rings); From 4b0779207e36d924bcfe5e34e8b817aecdea87a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Rodrigo=20Lugathe=20da=20Concei=C3=A7=C3=A3o=20Alves?= Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 08:36:26 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 397/607] USB: core: add USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM for VIA Labs USB 2.0 hub MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit bd728c3d9b1cc0bb0fda6a7055c5c8b55d7477b2 upstream. The VIA Labs, Inc. USB 2.0 hub controller (2109:2817), found in a KVM switch, fails to enumerate high-power devices during cold boot and system restart. Applying the kernel parameter usbcore.quirks=2109:2817:k resolves the issue. Enumeration failure log: usb 1-1.2.3: device descriptor read/64, error -32 usb 1-1.2.3: Device not responding to setup address. usb 1-1.2.3: device not accepting address 11, error -71 usb 1-1.2-port3: unable to enumerate USB device Add USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM for this device. Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Lugathe da Conceição Alves Cc: stable Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260603113626.395612-1-lugathe2@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c index 21f9b7fec8cb5..c799f8f7b1fb0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c @@ -577,6 +577,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = { /* VLI disk */ { USB_DEVICE(0x2109, 0x0711), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, + /* VIA Labs, Inc. USB2.0 Hub */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x2109, 0x2817), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, + /* Raydium Touchscreen */ { USB_DEVICE(0x2386, 0x3114), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, From 0bbab8882a319f74dbcd40fd30b8e072656eb360 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: WenTao Liang Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 21:11:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 398/607] usb: dwc3: meson-g12a: fix refcount leak in dwc3_meson_g12a_resume() commit 692c354bef03b77b30e57e61934da502c8a12d45 upstream. If dwc3_meson_g12a_resume() succeeds in calling reset_control_reset(), an internal triggered_count reference is acquired. If any later step fails (usb_init, phy_init, phy_power_on, regulator_enable, or usb_post_init), the function returns the error without rearming the reset control. This leaks the reference and leaves the reset control in a triggered state, causing future reset_control_reset() calls to incorrectly return early as if already reset. Add an error path that calls reset_control_rearm() to balance the reference before returning the error. Cc: stable Fixes: 5b0ba0caaf3a ("usb: dwc3: meson-g12a: refactor usb init") Signed-off-by: WenTao Liang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260611131121.81784-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c index 55e144ba8cfc6..4d611c08e8a4c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-meson-g12a.c @@ -907,35 +907,39 @@ static int __maybe_unused dwc3_meson_g12a_resume(struct device *dev) ret = priv->drvdata->usb_init(priv); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_rearm; /* Init PHYs */ for (i = 0 ; i < PHY_COUNT ; ++i) { ret = phy_init(priv->phys[i]); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_rearm; } /* Set PHY Power */ for (i = 0 ; i < PHY_COUNT ; ++i) { ret = phy_power_on(priv->phys[i]); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_rearm; } if (priv->vbus && priv->otg_phy_mode == PHY_MODE_USB_HOST) { ret = regulator_enable(priv->vbus); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_rearm; } if (priv->drvdata->usb_post_init) { ret = priv->drvdata->usb_post_init(priv); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_rearm; } return 0; + +err_rearm: + reset_control_rearm(priv->reset); + return ret; } static const struct dev_pm_ops dwc3_meson_g12a_dev_pm_ops = { From 6bc17a78a05671d303820224fb37ca339c1dc2cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dawei Feng Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 15:14:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 399/607] usb: free iso schedules on failed submit commit b9399d25fbb34a05bbe76eeedd730f62ff2670e9 upstream. EHCI and FOTG210 isochronous submits build an ehci_iso_sched before linking the URB to the endpoint queue, and keep the staged schedule in urb->hcpriv until iso_stream_schedule() and the link helpers consume it. If the controller is no longer accessible, or usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep() fails, submit jumps to done_not_linked before that handoff happens and leaks the staged schedule still attached to urb->hcpriv. Free the staged schedule from done_not_linked when submit fails before the URB is linked and clear urb->hcpriv after the free. The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still present in v7.1.1. An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have an EHCI host controller with a USB isochronous device to test with, no runtime testing was able to be performed. Fixes: 8de98402652c ("[PATCH] USB: Fix USB suspend/resume crasher (#2)") Fixes: e9df41c5c589 ("USB: make HCDs responsible for managing endpoint queues") Fixes: 7d50195f6c50 ("usb: host: Faraday fotg210-hcd driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng Reviewed-by: Alan Stern Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260630071419.349161-1-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-hcd.c | 6 ++++-- drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c | 11 +++++++++-- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-hcd.c b/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-hcd.c index 64c4965a160f4..340b45c94d75d 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-hcd.c +++ b/drivers/usb/fotg210/fotg210-hcd.c @@ -4267,8 +4267,6 @@ static int iso_stream_schedule(struct fotg210_hcd *fotg210, struct urb *urb, return 0; fail: - iso_sched_free(stream, sched); - urb->hcpriv = NULL; return status; } @@ -4562,6 +4560,10 @@ static int itd_submit(struct fotg210_hcd *fotg210, struct urb *urb, else usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(fotg210_to_hcd(fotg210), urb); done_not_linked: + if (status < 0) { + iso_sched_free(stream, urb->hcpriv); + urb->hcpriv = NULL; + } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fotg210->lock, flags); done: return status; diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c index 7e834587e7de1..e6742838f9a68 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/ehci-sched.c @@ -1624,6 +1624,7 @@ iso_stream_schedule( status = 1; /* and give it back immediately */ iso_sched_free(stream, sched); sched = NULL; + urb->hcpriv = NULL; } } urb->error_count = skip / period; @@ -1654,8 +1655,6 @@ iso_stream_schedule( return status; fail: - iso_sched_free(stream, sched); - urb->hcpriv = NULL; return status; } @@ -1967,6 +1966,10 @@ static int itd_submit(struct ehci_hcd *ehci, struct urb *urb, usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(ehci_to_hcd(ehci), urb); } done_not_linked: + if (status < 0) { + iso_sched_free(stream, urb->hcpriv); + urb->hcpriv = NULL; + } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ehci->lock, flags); done: return status; @@ -2344,6 +2347,10 @@ static int sitd_submit(struct ehci_hcd *ehci, struct urb *urb, usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(ehci_to_hcd(ehci), urb); } done_not_linked: + if (status < 0) { + iso_sched_free(stream, urb->hcpriv); + urb->hcpriv = NULL; + } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ehci->lock, flags); done: return status; From 01feaf024f29618d5ffa7ab0fd858e0579dcbf7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maoyi Xie Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 23:08:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 400/607] usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler commit f8f680609c2b3ab795ffcd6f21585b6dfc46d395 upstream. The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first configuration when none is selected: if (cdev->config) config = cdev->config; else config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs, struct usb_configuration, list); if (!config) goto done; ... memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value); list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead. When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response buffer. cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch. Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job. Fixes: 53e6242db8d6 ("usb: gadget: composite: add USB_DT_OTG request handling") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527150832.2943293-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c index bb3fa6fa9e8b9..e09256304dc0a 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/composite.c @@ -1863,9 +1863,10 @@ composite_setup(struct usb_gadget *gadget, const struct usb_ctrlrequest *ctrl) if (cdev->config) config = cdev->config; else - config = list_first_entry( + config = list_first_entry_or_null( &cdev->configs, - struct usb_configuration, list); + struct usb_configuration, + list); if (!config) goto done; From b52476a83d9e12df00765359d728a875b128bef1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jimmy Hu Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:37:04 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 401/607] usb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver commit 67e511d2989eb1c8c588b599ce2fcc6bb8e6f7ea upstream. The udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget, but their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where usb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work) while gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory (e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a NULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed: [39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140 [39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60 ... [39430.911890][ T1171] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8 [39430.911910][ T1171] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140 [39430.931308][ T1171] configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134 [39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode [39430.957287][ T1171] dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c [39430.957304][ T1171] __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664 Fix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the gadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new usb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added, usb_add_gadget() stores the gadget's release routine in the udc structure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is released, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and then calls the gadget's release routine. Suggested-by: Alan Stern Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Jimmy Hu Reviewed-by: Alan Stern Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625073705.803880-1-hhhuuu@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c index 8dbe79bdc0f9c..ab1bcc5512b2c 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c @@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ static const struct bus_type gadget_bus_type; /** * struct usb_udc - describes one usb device controller * @driver: the gadget driver pointer. For use by the class code - * @dev: the child device to the actual controller * @gadget: the gadget. For use by the class code + * @gadget_release: the gadget's release routine + * @dev: the child device to the actual controller * @list: for use by the udc class driver * @vbus: for udcs who care about vbus status, this value is real vbus status; * for udcs who do not care about vbus status, this value is always true @@ -53,6 +54,7 @@ static const struct bus_type gadget_bus_type; struct usb_udc { struct usb_gadget_driver *driver; struct usb_gadget *gadget; + void (*gadget_release)(struct device *dev); struct device dev; struct list_head list; bool vbus; @@ -1356,6 +1358,17 @@ static void usb_udc_nop_release(struct device *dev) dev_vdbg(dev, "%s\n", __func__); } +static void usb_gadget_release(struct device *dev) +{ + struct usb_gadget *gadget = dev_to_usb_gadget(dev); + struct usb_udc *udc = gadget->udc; + /* Cache the gadget's release routine to prevent UAF */ + void (*release)(struct device *dev) = udc->gadget_release; + + put_device(&udc->dev); + release(dev); +} + /** * usb_initialize_gadget - initialize a gadget and its embedded struct device * @parent: the parent device to this udc. Usually the controller driver's @@ -1412,6 +1425,14 @@ int usb_add_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget) mutex_init(&udc->connect_lock); udc->started = false; + /* + * Align decoupled lifecycles: take a UDC reference to ensure it + * remains allocated until the gadget is released, requiring an + * override of the gadget's release routine to drop it. + */ + udc->gadget_release = gadget->dev.release; + gadget->dev.release = usb_gadget_release; + get_device(&udc->dev); mutex_lock(&udc_lock); list_add_tail(&udc->list, &udc_list); @@ -1456,6 +1477,12 @@ int usb_add_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget) mutex_lock(&udc_lock); list_del(&udc->list); mutex_unlock(&udc_lock); + /* + * Revert the override and drop the UDC reference to prevent + * leaking the UDC if the gadget was statically allocated. + */ + gadget->dev.release = udc->gadget_release; + put_device(&udc->dev); err_put_udc: put_device(&udc->dev); From 8a5eba992c862b0c94411eecf9b7121e8636db38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Rao Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:46:17 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 402/607] usb: gadget: f_printer: take kref only for successful open commit 30adce93d5c4a5a1ec29d9249e3fdfcc391d406b upstream. printer_open() returns -EBUSY when the character device is already open, but it increments dev->kref regardless of the return value. VFS does not call ->release() for a failed open, so every rejected second open permanently leaks one reference. Move kref_get() into the successful-open branch. Fixes: e8d5f92b8d30 ("usb: gadget: function: printer: fix use-after-free in __lock_acquire") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Xu Rao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/80295742B820DA9B+20260626064617.4090626-1-raoxu@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c index d295ade8fa679..a3884afa42b4b 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c @@ -363,12 +363,11 @@ printer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *fd) ret = 0; /* Change the printer status to show that it's on-line. */ dev->printer_status |= PRINTER_SELECTED; + kref_get(&dev->kref); } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags); - kref_get(&dev->kref); - return ret; } From 54c2b7356b4aeea467f9fb13b85e9e036bc428cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 17:26:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 403/607] USB: idmouse: fix use-after-free on disconnect race commit ff002c153f9722caece3983cc23dc4d9d4652cb4 upstream. mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") Fixes: 54d2bc068fd2 ("USB: fix locking in idmouse") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.24 Cc: Oliver Neukum Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622152612.116422-3-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/idmouse.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/idmouse.c b/drivers/usb/misc/idmouse.c index ea39243efee39..0ce12717c14d7 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/idmouse.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/idmouse.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, idmouse_table); /* structure to hold all of our device specific stuff */ struct usb_idmouse { + struct kref kref; struct usb_device *udev; /* save off the usb device pointer */ struct usb_interface *interface; /* the interface for this device */ @@ -209,8 +210,10 @@ static int idmouse_resume(struct usb_interface *intf) return 0; } -static inline void idmouse_delete(struct usb_idmouse *dev) +static inline void idmouse_delete(struct kref *kref) { + struct usb_idmouse *dev = container_of(kref, struct usb_idmouse, kref); + kfree(dev->bulk_in_buffer); kfree(dev); } @@ -254,6 +257,8 @@ static int idmouse_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) /* increment our usage count for the driver */ ++dev->open; + kref_get(&dev->kref); + /* save our object in the file's private structure */ file->private_data = dev; @@ -277,16 +282,11 @@ static int idmouse_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) /* lock our device */ mutex_lock(&dev->lock); - --dev->open; + mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); + + kref_put(&dev->kref, idmouse_delete); - if (!dev->present) { - /* the device was unplugged before the file was released */ - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); - idmouse_delete(dev); - } else { - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); - } return 0; } @@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ static int idmouse_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, if (dev == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + kref_init(&dev->kref); mutex_init(&dev->lock); dev->udev = udev; dev->interface = interface; @@ -342,8 +343,7 @@ static int idmouse_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, result = usb_find_bulk_in_endpoint(iface_desc, &endpoint); if (result) { dev_err(&interface->dev, "Unable to find bulk-in endpoint.\n"); - idmouse_delete(dev); - return result; + goto err_put_kref; } dev->orig_bi_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(endpoint); @@ -351,8 +351,8 @@ static int idmouse_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, dev->bulk_in_endpointAddr = endpoint->bEndpointAddress; dev->bulk_in_buffer = kmalloc(IMGSIZE + dev->bulk_in_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev->bulk_in_buffer) { - idmouse_delete(dev); - return -ENOMEM; + result = -ENOMEM; + goto err_put_kref; } /* allow device read, write and ioctl */ @@ -364,14 +364,18 @@ static int idmouse_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, if (result) { /* something prevented us from registering this device */ dev_err(&interface->dev, "Unable to allocate minor number.\n"); - idmouse_delete(dev); - return result; + goto err_put_kref; } /* be noisy */ dev_info(&interface->dev,"%s now attached\n",DRIVER_DESC); return 0; + +err_put_kref: + kref_put(&dev->kref, idmouse_delete); + + return result; } static void idmouse_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) @@ -387,14 +391,9 @@ static void idmouse_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) /* prevent device read, write and ioctl */ dev->present = 0; - /* if the device is opened, idmouse_release will clean this up */ - if (!dev->open) { - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); - idmouse_delete(dev); - } else { - /* unlock */ - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); - } + mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); + + kref_put(&dev->kref, idmouse_delete); dev_info(&interface->dev, "disconnected\n"); } From 2107a4fc8ff1cf1d52f416c1e5cc8e97413a5915 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 17:26:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 404/607] USB: ldusb: fix use-after-free on disconnect race commit 19bdfc7b3c179331eafa423d87e1336f43bbfeb8 upstream. mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") Fixes: ce0d7d3f575f ("usb: ldusb: ld_usb semaphore to mutex") Cc: stable Cc: Daniel Walker Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622152612.116422-4-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c b/drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c index f392d6f84df9c..7903ef81b8f95 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(min_interrupt_out_interval, "Minimum interrupt out interval in /* Structure to hold all of our device specific stuff */ struct ld_usb { + struct kref kref; struct mutex mutex; /* locks this structure */ struct usb_interface *intf; /* save off the usb interface pointer */ unsigned long disconnected:1; @@ -201,8 +202,10 @@ static void ld_usb_abort_transfers(struct ld_usb *dev) /* * ld_usb_delete */ -static void ld_usb_delete(struct ld_usb *dev) +static void ld_usb_delete(struct kref *kref) { + struct ld_usb *dev = container_of(kref, struct ld_usb, kref); + /* free data structures */ usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt_in_urb); usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt_out_urb); @@ -355,6 +358,8 @@ static int ld_usb_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) goto unlock_exit; } + kref_get(&dev->kref); + /* save device in the file's private structure */ file->private_data = dev; @@ -381,17 +386,8 @@ static int ld_usb_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) mutex_lock(&dev->mutex); - if (dev->open_count != 1) { - retval = -ENODEV; + if (dev->disconnected) goto unlock_exit; - } - if (dev->disconnected) { - /* the device was unplugged before the file was released */ - mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); - /* unlock here as ld_usb_delete frees dev */ - ld_usb_delete(dev); - goto exit; - } /* wait until write transfer is finished */ if (dev->interrupt_out_busy) @@ -401,7 +397,7 @@ static int ld_usb_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) unlock_exit: mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); - + kref_put(&dev->kref, ld_usb_delete); exit: return retval; } @@ -659,6 +655,8 @@ static int ld_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id * dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dev) goto exit; + + kref_init(&dev->kref); mutex_init(&dev->mutex); spin_lock_init(&dev->rbsl); dev->intf = intf; @@ -740,7 +738,7 @@ static int ld_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id * return retval; error: - ld_usb_delete(dev); + kref_put(&dev->kref, ld_usb_delete); return retval; } @@ -768,18 +766,18 @@ static void ld_usb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf) mutex_lock(&dev->mutex); - /* if the device is not opened, then we clean up right now */ - if (!dev->open_count) { - mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); - ld_usb_delete(dev); - } else { - dev->disconnected = 1; + dev->disconnected = 1; + + if (dev->open_count) { /* wake up pollers */ wake_up_interruptible_all(&dev->read_wait); wake_up_interruptible_all(&dev->write_wait); - mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); } + mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); + + kref_put(&dev->kref, ld_usb_delete); + dev_info(&intf->dev, "LD USB Device #%d now disconnected\n", (minor - USB_LD_MINOR_BASE)); } From b748f97aff339e7f08dca9cf38a05b980fb66fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 19:05:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 405/607] USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect commit bc0e4f16c44e50daa0b1ea729934baa3b4815dee upstream. Submitted write URBs are not stopped on close() and therefore need to be stopped unconditionally on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the completion handler. Fixes: b5f8d46867ca ("USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free after driver unbind") Fixes: 946b960d13c1 ("USB: add driver for iowarrior devices.") Reported-by: syzbot+ad2aac2febc3bedf0962@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a0ce39b.170a0220.39a13.0007.GAE@google.com/ Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523170523.1074563-1-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c index 365c100693458..38f6dcdfd7fb9 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c @@ -919,13 +919,15 @@ static void iowarrior_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) /* prevent device read, write and ioctl */ dev->present = 0; + /* write urbs are not stopped on close() so kill unconditionally */ + usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->submitted); + if (dev->opened) { /* There is a process that holds a filedescriptor to the device , so we only shutdown read-/write-ops going on. Deleting the device is postponed until close() was called. */ usb_kill_urb(dev->int_in_urb); - usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->submitted); wake_up_interruptible(&dev->read_wait); wake_up_interruptible(&dev->write_wait); mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex); From 6af28345cbf8b9a5142353353871f73433f8dd9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Erich E. Hoover" Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 14:45:08 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 406/607] USB: quirks: add NO_LPM for the Samsung T5 EVO Portable SSD commit fc591787785b9709a0bb65a7df3ba2537d611c47 upstream. The Samsung T5 EVO Portable SSD (04e8:6200) exhibit two forms of link instability when USB Link Power Management is enabled: 1. The units fail to initialize properly on first detection, resulting in a lockup in the drive where it must be power cycled or the kernel will not recognize the presence of the device. 2. If used for sustained operations (small amounts of continuous data are transferred to the unit) then the unit will "hiccup" after roughly 8 hours of use and will disconnect and reconnect. This has a certain probability of triggering the first issue, but also causes mount points to become invalid since the device gets issued a new letter. Signed-off-by: Erich E. Hoover Cc: stable Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602204508.48856-1-erich.e.hoover@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c index c799f8f7b1fb0..c921732836f7a 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c @@ -297,6 +297,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = { /* CarrolTouch 4500U */ { USB_DEVICE(0x04e7, 0x0030), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME }, + /* Samsung T5 EVO Portable SSD */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x04e8, 0x6200), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_NO_LPM }, + /* Samsung Android phone modem - ID conflict with SPH-I500 */ { USB_DEVICE(0x04e8, 0x6601), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_CONFIG_INTF_STRINGS }, From 766738ecf2b819e54d38763c8d1c8ae6cff14b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 17:26:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 407/607] USB: legousbtower: fix use-after-free on disconnect race commit 62fc8eb1b1481051f7bab4aa93d79809053dd09f upstream. mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly (unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2] Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect(). [1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic") [2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object after it's unlocked") Fixes: 18bcbcfe9ca2 ("USB: misc: legousbtower: semaphore to mutex") Cc: stable Cc: Daniel Walker Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622152612.116422-5-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c b/drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c index 379cf01a6e96e..22e82648b3c23 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/legousbtower.c @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, tower_table); /* Structure to hold all of our device specific stuff */ struct lego_usb_tower { + struct kref kref; struct mutex lock; /* locks this structure */ struct usb_device *udev; /* save off the usb device pointer */ unsigned char minor; /* the starting minor number for this device */ @@ -220,7 +221,6 @@ struct lego_usb_tower { /* local function prototypes */ static ssize_t tower_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos); static ssize_t tower_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *ppos); -static inline void tower_delete(struct lego_usb_tower *dev); static int tower_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static int tower_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static __poll_t tower_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); @@ -286,8 +286,10 @@ static inline void lego_usb_tower_debug_data(struct device *dev, /* * tower_delete */ -static inline void tower_delete(struct lego_usb_tower *dev) +static inline void tower_delete(struct kref *kref) { + struct lego_usb_tower *dev = container_of(kref, struct lego_usb_tower, kref); + /* free data structures */ usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt_in_urb); usb_free_urb(dev->interrupt_out_urb); @@ -381,6 +383,8 @@ static int tower_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) dev->open_count = 1; + kref_get(&dev->kref); + unlock_exit: mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); @@ -404,14 +408,8 @@ static int tower_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) mutex_lock(&dev->lock); - if (dev->disconnected) { - /* the device was unplugged before the file was released */ - - /* unlock here as tower_delete frees dev */ - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); - tower_delete(dev); - goto exit; - } + if (dev->disconnected) + goto out_unlock; /* wait until write transfer is finished */ if (dev->interrupt_out_busy) { @@ -425,7 +423,9 @@ static int tower_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) dev->open_count = 0; +out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); + kref_put(&dev->kref, tower_delete); exit: return retval; } @@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ static int tower_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, const struct usb_device_ if (!dev) goto exit; + kref_init(&dev->kref); mutex_init(&dev->lock); dev->udev = usb_get_dev(udev); spin_lock_init(&dev->read_buffer_lock); @@ -828,7 +829,7 @@ static int tower_probe(struct usb_interface *interface, const struct usb_device_ return retval; error: - tower_delete(dev); + kref_put(&dev->kref, tower_delete); return retval; } @@ -856,18 +857,18 @@ static void tower_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface) mutex_lock(&dev->lock); - /* if the device is not opened, then we clean up right now */ - if (!dev->open_count) { - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); - tower_delete(dev); - } else { - dev->disconnected = 1; + dev->disconnected = 1; + + if (dev->open_count) { /* wake up pollers */ wake_up_interruptible_all(&dev->read_wait); wake_up_interruptible_all(&dev->write_wait); - mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); } + mutex_unlock(&dev->lock); + + kref_put(&dev->kref, tower_delete); + dev_info(&interface->dev, "LEGO USB Tower #%d now disconnected\n", (minor - LEGO_USB_TOWER_MINOR_BASE)); } From e0886775952e3dd542b11ec54cb5476e62acc4f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Myeonghun Pak Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 21:16:25 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 408/607] usb: sl811-hcd: disable controller wakeup on remove commit 4e8ba83ac4d311992e6a4c21de5dd705010df06e upstream. sl811h_probe() enables the HCD controller device as a wakeup source after usb_add_hcd() succeeds, but sl811h_remove() removes the HCD and releases the driver resources without disabling that wakeup source. Disable controller wakeup after usb_remove_hcd() and before usb_put_hcd() so the wakeup source object is detached while the controller device pointer is still available. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. Fixes: 3c9740a117d4 ("usb: hcd: move controller wakeup setting initialization to individual driver") Cc: stable Co-developed-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Myeonghun Pak Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701121625.96815-1-mhun512@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c b/drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c index ea3cab99c5d40..9dce7150480f5 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/sl811-hcd.c @@ -1591,6 +1591,7 @@ sl811h_remove(struct platform_device *dev) remove_debug_file(sl811); usb_remove_hcd(hcd); + device_wakeup_disable(hcd->self.controller); /* some platforms may use IORESOURCE_IO */ res = platform_get_resource(dev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 1); From 964d572b6c00902fe216f2e1832cce7136cac31d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Rao Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 13:38:42 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 409/607] USB: storage: include US_FL_NO_SAME in quirks mask commit 2c00e09e3f9f06f8434f5ea2ee6179ce46692ee6 upstream. usb_stor_adjust_quirks() parses the usb-storage.quirks module parameter into a new flag set and then applies it with the quirk mask to override built-in flags. The mask is meant to cover the flags that can be overridden by the module parameter. The 'k' quirk character sets US_FL_NO_SAME, but US_FL_NO_SAME is not included in the mask. As a result, the module parameter can set US_FL_NO_SAME, but it cannot clear a built-in US_FL_NO_SAME flag by providing an override entry that omits 'k'. Add US_FL_NO_SAME to the mask so that the module parameter can override it in the same way as the other supported flags. Fixes: 8010622c86ca ("USB: UAS: introduce a quirk to set no_write_same") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Xu Rao Reviewed-by: Alan Stern Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3BCE5880F9A45C2E+20260602053842.2920137-1-raoxu@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/storage/usb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c b/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c index 152ee33765500..27901b7a000ad 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/usb.c @@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ void usb_stor_adjust_quirks(struct usb_device *udev, u64 *fflags) US_FL_INITIAL_READ10 | US_FL_WRITE_CACHE | US_FL_NO_ATA_1X | US_FL_NO_REPORT_OPCODES | US_FL_MAX_SECTORS_240 | US_FL_NO_REPORT_LUNS | - US_FL_ALWAYS_SYNC); + US_FL_ALWAYS_SYNC | US_FL_NO_SAME); p = quirks; while (*p) { From 48394f94211cf8fe0ea8604fc441633abf90fc94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?HE=20WEI=20=28=E3=82=AE=E3=82=AB=E3=82=AF=29?= Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 18:09:52 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 410/607] usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 8c6314489550fa81d41723a0ff33f655b5b6c7b6 upstream. usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len) into the caller's buffer. bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len: if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) || (ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt)))) return -EMSGSIZE; txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe(). A malicious or malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len. memcpy() then reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab object. The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read. The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len. Reject any response that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing "act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above. The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never leave the allocation. Found by code review. The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len checks and the memcpy). A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is also available. Fixes: 121a0f839dbb ("usb: misc: Add Intel USBIO bridge driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: HE WEI (ギカク) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260624090952.86439-1-skyexpoc@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c b/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c index 759af25313b0f..7315cd2469234 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c @@ -344,6 +344,10 @@ int usbio_bulk_msg(struct auxiliary_device *adev, u8 type, u8 cmd, bool last, if (ibuf_len < bpkt_len) return -ENOSPC; + /* The device must not claim more payload than it actually sent. */ + if (bpkt_len > act - sizeof(*bpkt)) + return -EPROTO; + memcpy(ibuf, bpkt->data, bpkt_len); return bpkt_len; From 729b68a5bad71220ae0914c8bdab9488ad5be6c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Myeonghun Pak Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 00:10:49 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 411/607] USB: misc: uss720: unregister parport on probe failure commit b4ecbdc4f8830f5586c4a5cfc384c00f20f8f8b3 upstream. uss720_probe() registers a parport before reading the 1284 register used to detect unsupported Belkin F5U002 adapters. If get_1284_register() fails, the error path drops the driver private data and the USB device reference, but leaves the parport device registered. Leaving the port registered is more than a private allocation leak: parport_register_port() has already reserved a parport number and registered the parport bus device, while pp->private_data still points at the private data that the common error path is about to release. Undo the pre-announce registration in the get_1284_register() failure branch before jumping to the common private-data cleanup path. Clear priv->pp first, matching the disconnect path and avoiding a stale pointer in the private data. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. Fixes: 3295f1b866bf ("usb: misc: uss720: check for incompatible versions of the Belkin F5U002") Cc: stable Co-developed-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Myeonghun Pak Reviewed-by: Alex Henrie Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260706151049.63470-1-mhun512@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c b/drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c index 3138f5dca6da4..6ebcfaf525989 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/uss720.c @@ -735,8 +735,11 @@ static int uss720_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, * here. */ ret = get_1284_register(pp, 0, ®, GFP_KERNEL); dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "reg: %7ph\n", priv->reg); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + priv->pp = NULL; + parport_del_port(pp); goto probe_abort; + } ret = usb_find_last_int_in_endpoint(interface, &epd); if (!ret) { From 8c29d9cfab1c3cf0d0b7fcdf9255597be30aa3e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoxiang Li Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 17:33:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 412/607] usb: mtu3: unmap request DMA on queue failure commit 0bddda5a11665c210339de76d27ebbd1a2e0b43c upstream. mtu3_gadget_queue() maps the request before checking whether the QMU GPD ring can accept another transfer. the request is returned with -EAGAIN before it is linked on the endpoint request list if mtu3_prepare_transfer() fails. Normal completion and dequeue paths unmap requests from mtu3_req_complete(), but this error path never reaches that helper, so the DMA mapping is left active. Unmap the request before returning from the failed queue path. Fixes: df2069acb005 ("usb: Add MediaTek USB3 DRD driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260623093325.2105323-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c b/drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c index bf73fbc29976f..47fd998f09d53 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/mtu3/mtu3_gadget.c @@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ static int mtu3_gadget_queue(struct usb_ep *ep, if (mtu3_prepare_transfer(mep)) { ret = -EAGAIN; + usb_gadget_unmap_request(&mtu->g, req, mep->is_in); goto error; } From cf6ca0aefae03958cfb5b189b0adbfb25c06bfac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 14:45:26 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 413/607] USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix information leak commit 6bfc8d01ac4068eced509f8fc74d0cd205e4dcec upstream. The write() callback is supposed to return the number of characters accepted or a negative errno. Since the addition of write fifo support the keyspan_pda implementation will however return the number characters submitted to the device if the write urb is not already in use. If this number is larger than the number of characters passed to write(), the line discipline continues writing data from beyond the tty write buffer. Fix the information leak by making sure that keyspan_pda_write_start() returns zero on success as intended. Fixes: 034e38e8f687 ("USB: serial: keyspan_pda: add write-fifo support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/keyspan_pda.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan_pda.c b/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan_pda.c index e98b479593d37..f800bf5ac1de9 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan_pda.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/keyspan_pda.c @@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static int keyspan_pda_write_start(struct usb_serial_port *port) if (count == room) schedule_work(&priv->unthrottle_work); - return count; + return 0; } static void keyspan_pda_write_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb) From 4b147eb6ae6e0da5a214aa201b1a3c091827e40f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabio Porcedda Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 13:39:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 414/607] USB: serial: option: add Telit Cinterion FE990D50 compositions commit b33ab1dd80f5c1742f49eb6ec7b337c5ffcf3d32 upstream. Add support for Telit Cinterion FE990D50 compositions: 0x990: RNDIS + tty (AT/NMEA) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (diag) + ADPL + adb T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=06 Cnt=03 Dev#= 3 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=0990 Rev=06.06 S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion S: Product=FE990 S: SerialNumber=90b6a3ed C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=04 Prot=01 Driver=rndis_host E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=rndis_host E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8b(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8c(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=70 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8d(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms 0x991: rmnet + tty (AT/NMEA) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (diag) + ADPL + adb T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=06 Cnt=03 Dev#= 9 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=0991 Rev=06.06 S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion S: Product=FE990 S: SerialNumber=90b6a3ed C: #Ifs= 9 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=(none) E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 8 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8b(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8c(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=70 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8d(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms 0x992: MBIM + tty (AT/NMEA) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (diag) + ADPL + adb T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=06 Cnt=03 Dev#= 12 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=0992 Rev=06.06 S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion S: Product=FE990 S: SerialNumber=90b6a3ed C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8b(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8c(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=70 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8d(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms 0x993: ECM + tty (AT/NMEA) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (AT) + tty (diag) + ADPL + adb T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=06 Cnt=03 Dev#= 15 Spd=480 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 2.10 Cls=00(>ifc ) Sub=00 Prot=00 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=1bc7 ProdID=0993 Rev=06.06 S: Manufacturer=Telit Cinterion S: Product=FE990 S: SerialNumber=90b6a3ed C: #Ifs=10 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=500mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=06 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether E: Ad=82(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 16 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=00 Driver=cdc_ether E: Ad=01(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=81(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=83(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=03(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=85(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=86(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=04(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=87(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=88(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option E: Ad=05(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=89(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8a(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 10 Ivl=32ms I: If#= 6 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option E: Ad=06(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8b(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 7 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=80 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8c(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 8 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=70 Driver=(none) E: Ad=8d(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms I: If#= 9 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=42 Prot=01 Driver=(none) E: Ad=07(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=8e(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Fabio Porcedda Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c index 2f6be5e1f01f2..b4b58e48e2253 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/option.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/option.c @@ -1326,6 +1326,22 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_CC864_SINGLE) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_DE910_DUAL) }, { USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_UE910_V2) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0990, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30), /* Telit FE990D50 (RNDIS) */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0990, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0990, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0991, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30), /* Telit FE990D50 (rmnet) */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(5) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0991, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0991, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0992, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30), /* Telit FE990D50 (MBIM) */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0992, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0992, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0993, 0xff, 0xff, 0x30), /* Telit FE990D50 (ECM) */ + .driver_info = NCTRL(6) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0993, 0xff, 0xff, 0x40) }, + { USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x0993, 0xff, 0xff, 0x60) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1031, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX */ .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(3) }, { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1033, 0xff), /* Telit LE910C1-EUX (ECM) */ From eab394781e9321c0c7e97a24fd092387cb262f40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 17:08:15 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 415/607] USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix broken rx after throttle commit 83a3dfc018943b05b6daf3a6f891833e1aabfa1f upstream. If the port is closed while throttled, the read urb is never resubmitted and the port will not receive any further data until the device is reconnected (or the driver is rebound). Clear the throttle flags and submit the urb if needed when opening the port. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c index a876d6629b65d..83bf3abd09c5f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c @@ -1071,6 +1071,7 @@ static int digi_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port) unsigned char buf[32]; struct digi_port *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port); struct ktermios not_termios; + int throttled; /* be sure the device is started up */ if (digi_startup_device(port->serial) != 0) @@ -1098,6 +1099,21 @@ static int digi_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port) not_termios.c_iflag = ~tty->termios.c_iflag; digi_set_termios(tty, port, ¬_termios); } + + spin_lock_irq(&priv->dp_port_lock); + throttled = priv->dp_throttle_restart; + priv->dp_throttled = 0; + priv->dp_throttle_restart = 0; + spin_unlock_irq(&priv->dp_port_lock); + + if (throttled) { + ret = usb_submit_urb(port->read_urb, GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) { + dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to submit read urb: %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + } + return 0; } From 2b7dc482f859f2d027db07ff0efc1c5df5b3451a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 17:11:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 416/607] USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix hard lockup on disconnect commit 5c1ea24b53bf3bfb859f0a05573997487975da23 upstream. If submitting the OOB write urb fails persistently (e.g if the device is being disconnected) the driver would loop indefinitely with interrupts disabled. Check for urb submission errors when sending OOB commands to avoid hanging if, for example, open(), set_termios() or close() races with a physical disconnect. This is issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing an unrelated change to the driver. Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260610132232.356139-1-johan%40kernel.org?part=1 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c index 83bf3abd09c5f..3f0bd8a358907 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c @@ -394,12 +394,14 @@ static int digi_write_oob_command(struct usb_serial_port *port, len &= ~3; memcpy(oob_port->write_urb->transfer_buffer, buf, len); oob_port->write_urb->transfer_buffer_length = len; + ret = usb_submit_urb(oob_port->write_urb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (ret == 0) { - oob_priv->dp_write_urb_in_use = 1; - count -= len; - buf += len; - } + if (ret) + break; + + oob_priv->dp_write_urb_in_use = 1; + count -= len; + buf += len; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&oob_priv->dp_port_lock, flags); if (ret) From 1243f120790042c2ac92e84e797dacc75fff4366 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 17:12:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 417/607] USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix write buffer corruption commit 24ca1fea8f2753bf33e1d458ec1ae5d9b7796a65 upstream. The digi_write_inb_command() is supposed to wait for the write urb to become available or return an error, but instead it updates the transfer buffer and tries to resubmit the urb on timeout. To make things worse, for commands like break control where no timeout is used, the driver would corrupt the urb immediately due to a broken jiffies comparison (on 32-bit machines this takes five minutes of uptime to trigger due to INITIAL_JIFFIES). Fix this by adding the missing return on timeout and waiting indefinitely when no timeout has been specified as intended. This issue was (sort of) flagged by Sashiko when reviewing an unrelated change to the driver. Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260610132232.356139-1-johan%40kernel.org?part=11 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c b/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c index 3f0bd8a358907..3fbda586037db 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/serial/digi_acceleport.c @@ -431,20 +431,22 @@ static int digi_write_inb_command(struct usb_serial_port *port, int len; struct digi_port *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port); unsigned char *data = port->write_urb->transfer_buffer; + unsigned long expire; unsigned long flags; dev_dbg(&port->dev, "digi_write_inb_command: TOP: port=%d, count=%d\n", priv->dp_port_num, count); if (timeout) - timeout += jiffies; - else - timeout = ULONG_MAX; + expire = jiffies + timeout; spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->dp_port_lock, flags); while (count > 0 && ret == 0) { - while (priv->dp_write_urb_in_use && - time_before(jiffies, timeout)) { + while (priv->dp_write_urb_in_use) { + if (timeout && time_after(jiffies, expire)) { + ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + break; + } cond_wait_interruptible_timeout_irqrestore( &priv->write_wait, DIGI_RETRY_TIMEOUT, &priv->dp_port_lock, flags); @@ -453,6 +455,9 @@ static int digi_write_inb_command(struct usb_serial_port *port, spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->dp_port_lock, flags); } + if (ret) + break; + /* len must be a multiple of 4 and small enough to */ /* guarantee the write will send buffered data first, */ /* so commands are in order with data and not split */ From 1967a7f0cd5c08eb479196daa5aaa4b7b7a7bd04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:58:03 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 418/607] USB: ulpi: fix memory leak on registration failure commit 8af6812795869a66e9b26044f455b13deecdb69c upstream. The allocated device name is never freed on early ULPI device registration failures. Fix this by initialising the device structure earlier and releasing the initial reference whenever registration fails. Fixes: 289fcff4bcdb ("usb: add bus type for USB ULPI") Cc: stable Cc: Heikki Krogerus Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608145803.69360-1-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c | 23 ++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c b/drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c index 95caad156de58..968b8f903526e 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c @@ -281,28 +281,24 @@ static int ulpi_register(struct device *dev, struct ulpi *ulpi) ulpi->dev.parent = dev; /* needed early for ops */ ulpi->dev.bus = &ulpi_bus; ulpi->dev.type = &ulpi_dev_type; + + device_initialize(&ulpi->dev); + dev_set_name(&ulpi->dev, "%s.ulpi", dev_name(dev)); ACPI_COMPANION_SET(&ulpi->dev, ACPI_COMPANION(dev)); ret = ulpi_of_register(ulpi); - if (ret) { - kfree(ulpi); + if (ret) return ret; - } ret = ulpi_read_id(ulpi); - if (ret) { - of_node_put(ulpi->dev.of_node); - kfree(ulpi); + if (ret) return ret; - } - ret = device_register(&ulpi->dev); - if (ret) { - put_device(&ulpi->dev); + ret = device_add(&ulpi->dev); + if (ret) return ret; - } root = debugfs_create_dir(dev_name(&ulpi->dev), ulpi_root); debugfs_create_file("regs", 0444, root, ulpi, &ulpi_regs_fops); @@ -334,9 +330,10 @@ struct ulpi *ulpi_register_interface(struct device *dev, ulpi->ops = ops; ret = ulpi_register(dev, ulpi); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + put_device(&ulpi->dev); return ERR_PTR(ret); - + } return ulpi; } From 2d84c8376f7aa7ca703010e79dec26a2183d0ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Rao Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 15:06:07 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 419/607] USB: usb-storage: ene_ub6250: restore media-ready check commit 5fc3f333c001f1e308bbcdeecdec0d054d24338b upstream. Commit 1892bf90677a ("USB: usb-storage: Fix use of bitfields for hardware data in ene_ub6250.c") converted the media status fields from bitfields to bit masks. The original ene_transport() test called ene_init() only when neither media type was ready: !(sd_ready || ms_ready) The converted test became: !sd_ready || ms_ready This is not equivalent. Restore the original semantics by testing that both ready bits are clear before calling ene_init(). Fixes: 1892bf90677a ("USB: usb-storage: Fix use of bitfields for hardware data in ene_ub6250.c") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Xu Rao Reviewed-by: Alan Stern Link: https://patch.msgid.link/F42641386E32404F+20260626070607.4119527-1-raoxu@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c index ce91fb1059754..5b4cbd15c3c8a 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/ene_ub6250.c @@ -2306,7 +2306,8 @@ static int ene_transport(struct scsi_cmnd *srb, struct us_data *us) /*US_DEBUG(usb_stor_show_command(us, srb)); */ scsi_set_resid(srb, 0); - if (unlikely(!(info->SD_Status & SD_Ready) || (info->MS_Status & MS_Ready))) + if (unlikely(!(info->SD_Status & SD_Ready) && + !(info->MS_Status & MS_Ready))) result = ene_init(us); if (result == USB_STOR_XFER_GOOD) { result = USB_STOR_TRANSPORT_ERROR; From 6c7e8e2514374b0b1ea5897c227de5ebff7b06ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yichong Chen Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 10:06:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 420/607] usbip: tools: support SuperSpeedPlus devices commit 195e667c8719480c320cd48ac0fbf1cb81d6ffe0 upstream. USB devices running at SuperSpeedPlus report "10000" or "20000" in their sysfs speed attribute. usbip currently maps only "5000" to USB_SPEED_SUPER, so a SuperSpeedPlus device is imported as USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN. The attach request is then rejected by vhci_hcd: vhci_hcd: Failed attach request for unsupported USB speed: UNKNOWN Map the SuperSpeedPlus sysfs speed values to USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS, use the SuperSpeed VHCI hub for SuperSpeedPlus devices, and recognize the gadget current_speed string used by the kernel. Fixes: b2316645ca5e ("usb: show speed "10000" in sysfs for USB 3.1 SuperSpeedPlus devices") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/00C828F338E43447+20260617020613.199086-1-chenyichong@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c | 2 ++ tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_device_driver.c | 4 ++++ tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c index b8d7d480595a8..f4734f552d314 100644 --- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c +++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_common.c @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ static const struct speed_string speed_strings[] = { { USB_SPEED_HIGH, "480", "High Speed(480Mbps)" }, { USB_SPEED_WIRELESS, "53.3-480", "Wireless"}, { USB_SPEED_SUPER, "5000", "Super Speed(5000Mbps)" }, + { USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS, "10000", "Super Speed Plus(10000Mbps)" }, + { USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS, "20000", "Super Speed Plus(20000Mbps)" }, { 0, NULL, NULL } }; diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_device_driver.c b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_device_driver.c index 927a151fa9aa9..f8879a580407e 100644 --- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_device_driver.c +++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/usbip_device_driver.c @@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ static struct { .speed = USB_SPEED_SUPER, .name = "super-speed", }, + { + .speed = USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS, + .name = "super-speed-plus", + }, }; static diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c index 8159fd98680b4..4ca3783ee5b7c 100644 --- a/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c +++ b/tools/usb/usbip/libsrc/vhci_driver.c @@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ int usbip_vhci_get_free_port(uint32_t speed) switch (speed) { case USB_SPEED_SUPER: + case USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS: if (vhci_driver->idev[i].hub != HUB_SPEED_SUPER) continue; break; From 347b59e9f96719d89b6ef555d02a18ada1a5846f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sam Day Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2026 14:29:10 +1000 Subject: [PATCH 421/607] usbip: vudc: fix NULL deref in vep_dequeue() commit c5371e0b91b24159a3ebaa61e70b0980bcf03c0a upstream. vep_alloc_request() wasn't initializing vrequest->udc, so cancellations on the FunctionFS AIO path were arriving in vep_dequeue without a valid UDC reference. Since vrequest->udc is never actually properly used anywhere, we opt to remove it, and update vep_dequeue to obtain a reference to the udc with ep_to_vudc(), consistent with the other vep_ ops. AFAICT this bug has existed for ~10 years. Seems that nobody has really stressed the FunctionFS AIO path on usbip's vudc. I tested this fix in a QEMU aarch64 guest driving FunctionFS endpoints via AIO. Before the fix, running `usbip attach` from the host would cause the guest to oops with the following backtrace: Call trace: vep_dequeue+0x1c/0xe4 (P) usb_ep_dequeue+0x14/0x20 ffs_aio_cancel+0x24/0x34 __arm64_sys_io_cancel+0xb0/0x124 do_el0_svc+0x68/0x100 el0_svc+0x18/0x5c el0t_64_sync_handler+0x98/0xdc el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 Assisted-by: opencode:openai/gpt-5.5 Cc: stable Fixes: b6a0ca111867 ("usbip: vudc: Add UDC specific ops") Reviewed-by: Igor Kotrasinski Signed-off-by: Sam Day Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260626-usbip-vudc-deque-fix-v3-1-98c2dc4d6a48@samcday.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/usbip/vudc.h | 1 - drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc.h b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc.h index faf61c9c6a989..5ef0e7d9b23ad 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc.h +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc.h @@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ struct vep { struct vrequest { struct usb_request req; - struct vudc *udc; struct list_head req_entry; /* Request queue */ }; diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c index a5c1001071868..98e13f164ac75 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c +++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/vudc_dev.c @@ -333,7 +333,6 @@ static int vep_queue(struct usb_ep *_ep, struct usb_request *_req, static int vep_dequeue(struct usb_ep *_ep, struct usb_request *_req) { struct vep *ep; - struct vrequest *req; struct vudc *udc; struct vrequest *lst; unsigned long flags; @@ -343,8 +342,7 @@ static int vep_dequeue(struct usb_ep *_ep, struct usb_request *_req) return ret; ep = to_vep(_ep); - req = to_vrequest(_req); - udc = req->udc; + udc = ep_to_vudc(ep); if (!udc->driver) return -ESHUTDOWN; From 1126f1110b86c1f8146338b8b7df905438ea0747 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Myeonghun Pak Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 20:40:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 422/607] usb: typec: anx7411: use devm_pm_runtime_enable() commit 0ef7cc27da8b9e315a4a5a665c68c44206f5e559 upstream. anx7411_i2c_probe() enables runtime PM before returning successfully, but anx7411_i2c_remove() tears down the Type-C partner state, workqueue, dummy I2C device, mux, switch and port without disabling runtime PM. Use devm_pm_runtime_enable() so runtime PM is disabled automatically on driver detach. Since devres action registration can fail, route that failure through the existing probe unwind path. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code. Fixes: fe6d8a9c8e64 ("usb: typec: anx7411: Add Analogix PD ANX7411 support") Cc: stable Co-developed-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Ijae Kim Signed-off-by: Myeonghun Pak Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701114006.75738-1-mhun512@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/anx7411.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/anx7411.c b/drivers/usb/typec/anx7411.c index 0ae0a5ee3fae0..6b4cbc3bfa37d 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/anx7411.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/anx7411.c @@ -1538,7 +1538,9 @@ static int anx7411_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *client) if (anx7411_typec_check_connection(plat)) dev_err(dev, "check status\n"); - pm_runtime_enable(dev); + ret = devm_pm_runtime_enable(dev); + if (ret) + goto free_wq; return 0; From bf6aa6c0ce0db4a1cf1ac4194c6b3f450b9d710b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shuangpeng Bai Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 15:13:29 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 423/607] usb: typec: class: drop PD lookup reference commit 43ae2f90b70cda374c487c1639a01d0f14e5d583 upstream. usb_power_delivery_find() wraps class_find_device_by_name(). That helper returns a device reference that must be released by the caller. select_usb_power_delivery_store() only needs this reference while calling the pd_set callback. Drop it once the callback returns. Otherwise the sysfs write can pin the selected USB Power Delivery object and prevent it from being released on unregister. Fixes: a7cff92f0635 ("usb: typec: USB Power Delivery helpers for ports and partners") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260702191329.2648043-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/class.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/class.c b/drivers/usb/typec/class.c index 67a533e351506..851dda428f552 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/class.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/class.c @@ -1525,6 +1525,7 @@ static ssize_t select_usb_power_delivery_store(struct device *dev, return -EINVAL; ret = port->ops->pd_set(port, pd); + put_device(&pd->dev); if (ret) return ret; From 0bc177820bd38a3ae77e53b55be770cce2dd0887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Yan Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 18:50:24 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 424/607] usb: typec: tcpm: Fix VDM type for Enter Mode commands commit 9cff680e47632b7723cb19f9c5e63669063c3417 upstream. VDO() second parameter is VDM type (bit 15): 1 for SVDM, 0 for UVDM. Using 'vdo ? 2 : 1' corrupts SVID low bit when vdo is non-NULL (2 << 15 = BIT(16)). Enter Mode is always SVDM, hardcode to 1. Fixes: 8face9aa57c8 ("usb: typec: Add parameter for the VDO to typec_altmode_enter()") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Andy Yan Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604105059.18750-1-andyshrk@163.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c index e1ca6e7bbe557..97db11a4d6796 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c @@ -2928,7 +2928,7 @@ static int tcpm_altmode_enter(struct typec_altmode *altmode, u32 *vdo) if (svdm_version < 0) return svdm_version; - header = VDO(altmode->svid, vdo ? 2 : 1, svdm_version, CMD_ENTER_MODE); + header = VDO(altmode->svid, 1, svdm_version, CMD_ENTER_MODE); header |= VDO_OPOS(altmode->mode); return tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked(port, header, vdo, vdo ? 1 : 0, TCPC_TX_SOP); @@ -2976,7 +2976,7 @@ static int tcpm_cable_altmode_enter(struct typec_altmode *altmode, enum typec_pl if (svdm_version < 0) return svdm_version; - header = VDO(altmode->svid, vdo ? 2 : 1, svdm_version, CMD_ENTER_MODE); + header = VDO(altmode->svid, 1, svdm_version, CMD_ENTER_MODE); header |= VDO_OPOS(altmode->mode); return tcpm_queue_vdm_unlocked(port, header, vdo, vdo ? 1 : 0, TCPC_TX_SOP_PRIME); From 3e1b1ac47e8163627f159f30d80d51b914620dd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Badhri Jagan Sridharan Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 22:08:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 425/607] usb: typec: tcpm: Validate SVID index in svdm_consume_modes() commit 7b681dd5fbf60b24a13c14661e5b7735759fb491 upstream. In svdm_consume_modes(), the SVID value is read from pmdata->svids using pmdata->svid_index as an array index without bounds validation: paltmode->svid = pmdata->svids[pmdata->svid_index]; If pmdata->svid_index is driven beyond SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX (16), it results in an out-of-bounds read of the pmdata->svids array. Because pd_mode_data is embedded inside struct tcpm_port, indexing past svids reads into adjacent fields. In particular: - At index 16, it reads the altmodes count. - At index 18 and beyond, it reads into altmode_desc[], which contains partner-supplied SVDM Discovery Modes VDOs. By injecting a chosen SVID into altmode_desc[0].vdo and driving svid_index to 20, the partner can force paltmode->svid to be loaded with an arbitrary, partner- chosen SVID, which is then registered via typec_partner_register_altmode(). Fix this by validating that pmdata->svid_index is non-negative and strictly less than pmdata->nsvids before accessing the pmdata->svids array inside svdm_consume_modes(). Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Fixes: 4ab8c18d4d67 ("usb: typec: Register a device for every mode") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan Reviewed-by: RD Babiera Acked-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622220803.305750-1-badhri@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c index 97db11a4d6796..2209fab8f4431 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c @@ -1840,6 +1840,11 @@ static void svdm_consume_modes(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt, return; } + if (pmdata->svid_index < 0 || pmdata->svid_index >= pmdata->nsvids) { + tcpm_log(port, "Invalid SVID index %d", pmdata->svid_index); + return; + } + for (i = 1; i < cnt; i++) { if (pmdata->altmodes >= ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX) { /* Already logged in svdm_consume_svids() */ From 8c00aec752ce1d8b07bbf5db2193e8192cbd1a53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrei Kuchynski Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 14:28:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 426/607] usb: typec: ucsi: Invert DisplayPort role assignment commit d092d7edf8faefa3e27b9fc7f0e7904b06c833a2 upstream. The existing implementation assigned these flags backwards, configuring the partner's DisplayPort role to match the port's role instead of complementing it. This prevents proper configuration during DP altmode activation, often causing `pin_assignment` to remain 0 in `dp_altmode_configure()` and resulting in VDM negotiation failures: [ 583.328246] typec port1.1: VDM 0xff01a150 failed Additionally, the fix ensures that the `pin_assignment` sysfs attribute displays the correct values. Cc: stable Fixes: af8622f6a585 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Support for DisplayPort alt mode") Signed-off-by: Andrei Kuchynski Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260601142837.3240207-1-akuchynski@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c index 67a0991a7b769..c44da2fae81fb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c @@ -166,12 +166,12 @@ static int ucsi_displayport_status_update(struct ucsi_dp *dp) * that Multi-function is preferred. */ if (DP_CAP_CAPABILITY(cap) & DP_CAP_UFP_D) { - dp->data.status |= DP_STATUS_CON_UFP_D; + dp->data.status |= DP_STATUS_CON_DFP_D; if (DP_CAP_UFP_D_PIN_ASSIGN(cap) & BIT(DP_PIN_ASSIGN_D)) dp->data.status |= DP_STATUS_PREFER_MULTI_FUNC; } else { - dp->data.status |= DP_STATUS_CON_DFP_D; + dp->data.status |= DP_STATUS_CON_UFP_D; if (DP_CAP_DFP_D_PIN_ASSIGN(cap) & BIT(DP_PIN_ASSIGN_D)) dp->data.status |= DP_STATUS_PREFER_MULTI_FUNC; From b1dfdff51a865674cc43ce84256d2c85843e8c7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Madhu M Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 21:03:11 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 427/607] usb: typec: ucsi: Pass full DP config payload in SET_NEW_CAM for DP alt mode commit 735a461d060d4eeb2f9732aba1295bc32a3982e2 upstream. In the UCSI Specification Revision 3.1 RC1, bits 32-63 of the SET_NEW_CAM command hold the 32-bit Alternate Mode Specific (AMSpecific) field. For DisplayPort Alternate Mode, this field must contain the full 32-bit DisplayPort configuration VDO payload that the OPM wants the connector to operate in, rather than just the pin assignment value. This AMSpecific value follows the DisplayPort Configurations defined in the DisplayPort Alt Mode on USB Type-C Specification v2.1a, Table 5-13: SOP DisplayPort Configurations. Fixes: af8622f6a585 ("usb: typec: ucsi: Support for DisplayPort alt mode") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Madhu M Reviewed-by: Jameson Thies Reviewed-by: Andrei Kuchynski Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619153311.3526083-1-madhu.m@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c index c44da2fae81fb..7067f2561b846 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/displayport.c @@ -185,13 +185,12 @@ static int ucsi_displayport_status_update(struct ucsi_dp *dp) static int ucsi_displayport_configure(struct ucsi_dp *dp) { - u32 pins = DP_CONF_GET_PIN_ASSIGN(dp->data.conf); u64 command; if (!dp->override) return 0; - command = UCSI_CMD_SET_NEW_CAM(dp->con->num, 1, dp->offset, pins); + command = UCSI_CMD_SET_NEW_CAM(dp->con->num, 1, dp->offset, dp->data.conf); return ucsi_send_command(dp->con->ucsi, command, NULL, 0); } From f5c772b76bbd95de8be51cf849c6098f6af6fcf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fan Wu Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 13:20:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 428/607] usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: Fix use-after-free of ucsi on remove commit 1f0bdc2884b67de337215079bba166df0cdf4ac5 upstream. The threaded IRQ handler ccg_irq_handler() calls ucsi_notify_common(), which on a connector-change event calls ucsi_connector_change() and schedules connector work. In ucsi_ccg_remove(), ucsi_destroy() frees uc->ucsi (kfree) before free_irq() is called, so a handler invocation already in flight may access the freed object after ucsi_destroy(). CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (threaded IRQ) ucsi_destroy(uc->ucsi) | ccg_irq_handler() kfree(ucsi) // FREE | ucsi_notify_common(uc->ucsi) // USE Move free_irq() before ucsi_destroy() in the remove path. It is kept after ucsi_unregister(): ucsi_unregister() cancels connector work whose handler issues GET_CONNECTOR_STATUS through ucsi_send_command_common(), which waits for a completion that is signalled from the IRQ handler, so the IRQ must stay active until that work has been cancelled. The probe error path already orders free_irq() before ucsi_destroy(). This bug was found by static analysis. Fixes: e32fd989ac1c ("usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: Move to the new API") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Fan Wu Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616132011.103279-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c index 9d7b834a76fa8..6c1f62c78ac25 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_ccg.c @@ -1518,8 +1518,8 @@ static void ucsi_ccg_remove(struct i2c_client *client) cancel_work_sync(&uc->work); pm_runtime_disable(uc->dev); ucsi_unregister(uc->ucsi); - ucsi_destroy(uc->ucsi); free_irq(uc->irq, uc); + ucsi_destroy(uc->ucsi); } static const struct of_device_id ucsi_ccg_of_match_table[] = { From b45be66ed47d45d7d4af5c9c5bc8aebaada4e8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Menzel Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 13:07:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 429/607] usb: typec: ucsi: cancel pending work on system suspend commit 7c4a234bd31a64a8dbd0140dc812da592c5e0787 upstream. On a Dell XPS 13 9360 (BIOS 2.21.0), entering system suspend (deep/S3) races a pending UCSI connector-change worker against the ACPI EC teardown. The worker evaluates the UCSI _DSM (GET_CONNECTOR_STATUS), whose AML accesses the Embedded Controller. By that point the ACPI EC has already been stopped for suspend, so the EC address space handler rejects the access with AE_BAD_PARAMETER, aborting the AML and failing the connector query: [22314.689495] ACPI: EC: interrupt blocked [22314.711981] ACPI: PM: Preparing to enter system sleep state S3 [22314.743260] ACPI: EC: event blocked [22314.743265] ACPI: EC: EC stopped [22314.743267] ACPI: PM: Saving platform NVS memory [22314.744241] ACPI Error: AE_BAD_PARAMETER, Returned by Handler for [EmbeddedControl] (20260408/evregion-303) [22314.744432] ACPI Error: Aborting method \_SB.PCI0.LPCB.ECDV.ECW1 due to previous error (AE_BAD_PARAMETER) (20260408/psparse-543) [22314.744673] ACPI Error: Aborting method \ECWB due to previous error (AE_BAD_PARAMETER) (20260408/psparse-543) [22314.745201] ACPI Error: Aborting method \_SB.UBTC._DSM due to previous error (AE_BAD_PARAMETER) (20260408/psparse-543) [22314.745394] ACPI: \_SB_.UBTC: failed to evaluate _DSM c298836f-a47c-e411-ad36-631042b5008f rev:1 func:1 (0x1001) [22314.745414] ucsi_acpi USBC000:00: ucsi_acpi_dsm: failed to evaluate _DSM 1 [22314.745424] ucsi_acpi USBC000:00: ucsi_handle_connector_change: GET_CONNECTOR_STATUS failed (-5) ucsi_acpi implements a resume callback but no suspend callback, so nothing cancels the connector-change work before the firmware/EC is torn down. Add a `ucsi_suspend()` core helper that cancels the pending init and connector-change work, and wire it into ucsi_acpi's PM ops. The connector state is re-read on resume by `ucsi_resume()`, so cancelling the work loses nothing. Fixes: 4e3a50293c2b ("usb: typec: ucsi: acpi: Implement resume callback") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.8 Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260703110738.8457-2-pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h | 1 + drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_acpi.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c index 34e93d6c67690..b4b0c46d2fa44 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c @@ -1918,6 +1918,26 @@ static void ucsi_resume_work(struct work_struct *work) } } +int ucsi_suspend(struct ucsi *ucsi) +{ + int i; + + /* + * Cancel pending work so it cannot access the firmware after the ACPI + * EC is stopped for suspend; state is re-read on resume. + */ + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ucsi->work); + + if (!ucsi->connector) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ucsi->cap.num_connectors; i++) + cancel_work_sync(&ucsi->connector[i].work); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ucsi_suspend); + int ucsi_resume(struct ucsi *ucsi) { if (ucsi->connector) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h index e301d9012936f..a9144c2997391 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h @@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ int ucsi_send_command(struct ucsi *ucsi, u64 command, void *retval, size_t size); void ucsi_altmode_update_active(struct ucsi_connector *con); +int ucsi_suspend(struct ucsi *ucsi); int ucsi_resume(struct ucsi *ucsi); void ucsi_notify_common(struct ucsi *ucsi, u32 cci); diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_acpi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_acpi.c index 6b92f296e9850..94b52ccf6f426 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_acpi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi_acpi.c @@ -245,6 +245,13 @@ static void ucsi_acpi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) ucsi_acpi_notify); } +static int ucsi_acpi_suspend(struct device *dev) +{ + struct ucsi_acpi *ua = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + + return ucsi_suspend(ua->ucsi); +} + static int ucsi_acpi_resume(struct device *dev) { struct ucsi_acpi *ua = dev_get_drvdata(dev); @@ -252,7 +259,8 @@ static int ucsi_acpi_resume(struct device *dev) return ucsi_resume(ua->ucsi); } -static DEFINE_SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(ucsi_acpi_pm_ops, NULL, ucsi_acpi_resume); +static DEFINE_SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(ucsi_acpi_pm_ops, ucsi_acpi_suspend, + ucsi_acpi_resume); static const struct acpi_device_id ucsi_acpi_match[] = { { "PNP0CA0", 0 }, From e086c16962a1b0142e2675610e9c06fcfcd4c3a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Cercueil Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 17:29:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 430/607] usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix DMA fence leak MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit baa6b6068a3f2bf2ed525a1cb37975905dadc658 upstream. In ffs_dmabuf_transfer(), a ffs_dma_fence object is kmalloc'd, with the underlying dma_fence later initialized by dma_fence_init(), which sets its kref counter to 1. Then, dma_resv_add_fence() gets a second reference, and a pointer to the ffs_dma_fence is passed as the usb_request's "context" field. The dma-resv mechanism will manage the second reference, but the first reference is never properly released; the ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() function decreases the reference count, but only to balance with the reference grab in ffs_dmabuf_signal_done(). The code will then slowly leak memory as more ffs_dma_fence objects are created without being ever freed. Address this issue by transferring ownership of the fence to the DMA reservation object, by calling dma_fence_put() right after dma_resv_add_fence(). The ffs_dma_fence then gets properly discarded after being signalled. Fixes: 7b07a2a7ca02 ("usb: gadget: functionfs: Add DMABUF import interface") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil Tested-by: Nuno Sá Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609152905.729328-1-paul@crapouillou.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c index 737d60b26e029..7cddf88589335 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -1684,6 +1684,7 @@ static int ffs_dmabuf_transfer(struct file *file, resv_dir = epfile->in ? DMA_RESV_USAGE_READ : DMA_RESV_USAGE_WRITE; dma_resv_add_fence(dmabuf->resv, &fence->base, resv_dir); + dma_fence_put(&fence->base); dma_resv_unlock(dmabuf->resv); /* Now that the dma_fence is in place, queue the transfer. */ From 9818bcae3c0ca1dde4b9a334125c46676e0a9b29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Shi Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 18:00:25 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 431/607] block: skip sync_blockdev() on surprise removal in bdev_mark_dead() commit 49f06cff50a4ccf3b7a1a662ceb892b3b21a527a upstream. bdev_mark_dead()'s @surprise == true means the device is already gone. The filesystem callback fs_bdev_mark_dead() honours this and skips sync_filesystem(), but the bare block device path (no ->mark_dead op) lost its !surprise guard when the holder ->mark_dead callback was wired up (see Fixes), and now calls sync_blockdev() unconditionally, which can hang forever waiting on writeback that can no longer complete. syzkaller hit this via nvme_reset_work()'s "I/O queues lost" path: nvme_mark_namespaces_dead() -> blk_mark_disk_dead() -> bdev_mark_dead(bdev, true) -> sync_blockdev() blocks in folio_wait_writeback(), wedging the reset worker and every task waiting on it. Skip the sync on surprise removal, matching fs_bdev_mark_dead(); invalidate_bdev() still runs. Orderly removal (surprise == false) is unchanged. Found by FuzzNvme(Syzkaller with FEMU fuzzing framework). Fixes: d8530de5a6e8 ("block: call into the file system for bdev_mark_dead") Acked-by: Sungwoo Kim Acked-by: Dave Tian Acked-by: Weidong Zhu Signed-off-by: Chao Shi Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522220025.1770388-1-coshi036@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/bdev.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c index 57e78692084b1..02d7503e7c2c4 100644 --- a/block/bdev.c +++ b/block/bdev.c @@ -1237,7 +1237,13 @@ void bdev_mark_dead(struct block_device *bdev, bool surprise) bdev->bd_holder_ops->mark_dead(bdev, surprise); else { mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_holder_lock); - sync_blockdev(bdev); + /* + * On surprise removal the device is already gone; syncing is + * futile and can hang forever waiting on I/O that will never + * complete. Match fs_bdev_mark_dead(), which also skips it. + */ + if (!surprise) + sync_blockdev(bdev); } invalidate_bdev(bdev); From b7b2d2ccdbc4dce33a882d9c00484a3a2dc10866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baolin Wang Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2026 10:09:22 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 432/607] mm: shmem: fix potential livelock issue for shmem direct swapin When skipping swapcache for synchronous IO swap devices, swapcache_prepare() is used to prevent parallel swapin from proceeding with the swap cache flag. However, on PREEMPT kernels this can lead to a livelock, as reported by Chao[1]: Thread A starts direct swapin of a shmem folio and calls swapcache_prepare() to set SWAP_HAS_CACHE. It may then be preempted inside workingset_refault(). Meanwhile, a higher priority thread B also attempts direct swapin of the same shmem swap entry. Since swapcache_prepare() already marks the entry, thread B repeatedly gets -EEXIST and busy-loops waiting for thread A to finish. But as thread B runs at higher priority, thread A cannot preempt it, resulting in starvation and a livelock. Fix it by yielding the CPU with schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1) when swapcache_prepare() fails, following the same approach used in commit 029c4628b2eb ("mm: swap: get rid of livelock in swapin readahead") and commit 13ddaf26be32 ("mm/swap: fix race when skipping swapcache"). However, commit 01626a1823 ("mm: avoid unconditional one-tick sleep when swapcache_prepare fails") found that the unconditional one-tick sleep can cause UI stuttering on latency-sensitive Android devices. So we can follow the same approach by adding a waitqueue to wake up tasks when needed, instead of always sleeping for a full tick. Note that mainline does not have this potential issue, which has already been resolved by Kairui's swap refactoring work[2]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/700a2cbf90a2484f979aac858f08f5d4@xiaomi.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260517-swap-table-p4-v5-0-88ae43e064c7@tencent.com/ Fixes: 1dd44c0af4fa ("mm: shmem: skip swapcache for swapin of synchronous swap device") Reported-by: Ma Chao Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/700a2cbf90a2484f979aac858f08f5d4@xiaomi.com/ Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/shmem.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 94c5b0d78ac31..3c329b794ae4d 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -2005,11 +2005,14 @@ static struct folio *shmem_alloc_and_add_folio(struct vm_fault *vmf, return ERR_PTR(error); } +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(shmem_swapcache_wq); + static struct folio *shmem_swap_alloc_folio(struct inode *inode, struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgoff_t index, swp_entry_t entry, int order, gfp_t gfp) { struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); + DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); int nr_pages = 1 << order; struct folio *new; gfp_t alloc_gfp; @@ -2066,6 +2069,10 @@ static struct folio *shmem_swap_alloc_folio(struct inode *inode, if (swapcache_prepare(entry, nr_pages)) { folio_put(new); new = ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); + /* Relax a bit to prevent rapid repeated page faults */ + add_wait_queue(&shmem_swapcache_wq, &wait); + schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1); + remove_wait_queue(&shmem_swapcache_wq, &wait); /* Try smaller folio to avoid cache conflict */ goto fallback; } @@ -2423,6 +2430,8 @@ static int shmem_swapin_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, if (skip_swapcache) { folio->swap.val = 0; swapcache_clear(si, swap, nr_pages); + if (waitqueue_active(&shmem_swapcache_wq)) + wake_up(&shmem_swapcache_wq); } else { swap_cache_del_folio(folio); } @@ -2442,8 +2451,11 @@ static int shmem_swapin_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, if (folio) folio_unlock(folio); failed_nolock: - if (skip_swapcache) + if (skip_swapcache) { swapcache_clear(si, folio->swap, folio_nr_pages(folio)); + if (waitqueue_active(&shmem_swapcache_wq)) + wake_up(&shmem_swapcache_wq); + } if (folio) folio_put(folio); put_swap_device(si); From be1567992417dc92133e74126de7a6066c825ac9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Reinette Chatre Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 15:17:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 433/607] x86,fs/resctrl: Prevent out-of-bounds access while offlining CPU when SNC enabled commit fc16126cc11d9f507130bf84ab137ee0938c900e upstream. The architecture updates the cpu_mask in a domain's header to track which online CPUs are associated with the domain. When this mask becomes empty the architecture initiates offline of the domain that includes calling on resctrl fs to offline the domain. If it is a monitoring domain in which LLC occupancy is tracked resctrl fs forces the limbo handler to clear all busy RMID state associated with the domain. The limbo handler always reads the current event value associated with a busy RMID irrespective of it being checked as part of regular "is it still busy" check or whether it will be forced released anyway. When reading an RMID on a system with SNC enabled the "logical RMID" is converted to the "physical RMID" and this conversion requires the NUMA node ID of the resctrl monitoring domain that is in turn determined by querying the NUMA node ID of any CPU belonging to the monitoring domain. When the monitoring domain is going offline its cpu_mask is empty causing the NUMA node ID query via cpu_to_node() to be done with "nr_cpu_ids" as argument resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Refactor the limbo handler to skip reading the RMID when the RMID will just be forced to no longer be dirty in the domain anyway. Add a safety check to the architecture's RMID reader to protect against this scenario. Fixes: e13db55b5a0d ("x86/resctrl: Introduce snc_nodes_per_l3_cache") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1780456704.git.reinette.chatre%40intel.com?part=9 Reported-by: Sashiko Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) Cc: Link: https://patch.msgid.link/16137433df42f85013b2f7a53626795cbd6637b9.1781029125.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c | 8 +++++- fs/resctrl/monitor.c | 39 +++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c index fe1a2aa53c16a..4b2b539ddff95 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c @@ -243,14 +243,20 @@ int resctrl_arch_rmid_read(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_mon_domain *d, u64 *val, void *ignored) { struct rdt_hw_mon_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_mon_dom(d); - int cpu = cpumask_any(&d->hdr.cpu_mask); struct arch_mbm_state *am; u64 msr_val; u32 prmid; + int cpu; int ret; resctrl_arch_rmid_read_context_check(); + if (cpumask_empty(&d->hdr.cpu_mask)) { + pr_warn_once("Domain %d has no CPUs\n", d->hdr.id); + return -EINVAL; + } + + cpu = cpumask_any(&d->hdr.cpu_mask); prmid = logical_rmid_to_physical_rmid(cpu, rmid); ret = __rmid_read_phys(prmid, eventid, &msr_val); diff --git a/fs/resctrl/monitor.c b/fs/resctrl/monitor.c index 572a9925bd6ca..7012a75814ac3 100644 --- a/fs/resctrl/monitor.c +++ b/fs/resctrl/monitor.c @@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ void __check_limbo(struct rdt_mon_domain *d, bool force_free) struct rdt_resource *r = resctrl_arch_get_resource(RDT_RESOURCE_L3); u32 idx_limit = resctrl_arch_system_num_rmid_idx(); struct rmid_entry *entry; + bool rmid_dirty = true; u32 idx, cur_idx = 1; void *arch_mon_ctx; - bool rmid_dirty; u64 val = 0; arch_mon_ctx = resctrl_arch_mon_ctx_alloc(r, QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID); @@ -159,22 +159,27 @@ void __check_limbo(struct rdt_mon_domain *d, bool force_free) break; entry = __rmid_entry(idx); - if (resctrl_arch_rmid_read(r, d, entry->closid, entry->rmid, - QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID, &val, - arch_mon_ctx)) { - rmid_dirty = true; - } else { - rmid_dirty = (val >= resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold); - - /* - * x86's CLOSID and RMID are independent numbers, so the entry's - * CLOSID is an empty CLOSID (X86_RESCTRL_EMPTY_CLOSID). On Arm the - * RMID (PMG) extends the CLOSID (PARTID) space with bits that aren't - * used to select the configuration. It is thus necessary to track both - * CLOSID and RMID because there may be dependencies between them - * on some architectures. - */ - trace_mon_llc_occupancy_limbo(entry->closid, entry->rmid, d->hdr.id, val); + if (!force_free) { + if (resctrl_arch_rmid_read(r, d, entry->closid, + entry->rmid, QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID, + &val, arch_mon_ctx)) { + rmid_dirty = true; + } else { + rmid_dirty = (val >= resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold); + + /* + * x86's CLOSID and RMID are independent numbers, + * so the entry's CLOSID is an empty CLOSID + * (X86_RESCTRL_EMPTY_CLOSID). On Arm the RMID + * (PMG) extends the CLOSID (PARTID) space with + * bits that aren't used to select the configuration. + * It is thus necessary to track both CLOSID and + * RMID because there may be dependencies between + * them on some architectures. + */ + trace_mon_llc_occupancy_limbo(entry->closid, entry->rmid, + d->hdr.id, val); + } } if (force_free || !rmid_dirty) { From e5049526a7aacdb53aaaee2e21b0fd8c865f02b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alice Ryhl Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 06:45:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 434/607] rust_binder: introduce TransactionInfo [ Upstream commit 5326a18e3e640061ca4b65c1b732feaeace61c39 ] Rust Binder exposes information about transactions that are sent in various ways: printing to the kernel log, tracepoints, files in binderfs, and the upcoming netlink support. Currently all these mechanisms use disparate ways of obtaining the same information, so let's introduce a single Info struct that collects all the required information in a single place, so that all of these different mechanisms can operate in a more uniform way. For now, the new info struct is only used to replace a few things: * The BinderTransactionDataSg struct that is passed as an argument to several methods is removed as the information is moved into the new info struct and passed down that way. * The oneway spam detection fields on Transaction and Allocation can be removed, as the information can be returned to the caller via the mutable info struct instead. But several other uses of the info struct are planned in follow-up patches. Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260306-transaction-info-v1-1-fda58fca558b@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman [aliceryhl: explicitly impl Zeroable for UserPtr instead of using derive] Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs | 3 - drivers/android/binder/error.rs | 10 +- drivers/android/binder/process.rs | 15 +- drivers/android/binder/thread.rs | 190 +++++++++++++++----------- drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs | 83 ++++++----- rust/kernel/uaccess.rs | 3 + 6 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 134 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs b/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs index a9475e136d76f..3aaeefef6bdd9 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs @@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ pub(crate) struct Allocation { pub(crate) process: Arc, allocation_info: Option, free_on_drop: bool, - pub(crate) oneway_spam_detected: bool, #[allow(dead_code)] pub(crate) debug_id: usize, } @@ -68,7 +67,6 @@ impl Allocation { offset: usize, size: usize, ptr: usize, - oneway_spam_detected: bool, ) -> Self { Self { process, @@ -76,7 +74,6 @@ impl Allocation { size, ptr, debug_id, - oneway_spam_detected, allocation_info: None, free_on_drop: true, } diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/error.rs b/drivers/android/binder/error.rs index 9921827267d0d..c6a834071f8ce 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/error.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/error.rs @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ pub(crate) type BinderResult = core::result::Result; /// errno. pub(crate) struct BinderError { pub(crate) reply: u32, - source: Option, + pub(crate) source: Option, } impl BinderError { @@ -40,14 +40,6 @@ impl BinderError { pub(crate) fn is_dead(&self) -> bool { self.reply == BR_DEAD_REPLY } - - pub(crate) fn as_errno(&self) -> kernel::ffi::c_int { - self.source.unwrap_or(EINVAL).to_errno() - } - - pub(crate) fn should_pr_warn(&self) -> bool { - self.source.is_some() - } } /// Convert an errno into a `BinderError` and store the errno used to construct it. The errno diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/process.rs b/drivers/android/binder/process.rs index 8ccc9ffbcd90e..d33af8a043676 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/process.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/process.rs @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ use crate::{ range_alloc::{RangeAllocator, ReserveNew, ReserveNewArgs}, stats::BinderStats, thread::{PushWorkRes, Thread}, + transaction::TransactionInfo, BinderfsProcFile, DArc, DLArc, DTRWrap, DeliverToRead, }; @@ -981,16 +982,15 @@ impl Process { self: &Arc, debug_id: usize, size: usize, - is_oneway: bool, - from_pid: i32, + info: &mut TransactionInfo, ) -> BinderResult { use kernel::page::PAGE_SIZE; let mut reserve_new_args = ReserveNewArgs { debug_id, size, - is_oneway, - pid: from_pid, + is_oneway: info.is_oneway(), + pid: info.from_pid, ..ReserveNewArgs::default() }; @@ -1006,13 +1006,13 @@ impl Process { reserve_new_args = alloc_request.make_alloc()?; }; + info.oneway_spam_suspect = new_alloc.oneway_spam_detected; let res = Allocation::new( self.clone(), debug_id, new_alloc.offset, size, addr + new_alloc.offset, - new_alloc.oneway_spam_detected, ); // This allocation will be marked as in use until the `Allocation` is used to free it. @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ impl Process { let mapping = inner.mapping.as_mut()?; let offset = ptr.checked_sub(mapping.address)?; let (size, debug_id, odata) = mapping.alloc.reserve_existing(offset).ok()?; - let mut alloc = Allocation::new(self.clone(), debug_id, offset, size, ptr, false); + let mut alloc = Allocation::new(self.clone(), debug_id, offset, size, ptr); if let Some(data) = odata { alloc.set_info(data); } @@ -1397,8 +1397,7 @@ impl Process { .alloc .take_for_each(|offset, size, debug_id, odata| { let ptr = offset + address; - let mut alloc = - Allocation::new(self.clone(), debug_id, offset, size, ptr, false); + let mut alloc = Allocation::new(self.clone(), debug_id, offset, size, ptr); if let Some(data) = odata { alloc.set_info(data); } diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs b/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs index 6a2ddf0039c14..93aa98c2a173a 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use kernel::{ sync::{Arc, SpinLock}, task::Task, types::ARef, - uaccess::UserSlice, + uaccess::{UserPtr, UserSlice, UserSliceReader}, uapi, }; @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use crate::{ process::{GetWorkOrRegister, Process}, ptr_align, stats::GLOBAL_STATS, - transaction::Transaction, + transaction::{Transaction, TransactionInfo}, BinderReturnWriter, DArc, DLArc, DTRWrap, DeliverCode, DeliverToRead, }; @@ -948,13 +948,11 @@ impl Thread { pub(crate) fn copy_transaction_data( &self, to_process: Arc, - tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg, + info: &mut TransactionInfo, debug_id: usize, allow_fds: bool, txn_security_ctx_offset: Option<&mut usize>, ) -> BinderResult { - let trd = &tr.transaction_data; - let is_oneway = trd.flags & TF_ONE_WAY != 0; let mut secctx = if let Some(offset) = txn_security_ctx_offset { let secid = self.process.cred.get_secid(); let ctx = match security::SecurityCtx::from_secid(secid) { @@ -969,10 +967,10 @@ impl Thread { None }; - let data_size = trd.data_size.try_into().map_err(|_| EINVAL)?; + let data_size = info.data_size; let aligned_data_size = ptr_align(data_size).ok_or(EINVAL)?; - let offsets_size: usize = trd.offsets_size.try_into().map_err(|_| EINVAL)?; - let buffers_size: usize = tr.buffers_size.try_into().map_err(|_| EINVAL)?; + let offsets_size = info.offsets_size; + let buffers_size = info.buffers_size; let aligned_secctx_size = match secctx.as_ref() { Some((_offset, ctx)) => ptr_align(ctx.len()).ok_or(EINVAL)?, None => 0, @@ -995,32 +993,25 @@ impl Thread { size_of::(), ); let secctx_off = aligned_data_size + offsets_size + buffers_size; - let mut alloc = - match to_process.buffer_alloc(debug_id, len, is_oneway, self.process.task.pid()) { - Ok(alloc) => alloc, - Err(err) => { - pr_warn!( - "Failed to allocate buffer. len:{}, is_oneway:{}", - len, - is_oneway - ); - return Err(err); - } - }; + let mut alloc = match to_process.buffer_alloc(debug_id, len, info) { + Ok(alloc) => alloc, + Err(err) => { + pr_warn!( + "Failed to allocate buffer. len:{}, is_oneway:{}", + len, + info.is_oneway(), + ); + return Err(err); + } + }; - // SAFETY: This accesses a union field, but it's okay because the field's type is valid for - // all bit-patterns. - let trd_data_ptr = unsafe { &trd.data.ptr }; - let mut buffer_reader = - UserSlice::new(UserPtr::from_addr(trd_data_ptr.buffer as _), data_size).reader(); + let mut buffer_reader = UserSlice::new(info.data_ptr, data_size).reader(); let mut end_of_previous_object = 0; let mut sg_state = None; // Copy offsets if there are any. if offsets_size > 0 { - let mut offsets_reader = - UserSlice::new(UserPtr::from_addr(trd_data_ptr.offsets as _), offsets_size) - .reader(); + let mut offsets_reader = UserSlice::new(info.offsets_ptr, offsets_size).reader(); let offsets_start = aligned_data_size; let offsets_end = aligned_data_size + offsets_size; @@ -1194,37 +1185,92 @@ impl Thread { } } - fn transaction(self: &Arc, tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg, inner: T) - where - T: FnOnce(&Arc, &BinderTransactionDataSg) -> BinderResult, - { - if let Err(err) = inner(self, tr) { - if err.should_pr_warn() { - let mut ee = self.inner.lock().extended_error; - ee.command = err.reply; - ee.param = err.as_errno(); - pr_warn!( - "Transaction failed: {:?} my_pid:{}", - err, - self.process.pid_in_current_ns() - ); + // No inlining avoids allocating stack space for `BinderTransactionData` for the entire + // duration of `transaction()`. + #[inline(never)] + fn read_transaction_info( + &self, + cmd: u32, + reader: &mut UserSliceReader, + info: &mut TransactionInfo, + ) -> Result<()> { + let td = match cmd { + BC_TRANSACTION | BC_REPLY => { + reader.read::()?.with_buffers_size(0) + } + BC_TRANSACTION_SG | BC_REPLY_SG => reader.read::()?, + _ => return Err(EINVAL), + }; + + // SAFETY: Above `read` call initializes all bytes, so this union read is ok. + let trd_data_ptr = unsafe { &td.transaction_data.data.ptr }; + + info.is_reply = matches!(cmd, BC_REPLY | BC_REPLY_SG); + info.from_pid = self.process.task.pid(); + info.from_tid = self.id; + info.code = td.transaction_data.code; + info.flags = td.transaction_data.flags; + info.data_ptr = UserPtr::from_addr(trd_data_ptr.buffer as usize); + info.data_size = td.transaction_data.data_size as usize; + info.offsets_ptr = UserPtr::from_addr(trd_data_ptr.offsets as usize); + info.offsets_size = td.transaction_data.offsets_size as usize; + info.buffers_size = td.buffers_size as usize; + // SAFETY: Above `read` call initializes all bytes, so this union read is ok. + info.target_handle = unsafe { td.transaction_data.target.handle }; + Ok(()) + } + + #[inline(never)] + fn transaction(self: &Arc, cmd: u32, reader: &mut UserSliceReader) -> Result<()> { + let mut info = TransactionInfo::zeroed(); + self.read_transaction_info(cmd, reader, &mut info)?; + + let ret = if info.is_reply { + self.reply_inner(&mut info) + } else if info.is_oneway() { + self.oneway_transaction_inner(&mut info) + } else { + self.transaction_inner(&mut info) + }; + + if let Err(err) = ret { + if err.reply != BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE { + info.reply = err.reply; } self.push_return_work(err.reply); + if let Some(source) = &err.source { + info.errno = source.to_errno(); + info.reply = err.reply; + + { + let mut ee = self.inner.lock().extended_error; + ee.command = err.reply; + ee.param = source.to_errno(); + } + + pr_warn!( + "{}:{} transaction to {} failed: {source:?}", + info.from_pid, + info.from_tid, + info.to_pid + ); + } } + + Ok(()) } - fn transaction_inner(self: &Arc, tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg) -> BinderResult { - // SAFETY: Handle's type has no invalid bit patterns. - let handle = unsafe { tr.transaction_data.target.handle }; - let node_ref = self.process.get_transaction_node(handle)?; + fn transaction_inner(self: &Arc, info: &mut TransactionInfo) -> BinderResult { + let node_ref = self.process.get_transaction_node(info.target_handle)?; + info.to_pid = node_ref.node.owner.task.pid(); security::binder_transaction(&self.process.cred, &node_ref.node.owner.cred)?; // TODO: We need to ensure that there isn't a pending transaction in the work queue. How // could this happen? let top = self.top_of_transaction_stack()?; let list_completion = DTRWrap::arc_try_new(DeliverCode::new(BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE))?; let completion = list_completion.clone_arc(); - let transaction = Transaction::new(node_ref, top, self, tr)?; + let transaction = Transaction::new(node_ref, top, self, info)?; // Check that the transaction stack hasn't changed while the lock was released, then update // it with the new transaction. @@ -1240,7 +1286,7 @@ impl Thread { inner.push_work_deferred(list_completion); } - if let Err(e) = transaction.submit() { + if let Err(e) = transaction.submit(info) { completion.skip(); // Define `transaction` first to drop it after `inner`. let transaction; @@ -1253,18 +1299,21 @@ impl Thread { } } - fn reply_inner(self: &Arc, tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg) -> BinderResult { + fn reply_inner(self: &Arc, info: &mut TransactionInfo) -> BinderResult { let orig = self.inner.lock().pop_transaction_to_reply(self)?; if !orig.from.is_current_transaction(&orig) { return Err(EINVAL.into()); } + info.to_tid = orig.from.id; + info.to_pid = orig.from.process.task.pid(); + // We need to complete the transaction even if we cannot complete building the reply. let out = (|| -> BinderResult<_> { let completion = DTRWrap::arc_try_new(DeliverCode::new(BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE))?; let process = orig.from.process.clone(); let allow_fds = orig.flags & TF_ACCEPT_FDS != 0; - let reply = Transaction::new_reply(self, process, tr, allow_fds)?; + let reply = Transaction::new_reply(self, process, info, allow_fds)?; self.inner.lock().push_work(completion); orig.from.deliver_reply(Ok(reply), &orig); Ok(()) @@ -1285,16 +1334,12 @@ impl Thread { out } - fn oneway_transaction_inner(self: &Arc, tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg) -> BinderResult { - // SAFETY: The `handle` field is valid for all possible byte values, so reading from the - // union is okay. - let handle = unsafe { tr.transaction_data.target.handle }; - let node_ref = self.process.get_transaction_node(handle)?; + fn oneway_transaction_inner(self: &Arc, info: &mut TransactionInfo) -> BinderResult { + let node_ref = self.process.get_transaction_node(info.target_handle)?; + info.to_pid = node_ref.node.owner.task.pid(); security::binder_transaction(&self.process.cred, &node_ref.node.owner.cred)?; - let transaction = Transaction::new(node_ref, None, self, tr)?; - let code = if self.process.is_oneway_spam_detection_enabled() - && transaction.oneway_spam_detected - { + let transaction = Transaction::new(node_ref, None, self, info)?; + let code = if self.process.is_oneway_spam_detection_enabled() && info.oneway_spam_suspect { BR_ONEWAY_SPAM_SUSPECT } else { BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE @@ -1302,7 +1347,7 @@ impl Thread { let list_completion = DTRWrap::arc_try_new(DeliverCode::new(code))?; let completion = list_completion.clone_arc(); self.inner.lock().push_work(list_completion); - match transaction.submit() { + match transaction.submit(info) { Ok(()) => Ok(()), Err(err) => { completion.skip(); @@ -1323,29 +1368,8 @@ impl Thread { GLOBAL_STATS.inc_bc(cmd); self.process.stats.inc_bc(cmd); match cmd { - BC_TRANSACTION => { - let tr = reader.read::()?.with_buffers_size(0); - if tr.transaction_data.flags & TF_ONE_WAY != 0 { - self.transaction(&tr, Self::oneway_transaction_inner); - } else { - self.transaction(&tr, Self::transaction_inner); - } - } - BC_TRANSACTION_SG => { - let tr = reader.read::()?; - if tr.transaction_data.flags & TF_ONE_WAY != 0 { - self.transaction(&tr, Self::oneway_transaction_inner); - } else { - self.transaction(&tr, Self::transaction_inner); - } - } - BC_REPLY => { - let tr = reader.read::()?.with_buffers_size(0); - self.transaction(&tr, Self::reply_inner) - } - BC_REPLY_SG => { - let tr = reader.read::()?; - self.transaction(&tr, Self::reply_inner) + BC_TRANSACTION | BC_TRANSACTION_SG | BC_REPLY | BC_REPLY_SG => { + self.transaction(cmd, &mut reader)?; } BC_FREE_BUFFER => { let buffer = self.process.buffer_get(reader.read()?); diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs b/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs index 50bd1cee0f1a3..733f452d8f49d 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use kernel::{ seq_file::SeqFile, seq_print, sync::{Arc, SpinLock}, - task::Kuid, + task::{Kuid, Pid}, time::{Instant, Monotonic}, types::ScopeGuard, }; @@ -24,6 +24,33 @@ use crate::{ BinderReturnWriter, DArc, DLArc, DTRWrap, DeliverToRead, }; +#[derive(Zeroable)] +pub(crate) struct TransactionInfo { + pub(crate) from_pid: Pid, + pub(crate) from_tid: Pid, + pub(crate) to_pid: Pid, + pub(crate) to_tid: Pid, + pub(crate) code: u32, + pub(crate) flags: u32, + pub(crate) data_ptr: UserPtr, + pub(crate) data_size: usize, + pub(crate) offsets_ptr: UserPtr, + pub(crate) offsets_size: usize, + pub(crate) buffers_size: usize, + pub(crate) target_handle: u32, + pub(crate) errno: i32, + pub(crate) reply: u32, + pub(crate) oneway_spam_suspect: bool, + pub(crate) is_reply: bool, +} + +impl TransactionInfo { + #[inline] + pub(crate) fn is_oneway(&self) -> bool { + self.flags & TF_ONE_WAY != 0 + } +} + #[pin_data(PinnedDrop)] pub(crate) struct Transaction { pub(crate) debug_id: usize, @@ -41,7 +68,6 @@ pub(crate) struct Transaction { data_address: usize, sender_euid: Kuid, txn_security_ctx_off: Option, - pub(crate) oneway_spam_detected: bool, start_time: Instant, } @@ -54,17 +80,16 @@ impl Transaction { node_ref: NodeRef, from_parent: Option>, from: &Arc, - tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg, + info: &mut TransactionInfo, ) -> BinderResult> { let debug_id = super::next_debug_id(); - let trd = &tr.transaction_data; let allow_fds = node_ref.node.flags & FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_ACCEPTS_FDS != 0; let txn_security_ctx = node_ref.node.flags & FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_TXN_SECURITY_CTX != 0; let mut txn_security_ctx_off = if txn_security_ctx { Some(0) } else { None }; let to = node_ref.node.owner.clone(); let mut alloc = match from.copy_transaction_data( to.clone(), - tr, + info, debug_id, allow_fds, txn_security_ctx_off.as_mut(), @@ -77,15 +102,14 @@ impl Transaction { return Err(err); } }; - let oneway_spam_detected = alloc.oneway_spam_detected; - if trd.flags & TF_ONE_WAY != 0 { + if info.is_oneway() { if from_parent.is_some() { pr_warn!("Oneway transaction should not be in a transaction stack."); return Err(EINVAL.into()); } alloc.set_info_oneway_node(node_ref.node.clone()); } - if trd.flags & TF_CLEAR_BUF != 0 { + if info.flags & TF_CLEAR_BUF != 0 { alloc.set_info_clear_on_drop(); } let target_node = node_ref.node.clone(); @@ -99,15 +123,14 @@ impl Transaction { sender_euid: from.process.task.euid(), from: from.clone(), to, - code: trd.code, - flags: trd.flags, - data_size: trd.data_size as _, - offsets_size: trd.offsets_size as _, + code: info.code, + flags: info.flags, + data_size: info.data_size, + offsets_size: info.offsets_size, data_address, allocation <- kernel::new_spinlock!(Some(alloc.success()), "Transaction::new"), is_outstanding: AtomicBool::new(false), txn_security_ctx_off, - oneway_spam_detected, start_time: Instant::now(), }))?) } @@ -115,21 +138,19 @@ impl Transaction { pub(crate) fn new_reply( from: &Arc, to: Arc, - tr: &BinderTransactionDataSg, + info: &mut TransactionInfo, allow_fds: bool, ) -> BinderResult> { let debug_id = super::next_debug_id(); - let trd = &tr.transaction_data; - let mut alloc = match from.copy_transaction_data(to.clone(), tr, debug_id, allow_fds, None) - { - Ok(alloc) => alloc, - Err(err) => { - pr_warn!("Failure in copy_transaction_data: {:?}", err); - return Err(err); - } - }; - let oneway_spam_detected = alloc.oneway_spam_detected; - if trd.flags & TF_CLEAR_BUF != 0 { + let mut alloc = + match from.copy_transaction_data(to.clone(), info, debug_id, allow_fds, None) { + Ok(alloc) => alloc, + Err(err) => { + pr_warn!("Failure in copy_transaction_data: {:?}", err); + return Err(err); + } + }; + if info.flags & TF_CLEAR_BUF != 0 { alloc.set_info_clear_on_drop(); } Ok(DTRWrap::arc_pin_init(pin_init!(Transaction { @@ -139,15 +160,14 @@ impl Transaction { sender_euid: from.process.task.euid(), from: from.clone(), to, - code: trd.code, - flags: trd.flags, - data_size: trd.data_size as _, - offsets_size: trd.offsets_size as _, + code: info.code, + flags: info.flags, + data_size: info.data_size, + offsets_size: info.offsets_size, data_address: alloc.ptr, allocation <- kernel::new_spinlock!(Some(alloc.success()), "Transaction::new"), is_outstanding: AtomicBool::new(false), txn_security_ctx_off: None, - oneway_spam_detected, start_time: Instant::now(), }))?) } @@ -237,7 +257,7 @@ impl Transaction { /// stack, otherwise uses the destination process. /// /// Not used for replies. - pub(crate) fn submit(self: DLArc) -> BinderResult { + pub(crate) fn submit(self: DLArc, info: &mut TransactionInfo) -> BinderResult { // Defined before `process_inner` so that the destructor runs after releasing the lock. let _t_outdated; let _oneway_node; @@ -295,6 +315,7 @@ impl Transaction { } let res = if let Some(thread) = self.find_target_thread() { + info.to_tid = thread.id; match thread.push_work(self) { PushWorkRes::Ok => Ok(()), PushWorkRes::FailedDead(me) => Err((BinderError::new_dead(), me)), diff --git a/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs b/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs index a8fb4764185a1..2035c2877a2b2 100644 --- a/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs +++ b/rust/kernel/uaccess.rs @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ use core::mem::{size_of, MaybeUninit}; #[derive(Copy, Clone)] pub struct UserPtr(*mut c_void); +// SAFETY: Null pointer is a valid value. +unsafe impl Zeroable for UserPtr {} + impl UserPtr { /// Create a `UserPtr` from an integer representing the userspace address. #[inline] From bd818dcf4783ef5b924732f0ec52d931b94459bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alice Ryhl Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 06:45:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 435/607] rust_binder: fix BINDER_GET_EXTENDED_ERROR [ Upstream commit 77bfebf110773f5a0d6b5ff8110896adb2c9c335 ] This code currently copies the ExtendedError struct to the stack, modifies the copy, and then doesn't modify the original. Thus, fix it. Furthermore, errors when replying must be delivered directly to the remote thread, so update deliver_reply() to take an extended error argument. Cc: stable Fixes: eafedbc7c050 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver") Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Acked-by: Carlos Llamas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260605-set-extended-error-v3-1-d60b69a75f97@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/android/binder/error.rs | 13 +++--- drivers/android/binder/thread.rs | 65 +++++++++++++++++++-------- drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs | 15 +++---- 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/error.rs b/drivers/android/binder/error.rs index c6a834071f8ce..fd9e9d9e5658b 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/error.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/error.rs @@ -72,20 +72,17 @@ impl core::fmt::Debug for BinderError { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result { match self.reply { BR_FAILED_REPLY => match self.source.as_ref() { - Some(source) => f - .debug_struct("BR_FAILED_REPLY") - .field("source", source) - .finish(), + Some(source) => source.fmt(f), None => f.pad("BR_FAILED_REPLY"), }, BR_DEAD_REPLY => f.pad("BR_DEAD_REPLY"), BR_FROZEN_REPLY => f.pad("BR_FROZEN_REPLY"), BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN => f.pad("BR_TRANSACTION_PENDING_FROZEN"), BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE => f.pad("BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE"), - _ => f - .debug_struct("BinderError") - .field("reply", &self.reply) - .finish(), + _ => match self.source.as_ref() { + Some(source) => source.fmt(f), + None => self.reply.fmt(f), + }, } } } diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs b/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs index 93aa98c2a173a..ad8bdf762ddc6 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/thread.rs @@ -498,9 +498,16 @@ impl Thread { Ok(()) } + pub(crate) fn clear_extended_error(&self, debug_id: usize) { + self.inner.lock().extended_error = ExtendedError::new(debug_id as u32, BR_OK, 0); + } + pub(crate) fn get_extended_error(&self, data: UserSlice) -> Result { let mut writer = data.writer(); - let ee = self.inner.lock().extended_error; + let mut inner = self.inner.lock(); + let ee = inner.extended_error; + inner.extended_error = ExtendedError::new(0, BR_OK, 0); + drop(inner); writer.write(&ee)?; Ok(()) } @@ -1105,7 +1112,10 @@ impl Thread { inner.pop_transaction_to_reply(thread.as_ref()) } { let reply = Err(BR_DEAD_REPLY); - if !transaction.from.deliver_single_reply(reply, &transaction) { + if !transaction + .from + .deliver_single_reply(reply, &transaction, None) + { break; } @@ -1117,8 +1127,9 @@ impl Thread { &self, reply: Result, u32>, transaction: &DArc, + extended_error: Option, ) { - if self.deliver_single_reply(reply, transaction) { + if self.deliver_single_reply(reply, transaction, extended_error) { transaction.from.unwind_transaction_stack(); } } @@ -1132,6 +1143,7 @@ impl Thread { &self, reply: Result, u32>, transaction: &DArc, + extended_error: Option, ) -> bool { if let Ok(transaction) = &reply { transaction.set_outstanding(&mut self.process.inner.lock()); @@ -1147,6 +1159,12 @@ impl Thread { return true; } + if let Some(ee) = extended_error { + if inner.extended_error.command == BR_OK { + inner.extended_error = ee; + } + } + match reply { Ok(work) => { inner.push_work(work); @@ -1217,6 +1235,9 @@ impl Thread { info.buffers_size = td.buffers_size as usize; // SAFETY: Above `read` call initializes all bytes, so this union read is ok. info.target_handle = unsafe { td.transaction_data.target.handle }; + + info.debug_id = super::next_debug_id(); + Ok(()) } @@ -1225,6 +1246,8 @@ impl Thread { let mut info = TransactionInfo::zeroed(); self.read_transaction_info(cmd, reader, &mut info)?; + self.clear_extended_error(info.debug_id); + let ret = if info.is_reply { self.reply_inner(&mut info) } else if info.is_oneway() { @@ -1234,23 +1257,21 @@ impl Thread { }; if let Err(err) = ret { - if err.reply != BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE { - info.reply = err.reply; - } - self.push_return_work(err.reply); - if let Some(source) = &err.source { - info.errno = source.to_errno(); + if err.reply != BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE { info.reply = err.reply; + if let Some(source) = &err.source { + info.errno = source.to_errno(); - { - let mut ee = self.inner.lock().extended_error; - ee.command = err.reply; - ee.param = source.to_errno(); + { + let mut inner = self.inner.lock(); + inner.extended_error = + ExtendedError::new(info.debug_id as u32, err.reply, source.to_errno()); + } } pr_warn!( - "{}:{} transaction to {} failed: {source:?}", + "{}:{} transaction to {} failed: {err:?}", info.from_pid, info.from_tid, info.to_pid @@ -1315,18 +1336,24 @@ impl Thread { let allow_fds = orig.flags & TF_ACCEPT_FDS != 0; let reply = Transaction::new_reply(self, process, info, allow_fds)?; self.inner.lock().push_work(completion); - orig.from.deliver_reply(Ok(reply), &orig); + orig.from.deliver_reply(Ok(reply), &orig, None); Ok(()) })() .map_err(|mut err| { // At this point we only return `BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE` to the caller, and we must let // the sender know that the transaction has completed (with an error in this case). + pr_warn!( - "Failure {:?} during reply - delivering BR_FAILED_REPLY to sender.", - err + "{}:{} reply to {} failed: {err:?}", + info.from_pid, + info.from_tid, + info.to_pid ); - let reply = Err(BR_FAILED_REPLY); - orig.from.deliver_reply(reply, &orig); + + let param = err.source.as_ref().map_or(0, |e| e.to_errno()); + let ee = ExtendedError::new(info.debug_id as u32, err.reply, param); + orig.from + .deliver_reply(Err(BR_FAILED_REPLY), &orig, Some(ee)); err.reply = BR_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE; err }); diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs b/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs index 733f452d8f49d..b5434a2ae8193 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs +++ b/drivers/android/binder/transaction.rs @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ pub(crate) struct TransactionInfo { pub(crate) reply: u32, pub(crate) oneway_spam_suspect: bool, pub(crate) is_reply: bool, + pub(crate) debug_id: usize, } impl TransactionInfo { @@ -82,7 +83,6 @@ impl Transaction { from: &Arc, info: &mut TransactionInfo, ) -> BinderResult> { - let debug_id = super::next_debug_id(); let allow_fds = node_ref.node.flags & FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_ACCEPTS_FDS != 0; let txn_security_ctx = node_ref.node.flags & FLAT_BINDER_FLAG_TXN_SECURITY_CTX != 0; let mut txn_security_ctx_off = if txn_security_ctx { Some(0) } else { None }; @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ impl Transaction { let mut alloc = match from.copy_transaction_data( to.clone(), info, - debug_id, + info.debug_id, allow_fds, txn_security_ctx_off.as_mut(), ) { @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ impl Transaction { let data_address = alloc.ptr; Ok(DTRWrap::arc_pin_init(pin_init!(Transaction { - debug_id, + debug_id: info.debug_id, target_node: Some(target_node), from_parent, sender_euid: from.process.task.euid(), @@ -141,9 +141,8 @@ impl Transaction { info: &mut TransactionInfo, allow_fds: bool, ) -> BinderResult> { - let debug_id = super::next_debug_id(); let mut alloc = - match from.copy_transaction_data(to.clone(), info, debug_id, allow_fds, None) { + match from.copy_transaction_data(to.clone(), info, info.debug_id, allow_fds, None) { Ok(alloc) => alloc, Err(err) => { pr_warn!("Failure in copy_transaction_data: {:?}", err); @@ -154,7 +153,7 @@ impl Transaction { alloc.set_info_clear_on_drop(); } Ok(DTRWrap::arc_pin_init(pin_init!(Transaction { - debug_id, + debug_id: info.debug_id, target_node: None, from_parent: None, sender_euid: from.process.task.euid(), @@ -380,7 +379,7 @@ impl DeliverToRead for Transaction { let send_failed_reply = ScopeGuard::new(|| { if self.target_node.is_some() && self.flags & TF_ONE_WAY == 0 { let reply = Err(BR_FAILED_REPLY); - self.from.deliver_reply(reply, &self); + self.from.deliver_reply(reply, &self, None); } self.drop_outstanding_txn(); }); @@ -462,7 +461,7 @@ impl DeliverToRead for Transaction { // If this is not a reply or oneway transaction, then send a dead reply. if self.target_node.is_some() && self.flags & TF_ONE_WAY == 0 { let reply = Err(BR_DEAD_REPLY); - self.from.deliver_reply(reply, &self); + self.from.deliver_reply(reply, &self, None); } self.drop_outstanding_txn(); From 8ff183ee4d8c452960df58175a094828c0513b2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:11:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 436/607] bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying commit 96cce16e26dd02a8678f1e87f88a4b5cdb63b995 upstream. The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch prediction left behind by the old one. Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an old program that occupied the same space. Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse. Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL. Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated while the flush is active. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/linux/filter.h | 10 ++++++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index cf7a0bce1bb6d..3c4dd718beced 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1266,6 +1267,15 @@ extern long bpf_jit_limit_max; typedef void (*bpf_jit_fill_hole_t)(void *area, unsigned int size); +/* + * Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory, so that + * indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions left + * behind by an old program that occupied the same space. + */ +void bpf_arch_pred_flush(void); +DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_pred_flush); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_pred_flush_enabled); + void bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero(void *area, unsigned int size); struct bpf_binary_header * diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 931a4ddd8530c..a043fccb917e8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -864,6 +865,15 @@ void bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero(void *area, unsigned int size) memset(area, 0, size); } +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_pred_flush); + +/* + * Enabled once bpf_arch_pred_flush points at a real flush routine. Lets the + * pack allocator test "is a predictor flush wired up at all" with a cheap + * static branch instead of repeatedly querying the static call target. + */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(bpf_pred_flush_enabled); + #define BPF_PROG_SIZE_TO_NBITS(size) (round_up(size, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE) / BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE) static DEFINE_MUTEX(pack_mutex); @@ -923,6 +933,14 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns) mutex_lock(&pack_mutex); if (size > BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE) { + /* + * Allocations larger than a pack get their own pages, and + * predictors are not flushed for such allocation. This is only + * safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) + * are bounded well below a pack size. + */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled)) + pr_warn_once("BPF: Predictors not flushed for allocations greater than BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE\n"); size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE); ptr = bpf_jit_alloc_exec(size); if (ptr) { @@ -953,6 +971,7 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns) pos = 0; found_free_area: + static_call_cond(bpf_arch_pred_flush)(); bitmap_set(pack->bitmap, pos, nbits); ptr = (void *)(pack->ptr) + (pos << BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SHIFT); From 8a4c8af9ae67eb072d90d1b339f14d27a82bd2a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:11:52 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 437/607] x86/bugs: Enable IBPB flush on BPF JIT allocation commit a3af84b0fa00ead01fcd0e28b5d773ff25990a0d upstream. Enable hardening against JIT spraying when Spectre-v2 mitigations are in use. Specifically, issue an IBPB flush on BPF JIT memory reuse. Skip enabling the IBPB flush if the BPF dispatcher is already using a retpoline sequence. This hardening applies only when BPF-JIT is in use. Guard the enabling under CONFIG_BPF_JIT so that bugs.c still builds with CONFIG_BPF_JIT=n. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Dave Hansen Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 08ed5a2e46a5f..71e9861a16a89 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -386,6 +386,10 @@ extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void); extern void entry_untrain_ret(void); extern void write_ibpb(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +extern void bpf_arch_ibpb(void); +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d7fa03bf51b45..fd0b7880cf7e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1796,8 +1797,21 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : ""; } + +/* + * The "retpoline sequence" is the "call;mov;ret" sequence that + * replaces normal indirect branch instructions. Differentiate + * *the* retpoline sequence from the LFENCE-prefixed indirect + * branches that simply use the retpoline infrastructure. + */ +static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) +{ + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE); +} + #else static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } +static inline bool retpoline_seq_enabled(void) { return false; } #endif #define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n" @@ -2240,8 +2254,7 @@ static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void) return; /* Retpoline mitigates against BHI unless the CPU has RRSBA behavior */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)) { + if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) { spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(); if (rrsba_disabled) return; @@ -2383,6 +2396,27 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void) pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT +static void __bpf_arch_ibpb(void *unused) +{ + write_ibpb(); +} + +void bpf_arch_ibpb(void) +{ + on_each_cpu(__bpf_arch_ibpb, NULL, 1); +} + +static bool __init cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf(void) +{ + /* A genuine retpoline already neutralizes ring0 indirect predictions */ + if (retpoline_seq_enabled()) + return false; + + return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB); +} +#endif + static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void) { if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled()) @@ -2459,6 +2493,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT + if (cpu_wants_ibpb_bpf()) { + static_call_update(bpf_arch_pred_flush, bpf_arch_ibpb); + static_branch_enable(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled); + pr_info("Enabling IBPB for BPF\n"); + } +#endif } static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) @@ -3544,9 +3586,7 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void) return "; BHI: BHI_DIS_S"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP)) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && - !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) && - rrsba_disabled) + else if (retpoline_seq_enabled() && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_VMEXIT)) return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop"; From 666fc2e6e4d0a37592e5a3029deddc272e10df1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:12:07 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 438/607] bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF commit 0bb99f2cfaae6822d734d69722de30af823efdf3 upstream. Currently predictor flush on memory reuse is done for all BPF JIT allocations, but only cBPF programs can be loaded by an unprivileged user. eBPF is privileged by default, and flushing predictors for all CPUs on every eBPF reuse penalizes the common case for no security benefit. eBPF allocations can be frequent on busy systems, only flush predictors for cBPF programs. Trampoline and dispatcher allocations also skip the flush as they are eBPF-only. [pawan: backport had various conflicts in arches bpf_int_jit_compile(). loongarch bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't use pack allocator, dropped was_classic hunk. ] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 ++-- arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 ++-- arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c | 2 +- arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c | 3 ++- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 5 +++-- include/linux/filter.h | 5 +++-- kernel/bpf/core.c | 13 ++++++++----- kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 873c1b784a872..c563bae8fce1c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -2117,7 +2117,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog) image_size = extable_offset + extable_size; ro_header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(image_size, &ro_image_ptr, sizeof(u64), &header, &image_ptr, - jit_fill_hole); + jit_fill_hole, was_classic); if (!ro_header) { prog = orig_prog; goto out_off; @@ -2754,7 +2754,7 @@ int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags, void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size) { - return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole); + return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole, false); } void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c index e9d666508ae28..a000620ca99da 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c @@ -1474,7 +1474,7 @@ static void invoke_bpf_mod_ret(struct jit_ctx *ctx, struct bpf_tramp_links *tl, void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size) { - return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole); + return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole, false); } void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 189ef7b72081d..cedab25aa3a82 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp) alloclen = proglen + FUNCTION_DESCR_SIZE + fixup_len + extable_len; fhdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(alloclen, &fimage, 4, &hdr, &image, - bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns); + bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns, bpf_prog_was_classic(fp)); if (!fhdr) { fp = org_fp; goto out_addrs; @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn, bool in_arena) void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size) { - return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns); + return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_jit_fill_ill_insns, false); } void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size) diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c index 45cbc7c6fe490..9e9e6dcfc4825 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c +++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c @@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags, void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size) { - return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns); + return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns, false); } void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size) diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c index 191bf0e66c824..e4ab5bb9c9f64 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c +++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_core.c @@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog) bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(prog_size + extable_size, &jit_data->ro_image, sizeof(u32), &jit_data->header, &jit_data->image, - bpf_fill_ill_insns); + bpf_fill_ill_insns, + bpf_prog_was_classic(prog)); if (!jit_data->ro_header) { prog = orig_prog; goto out_offset; diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 788671a32d8ee..c3798cab3b7db 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -3447,7 +3447,7 @@ static int __arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *rw_im void *arch_alloc_bpf_trampoline(unsigned int size) { - return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole); + return bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, jit_fill_hole, false); } void arch_free_bpf_trampoline(void *image, unsigned int size) @@ -3780,7 +3780,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog) /* allocate module memory for x86 insns and extable */ header = bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(roundup(proglen, align) + extable_size, &image, align, &rw_header, &rw_image, - jit_fill_hole); + jit_fill_hole, + bpf_prog_was_classic(prog)); if (!header) { prog = orig_prog; goto out_addrs; diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h index 3c4dd718beced..2469fd2e40157 100644 --- a/include/linux/filter.h +++ b/include/linux/filter.h @@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *fp); struct bpf_binary_header * bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(const struct bpf_prog *fp); -void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns); +void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool was_classic); void bpf_prog_pack_free(void *ptr, u32 size); static inline bool bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(const struct bpf_prog *fp) @@ -1304,7 +1304,8 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **ro_image, unsigned int alignment, struct bpf_binary_header **rw_hdr, u8 **rw_image, - bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns); + bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, + bool was_classic); int bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize(struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header, struct bpf_binary_header *rw_header); void bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header, diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index a043fccb917e8..338a806e25c04 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_ins return NULL; } -void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns) +void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool was_classic) { unsigned int nbits = BPF_PROG_SIZE_TO_NBITS(size); struct bpf_prog_pack *pack; @@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns) * safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) * are bounded well below a pack size. */ - if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled)) + if (was_classic && static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled)) pr_warn_once("BPF: Predictors not flushed for allocations greater than BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE\n"); size = round_up(size, PAGE_SIZE); ptr = bpf_jit_alloc_exec(size); @@ -971,7 +971,9 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns) pos = 0; found_free_area: - static_call_cond(bpf_arch_pred_flush)(); + /* Flush only for cBPF as it may contain a crafted gadget */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled) && was_classic) + static_call_cond(bpf_arch_pred_flush)(); bitmap_set(pack->bitmap, pos, nbits); ptr = (void *)(pack->ptr) + (pos << BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SHIFT); @@ -1131,7 +1133,8 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr, unsigned int alignment, struct bpf_binary_header **rw_header, u8 **rw_image, - bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns) + bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, + bool was_classic) { struct bpf_binary_header *ro_header; u32 size, hole, start; @@ -1144,7 +1147,7 @@ bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(unsigned int proglen, u8 **image_ptr, if (bpf_jit_charge_modmem(size)) return NULL; - ro_header = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns); + ro_header = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(size, bpf_fill_ill_insns, was_classic); if (!ro_header) { bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(size); return NULL; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c b/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c index b77db7413f8c7..ea2d60dc1feeb 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ void bpf_dispatcher_change_prog(struct bpf_dispatcher *d, struct bpf_prog *from, mutex_lock(&d->mutex); if (!d->image) { - d->image = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero); + d->image = bpf_prog_pack_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, bpf_jit_fill_hole_with_zero, false); if (!d->image) goto out; d->rw_image = bpf_jit_alloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE); From f1f36bf9bb1173ef4ddb7fb917bbda75fb1db690 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:12:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 439/607] bpf: Skip redundant IBPB in pack allocator commit a23c1c5396a91680703360d1ee28a44657c503c4 upstream. bpf_prog_pack_alloc() issues IBPB on all CPUs on every cBPF allocation, even when reusing chunks from an existing pack where no new memory was touched since the last IBPB. Since IBPB on all CPUs is heavy, Dave Hansen suggested to track allocation since last IBPB, and only issue IBPB at reuse for the chunks that have not seen an IBPB since they were last freed. Track per-pack whether an IBPB is needed via arch_flush_needed. Set it when allocating a chunk, reset on IBPB flush. On reuse, conditionally issue the flush. Since IBPB invalidates all BTB entries, clear the flag on all packs after flushing. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 338a806e25c04..49ca543a41115 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -857,6 +857,7 @@ int bpf_jit_add_poke_descriptor(struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_prog_pack { struct list_head list; void *ptr; + bool arch_flush_needed; unsigned long bitmap[]; }; @@ -910,6 +911,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_ins bpf_fill_ill_insns(pack->ptr, BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE); bitmap_zero(pack->bitmap, BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE / BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SIZE); + if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled)) + pack->arch_flush_needed = true; set_vm_flush_reset_perms(pack->ptr); err = set_memory_rox((unsigned long)pack->ptr, BPF_PROG_PACK_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE); @@ -972,8 +975,15 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool found_free_area: /* Flush only for cBPF as it may contain a crafted gadget */ - if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled) && was_classic) + if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled) && + pack->arch_flush_needed && + was_classic) { + struct bpf_prog_pack *p; + static_call_cond(bpf_arch_pred_flush)(); + list_for_each_entry(p, &pack_list, list) + p->arch_flush_needed = false; + } bitmap_set(pack->bitmap, pos, nbits); ptr = (void *)(pack->ptr) + (pos << BPF_PROG_CHUNK_SHIFT); @@ -1011,6 +1021,9 @@ void bpf_prog_pack_free(void *ptr, u32 size) "bpf_prog_pack bug: missing bpf_arch_text_invalidate?\n"); bitmap_clear(pack->bitmap, pos, nbits); + + if (static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled)) + pack->arch_flush_needed = true; if (bitmap_find_next_zero_area(pack->bitmap, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT, 0, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT, 0) == 0) { list_del(&pack->list); From 0229944ba7923a73f54e94e42139518bfff9124c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:12:38 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 440/607] bpf: Prefer packs that won't trigger an IBPB flush on allocation commit a9b1f19a6a673ba06820898d0f1ad02883ea1639 upstream. Currently BPF pack allocator picks the chunks from the first available pack. While this is okay, it naturally leads to more frequent flushes when there are multiple packs in the system that weren't used since the last flush. As an optimization prefer allocating the new programs from packs that are unused since last flush. When all packs are dirty, allocation forces a flush and marks all packs clean. Below are some future optimizations ideas: 1. Currently, the "dirty" tracking is only done at the pack-level. Flush frequency can further be reduced with chunk-level tracking. This requires a new bitmap per-pack to track the dirty state. 2. IBPB flush is done on all CPUs, even if only a single CPU ran the BPF program. On a system with hundreds of CPUs this could be a major bottleneck forcing hundreds of IPIs to deliver the flush. The solution is to track the CPUs where a BPF program ran, and issue IBPB only on those CPUs. 3. Avoid IBPB when flush is already done at other sources (e.g. context switch). Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 49ca543a41115..e0ffdd985eb5d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -930,8 +930,8 @@ static struct bpf_prog_pack *alloc_new_pack(bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_ins void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool was_classic) { unsigned int nbits = BPF_PROG_SIZE_TO_NBITS(size); - struct bpf_prog_pack *pack; - unsigned long pos; + struct bpf_prog_pack *pack, *fallback_pack = NULL; + unsigned long pos, fallback_pos = 0; void *ptr = NULL; mutex_lock(&pack_mutex); @@ -963,8 +963,29 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool list_for_each_entry(pack, &pack_list, list) { pos = bitmap_find_next_zero_area(pack->bitmap, BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT, 0, nbits, 0); - if (pos < BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT) + if (pos >= BPF_PROG_CHUNK_COUNT) + continue; + /* Flush not enabled, use any pack */ + if (!static_branch_unlikely(&bpf_pred_flush_enabled)) goto found_free_area; + /* + * cBPF reuse of a dirty pack triggers a flush, so prefer a + * clean pack for cBPF. eBPF never flushes, so pick the first + * free pack, dirty or clean. + */ + if (!was_classic || !pack->arch_flush_needed) + goto found_free_area; + if (!fallback_pack) { + fallback_pack = pack; + fallback_pos = pos; + } + } + + /* No preferred pack found */ + if (fallback_pack) { + pack = fallback_pack; + pos = fallback_pos; + goto found_free_area; } pack = alloc_new_pack(bpf_fill_ill_insns); From d944b8add331883d8e026e152356e7d9349a3bcf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pawan Gupta Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:12:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 441/607] bpf: Prefer dirty packs for eBPF allocations commit b72e29e0f7ee329d89f86db8700c8ea99b4a370a upstream. The pack allocator only flushes predictors when reusing a dirty pack for cBPF, eBPF allocations never trigger a flush. Currently, eBPF picks the first free pack, which could be a clean pack. As an optimization, leaving a clean pack for cBPF can avoid flushes. Prefer dirty packs for eBPF and keep clean packs free for cBPF. This mirrors the existing cBPF preference for clean packs: each program kind prefers the pack that avoids an extra flush, and falls back to the other kind only when no preferred pack has room. eBPF reuse of a dirty pack is harmless since eBPF being privileged does not flush. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index e0ffdd985eb5d..b102704f89bc7 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -970,10 +970,10 @@ void *bpf_prog_pack_alloc(u32 size, bpf_jit_fill_hole_t bpf_fill_ill_insns, bool goto found_free_area; /* * cBPF reuse of a dirty pack triggers a flush, so prefer a - * clean pack for cBPF. eBPF never flushes, so pick the first - * free pack, dirty or clean. + * clean pack for cBPF. eBPF never flushes, so steer it to a + * dirty pack and keep clean packs free for cBPF. */ - if (!was_classic || !pack->arch_flush_needed) + if (was_classic ^ pack->arch_flush_needed) goto found_free_area; if (!fallback_pack) { fallback_pack = pack; From 335202ab25b01fdd45889ff25eab70864686dea3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 10:23:27 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 442/607] udf: validate free block extents against the partition length commit 5f0419457f89dce1a3f1c8e62a3adf2f39ab8168 upstream. udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap array. A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the image have a higher prerequisite. No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by a kernel panic. Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted callers cannot walk past the flexible array. Fixes: 56e69e59751d ("udf: prevent integer overflow in udf_bitmap_free_blocks()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515142327.1120767-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/udf/balloc.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/balloc.c b/fs/udf/balloc.c index 807c493ed0cd5..cc6dc6e1d84de 100644 --- a/fs/udf/balloc.c +++ b/fs/udf/balloc.c @@ -82,8 +82,9 @@ static int load_block_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, int nr_groups = bitmap->s_nr_groups; if (block_group >= nr_groups) { - udf_debug("block_group (%u) > nr_groups (%d)\n", + udf_debug("block_group (%u) >= nr_groups (%d)\n", block_group, nr_groups); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; } if (bitmap->s_block_bitmap[block_group]) { @@ -662,7 +663,7 @@ void udf_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, if (check_add_overflow(bloc->logicalBlockNum, offset, &blk) || check_add_overflow(blk, count, &blk) || - bloc->logicalBlockNum + count > map->s_partition_len) { + blk > map->s_partition_len) { udf_debug("Invalid request to free blocks: (%d, %u), off %u, " "len %u, partition len %u\n", partition, bloc->logicalBlockNum, offset, count, From e610fb113cdfa8bf4247c9bf4f2337b81ad4ddad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 02:53:31 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 443/607] udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size commit d8202786b3d75125c84ebc4de6d946f92fde0ee8 upstream. udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode size: map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2; lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads ((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block] so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an out-of-bounds read. Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one entry within the VAT inode. Fixes: fa5e08156335 ("udf: Handle VAT packed inside inode properly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-9a2317ee-v1-1-fefef5736154@proton.me Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/udf/super.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c index b2f168b0a0d18..4a325af4ba9c2 100644 --- a/fs/udf/super.c +++ b/fs/udf/super.c @@ -1263,6 +1263,14 @@ static int udf_load_vat(struct super_block *sb, int p_index, int type1_index) map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset = le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader); + if (map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset + > sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size) { + udf_err(sb, "Corrupted VAT header length %u (VAT inode size %lld)\n", + map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset, + sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size); + brelse(bh); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; + } map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries = (sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size - map->s_type_specific.s_virtual. From 04f4599a9efb90992d072a814960edf0cd62805d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 01:40:01 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 444/607] udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count commit 3ec997bd5508e9b25210b5bbec89031629cdb093 upstream. udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte sparingEntry elements: for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) { struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i]; ... entry->origLocation ... } in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds write. Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with struct_size(). Fixes: 1df2ae31c724 ("udf: Fortify loading of sparing table") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-91780c4e-v1-1-f15112ff6882@proton.me Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/udf/super.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c index 4a325af4ba9c2..62a311d88f2d6 100644 --- a/fs/udf/super.c +++ b/fs/udf/super.c @@ -1426,7 +1426,8 @@ static int udf_load_sparable_map(struct super_block *sb, if (ident != 0 || strncmp(st->sparingIdent.ident, UDF_ID_SPARING, strlen(UDF_ID_SPARING)) || - sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > + struct_size(st, mapEntry, + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen)) > sb->s_blocksize) { brelse(bh); continue; From c60932d6f8373268d0393053c45c522263feeed8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 11:03:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 445/607] hwrng: jh7110 - fix refcount leak in starfive_trng_read() commit 8d13f7a8450206e3f820cdb26e33e91d181071b4 upstream. The starfive_trng_read() function acquires a runtime PM reference via pm_runtime_get_sync() but fails to release it on two error paths. If starfive_trng_wait_idle() or starfive_trng_cmd() returns an error, the function exits without calling pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend(), leaving the runtime PM usage counter permanently elevated and preventing the device from entering runtime suspend. Refactor the function to use a unified error path that calls pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend() before returning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c388f458bc34 ("hwrng: starfive - Add TRNG driver for StarFive SoC") Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/hw_random/jh7110-trng.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/jh7110-trng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/jh7110-trng.c index 9776f4daa0445..4712c3c530e42 100644 --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/jh7110-trng.c +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/jh7110-trng.c @@ -256,19 +256,22 @@ static int starfive_trng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wai if (wait) { ret = starfive_trng_wait_idle(trng); - if (ret) - return -ETIMEDOUT; + if (ret) { + ret = -ETIMEDOUT; + goto out_put; + } } ret = starfive_trng_cmd(trng, STARFIVE_CTRL_GENE_RANDNUM, wait); if (ret) - return ret; + goto out_put; memcpy_fromio(buf, trng->base + STARFIVE_RAND0, max); + ret = max; +out_put: pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend(trng->dev); - - return max; + return ret; } static int starfive_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) From d161d47aba31dc99bbf6d1788c316a1b06ae89b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thorsten Blum Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2026 12:14:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 446/607] crypto: atmel-sha204a - drop hwrng quality reduction for ATSHA204A commit ea5e57cc97185329dcc5ebdcaae7e1500bf0ad0b upstream. Commit 8006aff15516 ("crypto: atmel-sha204a - Set hwrng quality to lowest possible") reduced the hwrng quality to 1 based on a review by Bill Cox [1]. However, despite its title, the review only tested the ATSHA204, not the ATSHA204A. In the same thread, Atmel engineer Landon Cox wrote "this behavior has been eliminated entirely"[2] in the ATSHA204A and "this problem does not affect the ATECC108 or the ATECC108A (or the ATSHA204A)"[3]. According to the official ATSHA204A datasheet [4], the device contains a high-quality hardware RNG that combines its output with an internal seed value stored in EEPROM or SRAM to generate random numbers. The device also implements all security functions using SHA-256, and the driver uses the chip's Random command in seed-update mode. Keep 'quality = 1' for ATSHA204, but drop the explicit hwrng quality reduction for ATSHA204A and fall back to the hwrng core default. [1] https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-December/023858.html [2] https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-December/023852.html [3] https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-December/023886.html [4] https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/en/DeviceDoc/ATSHA204A-Data-Sheet-40002025A.pdf Fixes: 8006aff15516 ("crypto: atmel-sha204a - Set hwrng quality to lowest possible") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c index ae04b27a9ad11..49e545ef6493b 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha204a.c @@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ #include #include "atmel-i2c.h" +/* + * According to review by Bill Cox [1], the ATSHA204 has very low entropy. + * [1] https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-December/023858.html + */ +static const unsigned short atsha204_quality = 1; + static void atmel_sha204a_rng_done(struct atmel_i2c_work_data *work_data, void *areq, int status) { @@ -158,6 +164,7 @@ static const struct attribute_group atmel_sha204a_groups = { static int atmel_sha204a_probe(struct i2c_client *client) { struct atmel_i2c_client_priv *i2c_priv; + const unsigned short *quality; int ret; ret = atmel_i2c_probe(client); @@ -171,11 +178,9 @@ static int atmel_sha204a_probe(struct i2c_client *client) i2c_priv->hwrng.name = dev_name(&client->dev); i2c_priv->hwrng.read = atmel_sha204a_rng_read; - /* - * According to review by Bill Cox [1], this HWRNG has very low entropy. - * [1] https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2014-December/023858.html - */ - i2c_priv->hwrng.quality = 1; + quality = i2c_get_match_data(client); + if (quality) + i2c_priv->hwrng.quality = *quality; ret = devm_hwrng_register(&client->dev, &i2c_priv->hwrng); if (ret) @@ -207,14 +212,14 @@ static void atmel_sha204a_remove(struct i2c_client *client) } static const struct of_device_id atmel_sha204a_dt_ids[] __maybe_unused = { - { .compatible = "atmel,atsha204", }, + { .compatible = "atmel,atsha204", .data = &atsha204_quality }, { .compatible = "atmel,atsha204a", }, { /* sentinel */ } }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, atmel_sha204a_dt_ids); static const struct i2c_device_id atmel_sha204a_id[] = { - { "atsha204" }, + { "atsha204", (kernel_ulong_t)&atsha204_quality }, { "atsha204a" }, { /* sentinel */ } }; From a8803c4f0ac3fa7df5551bbb5a8800c434a94357 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 08:45:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 447/607] nvme: target: rdma: fix ndev refcount leak on queue connect commit badc53620fe813b3a9f727ef9526f98567c2c898 upstream. nvmet_rdma_queue_connect() calls nvmet_rdma_find_get_device() which acquires a reference on the returned ndev via kref_get(). On the path where the host queue backlog is exceeded and the function returns NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY, reference of ndev is not released, leaking the kref. Fix this by adding a goto to the existing put_device label before the early return. Fixes: 31deaeb11ba7 ("nvmet-rdma: avoid circular locking dependency on install_queue()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c index 284ab759bbce3..9307dbc41303c 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c @@ -1599,8 +1599,10 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id, pending++; } mutex_unlock(&nvmet_rdma_queue_mutex); - if (pending > NVMET_RDMA_BACKLOG) - return NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY; + if (pending > NVMET_RDMA_BACKLOG) { + ret = NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY; + goto put_device; + } } ret = nvmet_rdma_cm_accept(cm_id, queue, &event->param.conn); From 427c82497e269579c95ce9142f07e88aa58f2b45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 10:21:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 448/607] block: partitions: fix of_node refcount leak in of_partition() commit 148cd4873115feb266c002d4d4618ea7f14342d9 upstream. of_partition() calls of_node_get() on the parent device node at the beginning of the function, storing the reference in 'partitions_np'. This reference is leaked in two paths: 1. The compatibility check at the top of the function returns 0 without releasing partitions_np when the node exists but is not "fixed-partitions" compatible. 2. The function returns 1 at the end after successfully processing all partitions without releasing partitions_np. Fix both leaks by adding of_node_put(partitions_np) on each path. Fixes: 2e3a191e89f9 ("block: add support for partition table defined in OF") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Reviewed-by: Md Haris Iqbal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260526102124.2283846-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/partitions/of.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/partitions/of.c b/block/partitions/of.c index 4e760fdffb3fe..629f0fdbeb737 100644 --- a/block/partitions/of.c +++ b/block/partitions/of.c @@ -76,8 +76,10 @@ int of_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state) struct device_node *partitions_np = of_node_get(ddev->of_node); if (!partitions_np || - !of_device_is_compatible(partitions_np, "fixed-partitions")) + !of_device_is_compatible(partitions_np, "fixed-partitions")) { + of_node_put(partitions_np); return 0; + } slot = 1; /* Validate parition offset and size */ @@ -106,5 +108,6 @@ int of_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state) strlcat(state->pp_buf, "\n", PAGE_SIZE); + of_node_put(partitions_np); return 1; } From 13f2f5defb4d7f8fe9510e4ec1a42f9a862bc441 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 13:04:16 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 449/607] dm-ioctl: report an error if a device has no table commit 457e32348d606a77f9b20e25e989734189834c07 upstream. When we send a message to a device that has no table, the return code was not set. The code would return "2", which is not considered a valid return value. Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Benjamin Marzinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c index de90feb842ab6..128dd1a939254 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-ioctl.c @@ -1806,8 +1806,11 @@ static int target_message(struct file *filp, struct dm_ioctl *param, size_t para goto out_argv; table = dm_get_live_table(md, &srcu_idx); - if (!table) + if (!table) { + DMERR("The device has no table."); + r = -EINVAL; goto out_table; + } if (dm_deleting_md(md)) { r = -ENXIO; From 7a69463e9ad23650b07b9d166f0ddfafbfb8c530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Achkinazi, Igor" Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 15:24:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 450/607] nvme-multipath: set BIO_REMAPPED on bios remapped to per-path namespace disks commit 88bac2c1a72b8f4f71e9845699aa872df04e5850 upstream. When nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() remaps a bio from the multipath head to a per-path namespace, bio_set_dev() clears BIO_REMAPPED. The remapped bio is then resubmitted through submit_bio_noacct() which calls bio_check_eod() because BIO_REMAPPED is not set. This races with nvme_ns_remove() which zeroes the per-path capacity before synchronize_srcu(): CPU 0 (IO submission) --------------------- srcu_read_lock() nvme_find_path() -> ns [NVME_NS_READY is set] CPU 1 (namespace removal) ------------------------- clear_bit(NVME_NS_READY) set_capacity(ns->disk, 0) synchronize_srcu() <- blocks CPU 0 (IO submission) --------------------- bio_set_dev(bio, ns->disk->part0) [clears BIO_REMAPPED] submit_bio_noacct(bio) -> bio_check_eod() sees capacity=0 -> bio fails with IO error The SRCU read lock prevents synchronize_srcu() from completing, but does not prevent set_capacity(0) from executing. The bio fails the EOD check before it reaches the NVMe driver, so nvme_failover_req() never gets a chance to redirect it to another path of multipath. IO errors are reported to the application despite another path being available. On older kernels (before commit 0b64682e78f7 "block: skip unnecessary checks for split bio"), the same race was also reachable through split remainders resubmitted via submit_bio_noacct(). Fix this by setting BIO_REMAPPED after bio_set_dev() in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio(). This skips bio_check_eod() on the per-path device; the EOD check already passed on the multipath head. NVMe per-path namespace devices are always whole disks (bd_partno=0), so the blk_partition_remap() skip also gated by BIO_REMAPPED is a no-op. The flag does not persist across failover and cannot go stale if the namespace geometry changes between attempts: nvme_failover_req() calls bio_set_dev() to redirect the bio back to the multipath head, which clears BIO_REMAPPED. When nvme_requeue_work() resubmits through submit_bio_noacct(), bio_check_eod() runs normally against the current capacity. Same approach as commit 3a905c37c351 ("block: skip bio_check_eod for partition-remapped bios"). Fixes: a7c7f7b2b641 ("nvme: use bio_set_dev to assign ->bi_bdev") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Igor Achkinazi Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c b/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c index 81ccdd91f7790..616d1ce6b8e5c 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/multipath.c @@ -528,6 +528,12 @@ static void nvme_ns_head_submit_bio(struct bio *bio) ns = nvme_find_path(head); if (likely(ns)) { bio_set_dev(bio, ns->disk->part0); + /* + * Use BIO_REMAPPED to skip bio_check_eod() when this bio + * enters submit_bio_noacct() for the per-path device. The EOD + * check already passed on the multipath head. + */ + bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_REMAPPED); bio->bi_opf |= REQ_NVME_MPATH; trace_block_bio_remap(bio, disk_devt(ns->head->disk), bio->bi_iter.bi_sector); From 56c021a0869260d04c4b65d1471936aaf9177114 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 15:00:00 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 451/607] nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page commit 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c upstream. nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound check: u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */ size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */ ... if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */ ... alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req); buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL); ... status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed() returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81 canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead. The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern "nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local destination offset with a fixed source pointer. Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns() (admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the host asks for more bytes than the log page contains. Fixes: a07b4970f464 ("nvmet: add a generic NVMe target") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c index c06f3e04296cc..1d22291bd8b07 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/discovery.c @@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page(struct nvmet_req *req) u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); size_t alloc_len; + size_t copy_len; struct nvmet_subsys_link *p; struct nvmet_port *r; u32 numrec = 0; @@ -242,7 +243,27 @@ static void nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page(struct nvmet_req *req) up_read(&nvmet_config_sem); - status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len); + /* + * Validate the host-supplied log page offset before copying out. + * Without this check, the host controls a 64-bit byte offset into + * a small kzalloc'd buffer: a value past the log page lets the + * subsequent memcpy read adjacent kernel heap, and a value aimed + * at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel copy and crashes + * the target host. The Discovery controller is unauthenticated, + * so the bug is reachable from any reachable fabric peer. + */ + if (offset > alloc_len) { + req->error_loc = + offsetof(struct nvme_get_log_page_command, lpo); + status = NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD | NVME_STATUS_DNR; + goto out_free_buffer; + } + + copy_len = min_t(size_t, data_len, alloc_len - offset); + status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, copy_len); + if (!status && copy_len < data_len) + status = nvmet_zero_sgl(req, copy_len, data_len - copy_len); +out_free_buffer: kfree(buffer); out: nvmet_req_complete(req, status); From 6d7649c1231dac14d906985d2936967e23041c26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianchu Chen Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 14:18:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 452/607] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length commit 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 upstream. nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes. A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp. With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication. Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c index 5946681cb0e32..4f2f03bdf2b38 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c @@ -134,13 +134,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) return 0; } -static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) +static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl) { struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d; - u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + u16 dhvlen; u8 *response; + if (tl < sizeof(*data)) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + + dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + + /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */ + if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen); @@ -339,7 +348,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvmet_req *req) switch (data->auth_id) { case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY: - dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d); + dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl); if (dhchap_status == 0) req->sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1; From 0912b98151eea6acfa2a0e11b5f772b198d29ab7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 18:32:49 +0930 Subject: [PATCH 453/607] btrfs: check and set EXTENT_DELALLOC_NEW before clearing EXTENT_DELALLOC commit 95ee2231896d5f2a31760411429075a99d6045a7 upstream. [WARNING] When running test cases with injected errors or shutdown, e.g. generic/388 or generic/475, there is a chance that the following kernel warning is triggered: BTRFS info (device dm-2): first mount of filesystem d8a19a28-3232-4809-b0df-38df83e71bff BTRFS info (device dm-2): using crc32c checksum algorithm BTRFS info (device dm-2): checking UUID tree BTRFS info (device dm-2): turning on async discard BTRFS info (device dm-2): enabling free space tree BTRFS critical (device dm-2 state E): emergency shutdown ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: extent_io.c:1742 at extent_writepage_io+0x437/0x520 [btrfs], CPU#2: kworker/u43:2/651591 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 651591 Comm: kworker/u43:2 Tainted: G W OE 7.0.0-rc6-custom+ #365 PREEMPT(full) 5804053f02137e627472d94b5128cc9fcb110e88 RIP: 0010:extent_writepage_io+0x437/0x520 [btrfs] Call Trace: extent_write_cache_pages+0x2a5/0x820 [btrfs 70299925d0856939e93b17d480651713b3cbba58] btrfs_writepages+0x74/0x130 [btrfs 70299925d0856939e93b17d480651713b3cbba58] do_writepages+0xd0/0x160 __writeback_single_inode+0x42/0x340 writeback_sb_inodes+0x22d/0x580 wb_writeback+0xc6/0x360 wb_workfn+0xbd/0x470 process_one_work+0x198/0x3b0 worker_thread+0x1c8/0x330 kthread+0xee/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x2a6/0x330 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS error (device dm-2 state E): root 5 ino 259 folio 1323008 is marked dirty without notifying the fs BTRFS error (device dm-2 state E): failed to submit blocks, root=5 inode=259 folio=1323008 submit_bitmap=0: -117 BTRFS info (device dm-2 state E): last unmount of filesystem d8a19a28-3232-4809-b0df-38df83e71bff [CAUSE] Inside btrfs we have the following pattern in several locations, for example inside btrfs_dirty_folio(): btrfs_clear_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, start_pos, end_of_last_block, EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | EXTENT_DEFRAG, cached); ret = btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, start_pos, end_of_last_block, extra_bits, cached); if (ret) return ret; However btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() can return IO errors other than -ENOMEM through the following callchain: btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() \- btrfs_find_new_delalloc_bytes() \- btrfs_get_extent() \- btrfs_lookup_file_extent() \- btrfs_search_slot() When such IO error happened, the previous btrfs_clear_extent_bit() has cleared the EXTENT_DELALLOC for the range, and we're expecting btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() to re-set EXTENT_DELALLOC. But since btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() failed before btrfs_set_extent_bit(), EXTENT_DELALLOC flag is no longer present. And if the folio range is dirty before entering btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(), we got a dirty folio but no EXTENT_DELALLOC flag now. Then we hit the folio writeback: extent_writepage() |- writepage_delalloc() | No ordered extent is created, as there is no EXTENT_DELALLOC set | for the folio range. | This also means the folio has no ordered flag set. | |- extent_writepage_io() \- if (unlikely(!folio_test_ordered(folio)) Now we hit the warning. [FIX] Introduce a new helper, btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc() to replace the currently open-coded btrfs_clear_extent_bit() + btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() combination. Instead of calling btrfs_clear_extent_bit() first, update EXTENT_DELALLOC_NEW first, as that part can fail due to metadata IO, meanwhile btrfs_clear_extent_bit() and btrfs_set_extent_bit() won't return any error but retry memory allocation until succeeded. This allows us to fail early without clearing EXTENT_DELALLOC bit, so even if that new btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc() failed before touching EXTENT_DELALLOC, the existing dirty range will still have their old EXTENT_DELALLOC flag present, thus avoid the warning. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h | 2 ++ fs/btrfs/file.c | 25 +++-------------- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/btrfs/reflink.c | 4 +-- 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h b/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h index a66ca5531b5c5..b6b46f951f11a 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h +++ b/fs/btrfs/btrfs_inode.h @@ -575,6 +575,8 @@ int btrfs_start_delalloc_roots(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, long nr, int btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end, unsigned int extra_bits, struct extent_state **cached_state); +int btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end, + unsigned int extra_bits, struct extent_state **cached_state); struct btrfs_new_inode_args { /* Input */ diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file.c b/fs/btrfs/file.c index 0fee45d35a5f8..66c76f425afb5 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/file.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/file.c @@ -93,16 +93,8 @@ int btrfs_dirty_folio(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct folio *folio, loff_t pos end_of_last_block = start_pos + num_bytes - 1; - /* - * The pages may have already been dirty, clear out old accounting so - * we can set things up properly - */ - btrfs_clear_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, start_pos, end_of_last_block, - EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | EXTENT_DEFRAG, - cached); - - ret = btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, start_pos, end_of_last_block, - extra_bits, cached); + ret = btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc(inode, start_pos, end_of_last_block, + extra_bits, cached); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1962,18 +1954,7 @@ static vm_fault_t btrfs_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf) } } - /* - * page_mkwrite gets called when the page is firstly dirtied after it's - * faulted in, but write(2) could also dirty a page and set delalloc - * bits, thus in this case for space account reason, we still need to - * clear any delalloc bits within this page range since we have to - * reserve data&meta space before lock_page() (see above comments). - */ - btrfs_clear_extent_bit(io_tree, page_start, end, - EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | - EXTENT_DEFRAG, &cached_state); - - ret = btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, page_start, end, 0, &cached_state); + ret = btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc(inode, page_start, end, 0, &cached_state); if (ret < 0) { btrfs_unlock_extent(io_tree, page_start, page_end, &cached_state); goto out_unlock; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index a4f1810db079d..b972d4cba9802 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -2720,7 +2720,13 @@ int btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end, unsigned int extra_bits, struct extent_state **cached_state) { - WARN_ON(PAGE_ALIGNED(end)); + const u32 blocksize = inode->root->fs_info->sectorsize; + + /* Basic alignment check. */ + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, blocksize), "start=%llu blocksize=%u", + start, blocksize); + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(end + 1, blocksize), "inclusive end=%llu blocksize=%u", + end, blocksize); if (start >= i_size_read(&inode->vfs_inode) && !(inode->flags & BTRFS_INODE_PREALLOC)) { @@ -2943,6 +2949,52 @@ int btrfs_writepage_cow_fixup(struct folio *folio) return -EAGAIN; } +/* + * Clear the old accounting flags and set EXTENT_DELALLOC for the range. + * + * Return <0 for error, in that case no range has EXTENT_DELALLOC bit cleared or set. + */ +int btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 start, u64 end, + unsigned int extra_bits, struct extent_state **cached_state) +{ + const u32 blocksize = inode->root->fs_info->sectorsize; + + /* The @extra_bits can only be EXTENT_NORESERVE for now. */ + ASSERT(!(extra_bits & ~EXTENT_NORESERVE), "extra_bits=0x%x", extra_bits); + + /* Basic alignment check. */ + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, blocksize), "start=%llu blocksize=%u", + start, blocksize); + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(end + 1, blocksize), "inclusive end=%llu blocksize=%u", + end, blocksize); + + /* + * Check and set DELALLOC_NEW flag, this needs to search tree thus can + * fail early. Thus we want to do this before clearing EXTENT_DELALLOC. + */ + if (start >= i_size_read(&inode->vfs_inode) && + !(inode->flags & BTRFS_INODE_PREALLOC)) { + /* + * There can't be any extents following EOF in this case so just + * set the delalloc new bit for the range directly. + */ + extra_bits |= EXTENT_DELALLOC_NEW; + } else { + int ret; + + ret = btrfs_find_new_delalloc_bytes(inode, start, end + 1 - start, + NULL); + if (unlikely(ret)) + return ret; + } + /* Clear the old accounting as the range may already be dirty. */ + btrfs_clear_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, start, end, + EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | + EXTENT_DEFRAG, cached_state); + return btrfs_set_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, start, end, + EXTENT_DELALLOC | extra_bits, cached_state); +} + static int insert_reserved_file_extent(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 file_pos, struct btrfs_file_extent_item *stack_fi, @@ -5053,12 +5105,7 @@ int btrfs_truncate_block(struct btrfs_inode *inode, u64 offset, u64 start, u64 e goto again; } - btrfs_clear_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, block_start, block_end, - EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | EXTENT_DEFRAG, - &cached_state); - - ret = btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, block_start, block_end, 0, - &cached_state); + ret = btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc(inode, block_start, block_end, 0, &cached_state); if (ret) { btrfs_unlock_extent(io_tree, block_start, block_end, &cached_state); goto out_unlock; diff --git a/fs/btrfs/reflink.c b/fs/btrfs/reflink.c index 614e884c2a9bc..b5f7b20c585a0 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/reflink.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/reflink.c @@ -93,9 +93,7 @@ static int copy_inline_to_page(struct btrfs_inode *inode, if (ret < 0) goto out_unlock; - btrfs_clear_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, file_offset, range_end, - EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | EXTENT_DEFRAG, NULL); - ret = btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(inode, file_offset, range_end, 0, NULL); + ret = btrfs_reset_extent_delalloc(inode, file_offset, range_end, 0, NULL); if (ret) goto out_unlock; From 7a64521802997257b144e6edfb4e278dbeb972dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Qu Wenruo Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 13:34:46 +0930 Subject: [PATCH 454/607] btrfs: do not trim a device which is not writeable commit 1b1937eb08f51319bf71575484cde2b8c517aedc upstream. [BUG] There is a bug report that btrfs/242 can randomly fail with the following NULL pointer dereference: run fstests btrfs/242 at 2026-06-01 10:25:08 BTRFS: device fsid d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874 devid 1 transid 9 /dev/sdc (8:32) scanned by mount (122609) BTRFS info (device sdc): first mount of filesystem d4d7f234-487c-4787-88e4-47a8b68c9874 BTRFS info (device sdc): using crc32c checksum algorithm BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing BTRFS warning (device sdc): devid 2 uuid fbe72d72-3272-482d-80fb-ab88ed398192 is missing BTRFS info (device sdc): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device sdc): turning on async discard BTRFS info (device sdc): enabling free space tree Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000018 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=000000013fd6b000 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 122625 Comm: fstrim Not tainted 7.0.10-2-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed e9a5f6b24978fba3bf015a992f865837fdfff3dd Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025 pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs] lr : btrfs_trim_fs+0x1f0/0xa00 [btrfs] Call trace: btrfs_trim_fs+0x34c/0xa00 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] (P) btrfs_ioctl_fitrim+0xe8/0x178 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] btrfs_ioctl+0xdd4/0x2bd8 [btrfs f02c1d570ceea621c69d302ba75dd61868083840] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x108 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x5c/0xd0 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x40 el0_svc+0x40/0x1d0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8 el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b8 Code: 17ffff83 f94017e0 f9002be0 f9402ea0 (f9400c00) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Also the reporter is very kind to test the following ASSERT() added to btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle(): ASSERT(device->bdev, "devid=%llu path=%s dev_state=0x%lx\n", device->devid, btrfs_dev_name(device), device->dev_state); And it shows the following output: assertion failed: device->bdev, in extent-tree.c:6630 (devid=2 path=/dev/sdd dev_state=0x82) Which means the device->bdev is NULL, and the dev_state is BTRFS_DEV_STATE_IN_FS_METADATA | BTRFS_DEV_STATE_ITEM_FOUND, without BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set. [CAUSE] The pc points to the following call chain: btrfs_trim_fs() |- btrfs_trim_free_extents() |- btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle() |- bdev_max_discard_sectors(device->bdev) So the NULL pointer dereference is caused by device->bdev being NULL. This looks impossible by a quick glance, as just before calling btrfs_trim_free_extents_throttle(), we have skipped any device that has BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag set. However in this particular case, there is a window where the missing device is later re-scanned, causing btrfs to remove the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag: btrfs_control_ioctl() |- btrfs_scan_one_device() |- device_list_add() |- rcu_assign_pointer(device->name, name); | This updates the missing device's path to the new good path. | |- clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING, &device->dev_state) This removes the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag. This allows the missing device to re-appear and clear the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING flag. However the device still does not have the BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE flag set, nor is its bdev pointer updated. The bdev pointer remains NULL, triggering the crash later. [FIX] This is a big de-synchronization between BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING and device->bdev pointer, and shows a gap in btrfs's re-appearing-device handling. The proper handling of re-appearing device will need quite some extra work, which is out of the context of this small fix. Thankfully the regular bbio submission path has already handled it well by checking if the device->bdev is NULL before submitting. So here we just fix the crash by checking if the device is writeable and has a bdev pointer before calling bdev_max_discard_sectors(). Reported-by: Su Yue Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/wlwir19t.fsf@damenly.org/ Fixes: 499f377f49f0 ("btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c index 663526d909ab1..ffe6c80495666 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c @@ -6411,12 +6411,16 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struct btrfs_device *device, u64 *trimmed) *trimmed = 0; - /* Discard not supported = nothing to do. */ - if (!bdev_max_discard_sectors(device->bdev)) + /* + * The caller only filters out MISSING devices, but a device that was + * missing at mount and later rescanned has MISSING cleared while bdev + * is still NULL and WRITEABLE is still unset. Skip those here. + */ + if (!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state) || !device->bdev) return 0; - /* Not writable = nothing to do. */ - if (!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state)) + /* Discard not supported = nothing to do. */ + if (!bdev_max_discard_sectors(device->bdev)) return 0; /* No free space = nothing to do. */ From ce93228e2193a17d2c58b656e439bb39fe5c3af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 06:41:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 455/607] partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array commit 2dc0bfd2fe355fb930de63c2f2eb8ced8570c579 upstream. aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array: int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count); ... for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) { struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i; ... lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix); pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds). The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via msdos_partition() -> aix_partition(). Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. Fixes: 6ceea22bbbc8 ("partitions: add aix lvm partition support files") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Acked-by: Philippe De Muyter Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260607064137.302574-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- block/partitions/aix.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/block/partitions/aix.c b/block/partitions/aix.c index 85f4b967565e3..cdcd60686e0ba 100644 --- a/block/partitions/aix.c +++ b/block/partitions/aix.c @@ -228,6 +228,15 @@ int aix_partition(struct parsed_partitions *state) int next_lp_ix = 1; int lp_ix; + /* + * pvd was read into a fixed-size struct pvd whose ppe[] array + * holds ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) entries. pp_count is an + * unvalidated on-disk __be16, so clamp the scan to the array + * size to avoid walking past the allocation. + */ + if (numpps > ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe)) + numpps = ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe); + for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) { struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i; unsigned int lv_ix; From b5699642640d6cff357638738c5293985cd5a53d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 01:18:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 456/607] isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record commit 5fa1d6a5ec2356d2107dead614437c66fa7138b1 upstream. get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component lies within the SL record before dereferencing it. A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255 bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory. ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media - desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled. Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink() fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260607011823.217748-1-hexlabsecurity@proton.me Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/isofs/rock.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c index 6c104fcb84481..869b331eff4f6 100644 --- a/fs/isofs/rock.c +++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c @@ -466,6 +466,9 @@ parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(struct iso_directory_record *de, inode->i_size = symlink_len; while (slen > 1) { rootflag = 0; + /* keep the component within the SL record */ + if (slp->len + 2 > slen) + goto eio; switch (slp->flags & ~1) { case 0: inode->i_size += @@ -621,6 +624,14 @@ static char *get_symlink_chunk(char *rpnt, struct rock_ridge *rr, char *plimit) slp = &rr->u.SL.link; while (slen > 1) { rootflag = 0; + /* + * A component is slp->len + 2 bytes (a two-byte header plus + * len bytes of text). If it does not fit in the bytes left in + * the SL record the record is malformed: fail like the plimit + * checks below so readlink() returns -EIO, not a truncated path. + */ + if (slp->len + 2 > slen) + return NULL; switch (slp->flags & ~1) { case 0: if (slp->len > plimit - rpnt) From 7465ed1524ace60c4794effbc94fd06c2a6c9fac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 15:53:28 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 457/607] crypto: af_alg - Remove zero-copy support from skcipher and aead commit ffdd2bc378953b525aca61902534e753f1f8e734 upstream. The zero-copy support is one of the riskiest aspects of AF_ALG. It allows userspace to request cryptographic operations directly on pagecache pages of files like the 'su' binary. It also allows userspace to concurrently modify the memory which is being operated on, a recipe for TOCTOU vulnerabilities. While zero-copy support is more valuable in other areas of the kernel like the frequently used networking and file I/O code, it has far less value in AF_ALG, which is a niche UAPI. AF_ALG primarily just exists for backwards compatibility with a small set of userspace programs such as 'iwd' that haven't yet been fixed to use userspace crypto code. Originally AF_ALG was intended to be used to access hardware crypto accelerators. However, it isn't an efficient interface for that anyway, and it turned out to be rarely used in this way in practice. Thus, the risks of the zero-copy support in AF_ALG vastly outweigh its benefits. Let's just remove it. This commit removes it from the "skcipher" and "aead" algorithm types. "hash" will be handled separately. This is a soft break, not a hard break. Even after this commit, it still works to use splice() or sendfile() to transfer data to an AF_ALG request socket from a pipe or any file, respectively. What changes is just that the kernel now makes an internal, stable copy of the data before doing the crypto operation. So performance is slightly reduced, but the UAPI isn't broken. And, very importantly, it's much safer. Tested with libkcapi/test.sh. All its test cases still pass. I also verified that this would have prevented the copy.fail exploit as well. I also used a custom test program to verify that sendfile() still works. Fixes: 8ff590903d5f ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations") Fixes: 400c40cf78da ("crypto: algif - add AEAD support") Reported-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn@theori.io> Link: https://copy.fail/ Reported-by: Feng Ning Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/afYcc-tZFwvZZo76@ans-MacBook-Pro.local Reviewed-by: Demi Marie Obenour Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst | 31 ++---------- crypto/af_alg.c | 73 +++++++++------------------ crypto/algif_aead.c | 8 +-- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst b/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst index f80f243e227e6..4630d3d74913b 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst +++ b/Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst @@ -328,33 +328,10 @@ CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG_CAVP option: Zero-Copy Interface ------------------- -In addition to the send/write/read/recv system call family, the AF_ALG -interface can be accessed with the zero-copy interface of -splice/vmsplice. As the name indicates, the kernel tries to avoid a copy -operation into kernel space. - -The zero-copy operation requires data to be aligned at the page -boundary. Non-aligned data can be used as well, but may require more -operations of the kernel which would defeat the speed gains obtained -from the zero-copy interface. - -The system-inherent limit for the size of one zero-copy operation is 16 -pages. If more data is to be sent to AF_ALG, user space must slice the -input into segments with a maximum size of 16 pages. - -Zero-copy can be used with the following code example (a complete -working example is provided with libkcapi): - -:: - - int pipes[2]; - - pipe(pipes); - /* input data in iov */ - vmsplice(pipes[1], iov, iovlen, SPLICE_F_GIFT); - /* opfd is the file descriptor returned from accept() system call */ - splice(pipes[0], NULL, opfd, NULL, ret, 0); - read(opfd, out, outlen); +AF_ALG used to have zero-copy support, but it was removed due to it being a +frequent source of vulnerabilities. For backwards compatibility the splice() +and sendfile() system calls are still supported, but the kernel will make an +internal copy of the data before passing it to the crypto code. Setsockopt Interface diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 0111d07545931..3c3cb965fd74e 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, ssize_t plen; /* use the existing memory in an allocated page */ - if (ctx->merge && !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) { + if (ctx->merge) { sgl = list_entry(ctx->tsgl_list.prev, struct af_alg_tsgl, list); sg = sgl->sg + sgl->cur - 1; @@ -1021,60 +1021,37 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, if (sgl->cur) sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1); - if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) { - struct sg_table sgtable = { - .sgl = sg, - .nents = sgl->cur, - .orig_nents = sgl->cur, - }; - - plen = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, len, &sgtable, - MAX_SGL_ENTS - sgl->cur, 0); - if (plen < 0) { - err = plen; + do { + struct page *pg; + unsigned int i = sgl->cur; + + plen = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE); + + pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pg) { + err = -ENOMEM; goto unlock; } - for (; sgl->cur < sgtable.nents; sgl->cur++) - get_page(sg_page(&sg[sgl->cur])); + sg_assign_page(sg + i, pg); + + err = memcpy_from_msg(page_address(sg_page(sg + i)), + msg, plen); + if (err) { + __free_page(sg_page(sg + i)); + sg_assign_page(sg + i, NULL); + goto unlock; + } + + sg[i].length = plen; len -= plen; ctx->used += plen; copied += plen; size -= plen; - } else { - do { - struct page *pg; - unsigned int i = sgl->cur; - - plen = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE); - - pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!pg) { - err = -ENOMEM; - goto unlock; - } - - sg_assign_page(sg + i, pg); - - err = memcpy_from_msg( - page_address(sg_page(sg + i)), - msg, plen); - if (err) { - __free_page(sg_page(sg + i)); - sg_assign_page(sg + i, NULL); - goto unlock; - } - - sg[i].length = plen; - len -= plen; - ctx->used += plen; - copied += plen; - size -= plen; - sgl->cur++; - } while (len && sgl->cur < MAX_SGL_ENTS); - - ctx->merge = plen & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); - } + sgl->cur++; + } while (len && sgl->cur < MAX_SGL_ENTS); + + ctx->merge = plen & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); if (!size) sg_mark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1); diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index cb651ab58d629..c6c2ce21895dd 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg (maybe with - * MSG_SPLICE_PAGES). Filling up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation - * -- the data will only be tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg - * call, the caller must provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg. Filling up the TX + * SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be tracked by the + * kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must provide a buffer + * which is tracked with the RX SGL. * * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is * allocated and prepared. As part of the recvmsg operation, the processed From 6f7b8e0321f3a8fbbd267d2ac15c671ab59e919e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thorsten Blum Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 18:39:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 458/607] crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps commit 3f57657b6ea23f933371f2c2846322f441773cee upstream. Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() and gen_split_key() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled. Fixes: 6e005503199b ("crypto: caam - print debug messages at debug level") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 12 ++++++------ drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c | 12 ++++++------ drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c | 4 ++-- drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c index 2cfb1b8d8c7cf..1bec11f3abbb1 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c @@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, dev_dbg(jrdev, "keylen %d enckeylen %d authkeylen %d\n", keys.authkeylen + keys.enckeylen, keys.enckeylen, keys.authkeylen); - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); /* @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, dma_sync_single_for_device(jrdev, ctx->key_dma, ctx->adata.keylen_pad + keys.enckeylen, ctx->dir); - print_hex_dump_debug("ctx.key@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("ctx.key@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, ctx->key, ctx->adata.keylen_pad + keys.enckeylen, 1); @@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (err) return err; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -695,7 +695,7 @@ static int rfc4106_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (err) return err; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ static int rfc4543_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (err) return err; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key, u32 *desc; const bool is_rfc3686 = alg->caam.rfc3686; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); ctx->cdata.keylen = keylen; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c index 65f6adb6c673f..aa779caacfe59 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, dev_dbg(jrdev, "keylen %d enckeylen %d authkeylen %d\n", keys.authkeylen + keys.enckeylen, keys.enckeylen, keys.authkeylen); - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); /* @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, ctx->adata.keylen_pad + keys.enckeylen, ctx->dir); - print_hex_dump_debug("ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, ctx->key, ctx->adata.keylen_pad + keys.enckeylen, 1); @@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (ret) return ret; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static int rfc4106_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (ret) return ret; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static int rfc4543_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (ret) return ret; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key, const bool is_rfc3686 = alg->caam.rfc3686; int ret = 0; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); ctx->cdata.keylen = keylen; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c index cc942e5ab2799..4c2a7159398d6 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c @@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ static int axcbc_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash, const u8 *key, DMA_TO_DEVICE); ctx->adata.keylen = keylen; - print_hex_dump_debug("axcbc ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)" : ", + print_hex_dump_devel("axcbc ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)" : ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, ctx->key, keylen, 1); return axcbc_set_sh_desc(ahash); @@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ static int acmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *ahash, const u8 *key, ctx->adata.key_virt = key; ctx->adata.keylen = keylen; - print_hex_dump_debug("acmac ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)" : ", + print_hex_dump_devel("acmac ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)" : ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); return acmac_set_sh_desc(ahash); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c index 88cc4fe2a585d..de2fcc387477d 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int gen_split_key(struct device *jrdev, u8 *key_out, dev_dbg(jrdev, "split keylen %d split keylen padded %d\n", adata->keylen, adata->keylen_pad); - print_hex_dump_debug("ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key_in, keylen, 1); if (local_max > max_keylen) @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ int gen_split_key(struct device *jrdev, u8 *key_out, wait_for_completion(&result.completion); ret = result.err; - print_hex_dump_debug("ctx.key@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("ctx.key@"__stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key_out, adata->keylen_pad, 1); } From d0b8cafd529b4ec759190c6081f7a76efb563a8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thorsten Blum Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 18:39:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 459/607] crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps again commit 8005dc808bcce7d6cc2ae015a3cde1683bee602d upstream. Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled. Fixes: 8d818c105501 ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add DPAA2-CAAM driver") Fixes: 226853ac3ebe ("crypto: caam/qi2 - add skcipher algorithms") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c index c97c10cdf207a..b26b5395ffef1 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, dev_dbg(dev, "keylen %d enckeylen %d authkeylen %d\n", keys.authkeylen + keys.enckeylen, keys.enckeylen, keys.authkeylen); - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); ctx->adata.keylen = keys.authkeylen; @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static int aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, memcpy(ctx->key + ctx->adata.keylen_pad, keys.enckey, keys.enckeylen); dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, ctx->key_dma, ctx->adata.keylen_pad + keys.enckeylen, ctx->dir); - print_hex_dump_debug("ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("ctx.key@" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, ctx->key, ctx->adata.keylen_pad + keys.enckeylen, 1); @@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ static int gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, ret = aes_check_keylen(keylen); if (ret) return ret; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ static int rfc4106_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (ret) return ret; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static int rfc4543_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, if (ret) return ret; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen); @@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static int skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher, const u8 *key, u32 *desc; const bool is_rfc3686 = alg->caam.rfc3686; - print_hex_dump_debug("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", + print_hex_dump_devel("key in @" __stringify(__LINE__)": ", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 4, key, keylen, 1); ctx->cdata.keylen = keylen; From 0016d3c21c6ab60a20be7f565cefb5999f3adeb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiaonan Zhao Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 18:11:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 460/607] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate poly1305 template argument commit 265b861bece38318b8e0fc8fac0643d4ef906d31 upstream. chachapoly_create() still accepts the compatibility poly1305 parameter in the template name, but it assumes the second template argument is always present and immediately passes it to strcmp(). When the argument is missing, crypto_attr_alg_name() returns an error pointer. Check for that before comparing the name so malformed template instantiations fail with an error instead of dereferencing the error pointer in strcmp(). This matches the surrounding Crypto API template pattern where crypto_attr_alg_name() results are validated before string-specific use. Fixes: a298765e28ad ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Use lib/crypto poly1305") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin Signed-off-by: Xiaonan Zhao Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c index b4b5a7198d841..27df9e1eb0580 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c +++ b/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c @@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static int chachapoly_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, struct aead_instance *inst; struct chachapoly_instance_ctx *ctx; struct skcipher_alg_common *chacha; + const char *poly_name; int err; if (ivsize > CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE) @@ -396,9 +397,15 @@ static int chachapoly_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, goto err_free_inst; chacha = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg_common(&ctx->chacha); + poly_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); + if (IS_ERR(poly_name)) { + err = PTR_ERR(poly_name); + goto err_free_inst; + } + err = -EINVAL; - if (strcmp(crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]), "poly1305") && - strcmp(crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]), "poly1305-generic")) + if (strcmp(poly_name, "poly1305") && + strcmp(poly_name, "poly1305-generic")) goto err_free_inst; /* Need 16-byte IV size, including Initial Block Counter value */ if (chacha->ivsize != CHACHA_IV_SIZE) From ac667f9f18c6b36e02eef59ea46d647729b0805f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 15:04:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 461/607] crypto: crypto4xx - Remove insecure and unused rng_alg commit 7811ec9e973d2c9e465083699f0c8240b98cb8c4 upstream. Remove crypto4xx_rng, as it is insecure and unused: - It has only a 64-bit security strength, which is highly inadequate. This can be seen by the fact that crypto4xx_hw_init() seeds it with only 64 bits of entropy, and the fact that the original commit mentions that it implements ANSI X9.17 Annex C. Another issue was that this driver didn't implement the crypto_rng API correctly, as crypto4xx_prng_generate() didn't return 0 on success. - No user of this code is known. It's usable only theoretically via the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG. But userspace actually just uses the actual Linux RNG (/dev/random etc) instead. And rng_algs don't contribute entropy to the actual Linux RNG either. (This may have been confused with hwrng, which does contribute entropy.) Fixes: d072bfa48853 ("crypto: crypto4xx - add prng crypto support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Acked-by: Christian Lamparter Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c | 88 ------------------------- drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.h | 4 -- drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_reg_def.h | 11 ---- 3 files changed, 103 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c index 8cdc66d520c99..be55eb6a03164 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.c @@ -31,11 +31,9 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include -#include #include #include "crypto4xx_reg_def.h" #include "crypto4xx_core.h" @@ -986,10 +984,6 @@ static int crypto4xx_register_alg(struct crypto4xx_device *sec_dev, rc = crypto_register_aead(&alg->alg.u.aead); break; - case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG: - rc = crypto_register_rng(&alg->alg.u.rng); - break; - default: rc = crypto_register_skcipher(&alg->alg.u.cipher); break; @@ -1015,10 +1009,6 @@ static void crypto4xx_unregister_alg(struct crypto4xx_device *sec_dev) crypto_unregister_aead(&alg->alg.u.aead); break; - case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG: - crypto_unregister_rng(&alg->alg.u.rng); - break; - default: crypto_unregister_skcipher(&alg->alg.u.cipher); } @@ -1077,69 +1067,6 @@ static irqreturn_t crypto4xx_ce_interrupt_handler_revb(int irq, void *data) PPC4XX_TMO_ERR_INT); } -static int ppc4xx_prng_data_read(struct crypto4xx_device *dev, - u8 *data, unsigned int max) -{ - unsigned int i, curr = 0; - u32 val[2]; - - do { - /* trigger PRN generation */ - writel(PPC4XX_PRNG_CTRL_AUTO_EN, - dev->ce_base + CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_CTRL); - - for (i = 0; i < 1024; i++) { - /* usually 19 iterations are enough */ - if ((readl(dev->ce_base + CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_STAT) & - CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_STAT_BUSY)) - continue; - - val[0] = readl_be(dev->ce_base + CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_RES_0); - val[1] = readl_be(dev->ce_base + CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_RES_1); - break; - } - if (i == 1024) - return -ETIMEDOUT; - - if ((max - curr) >= 8) { - memcpy(data, &val, 8); - data += 8; - curr += 8; - } else { - /* copy only remaining bytes */ - memcpy(data, &val, max - curr); - break; - } - } while (curr < max); - - return curr; -} - -static int crypto4xx_prng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, - const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, - u8 *dstn, unsigned int dlen) -{ - struct rng_alg *alg = crypto_rng_alg(tfm); - struct crypto4xx_alg *amcc_alg; - struct crypto4xx_device *dev; - int ret; - - amcc_alg = container_of(alg, struct crypto4xx_alg, alg.u.rng); - dev = amcc_alg->dev; - - mutex_lock(&dev->core_dev->rng_lock); - ret = ppc4xx_prng_data_read(dev, dstn, dlen); - mutex_unlock(&dev->core_dev->rng_lock); - return ret; -} - - -static int crypto4xx_prng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, - unsigned int slen) -{ - return 0; -} - /* * Supported Crypto Algorithms */ @@ -1269,18 +1196,6 @@ static struct crypto4xx_alg_common crypto4xx_alg[] = { .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, }, } }, - { .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG, .u.rng = { - .base = { - .cra_name = "stdrng", - .cra_driver_name = "crypto4xx_rng", - .cra_priority = 300, - .cra_ctxsize = 0, - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - }, - .generate = crypto4xx_prng_generate, - .seed = crypto4xx_prng_seed, - .seedsize = 0, - } }, }; /* @@ -1354,9 +1269,6 @@ static int crypto4xx_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) core_dev->dev->core_dev = core_dev; core_dev->dev->is_revb = is_revb; core_dev->device = dev; - rc = devm_mutex_init(&ofdev->dev, &core_dev->rng_lock); - if (rc) - return rc; spin_lock_init(&core_dev->lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&core_dev->dev->alg_list); ratelimit_default_init(&core_dev->dev->aead_ratelimit); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.h b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.h index ee36630c670f2..3a028aec3f0c1 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_core.h @@ -14,10 +14,8 @@ #define __CRYPTO4XX_CORE_H__ #include -#include #include #include -#include #include #include "crypto4xx_reg_def.h" #include "crypto4xx_sa.h" @@ -111,7 +109,6 @@ struct crypto4xx_core_device { u32 irq; struct tasklet_struct tasklet; spinlock_t lock; - struct mutex rng_lock; }; struct crypto4xx_ctx { @@ -135,7 +132,6 @@ struct crypto4xx_alg_common { union { struct skcipher_alg cipher; struct aead_alg aead; - struct rng_alg rng; } u; }; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_reg_def.h b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_reg_def.h index 1038061224da6..73d626308a848 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_reg_def.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/amcc/crypto4xx_reg_def.h @@ -90,20 +90,9 @@ #define CRYPTO4XX_BYTE_ORDER_CFG 0x000600d8 #define CRYPTO4XX_ENDIAN_CFG 0x000600d8 -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_STAT 0x00070000 -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_STAT_BUSY 0x1 #define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_CTRL 0x00070004 #define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_SEED_L 0x00070008 #define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_SEED_H 0x0007000c - -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_RES_0 0x00070020 -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_RES_1 0x00070024 -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_RES_2 0x00070028 -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_RES_3 0x0007002C - -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_LFSR_L 0x00070030 -#define CRYPTO4XX_PRNG_LFSR_H 0x00070034 - /* * Initialize CRYPTO ENGINE registers, and memory bases. */ From 774ddddf5eb26eeca177350413e3e2bc50930ee9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anastasia Tishchenko Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 13:57:40 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 462/607] crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication commit 27b536a2ec8e2f85a0380c2d13c9ecbc7aaab406 upstream. The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows. The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists from lower-bit overflow. When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers. It seems the check got lost in translation. Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry from the lower addition. Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") Signed-off-by: Anastasia Tishchenko Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+ Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/ecc.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/ecc.c b/crypto/ecc.c index 6cf9a945fc6c2..f97ff234086ff 100644 --- a/crypto/ecc.c +++ b/crypto/ecc.c @@ -402,14 +402,26 @@ static uint128_t mul_64_64(u64 left, u64 right) return result; } -static uint128_t add_128_128(uint128_t a, uint128_t b) +/* Calculate addition with overflow checking. Returns true on wrap-around, + * false otherwise. + */ +static bool check_add_128_128_overflow(uint128_t *result, uint128_t a, + uint128_t b) { - uint128_t result; + bool carry; - result.m_low = a.m_low + b.m_low; - result.m_high = a.m_high + b.m_high + (result.m_low < a.m_low); + result->m_low = a.m_low + b.m_low; + carry = (result->m_low < a.m_low); - return result; + result->m_high = a.m_high + b.m_high + carry; + + /* Using constant-time bitwise arithmetic to prevent timing + * side-channels. + */ + carry = (result->m_high < a.m_high) | + ((result->m_high == a.m_high) & carry); + + return carry; } static void vli_mult(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right, @@ -434,9 +446,7 @@ static void vli_mult(u64 *result, const u64 *left, const u64 *right, uint128_t product; product = mul_64_64(left[i], right[k - i]); - - r01 = add_128_128(r01, product); - r2 += (r01.m_high < product.m_high); + r2 += check_add_128_128_overflow(&r01, r01, product); } result[k] = r01.m_low; @@ -459,7 +469,7 @@ static void vli_umult(u64 *result, const u64 *left, u32 right, uint128_t product; product = mul_64_64(left[k], right); - r01 = add_128_128(r01, product); + check_add_128_128_overflow(&r01, r01, product); /* no carry */ result[k] = r01.m_low; r01.m_low = r01.m_high; @@ -496,8 +506,7 @@ static void vli_square(u64 *result, const u64 *left, unsigned int ndigits) product.m_low <<= 1; } - r01 = add_128_128(r01, product); - r2 += (r01.m_high < product.m_high); + r2 += check_add_128_128_overflow(&r01, r01, product); } result[k] = r01.m_low; From ee6a2a25665c6b599091acac22dc28e6c0006e12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 13:26:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 463/607] crypto: hisi-trng - Remove crypto_rng interface commit 216a7795ec210bdabd5dad42323eee70bbfc8d90 upstream. drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c exposes the same hardware through two completely separate interfaces, crypto_rng and hwrng. However, the implementation of this is buggy because it permits generation operations from these interfaces to run concurrently with each other, accessing the same registers. That is, hisi_trng_generate() synchronizes with itself but not with hisi_trng_read(). This results in potential repetition of output from the RNG, output of non-random values, etc. Fortunately, there's actually no point in hardware RNG drivers implementing the crypto_rng interface. It's not actually used by anything besides the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG, which in turn is not actually used in practice. Other crypto_rng hardware drivers are likewise being phased out, leaving just the hwrng support. Thus, remove it to simplify the code and avoid conflict (and confusion) with the hwrng interface which is the one that actually matters. Fixes: e4d9d10ef4be ("crypto: hisilicon/trng - add support for PRNG") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c | 296 +-------------------------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 295 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig index a0cb1a8186ac9..6f2094404079e 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig @@ -79,6 +79,5 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_HISI_TRNG tristate "Support for HISI TRNG Driver" depends on ARM64 && ACPI select HW_RANDOM - select CRYPTO_RNG help Support for HiSilicon TRNG Driver. diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c index 5ca0b90859a81..6584ed051e099 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/trng/trng.c @@ -1,234 +1,27 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* Copyright (c) 2019 HiSilicon Limited. */ -#include #include -#include #include #include #include #include #include -#include #include -#include #include #include #define HISI_TRNG_REG 0x00F0 #define HISI_TRNG_BYTES 4 #define HISI_TRNG_QUALITY 512 -#define HISI_TRNG_VERSION 0x01B8 -#define HISI_TRNG_VER_V1 GENMASK(31, 0) #define SLEEP_US 10 #define TIMEOUT_US 10000 -#define SW_DRBG_NUM_SHIFT 2 -#define SW_DRBG_KEY_BASE 0x082C -#define SW_DRBG_SEED(n) (SW_DRBG_KEY_BASE - ((n) << SW_DRBG_NUM_SHIFT)) -#define SW_DRBG_SEED_REGS_NUM 12 -#define SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE 48 -#define SW_DRBG_BLOCKS 0x0830 -#define SW_DRBG_INIT 0x0834 -#define SW_DRBG_GEN 0x083c -#define SW_DRBG_STATUS 0x0840 -#define SW_DRBG_BLOCKS_NUM 4095 -#define SW_DRBG_DATA_BASE 0x0850 -#define SW_DRBG_DATA_NUM 4 -#define SW_DRBG_DATA(n) (SW_DRBG_DATA_BASE - ((n) << SW_DRBG_NUM_SHIFT)) -#define SW_DRBG_BYTES 16 -#define SW_DRBG_ENABLE_SHIFT 12 -#define SEED_SHIFT_24 24 -#define SEED_SHIFT_16 16 -#define SEED_SHIFT_8 8 -#define SW_MAX_RANDOM_BYTES 65520 - -struct hisi_trng_list { - struct mutex lock; - struct list_head list; - bool is_init; -}; struct hisi_trng { void __iomem *base; - struct hisi_trng_list *trng_list; - struct list_head list; struct hwrng rng; - u32 ver; - u32 ctx_num; - /* The bytes of the random number generated since the last seeding. */ - u32 random_bytes; - struct mutex lock; -}; - -struct hisi_trng_ctx { - struct hisi_trng *trng; }; -static atomic_t trng_active_devs; -static struct hisi_trng_list trng_devices; -static int hisi_trng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait); - -static int hisi_trng_set_seed(struct hisi_trng *trng, const u8 *seed) -{ - u32 val, seed_reg, i; - int ret; - - writel(0x0, trng->base + SW_DRBG_BLOCKS); - - for (i = 0; i < SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE; - i += SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE / SW_DRBG_SEED_REGS_NUM) { - val = seed[i] << SEED_SHIFT_24; - val |= seed[i + 1UL] << SEED_SHIFT_16; - val |= seed[i + 2UL] << SEED_SHIFT_8; - val |= seed[i + 3UL]; - - seed_reg = (i >> SW_DRBG_NUM_SHIFT) % SW_DRBG_SEED_REGS_NUM; - writel(val, trng->base + SW_DRBG_SEED(seed_reg)); - } - - writel(SW_DRBG_BLOCKS_NUM | (0x1 << SW_DRBG_ENABLE_SHIFT), - trng->base + SW_DRBG_BLOCKS); - writel(0x1, trng->base + SW_DRBG_INIT); - ret = readl_relaxed_poll_timeout(trng->base + SW_DRBG_STATUS, - val, val & BIT(0), SLEEP_US, TIMEOUT_US); - if (ret) { - pr_err("failed to init trng(%d)\n", ret); - return -EIO; - } - - trng->random_bytes = 0; - - return 0; -} - -static int hisi_trng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, - unsigned int slen) -{ - struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); - struct hisi_trng *trng = ctx->trng; - int ret; - - if (slen < SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE) { - pr_err("slen(%u) is not matched with trng(%d)\n", slen, - SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE); - return -EINVAL; - } - - mutex_lock(&trng->lock); - ret = hisi_trng_set_seed(trng, seed); - mutex_unlock(&trng->lock); - - return ret; -} - -static int hisi_trng_reseed(struct hisi_trng *trng) -{ - u8 seed[SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE]; - int size; - - if (!trng->random_bytes) - return 0; - - size = hisi_trng_read(&trng->rng, seed, SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE, false); - if (size != SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE) - return -EIO; - - return hisi_trng_set_seed(trng, seed); -} - -static int hisi_trng_get_bytes(struct hisi_trng *trng, u8 *dstn, unsigned int dlen) -{ - u32 data[SW_DRBG_DATA_NUM]; - u32 currsize = 0; - u32 val = 0; - int ret; - u32 i; - - ret = hisi_trng_reseed(trng); - if (ret) - return ret; - - do { - ret = readl_relaxed_poll_timeout(trng->base + SW_DRBG_STATUS, - val, val & BIT(1), SLEEP_US, TIMEOUT_US); - if (ret) { - pr_err("failed to generate random number(%d)!\n", ret); - break; - } - - for (i = 0; i < SW_DRBG_DATA_NUM; i++) - data[i] = readl(trng->base + SW_DRBG_DATA(i)); - - if (dlen - currsize >= SW_DRBG_BYTES) { - memcpy(dstn + currsize, data, SW_DRBG_BYTES); - currsize += SW_DRBG_BYTES; - } else { - memcpy(dstn + currsize, data, dlen - currsize); - currsize = dlen; - } - - trng->random_bytes += SW_DRBG_BYTES; - writel(0x1, trng->base + SW_DRBG_GEN); - } while (currsize < dlen); - - return ret; -} - -static int hisi_trng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, - unsigned int slen, u8 *dstn, unsigned int dlen) -{ - struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); - struct hisi_trng *trng = ctx->trng; - unsigned int currsize = 0; - unsigned int block_size; - int ret; - - if (!dstn || !dlen) { - pr_err("output is error, dlen %u!\n", dlen); - return -EINVAL; - } - - do { - block_size = min_t(unsigned int, dlen - currsize, SW_MAX_RANDOM_BYTES); - mutex_lock(&trng->lock); - ret = hisi_trng_get_bytes(trng, dstn + currsize, block_size); - mutex_unlock(&trng->lock); - if (ret) - return ret; - currsize += block_size; - } while (currsize < dlen); - - return 0; -} - -static int hisi_trng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) -{ - struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - struct hisi_trng *trng; - u32 ctx_num = ~0; - - mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); - list_for_each_entry(trng, &trng_devices.list, list) { - if (trng->ctx_num < ctx_num) { - ctx_num = trng->ctx_num; - ctx->trng = trng; - } - } - ctx->trng->ctx_num++; - mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); - - return 0; -} - -static void hisi_trng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) -{ - struct hisi_trng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - - mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); - ctx->trng->ctx_num--; - mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); -} - static int hisi_trng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait) { struct hisi_trng *trng; @@ -260,42 +53,6 @@ static int hisi_trng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait) return currsize; } -static struct rng_alg hisi_trng_alg = { - .generate = hisi_trng_generate, - .seed = hisi_trng_seed, - .seedsize = SW_DRBG_SEED_SIZE, - .base = { - .cra_name = "stdrng", - .cra_driver_name = "hisi_stdrng", - .cra_priority = 300, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct hisi_trng_ctx), - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .cra_init = hisi_trng_init, - .cra_exit = hisi_trng_exit, - }, -}; - -static void hisi_trng_add_to_list(struct hisi_trng *trng) -{ - mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); - list_add_tail(&trng->list, &trng_devices.list); - mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); -} - -static int hisi_trng_del_from_list(struct hisi_trng *trng) -{ - int ret = -EBUSY; - - mutex_lock(&trng_devices.lock); - if (!trng->ctx_num) { - list_del(&trng->list); - ret = 0; - } - mutex_unlock(&trng_devices.lock); - - return ret; -} - static int hisi_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct hisi_trng *trng; @@ -305,68 +62,20 @@ static int hisi_trng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (!trng) return -ENOMEM; - platform_set_drvdata(pdev, trng); - trng->base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); if (IS_ERR(trng->base)) return PTR_ERR(trng->base); - trng->ctx_num = 0; - trng->random_bytes = SW_MAX_RANDOM_BYTES; - mutex_init(&trng->lock); - trng->ver = readl(trng->base + HISI_TRNG_VERSION); - if (!trng_devices.is_init) { - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&trng_devices.list); - mutex_init(&trng_devices.lock); - trng_devices.is_init = true; - } - - hisi_trng_add_to_list(trng); - if (trng->ver != HISI_TRNG_VER_V1 && - atomic_inc_return(&trng_active_devs) == 1) { - ret = crypto_register_rng(&hisi_trng_alg); - if (ret) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, - "failed to register crypto(%d)\n", ret); - atomic_dec_return(&trng_active_devs); - goto err_remove_from_list; - } - } - trng->rng.name = pdev->name; trng->rng.read = hisi_trng_read; trng->rng.quality = HISI_TRNG_QUALITY; + ret = devm_hwrng_register(&pdev->dev, &trng->rng); - if (ret) { + if (ret) dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register hwrng: %d!\n", ret); - goto err_crypto_unregister; - } - - return ret; - -err_crypto_unregister: - if (trng->ver != HISI_TRNG_VER_V1 && - atomic_dec_return(&trng_active_devs) == 0) - crypto_unregister_rng(&hisi_trng_alg); - -err_remove_from_list: - hisi_trng_del_from_list(trng); return ret; } -static void hisi_trng_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) -{ - struct hisi_trng *trng = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); - - /* Wait until the task is finished */ - while (hisi_trng_del_from_list(trng)) - ; - - if (trng->ver != HISI_TRNG_VER_V1 && - atomic_dec_return(&trng_active_devs) == 0) - crypto_unregister_rng(&hisi_trng_alg); -} - static const struct acpi_device_id hisi_trng_acpi_match[] = { { "HISI02B3", 0 }, { } @@ -375,7 +84,6 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, hisi_trng_acpi_match); static struct platform_driver hisi_trng_driver = { .probe = hisi_trng_probe, - .remove = hisi_trng_remove, .driver = { .name = "hisi-trng-v2", .acpi_match_table = ACPI_PTR(hisi_trng_acpi_match), From c4bd2f4c35b0e15b6040c2f7e7e7986780c066cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruijie Li Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 19:45:21 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 464/607] crypto: pcrypt - restore callback for non-parallel fallback commit ed459fe319376e876de433d12b6c6772e612ca36 upstream. pcrypt installs pcrypt_aead_done() on the child AEAD request before trying to submit it through padata. If padata_do_parallel() returns -EBUSY, pcrypt falls back to calling the child AEAD directly. That fallback must not keep the padata completion callback. Otherwise an asynchronous completion runs pcrypt_aead_done() even though the request was never enrolled in padata. Restore the original request callback and callback data before calling the child AEAD directly. This keeps the fallback path aligned with a direct AEAD request while leaving the parallel path unchanged. Fixes: 662f2f13e66d ("crypto: pcrypt - Call crypto layer directly when padata_do_parallel() return -EBUSY") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Ruijie Li Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/pcrypt.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/pcrypt.c b/crypto/pcrypt.c index ed0feaba23832..9f372442981e6 100644 --- a/crypto/pcrypt.c +++ b/crypto/pcrypt.c @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ static int pcrypt_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) return -EINPROGRESS; if (err == -EBUSY) { /* try non-parallel mode */ + aead_request_set_callback(creq, flags, req->base.complete, + req->base.data); return crypto_aead_encrypt(creq); } @@ -173,6 +175,8 @@ static int pcrypt_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) return -EINPROGRESS; if (err == -EBUSY) { /* try non-parallel mode */ + aead_request_set_callback(creq, flags, req->base.complete, + req->base.data); return crypto_aead_decrypt(creq); } From cc4e42b3ee9fc53ba1a63106c2db46f17ffedd00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 10:27:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 465/607] crypto: tegra - fix refcount leak in tegra_se_host1x_submit() commit 6ea0ce3a19f9c37a014099e2b0a46b27fa164564 upstream. The timeout error path in tegra_se_host1x_submit() returns without calling host1x_job_put(), while all other paths (success, submit error, pin error) properly release the job reference through the job_put label. Since host1x_job_alloc() initializes the reference count and host1x_job_put() is required to drop it, omitting it on timeout causes a permanent refcount leak. Fix this by redirecting the timeout return to the existing job_put label, ensuring the job reference and any associated syncpt references are consistently released. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0880bb3b00c8 ("crypto: tegra - Add Tegra Security Engine driver") Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Reviewed-by: Akhil R Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c b/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c index 7237f14eaf5ae..2755f19ad05e9 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/tegra/tegra-se-main.c @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ int tegra_se_host1x_submit(struct tegra_se *se, struct tegra_se_cmdbuf *cmdbuf, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT, NULL); if (ret) { dev_err(se->dev, "host1x job timed out\n"); - return ret; + goto job_put; } host1x_job_put(job); From 53b8fb85f332b71f9946c1216620e57f1bfde72d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 21:25:25 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 466/607] crypto: loongson - Select CRYPTO_RNG commit 4c600ab0d8cfc9d75b92f3426dbcb2ad85eac91d upstream. This driver registers a rng_alg, so it requires CRYPTO_RNG. Fixes: 766b2d724c8d ("crypto: loongson - add Loongson RNG driver support") Reported-by: kernel test robot Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202605201622.qWOiiZTV-lkp@intel.com/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig index 15475da8fc11d..f4e1544ffbb49 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_LOONGSON_RNG tristate "Support for Loongson RNG Driver" depends on MFD_LOONGSON_SE + select CRYPTO_RNG help Support for Loongson RNG Driver. From 9e983d0a74a6a2348e4ce61647ec8a4dfbe198ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 10:51:44 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 467/607] crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for SEV ioctls commit fb1758e74b8061aacfbce7bbb7a7cc650537e167 upstream. Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? sev_move_to_init_state() is called for ioctls requiring only SEV firmware: SEV_PEK_GEN, SEV_PDH_GEN, SEV_PEK_CSR, SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, and SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT. After the firmware command, it does SEV_SHUTDOWN on the SEV firmware. Since these commands do not require SNP to be initialized, skip it by calling __sev_platform_init_locked() which only initializes the SEV firmware. This way SNP is not Initialized at all, and HSAVE_PA is not cleared. The previous code saved any SEV initialization firmware error to init_args.error and then threw it away and hardcoded the return value of INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE regardless of the real firmware error. This patch changes it to surface the underlying error, which is hopefully both more useful and doesn't cause any problems. Note that it is still safe to call __sev_firmware_shutdown() directly: it calls __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(), which skips SNP shutdown if SNP was not initialized. Fixes: ceac7fb89e8d ("crypto: ccp - Ensure implicit SEV/SNP init and shutdown in ioctls") Reported-by: Sashiko Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org CC: Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c index 5c7a5ff2d9eaa..ac640dcda7030 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -1689,14 +1689,11 @@ static int sev_get_platform_state(int *state, int *error) static int sev_move_to_init_state(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool *shutdown_required) { - struct sev_platform_init_args init_args = {0}; int rc; - rc = _sev_platform_init_locked(&init_args); - if (rc) { - argp->error = SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE; + rc = __sev_platform_init_locked(&argp->error); + if (rc) return rc; - } *shutdown_required = true; From 7a361c74bb12f3398c388905f1d325be642cd36e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 10:51:45 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 468/607] crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_COMMIT) commit 5a1364da2f04217a36e2fdfa2db4ee025b383a20 upstream. Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? The SNP_COMMIT command does not require the firmware to be in any particular state. Skip initializing it if it was previously uninitialized. The SEV-SNP firmware specification doc 56860 does not mention SNP_COMMIT in Table 5 as a command that is allowed in the UNINIT state, but it is in fact allowed and a future documentation update will reflect that. Fixes: ceac7fb89e8d ("crypto: ccp - Ensure implicit SEV/SNP init and shutdown in ioctls") Reported-by: Sashiko Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org CC: Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 13 +------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c index ac640dcda7030..42dd9b2717798 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -2411,24 +2411,13 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp) static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_commit(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp) { - struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; struct sev_data_snp_commit buf; - bool shutdown_required = false; - int ret, error; - - if (!sev->snp_initialized) { - ret = snp_move_to_init_state(argp, &shutdown_required); - if (ret) - return ret; - } + int ret; buf.len = sizeof(buf); ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_COMMIT, &buf, &argp->error); - if (shutdown_required) - __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(&error, false); - return ret; } From 92567ed9306d5a3d1b007eb4faeff30cc3ffc3e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 10:51:46 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 469/607] crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_VLEK_LOAD) commit f91e9dbb5845d1e5abf1028e6df57dcf61583e1b upstream. Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? The SEV firmware docs for SNP_VLEK_LOAD note: > On SNP_SHUTDOWN, the VLEK is deleted. That is, the initialization/shutdown wrapper here is pointless, because the firmware immediately throws away the key anyway. Instead, refuse to do anything if SNP has not been previously initialized. This is an ABI break: before, this was a no-op and almost certainly a mistake by userspace, and now it returns -ENODEV. ABI compatibility could be maintained here by simply returning 0 in the check instead. Fixes: ceac7fb89e8d ("crypto: ccp - Ensure implicit SEV/SNP init and shutdown in ioctls") Reported-by: Sashiko Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org CC: Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 17 ++++------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c index 42dd9b2717798..89276f839298e 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -2455,9 +2455,8 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable) { struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; struct sev_user_data_snp_vlek_load input; - bool shutdown_required = false; - int ret, error; void *blob; + int ret; if (!argp->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -2465,6 +2464,9 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable) if (!writable) return -EPERM; + if (!sev->snp_initialized) + return -ENODEV; + if (copy_from_user(&input, u64_to_user_ptr(argp->data), sizeof(input))) return -EFAULT; @@ -2478,18 +2480,7 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable) input.vlek_wrapped_address = __psp_pa(blob); - if (!sev->snp_initialized) { - ret = snp_move_to_init_state(argp, &shutdown_required); - if (ret) - goto cleanup; - } - ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_VLEK_LOAD, &input, &argp->error); - - if (shutdown_required) - __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(&error, false); - -cleanup: kfree(blob); return ret; From 441ea32cf2755a0dc593557056b00b7caa0651f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Tycho Andersen (AMD)" Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 10:51:47 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 470/607] crypto: ccp - Do not initialize SNP for ioctl(SNP_CONFIG) commit 08f0e65e784c4b20e6e620dd4f68d8636073a3d2 upstream. Sashiko notes: > if SEV initialization fails and KVM is actively running normal VMs, could a > userspace process trigger this code path via /dev/sev ioctls (e.g., > SEV_PDH_GEN) and zero out MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA globally? Would the next VMRUN > execution for an active VM trigger a general protection fault and crash the > host? Refuse to re-try initialization if SNP is not already initialized for SNP_CONFIG. This is technically an ABI break: before if SNP initialization failed it could be transparently retriggered by this ioctl, and if no VMs were running, everything worked fine. Hopefully this is enough of a corner case that nobody will notice, but someone does, there are a few options: * do something like symbol_get() for kvm and refuse to initialize if KVM is loaded * check each cpu's HSAVE_PA for non-zero data before re-initializing * once initialization has failed, continue to refuse to initialize until the ccp module is unloaded Fixes: ceac7fb89e8d ("crypto: ccp - Ensure implicit SEV/SNP init and shutdown in ioctls") Reported-by: Sashiko Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org CC: Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 33 ++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c index 89276f839298e..d99726d1d57f0 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c @@ -1700,21 +1700,6 @@ static int sev_move_to_init_state(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool *shutdown_req return 0; } -static int snp_move_to_init_state(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool *shutdown_required) -{ - int error, rc; - - rc = __sev_snp_init_locked(&error, 0); - if (rc) { - argp->error = SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE; - return rc; - } - - *shutdown_required = true; - - return 0; -} - static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable) { int state, rc; @@ -2425,8 +2410,6 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_set_config(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable { struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data; struct sev_user_data_snp_config config; - bool shutdown_required = false; - int ret, error; if (!argp->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -2434,21 +2417,13 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_set_config(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable if (!writable) return -EPERM; + if (!sev->snp_initialized) + return -ENODEV; + if (copy_from_user(&config, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(config))) return -EFAULT; - if (!sev->snp_initialized) { - ret = snp_move_to_init_state(argp, &shutdown_required); - if (ret) - return ret; - } - - ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_CONFIG, &config, &argp->error); - - if (shutdown_required) - __sev_snp_shutdown_locked(&error, false); - - return ret; + return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SNP_CONFIG, &config, &argp->error); } static int sev_ioctl_do_snp_vlek_load(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp, bool writable) From 23b8b188cb32e5531d0f8d3af9506f8959cb369e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:33:45 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 471/607] crypto: drbg - Fix returning success on failure in CTR_DRBG commit 39a31ad9e2a5ed7e9c9c6f711dca96c8c8f5f26b upstream. drbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the output buffer uninitialized. Fix it. Fixes: cde001e4c3c3 ("crypto: rng - RNGs must return 0 in success case") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index dbe4c8bb5ceb7..a40cb75cecdcd 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static int drbg_ctr_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg, if (addtl && !list_empty(addtl)) { ret = drbg_ctr_update(drbg, addtl, 2); if (ret) - return 0; + return ret; } /* 10.2.1.5.2 step 4.1 */ From 53d38b93cadc08bcbe6e200bb19d37cb9bec1f1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:33:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 472/607] crypto: drbg - Fix drbg_max_addtl() on 64-bit kernels commit 6f49f00c981bbb9ef602966f19bfdbef46b681d2 upstream. On 64-bit kernels, drbg_max_addtl() returns 2**35 bytes. That's too large, for two reasons: 1. SP800-90A says the maximum limit is 2**35 *bits*, not 2**35 bytes. So the implemented limit has confused bits and bytes. 2. When drbg_kcapi_hash() calls crypto_shash_update() on the additional information string, the length is implicitly cast to 'unsigned int'. That truncates the additional information string to U32_MAX bytes. Fix the maximum additional information string length to always be U32_MAX - 1, causing an error to be returned for any longer lengths. Fixes: 541af946fe13 ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/crypto/drbg.h | 18 +++++++----------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h index af5ad51d3eef8..1e3dd17266740 100644 --- a/include/crypto/drbg.h +++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h @@ -171,19 +171,15 @@ static inline size_t drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg) return (1 << 16); } +/* + * SP800-90A allows implementations to support additional info / personalization + * strings of up to 2**35 bits. Implementations can have a smaller maximum. We + * use 2**35 - 16 bits == U32_MAX - 1 bytes so that the max + 1 always fits in a + * size_t, allowing drbg_healthcheck_sanity() to verify its enforcement. + */ static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg) { - /* SP800-90A requires 2**35 bytes additional info str / pers str */ -#if (__BITS_PER_LONG == 32) - /* - * SP800-90A allows smaller maximum numbers to be returned -- we - * return SIZE_MAX - 1 to allow the verification of the enforcement - * of this value in drbg_healthcheck_sanity. - */ - return (SIZE_MAX - 1); -#else - return (1UL<<35); -#endif + return U32_MAX - 1; } static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg) From 5337b5cd3608a7d25cd89ce0225f4e020015edfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:33:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 473/607] crypto: drbg - Fix the fips_enabled priority boost commit a8a1f93080efc83a9ff8452954429ae379e9e614 upstream. When fips_enabled=1, it seems to have been intended for one of the algorithms defined in crypto/drbg.c to be the highest priority "stdrng" algorithm, so that it is what is used by "stdrng" users. However, the code only boosts the priority to 400, which is less than the priority 500 used in drivers/crypto/caam/caamprng.c. Thus, the CAAM RNG could be used instead. Fix this by boosting the priority by 2000 instead of 200. Fixes: 541af946fe13 ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- crypto/drbg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c index a40cb75cecdcd..dc8996789da67 100644 --- a/crypto/drbg.c +++ b/crypto/drbg.c @@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ static inline void __init drbg_fill_array(struct rng_alg *alg, * it is selected. */ if (fips_enabled) - alg->base.cra_priority += 200; + alg->base.cra_priority += 2000; alg->base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct drbg_state); alg->base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; From 050bded706ee59d86615e8c535232edc55c200e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 17:16:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 474/607] crypto: qat - centralize bus master enable commit e5712ff82947dd02d118cee119ed36cec671d814 upstream. QAT driver currently toggles PCI bus mastering in multiple places (probe paths, and reset callbacks). This makes BME state depend on call ordering and on what PCI command bits were captured in saved PCI config state. Make BME control explicit and deterministic: - remove pci_set_master() from device-specific probe paths - add adf_set_bme() and call it from adf_dev_init() so BME is enabled at one point before device bring-up - drop redundant pci_set_master() and pci_clear_master from adf_aer.c and rely on the unified init path for BME enablement This is in preparation for adding reset_prepare() and reset_done() hooks. In the PCI reset callback flow, the PCI core saves and restores device configuration state around reset_prepare() and reset_done(). This change is needed to ensure that we are able to properly shutdown or reinitialize the device post sysfs triggered resets. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_420xx/adf_drv.c | 2 -- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_4xxx/adf_drv.c | 2 -- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c | 2 -- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxx/adf_drv.c | 1 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c | 1 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62x/adf_drv.c | 1 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c | 1 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c | 10 +++++++--- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h | 1 + drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c | 2 ++ drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c | 1 - drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c | 1 - 12 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_420xx/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_420xx/adf_drv.c index cfa00daeb4fba..3acbbb586dc0c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_420xx/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_420xx/adf_drv.c @@ -146,8 +146,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) } } - pci_set_master(pdev); - if (pci_save_state(pdev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to save pci state.\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_4xxx/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_4xxx/adf_drv.c index c9be5dcddb277..f33182c101e2e 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_4xxx/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_4xxx/adf_drv.c @@ -148,8 +148,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) } } - pci_set_master(pdev); - if (pci_save_state(pdev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to save pci state.\n"); ret = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c index f0d112e4b56c3..a30c65af6b4f7 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_6xxx/adf_drv.c @@ -162,8 +162,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) } } - pci_set_master(pdev); - /* * The PCI config space is saved at this point and will be restored * after a Function Level Reset (FLR) as the FLR does not completely diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxx/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxx/adf_drv.c index bceb5dd8b148c..c745397e63a52 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxx/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxx/adf_drv.c @@ -167,7 +167,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) goto out_err_free_reg; } } - pci_set_master(pdev); if (pci_save_state(pdev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to save pci state\n"); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c index c622793e94a87..b31c58fdfb58e 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c3xxxvf/adf_drv.c @@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) goto out_err_free_reg; } } - pci_set_master(pdev); /* Completion for VF2PF request/response message exchange */ init_completion(&accel_dev->vf.msg_received); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62x/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62x/adf_drv.c index 23ccb72b6ea22..941400c64d4be 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62x/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62x/adf_drv.c @@ -167,7 +167,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) goto out_err_free_reg; } } - pci_set_master(pdev); if (pci_save_state(pdev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to save pci state\n"); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c index 4840d44bbd5b2..631eb2b411506 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_c62xvf/adf_drv.c @@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) goto out_err_free_reg; } } - pci_set_master(pdev); /* Completion for VF2PF request/response message exchange */ init_completion(&accel_dev->vf.msg_received); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c index f63e78724c7a7..1722315762791 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, adf_error_notifier(accel_dev); adf_pf2vf_notify_fatal_error(accel_dev); adf_dev_restarting_notify(accel_dev); - pci_clear_master(pdev); adf_dev_down(accel_dev); return PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET; @@ -106,6 +105,13 @@ void adf_dev_restore(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) } } +void adf_set_bme(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) +{ + struct pci_dev *pdev = accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev); + + pci_set_master(pdev); +} + static void adf_device_sriov_worker(struct work_struct *work) { struct adf_sriov_dev_data *sriov_data = @@ -198,8 +204,6 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *pdev) return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; } - if (!pdev->is_busmaster) - pci_set_master(pdev); pci_restore_state(pdev); res = adf_dev_up(accel_dev, false); if (res && res != -EALREADY) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h index c625324bd47f9..a2b9491c26b13 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ extern const struct pci_error_handlers adf_err_handler; void adf_reset_sbr(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); void adf_reset_flr(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); void adf_dev_restore(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); +void adf_set_bme(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); int adf_init_aer(void); void adf_exit_aer(void); int adf_init_arb(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c index 46491048e0bb4..389d5eb66b51f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c @@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static int adf_dev_init(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) return -EFAULT; } + adf_set_bme(accel_dev); + if (!test_bit(ADF_STATUS_CONFIGURED, &accel_dev->status) && !accel_dev->is_vf) { dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Device not configured\n"); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c index b59e0cc49e521..99a6bf9e2b005 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xcc/adf_drv.c @@ -167,7 +167,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) goto out_err_free_reg; } } - pci_set_master(pdev); if (pci_save_state(pdev)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to save pci state\n"); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c index 7cd528ee31e77..e3eab03ad65bd 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_dh895xccvf/adf_drv.c @@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ static int adf_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) goto out_err_free_reg; } } - pci_set_master(pdev); /* Completion for VF2PF request/response message exchange */ init_completion(&accel_dev->vf.msg_received); From 33cfc0ce28ac9f8c228a93dc4f1b70fc7c3d22c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 17:16:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 475/607] crypto: qat - handle sysfs-triggered reset callbacks commit 4627ef7019bc532f992c0723e881811ce12f0a02 upstream. A reset requested through /sys/bus/pci/devices/.../reset invokes the driver reset_prepare() and reset_done() callbacks. The QAT driver does not implement those callbacks today, so the reset proceeds without quiescing the device or bringing it back up afterward, which leaves the device unusable. Hook reset_prepare() and reset_done() into adf_err_handler so the common shutdown and recovery flow also runs for reset. Skip device quiesce if the device is already in a down state. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Reviewed-by: Damian Muszynski Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c index 1722315762791..a9a2dd5222e3d 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c @@ -222,10 +222,22 @@ static void adf_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev) dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Device is up and running\n"); } +static void adf_reset_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + reset_prepare(pdev); +} + +static void adf_reset_done(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + reset_done(pdev); +} + const struct pci_error_handlers adf_err_handler = { .error_detected = adf_error_detected, .slot_reset = adf_slot_reset, .resume = adf_resume, + .reset_prepare = adf_reset_prepare, + .reset_done = adf_reset_done, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(adf_err_handler); From 45b65a21edbe0cf93a1e1451cfeefc5d4965deab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 17:16:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 476/607] crypto: qat - keep VFs enabled during reset commit 57518500053987672050dc2f7bf8a774d5d52fd9 upstream. When a reset is triggered via sysfs, the PCI core invokes the reset_prepare() callback while holding pci_dev_lock(), which includes the PCI configuration space access semaphore. If reset_prepare() calls adf_dev_down(), the call chain adf_dev_stop() -> adf_disable_sriov() -> pci_disable_sriov() attempts to acquire the same semaphore, resulting in a deadlock. Avoid this by skipping pci_disable_sriov() when ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING is set. During reset the PCI topology is preserved, so VF devices remain valid and enumerated across the reset. VF notification and the quiesce handshake via adf_pf2vf_notify_restarting() are still performed unconditionally so that VFs stop submitting work before the PF shuts down. Correspondingly, skip pci_enable_sriov() in adf_enable_sriov() when VFs are already present, since their PCI devices were preserved from before the restart. This is in preparation for adding reset_prepare() and reset_done() callbacks in adf_aer.c. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Reviewed-by: Damian Muszynski Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_sriov.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_sriov.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_sriov.c index 31d1ef0cb1f52..e9f825368b7ea 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_sriov.c @@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ static int adf_enable_sriov(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) /* Enable VF to PF interrupts for all VFs */ adf_enable_vf2pf_interrupts(accel_dev, BIT_ULL(totalvfs) - 1); + /* Do not enable SR-IOV if already enabled */ + if (pci_num_vf(pdev)) + return 0; + /* * Due to the hardware design, when SR-IOV and the ring arbiter * are enabled all the VFs supported in hardware must be enabled in @@ -247,7 +251,13 @@ void adf_disable_sriov(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) adf_pf2vf_notify_restarting(accel_dev); adf_pf2vf_wait_for_restarting_complete(accel_dev); - pci_disable_sriov(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)); + /* + * When the device is restarting, preserve VF PCI devices across + * the reset by skipping pci_disable_sriov(). VFs are notified to + * quiesce regardless so the PF can safely shut down. + */ + if (!test_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status)) + pci_disable_sriov(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)); /* Disable VF to PF interrupts */ adf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(accel_dev); From e310e8dc8ce72f5b314db631bd5e500c95b8fcd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 17:16:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 477/607] crypto: qat - notify fatal error before AER reset preparation commit 6931835f2fdd0cb9b1c7791748d7e67d0749056a upstream. Send fatal error notifications to subsystems and VFs as soon as AER error detection starts, before entering the reset preparation shutdown sequence. This reduces notification latency and ensures peers are informed immediately on fatal detection, rather than after restart-state setup and arbitration teardown. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Reviewed-by: Damian Muszynski Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c index a9a2dd5222e3d..1d786f793b8b7 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c @@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; } + adf_error_notifier(accel_dev); + adf_pf2vf_notify_fatal_error(accel_dev); set_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status); if (accel_dev->hw_device->exit_arb) { dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Disabling arbitration\n"); accel_dev->hw_device->exit_arb(accel_dev); } - adf_error_notifier(accel_dev); - adf_pf2vf_notify_fatal_error(accel_dev); adf_dev_restarting_notify(accel_dev); adf_dev_down(accel_dev); From c3c5925791cff3b84d313293fd60f384d877d793 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 13:41:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 478/607] crypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock commit 5c6f845e77ec35f9b7b047cc8f9789bf397cdd3e upstream. The service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are added or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but several functions iterate over the list without holding this lock. A concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call could modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or a use-after-free. Fix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry() iterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(), adf_dev_stop(), adf_dev_shutdown(), adf_dev_restarting_notify(), adf_dev_restarted_notify(), and adf_error_notifier(). The lock ordering is safe: callers of the static helpers (adf_dev_up() and adf_dev_down()) acquire state_lock before service_lock, and no event_hld callback or service_lock holder ever acquires state_lock in the reverse order. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d8cba25d2c68 ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT driver framework") Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Co-developed-by: Maksim Lukoshkov Signed-off-by: Maksim Lukoshkov Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c index 389d5eb66b51f..fe397f39a6c4f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_init.c @@ -154,15 +154,18 @@ static int adf_dev_init(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) * This is to facilitate any ordering dependencies between services * prior to starting any of the accelerators. */ + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_INIT)) { dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to initialise service %s\n", service->name); + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return -EFAULT; } set_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->init_status); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return 0; } @@ -231,15 +234,18 @@ static int adf_dev_start(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) return ret; + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_START)) { dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to start service %s\n", service->name); + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return -EFAULT; } set_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->start_status); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_STARTING, &accel_dev->status); set_bit(ADF_STATUS_STARTED, &accel_dev->status); @@ -310,6 +316,7 @@ static void adf_dev_stop(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) qat_comp_algs_unregister(); clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_COMP_ALGS_REGISTERED, &accel_dev->status); + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (!test_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->start_status)) continue; @@ -321,6 +328,7 @@ static void adf_dev_stop(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) clear_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->start_status); } } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); if (hw_data->stop_timer) hw_data->stop_timer(accel_dev); @@ -370,6 +378,7 @@ static void adf_dev_shutdown(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) &accel_dev->status); } + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (!test_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->init_status)) continue; @@ -380,6 +389,7 @@ static void adf_dev_shutdown(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) else clear_bit(accel_dev->accel_id, service->init_status); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); adf_rl_exit(accel_dev); @@ -414,12 +424,14 @@ int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) { struct service_hndl *service; + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_RESTARTING)) dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to restart service %s.\n", service->name); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return 0; } @@ -427,12 +439,14 @@ int adf_dev_restarted_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) { struct service_hndl *service; + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_RESTARTED)) dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to restart service %s.\n", service->name); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); return 0; } @@ -440,12 +454,14 @@ void adf_error_notifier(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) { struct service_hndl *service; + mutex_lock(&service_lock); list_for_each_entry(service, &service_table, list) { if (service->event_hld(accel_dev, ADF_EVENT_FATAL_ERROR)) dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to send error event to %s.\n", service->name); } + mutex_unlock(&service_lock); } int adf_dev_down(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev) From fabf364ef9db5c6315205f2eac1d066b7e044cbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 17:16:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 479/607] crypto: qat - skip restart for down devices commit 9676657117b79f88c22875680c36d7da84b75eca upstream. Skip the shutdown and restart flow when adf_slot_reset() is entered for a device that is already down. In that case, leave ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING clear and let adf_slot_reset() restore PCI function state without calling adf_dev_up(), re-enabling SR-IOV, or sending restarted notifications. This is in preparation for adding reset_prepare() and reset_done() callbacks in adf_aer.c. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c index 1d786f793b8b7..0fa8300c239b5 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; } + if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_CAN_RECOVER; + adf_error_notifier(accel_dev); adf_pf2vf_notify_fatal_error(accel_dev); set_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status); @@ -204,6 +207,9 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *pdev) return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; } + if (!adf_devmgr_in_reset(accel_dev)) + goto reset_complete; + pci_restore_state(pdev); res = adf_dev_up(accel_dev, false); if (res && res != -EALREADY) @@ -213,6 +219,8 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *pdev) adf_pf2vf_notify_restarted(accel_dev); adf_dev_restarted_notify(accel_dev); clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status); + +reset_complete: return PCI_ERS_RESULT_RECOVERED; } From 6fb62b767f3e27661e8f8d2f7b85f4e098fcdb1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giovanni Cabiddu Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 16:57:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 480/607] crypto: qat - validate RSA CRT component lengths commit b3ac78756588059729b9195fcc9f4b37d54057a5 upstream. The generic RSA key parser (rsa_helper.c) bounds each CRT component (p, q, dp, dq, qinv) by the modulus size n_sz, but qat_rsa_setkey_crt() allocates half-size DMA buffers (key_sz / 2) and right-aligns each component with: memcpy(dst + half_key_sz - len, src, len) When a CRT component is larger than half_key_sz the subtraction underflows and memcpy writes past the DMA buffer, causing memory corruption. Add a len > half_key_sz check next to the existing !len check for each of the five CRT components so the driver falls back to the non-CRT path instead of writing out of bounds. Fixes: 879f77e9071f ("crypto: qat - Add RSA CRT mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Laurent M Coquerel Tested-by: Laurent M Coquerel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c index 85c682e248fb9..afb7e3f44a5f8 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c @@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ static void qat_rsa_setkey_crt(struct qat_rsa_ctx *ctx, struct rsa_key *rsa_key) ptr = rsa_key->p; len = rsa_key->p_sz; qat_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &len); - if (!len) + if (!len || len > half_key_sz) goto err; ctx->p = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, half_key_sz, &ctx->dma_p, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx->p) @@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@ static void qat_rsa_setkey_crt(struct qat_rsa_ctx *ctx, struct rsa_key *rsa_key) ptr = rsa_key->q; len = rsa_key->q_sz; qat_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &len); - if (!len) + if (!len || len > half_key_sz) goto free_p; ctx->q = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, half_key_sz, &ctx->dma_q, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ctx->q) @@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static void qat_rsa_setkey_crt(struct qat_rsa_ctx *ctx, struct rsa_key *rsa_key) ptr = rsa_key->dp; len = rsa_key->dp_sz; qat_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &len); - if (!len) + if (!len || len > half_key_sz) goto free_q; ctx->dp = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, half_key_sz, &ctx->dma_dp, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ static void qat_rsa_setkey_crt(struct qat_rsa_ctx *ctx, struct rsa_key *rsa_key) ptr = rsa_key->dq; len = rsa_key->dq_sz; qat_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &len); - if (!len) + if (!len || len > half_key_sz) goto free_dp; ctx->dq = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, half_key_sz, &ctx->dma_dq, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ static void qat_rsa_setkey_crt(struct qat_rsa_ctx *ctx, struct rsa_key *rsa_key) ptr = rsa_key->qinv; len = rsa_key->qinv_sz; qat_rsa_drop_leading_zeros(&ptr, &len); - if (!len) + if (!len || len > half_key_sz) goto free_dq; ctx->qinv = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, half_key_sz, &ctx->dma_qinv, GFP_KERNEL); From 7584c92f72447b20347ec8e7b6a17fb16b3daa4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ahsan Atta Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 17:16:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 481/607] crypto: qat - factor out AER reset helpers commit 56707afb92fee371c0f2e04332c9aa03cdb89793 upstream. Move the shutdown and recovery sequences out of adf_error_detected() and adf_slot_reset() into reset_prepare() and reset_done() helpers. This makes the AER recovery path easier to follow and prepares the common reset flow for reuse by additional PCI reset callbacks without duplicating the logic. No functional change intended. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ahsan Atta Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu Reviewed-by: Damian Muszynski Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c | 86 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c index 0fa8300c239b5..ad35d1887f162 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c @@ -17,27 +17,18 @@ struct adf_fatal_error_data { static struct workqueue_struct *device_reset_wq; static struct workqueue_struct *device_sriov_wq; -static pci_ers_result_t adf_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, - pci_channel_state_t state) +static pci_ers_result_t reset_prepare(struct pci_dev *pdev) { struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev = adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(pdev); - dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Acceleration driver hardware error detected.\n"); if (!accel_dev) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't find acceleration device\n"); return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; } - if (state == pci_channel_io_perm_failure) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't recover from device error\n"); - return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; - } - if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) return PCI_ERS_RESULT_CAN_RECOVER; - adf_error_notifier(accel_dev); - adf_pf2vf_notify_fatal_error(accel_dev); set_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status); if (accel_dev->hw_device->exit_arb) { dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Disabling arbitration\n"); @@ -49,6 +40,57 @@ static pci_ers_result_t adf_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, return PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET; } +static pci_ers_result_t reset_done(struct pci_dev *pdev) +{ + struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev = adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(pdev); + int res; + + if (!accel_dev) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't find acceleration device\n"); + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; + } + + if (!adf_devmgr_in_reset(accel_dev)) + goto reset_complete; + + pci_restore_state(pdev); + res = adf_dev_up(accel_dev, false); + if (res && res != -EALREADY) + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; + + adf_reenable_sriov(accel_dev); + adf_pf2vf_notify_restarted(accel_dev); + adf_dev_restarted_notify(accel_dev); + clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status); + +reset_complete: + dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Device reset completed successfully\n"); + + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_RECOVERED; +} + +static pci_ers_result_t adf_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, + pci_channel_state_t state) +{ + struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev = adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(pdev); + + dev_info(&pdev->dev, "Acceleration driver hardware error detected.\n"); + if (!accel_dev) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't find acceleration device\n"); + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; + } + + if (state == pci_channel_io_perm_failure) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Can't recover from device error\n"); + return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; + } + + adf_error_notifier(accel_dev); + adf_pf2vf_notify_fatal_error(accel_dev); + + return reset_prepare(pdev); +} + /* reset dev data */ struct adf_reset_dev_data { int mode; @@ -199,29 +241,7 @@ static int adf_dev_aer_schedule_reset(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev, static pci_ers_result_t adf_slot_reset(struct pci_dev *pdev) { - struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev = adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(pdev); - int res = 0; - - if (!accel_dev) { - pr_err("QAT: Can't find acceleration device\n"); - return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; - } - - if (!adf_devmgr_in_reset(accel_dev)) - goto reset_complete; - - pci_restore_state(pdev); - res = adf_dev_up(accel_dev, false); - if (res && res != -EALREADY) - return PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; - - adf_reenable_sriov(accel_dev); - adf_pf2vf_notify_restarted(accel_dev); - adf_dev_restarted_notify(accel_dev); - clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status); - -reset_complete: - return PCI_ERS_RESULT_RECOVERED; + return reset_done(pdev); } static void adf_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev) From f52aa95e3cae15311378a24f116224c797b1fa3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 482/607] crypto: talitos - use dma_sync_single_for_cpu() before reading descriptor header commit e17ff3d6ff907dc8406261e8fd3e1fc8a908f0f6 upstream. In order to know if a descriptor has been processed by the device, the driver polls the FIFO to see if DESC_HDR_DONE is set on a descriptor header to confirm completion. The current code does not make sure that the CPU gets up to date data before reading the descriptor. Fix this by calling dma_sync_single_for_cpu() before reading memory written by the device. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 58cdbc6d2263 ("crypto: talitos - fix hash on SEC1.") Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index bc61d0fe35140..440e19dc8de60 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -322,19 +322,31 @@ static int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc, return -EINPROGRESS; } -static __be32 get_request_hdr(struct talitos_request *request, bool is_sec1) +static __be32 get_request_hdr(struct device *dev, + struct talitos_request *request, bool is_sec1) { struct talitos_edesc *edesc; - if (!is_sec1) + if (!is_sec1) { + dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, request->dma_desc, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + return request->desc->hdr; + } - if (!request->desc->next_desc) + if (!request->desc->next_desc) { + dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, request->dma_desc, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); return request->desc->hdr1; + } else { + dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, + be32_to_cpu(request->desc->next_desc), + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); - edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); - - return ((struct talitos_desc *)(edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len))->hdr1; + return ((struct talitos_desc *)(edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len)) + ->hdr1; + } } /* @@ -358,7 +370,7 @@ static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch) /* descriptors with their done bits set don't get the error */ rmb(); - hdr = get_request_hdr(request, is_sec1); + hdr = get_request_hdr(dev, request, is_sec1); if ((hdr & DESC_HDR_DONE) == DESC_HDR_DONE) status = 0; From 664e7f16e74fcf73b8ae40cbf9a1e288bb5c4c3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 483/607] crypto: talitos - add chaining of arbitrary number of descriptor for the SEC1 commit f126384ed55279c3b676f89d5ab547b8de8df782 upstream. The SEC1 hardware can process a chain of descriptors without host intervention. Only the hash implementation currently use this feature, but with a chain of at most 2 descriptors added in commit 37b5e8897eb5 ("crypto: talitos - chain in buffered data for ahash on SEC1"). Add supports for chaining an arbitrary number of descriptors in a chain. Adapt the ahash implementation to make it compatible. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- drivers/crypto/talitos.h | 2 + 2 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 440e19dc8de60..b0ebf99b94f5f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -273,7 +273,10 @@ static int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc, void *context, int error), void *context) { + struct talitos_edesc *edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + dma_addr_t dma_desc, prev_dma_desc; + struct talitos_edesc *prev_edesc = NULL; struct talitos_request *request; unsigned long flags; int head; @@ -292,10 +295,31 @@ static int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc, /* map descriptor and save caller data */ if (is_sec1) { - desc->hdr1 = desc->hdr; - request->dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, &desc->hdr1, + while (edesc) { + edesc->desc.hdr1 = edesc->desc.hdr; + + dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, &edesc->desc.hdr1, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + + if (!prev_edesc) { + request->dma_desc = dma_desc; + goto next; + } + + /* Chain in any previous descriptors. */ + + prev_edesc->desc.next_desc = cpu_to_be32(dma_desc); + + dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, prev_dma_desc, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + +next: + prev_edesc = edesc; + prev_dma_desc = dma_desc; + edesc = edesc->next_desc; + } } else { request->dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, desc, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, @@ -326,6 +350,7 @@ static __be32 get_request_hdr(struct device *dev, struct talitos_request *request, bool is_sec1) { struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + dma_addr_t dma_desc; if (!is_sec1) { dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, request->dma_desc, @@ -334,19 +359,17 @@ static __be32 get_request_hdr(struct device *dev, return request->desc->hdr; } - if (!request->desc->next_desc) { - dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, request->dma_desc, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - return request->desc->hdr1; - } else { - dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, - be32_to_cpu(request->desc->next_desc), - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); - - return ((struct talitos_desc *)(edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len)) - ->hdr1; + edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); + dma_desc = request->dma_desc; + while (edesc->next_desc) { + dma_desc = be32_to_cpu(edesc->desc.next_desc); + edesc = edesc->next_desc; } + + dma_sync_single_for_cpu(dev, dma_desc, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + + return edesc->desc.hdr1; } /* @@ -356,6 +379,7 @@ static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch) { struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); struct talitos_request *request, saved_req; + struct talitos_edesc *edesc; unsigned long flags; int tail, status; bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); @@ -380,9 +404,22 @@ static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch) else status = error; - dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + if (is_sec1) { + dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + edesc = container_of(request->desc, + struct talitos_edesc, desc); + while (edesc->next_desc) { + dma_unmap_single( + dev, be32_to_cpu(edesc->desc.next_desc), + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + edesc = edesc->next_desc; + } + } else { + dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + } /* copy entries so we can call callback outside lock */ saved_req.desc = request->desc; @@ -477,8 +514,12 @@ DEF_TALITOS2_DONE(ch1_3, TALITOS2_ISR_CH_1_3_DONE) static __be32 current_desc_hdr(struct device *dev, int ch) { struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); + struct talitos_request *request; + struct talitos_edesc *edesc; int tail, iter; dma_addr_t cur_desc; + __be32 hdr = 0; cur_desc = ((u64)in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CDPR)) << 32; cur_desc |= in_be32(priv->chan[ch].reg + TALITOS_CDPR_LO); @@ -489,27 +530,35 @@ static __be32 current_desc_hdr(struct device *dev, int ch) } tail = priv->chan[ch].tail; - iter = tail; - while (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].dma_desc != cur_desc && - priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->next_desc != cpu_to_be32(cur_desc)) { - iter = (iter + 1) & (priv->fifo_len - 1); - if (iter == tail) { - dev_err(dev, "couldn't locate current descriptor\n"); - return 0; + do { + request = &priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter]; + + if (request->dma_desc == cur_desc) { + hdr = request->desc->hdr; + } else if (is_sec1) { + edesc = container_of(request->desc, + struct talitos_edesc, desc); + while (edesc->next_desc) { + if (edesc->desc.next_desc == + cpu_to_be32(cur_desc)) { + hdr = edesc->next_desc->desc.hdr1; + break; + } + edesc = edesc->next_desc; + } } - } - if (priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->next_desc == cpu_to_be32(cur_desc)) { - struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + if (hdr) + break; - edesc = container_of(priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc, - struct talitos_edesc, desc); - return ((struct talitos_desc *) - (edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len))->hdr; - } + iter = (iter + 1) & (priv->fifo_len - 1); + } while (iter != tail); + + if (!hdr) + dev_err(dev, "couldn't locate current descriptor\n"); - return priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter].desc->hdr; + return hdr; } /* @@ -1408,10 +1457,6 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_edesc_alloc(struct device *dev, dma_len = 0; } alloc_len += icv_stashing ? authsize : 0; - - /* if its a ahash, add space for a second desc next to the first one */ - if (is_sec1 && !dst) - alloc_len += sizeof(struct talitos_desc); alloc_len += ivsize; edesc = kmalloc(ALIGN(alloc_len, dma_get_cache_alignment()), flags); @@ -1427,6 +1472,7 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *talitos_edesc_alloc(struct device *dev, edesc->dst_nents = dst_nents; edesc->iv_dma = iv_dma; edesc->dma_len = dma_len; + edesc->next_desc = NULL; if (dma_len) edesc->dma_link_tbl = dma_map_single(dev, &edesc->link_tbl[0], edesc->dma_len, @@ -1727,8 +1773,10 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev, struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc; - struct talitos_desc *desc2 = (struct talitos_desc *) - (edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len); + struct talitos_desc *desc2; + + if (desc->next_desc) + desc2 = &edesc->next_desc->desc; unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE); if (desc->next_desc && @@ -1756,10 +1804,17 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev, if (edesc->dma_len) dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); +} - if (desc->next_desc) - dma_unmap_single(dev, be32_to_cpu(desc->next_desc), - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); +static void free_edesc_list_from(struct talitos_edesc *edesc) +{ + struct talitos_edesc *next; + + while (edesc) { + next = edesc->next_desc; + kfree(edesc); + edesc = next; + } } static void ahash_done(struct device *dev, @@ -1778,7 +1833,7 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *dev, } common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq); - kfree(edesc); + free_edesc_list_from(edesc); if (err) { ahash_request_complete(areq, err); @@ -1894,14 +1949,23 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, talitos_handle_buggy_hash(ctx, edesc, &desc->ptr[3]); if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf && length) { - struct talitos_desc *desc2 = (struct talitos_desc *) - (edesc->buf + edesc->dma_len); - dma_addr_t next_desc; + struct talitos_edesc *edesc2; + struct talitos_desc *desc2; + + edesc2 = kzalloc(sizeof(*edesc2), + areq->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? + GFP_KERNEL : + GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!edesc2) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err; + } + edesc->next_desc = edesc2; + + desc2 = &edesc2->desc; - memset(desc2, 0, sizeof(*desc2)); desc2->hdr = desc->hdr; desc2->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT; - desc2->hdr1 = desc2->hdr; desc->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD; desc->hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT; desc->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_DONE_NOTIFY; @@ -1925,21 +1989,21 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, req_ctx->hw_context_size, req_ctx->hw_context, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - - next_desc = dma_map_single(dev, &desc2->hdr1, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - desc->next_desc = cpu_to_be32(next_desc); } if (sync_needed) dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, areq); - if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) { - common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq); - kfree(edesc); - } + ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, + areq); + if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) + goto err; + + return -EINPROGRESS; +err: + common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq); + kfree(edesc); return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.h b/drivers/crypto/talitos.h index 1a93ee355929d..596f96bba3efa 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.h @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct talitos_desc { * @iv_dma: dma address of iv for checking continuity and link table * @dma_len: length of dma mapped link_tbl space * @dma_link_tbl: bus physical address of link_tbl/buf + * @next_desc: next descriptor * @desc: h/w descriptor * @link_tbl: input and output h/w link tables (if {src,dst}_nents > 1) (SEC2) * @buf: input and output buffeur (if {src,dst}_nents > 1) (SEC1) @@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ struct talitos_edesc { dma_addr_t iv_dma; int dma_len; dma_addr_t dma_link_tbl; + struct talitos_edesc *next_desc; struct talitos_desc desc; union { DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct talitos_ptr, link_tbl); From 3fa1846f75edff437a7a9a001031a193e9d4629b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:49 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 484/607] crypto: talitos - move dma unmapping code in flush_channel() into a standalone dma_unmap_request() function commit 4d9b0b7415b9e79a3d54d18b5ff230974ea78740 upstream. Previously added code to flush_channel() in order to unmap an entire descriptor. Move that code into a standalone function to improve readability. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index b0ebf99b94f5f..a98b40f566dd8 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -372,6 +372,27 @@ static __be32 get_request_hdr(struct device *dev, return edesc->desc.hdr1; } +static void dma_unmap_request(struct device *dev, + struct talitos_request *request, bool is_sec1) +{ + struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + + if (is_sec1) { + dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); + while (edesc->next_desc) { + dma_unmap_single(dev, + be32_to_cpu(edesc->desc.next_desc), + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + edesc = edesc->next_desc; + } + } else { + dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + } +} + /* * process what was done, notify callback of error if not */ @@ -379,7 +400,6 @@ static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch) { struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); struct talitos_request *request, saved_req; - struct talitos_edesc *edesc; unsigned long flags; int tail, status; bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); @@ -404,22 +424,7 @@ static void flush_channel(struct device *dev, int ch, int error, int reset_ch) else status = error; - if (is_sec1) { - dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - edesc = container_of(request->desc, - struct talitos_edesc, desc); - while (edesc->next_desc) { - dma_unmap_single( - dev, be32_to_cpu(edesc->desc.next_desc), - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - edesc = edesc->next_desc; - } - } else { - dma_unmap_single(dev, request->dma_desc, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - } + dma_unmap_request(dev, request, is_sec1); /* copy entries so we can call callback outside lock */ saved_req.desc = request->desc; From aea8cfbd60da997a59ccebf93045adbb812f8d5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 485/607] crypto: talitos - move dma mapping code in talitos_submit() into a standalone dma_map_request() function commit 5c0aa8cad7745505297103f05dda3fa06e8ac670 upstream. Previously added code to talitos_submit() in order to map an entire descriptor chain. Move that code into a standalone function to improve readability. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index a98b40f566dd8..183d51fa9a4ac 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -255,6 +255,46 @@ static int init_device(struct device *dev) return 0; } +static void dma_map_request(struct device *dev, struct talitos_request *request, + struct talitos_desc *desc, bool is_sec1) +{ + struct talitos_edesc *edesc = + container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); + dma_addr_t dma_desc, prev_dma_desc; + struct talitos_edesc *prev_edesc = NULL; + + if (is_sec1) { + while (edesc) { + edesc->desc.hdr1 = edesc->desc.hdr; + + dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, &edesc->desc.hdr1, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + + if (!prev_edesc) { + request->dma_desc = dma_desc; + goto next; + } + + /* Chain in any previous descriptors. */ + + prev_edesc->desc.next_desc = cpu_to_be32(dma_desc); + + dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, prev_dma_desc, + TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_TO_DEVICE); + +next: + prev_edesc = edesc; + prev_dma_desc = dma_desc; + edesc = edesc->next_desc; + } + } else { + request->dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, desc, TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, + DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + } +} + /** * talitos_submit - submits a descriptor to the device for processing * @dev: the SEC device to be used @@ -273,10 +313,7 @@ static int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc, void *context, int error), void *context) { - struct talitos_edesc *edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - dma_addr_t dma_desc, prev_dma_desc; - struct talitos_edesc *prev_edesc = NULL; struct talitos_request *request; unsigned long flags; int head; @@ -294,37 +331,7 @@ static int talitos_submit(struct device *dev, int ch, struct talitos_desc *desc, request = &priv->chan[ch].fifo[head]; /* map descriptor and save caller data */ - if (is_sec1) { - while (edesc) { - edesc->desc.hdr1 = edesc->desc.hdr; - - dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, &edesc->desc.hdr1, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - - if (!prev_edesc) { - request->dma_desc = dma_desc; - goto next; - } - - /* Chain in any previous descriptors. */ - - prev_edesc->desc.next_desc = cpu_to_be32(dma_desc); - - dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, prev_dma_desc, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - -next: - prev_edesc = edesc; - prev_dma_desc = dma_desc; - edesc = edesc->next_desc; - } - } else { - request->dma_desc = dma_map_single(dev, desc, - TALITOS_DESC_SIZE, - DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - } + dma_map_request(dev, request, desc, is_sec1); request->callback = callback; request->context = context; From a8decb89920a1562634a68b8f3e9384b72df569e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 486/607] crypto: talitos - move code in current_desc_hdr() into a standalone function commit f8713d9e6091755dd30f7f1cfa25f8440cddf81b upstream. Previously added code in current_desc_hdr() in order to add support for searching an offending descriptor inside a descriptor chain. Move that code into a standalone function to improve readability. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 183d51fa9a4ac..b808833d18ef1 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -520,6 +520,24 @@ DEF_TALITOS2_DONE(ch0, TALITOS2_ISR_CH_0_DONE) DEF_TALITOS2_DONE(ch0_2, TALITOS2_ISR_CH_0_2_DONE) DEF_TALITOS2_DONE(ch1_3, TALITOS2_ISR_CH_1_3_DONE) +static __be32 search_desc_hdr_in_request(struct talitos_request *request, + dma_addr_t cur_desc, bool is_sec1) +{ + struct talitos_edesc *edesc; + + if (request->dma_desc == cur_desc) { + return request->desc->hdr; + } else if (is_sec1) { + edesc = container_of(request->desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); + while (edesc->next_desc) { + if (edesc->desc.next_desc == cpu_to_be32(cur_desc)) + return edesc->next_desc->desc.hdr1; + edesc = edesc->next_desc; + } + } + return 0; +} + /* * locate current (offending) descriptor */ @@ -528,7 +546,6 @@ static __be32 current_desc_hdr(struct device *dev, int ch) struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); struct talitos_request *request; - struct talitos_edesc *edesc; int tail, iter; dma_addr_t cur_desc; __be32 hdr = 0; @@ -546,21 +563,7 @@ static __be32 current_desc_hdr(struct device *dev, int ch) do { request = &priv->chan[ch].fifo[iter]; - if (request->dma_desc == cur_desc) { - hdr = request->desc->hdr; - } else if (is_sec1) { - edesc = container_of(request->desc, - struct talitos_edesc, desc); - while (edesc->next_desc) { - if (edesc->desc.next_desc == - cpu_to_be32(cur_desc)) { - hdr = edesc->next_desc->desc.hdr1; - break; - } - edesc = edesc->next_desc; - } - } - + hdr = search_desc_hdr_in_request(request, cur_desc, is_sec1); if (hdr) break; From 40a2e90acdb1a0963584c4d48c37dafae08f8410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:52 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 487/607] crypto: talitos/hash - prepare SEC1 descriptor chaining, remove additional descriptor commit 59b5d899e33701665f18abe6bebf987427876e3e upstream. Currently, when SEC1 has buffered data (nbuf != 0), the ahash code creates an additional descriptor on the fly inside common_nonsnoop_hash() to handle the remainder of the data. This approach is incompatible with the arbitrary-length descriptor chaining that follows. Remove the "additional descriptor" logic from common_nonsnoop_hash() and common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(). Also remove the nbytes adjustment for SEC1 in ahash_edesc_alloc() that subtracted nbuf. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 101 +++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index b808833d18ef1..0184982cb39b8 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -1788,15 +1788,9 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev, struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc; - struct talitos_desc *desc2; - - if (desc->next_desc) - desc2 = &edesc->next_desc->desc; unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - if (desc->next_desc && - desc->ptr[5].ptr != desc2->ptr[5].ptr) - unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc2->ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + if (req_ctx->last_desc) memcpy(areq->result, req_ctx->hw_context, crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)); @@ -1808,13 +1802,6 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev, if (from_talitos_ptr_len(&desc->ptr[1], is_sec1)) unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[1], DMA_TO_DEVICE); - else if (desc->next_desc) - unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc2->ptr[1], - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - - if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf) - unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[3], - DMA_TO_DEVICE); if (edesc->dma_len) dma_unmap_single(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len, @@ -1922,9 +1909,6 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, to_talitos_ptr(&desc->ptr[2], ctx->dma_key, ctx->keylen, is_sec1); - if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf) - length -= req_ctx->nbuf; - sg_count = edesc->src_nents ?: 1; if (is_sec1 && sg_count > 1) sg_copy_to_buffer(req_ctx->psrc, sg_count, edesc->buf, length); @@ -1934,16 +1918,10 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, /* * data in */ - if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf) { - map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[3], req_ctx->nbuf, - req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx], - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - } else { - sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc, - &desc->ptr[3], sg_count, 0, 0); - if (sg_count > 1) - sync_needed = true; - } + sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc, + &desc->ptr[3], sg_count, 0, 0); + if (sg_count > 1) + sync_needed = true; /* fifth DWORD empty */ @@ -1963,49 +1941,6 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, if (is_sec1 && from_talitos_ptr_len(&desc->ptr[3], true) == 0) talitos_handle_buggy_hash(ctx, edesc, &desc->ptr[3]); - if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf && length) { - struct talitos_edesc *edesc2; - struct talitos_desc *desc2; - - edesc2 = kzalloc(sizeof(*edesc2), - areq->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? - GFP_KERNEL : - GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!edesc2) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err; - } - edesc->next_desc = edesc2; - - desc2 = &edesc2->desc; - - desc2->hdr = desc->hdr; - desc2->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT; - desc->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD; - desc->hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT; - desc->hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_DONE_NOTIFY; - - if (desc->ptr[1].ptr) - copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[1], &desc->ptr[1], - is_sec1); - else - map_single_talitos_ptr_nosync(dev, &desc2->ptr[1], - req_ctx->hw_context_size, - req_ctx->hw_context, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); - copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[2], &desc->ptr[2], is_sec1); - sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc, - &desc2->ptr[3], sg_count, 0, 0); - if (sg_count > 1) - sync_needed = true; - copy_talitos_ptr(&desc2->ptr[5], &desc->ptr[5], is_sec1); - if (req_ctx->last_desc) - map_single_talitos_ptr_nosync(dev, &desc->ptr[5], - req_ctx->hw_context_size, - req_ctx->hw_context, - DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - } - if (sync_needed) dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); @@ -2028,11 +1963,6 @@ static struct talitos_edesc *ahash_edesc_alloc(struct ahash_request *areq, struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); - struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev); - bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); - - if (is_sec1) - nbytes -= req_ctx->nbuf; return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, req_ctx->psrc, NULL, NULL, 0, nbytes, 0, 0, 0, areq->base.flags, false); @@ -2051,8 +1981,6 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes unsigned int nsg; int nents; struct device *dev = ctx->dev; - struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); u8 *ctx_buf = req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx]; if (!req_ctx->last_desc && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) { @@ -2084,30 +2012,13 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes } /* Chain in any previously buffered data */ - if (!is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf) { + if (req_ctx->nbuf) { nsg = (req_ctx->nbuf < nbytes_to_hash) ? 2 : 1; sg_init_table(req_ctx->bufsl, nsg); sg_set_buf(req_ctx->bufsl, ctx_buf, req_ctx->nbuf); if (nsg > 1) sg_chain(req_ctx->bufsl, 2, req_ctx->request_sl); req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->bufsl; - } else if (is_sec1 && req_ctx->nbuf && req_ctx->nbuf < blocksize) { - int offset; - - if (nbytes_to_hash > blocksize) - offset = blocksize - req_ctx->nbuf; - else - offset = nbytes_to_hash - req_ctx->nbuf; - nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, offset); - if (nents < 0) { - dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n"); - return nents; - } - sg_copy_to_buffer(req_ctx->request_sl, nents, - ctx_buf + req_ctx->nbuf, offset); - req_ctx->nbuf += offset; - req_ctx->psrc = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->bufsl, req_ctx->request_sl, - offset); } else req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->request_sl; From 042730207a9917949a5ba4704d5bc2c9fb0c4617 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 488/607] crypto: talitos/hash - use descriptor chaining for SEC1 instead of workqueue commit f1ede6d95d8ad3b32c6a552d2baab805bd00fc38 upstream. Rework the SEC1 ahash implementation to build a chain of hardware descriptors, replacing the previous approach of submitting one descriptor at a time via a workqueue, introduced by commit 655ef638a2bc ("crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation"). Introduce ahash_process_req_prepare() which iterates over the request data, allocating enough descriptors to cover the entire ahash request. The new fields (bufsl, src, first, last) are added to talitos_edesc for this purpose. common_nonsnoop_hash() no longer calls talitos_submit(); it only maps and sets up the descriptor. Submission is now done by the caller after the chain is built. ahash_free_desc_list_from() takes over calling common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap() for each descriptor during cleanup. Compared to the workqueue based solution, request are slightly faster since there is no more scheduling latency induced by the workqueue, and only one interrupt is generated by the device at the end of a chain. Commit 655ef638a2bc ("crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation") : $ /usr/libexec/libkcapi/sha256sum ./test_5M.bin 013c5609d63c... ./test_5M.bin real 0m 0.41s user 0m 0.01s sys 0m 0.07s Now : $ /usr/libexec/libkcapi/sha256sum ./test_5M.bin 013c5609d63c... ./test_5M.bin real 0m 0.33s user 0m 0.01s sys 0m 0.20s Tested on a system with an MPC885 SoC featuring the SEC1 Lite. The increase in sys time is due to the fact that commit 37b5e8897eb5 ("crypto: talitos - chain in buffered data for ahash on SEC1") can no longer be applied. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/crypto/talitos.h | 10 +++ 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 0184982cb39b8..883115d66fc44 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -1791,12 +1791,12 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev, unmap_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5], DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - if (req_ctx->last_desc) + if (edesc->last && req_ctx->last_request) memcpy(areq->result, req_ctx->hw_context, crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)); - if (req_ctx->psrc) - talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, req_ctx->psrc, NULL, 0, 0); + if (edesc->src) + talitos_sg_unmap(dev, edesc, edesc->src, NULL, 0, 0); /* When using hashctx-in, must unmap it. */ if (from_talitos_ptr_len(&desc->ptr[1], is_sec1)) @@ -1808,12 +1808,14 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(struct device *dev, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); } -static void free_edesc_list_from(struct talitos_edesc *edesc) +static void free_edesc_list_from(struct ahash_request *areq, struct talitos_edesc *edesc) { + struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq)); struct talitos_edesc *next; while (edesc) { next = edesc->next_desc; + common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(ctx->dev, edesc, areq); kfree(edesc); edesc = next; } @@ -1828,19 +1830,18 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *dev, container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); + if (!req_ctx->last_desc && req_ctx->to_hash_later) { /* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */ req_ctx->buf_idx = (req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1; req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later; } - common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq); - free_edesc_list_from(edesc); + free_edesc_list_from(areq, edesc); - if (err) { - ahash_request_complete(areq, err); - return; - } + ahash_request_complete(areq, err); + + return; req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes -= req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes; @@ -1874,18 +1875,15 @@ static void talitos_handle_buggy_hash(struct talitos_ctx *ctx, (char *)padded_hash, DMA_TO_DEVICE); } -static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, - struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int length, - void (*callback) (struct device *dev, - struct talitos_desc *desc, - void *context, int error)) +static void common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, + struct ahash_request *areq, + unsigned int length) { struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); struct device *dev = ctx->dev; struct talitos_desc *desc = &edesc->desc; - int ret; bool sync_needed = false; struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); @@ -1894,7 +1892,7 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, /* first DWORD empty */ /* hash context in */ - if (!req_ctx->first_desc || req_ctx->swinit) { + if (!edesc->first || !req_ctx->first_desc || req_ctx->swinit) { map_single_talitos_ptr_nosync(dev, &desc->ptr[1], req_ctx->hw_context_size, req_ctx->hw_context, @@ -1911,22 +1909,22 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, sg_count = edesc->src_nents ?: 1; if (is_sec1 && sg_count > 1) - sg_copy_to_buffer(req_ctx->psrc, sg_count, edesc->buf, length); + sg_copy_to_buffer(edesc->src, sg_count, edesc->buf, length); else if (length) - sg_count = dma_map_sg(dev, req_ctx->psrc, sg_count, - DMA_TO_DEVICE); + sg_count = dma_map_sg(dev, edesc->src, sg_count, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + /* * data in */ - sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, req_ctx->psrc, length, edesc, - &desc->ptr[3], sg_count, 0, 0); + sg_count = talitos_sg_map(dev, edesc->src, length, edesc, &desc->ptr[3], + sg_count, 0, 0); if (sg_count > 1) sync_needed = true; /* fifth DWORD empty */ /* hash/HMAC out -or- hash context out */ - if (req_ctx->last_desc) + if (edesc->last && req_ctx->last_request) map_single_talitos_ptr(dev, &desc->ptr[5], crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm), req_ctx->hw_context, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); @@ -1944,30 +1942,89 @@ static int common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, if (sync_needed) dma_sync_single_for_device(dev, edesc->dma_link_tbl, edesc->dma_len, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); - - ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, desc, callback, - areq); - if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) - goto err; - - return -EINPROGRESS; -err: - common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq); - kfree(edesc); - return ret; } static struct talitos_edesc *ahash_edesc_alloc(struct ahash_request *areq, + struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes) { struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); - struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); - return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, req_ctx->psrc, NULL, NULL, 0, + return talitos_edesc_alloc(ctx->dev, src, NULL, NULL, 0, nbytes, 0, 0, 0, areq->base.flags, false); } +static struct talitos_edesc * +ahash_process_req_prepare(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes, + unsigned int blocksize, bool is_sec1) +{ + struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq)); + struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); + struct talitos_edesc *first = NULL, *prev_edesc = NULL, *edesc; + size_t desc_max = is_sec1 ? TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN : SIZE_MAX; + struct scatterlist tmp[2]; + size_t to_hash_this_desc; + struct scatterlist *src; + size_t offset = 0; + + do { + src = scatterwalk_ffwd(tmp, req_ctx->psrc, offset); + + to_hash_this_desc = + min(nbytes, ALIGN_DOWN(desc_max, blocksize)); + + /* Allocate extended descriptor */ + edesc = ahash_edesc_alloc(areq, src, to_hash_this_desc); + if (IS_ERR(edesc)) { + if (first) + free_edesc_list_from(areq, first); + return edesc; + } + + edesc->src = + scatterwalk_ffwd(edesc->bufsl, req_ctx->psrc, offset); + edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template; + edesc->first = offset == 0; + edesc->last = nbytes - to_hash_this_desc == 0; + + /* On last one, request SEC to pad; otherwise continue */ + if (req_ctx->last_request && edesc->last) + edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD; + else + edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT; + + /* request SEC to INIT hash. */ + if (req_ctx->first_desc && edesc->first && !req_ctx->swinit) + edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT; + + /* + * When the tfm context has a keylen, it's an HMAC. + * A first or last (ie. not middle) descriptor must request HMAC. + */ + if (ctx->keylen && ((req_ctx->first_desc && edesc->first) || + (req_ctx->last_request && edesc->last))) + edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC; + + /* clear the DN bit */ + if (is_sec1 && !edesc->last) + edesc->desc.hdr &= ~DESC_HDR_DONE_NOTIFY; + + common_nonsnoop_hash(edesc, areq, to_hash_this_desc); + + offset += to_hash_this_desc; + nbytes -= to_hash_this_desc; + + if (!prev_edesc) + first = edesc; + else + prev_edesc->next_desc = edesc; + prev_edesc = edesc; + } while (nbytes); + + return first; +} + static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes) { struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); @@ -1976,14 +2033,16 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes struct talitos_edesc *edesc; unsigned int blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm)); + bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(dev_get_drvdata(ctx->dev)); unsigned int nbytes_to_hash; unsigned int to_hash_later; unsigned int nsg; int nents; struct device *dev = ctx->dev; u8 *ctx_buf = req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx]; + int ret; - if (!req_ctx->last_desc && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) { + if (!req_ctx->last_request && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) { /* Buffer up to one whole block */ nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, nbytes); if (nents < 0) { @@ -2000,7 +2059,7 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes nbytes_to_hash = nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf; to_hash_later = nbytes_to_hash & (blocksize - 1); - if (req_ctx->last_desc) + if (req_ctx->last_request) to_hash_later = 0; else if (to_hash_later) /* There is a partial block. Hash the full block(s) now */ @@ -2035,30 +2094,16 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes } req_ctx->to_hash_later = to_hash_later; - /* Allocate extended descriptor */ - edesc = ahash_edesc_alloc(req_ctx->areq, nbytes_to_hash); + edesc = ahash_process_req_prepare(areq, nbytes_to_hash, blocksize, + is_sec1); if (IS_ERR(edesc)) return PTR_ERR(edesc); - edesc->desc.hdr = ctx->desc_hdr_template; - - /* On last one, request SEC to pad; otherwise continue */ - if (req_ctx->last_desc) - edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_PAD; - else - edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT; - - /* request SEC to INIT hash. */ - if (req_ctx->first_desc && !req_ctx->swinit) - edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT; - - /* When the tfm context has a keylen, it's an HMAC. - * A first or last (ie. not middle) descriptor must request HMAC. - */ - if (ctx->keylen && (req_ctx->first_desc || req_ctx->last_desc)) - edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC; + ret = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, &edesc->desc, ahash_done, areq); + if (ret != -EINPROGRESS) + free_edesc_list_from(areq, edesc); - return common_nonsnoop_hash(edesc, req_ctx->areq, nbytes_to_hash, ahash_done); + return ret; } static void sec1_ahash_process_remaining(struct work_struct *work) @@ -2102,16 +2147,13 @@ static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes) req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes; if (is_sec1) { - if (nbytes > TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN) - nbytes = TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN; - else if (req_ctx->last_request) + if (req_ctx->last_request) req_ctx->last_desc = 1; } req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes; - return ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq, - req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes); + return ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq, nbytes); } static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.h b/drivers/crypto/talitos.h index 596f96bba3efa..11f0eb6a41db6 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.h +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.h @@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ struct talitos_desc { /* * talitos_edesc - s/w-extended descriptor + * @bufsl: scatterlist buffer + * @src: pointer to input scatterlist + * @first: first descriptor of a chain + * @last: last descriptor of a chain + * * @src_nents: number of segments in input scatterlist * @dst_nents: number of segments in output scatterlist * @iv_dma: dma address of iv for checking continuity and link table @@ -59,6 +64,11 @@ struct talitos_desc { * of link_tbl data */ struct talitos_edesc { + struct scatterlist bufsl[2]; + struct scatterlist *src; + int first; + int last; + int src_nents; int dst_nents; dma_addr_t iv_dma; From b960edc92c81be0ad008f3808e1ef2f1b26890a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:54 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 489/607] crypto: talitos/hash - drop workqueue mechanism for SEC1 commit be4802afb1700534e48cb776d0d1e772c27de130 upstream. Now that SEC1 hash uses hardware descriptor chaining instead of a workqueue to process requests exceeding TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN, the workqueue code is no longer needed. Remove sec1_ahash_process_remaining(), the related fields from talitos_ahash_req_ctx (request_bufsl, areq, request_sl, remaining_ahash_request_bytes, current_ahash_request_bytes, sec1_ahash_process_remaining), the dead code in ahash_done(), and simplify ahash_process_req() to call ahash_process_req_one() directly with the original areq->src and areq->nbytes. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 80 ++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 883115d66fc44..1f497930800b6 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ * All rights reserved. */ -#include #include #include #include @@ -952,13 +951,6 @@ struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx { unsigned int nbuf; struct scatterlist bufsl[2]; struct scatterlist *psrc; - - struct scatterlist request_bufsl[2]; - struct ahash_request *areq; - struct scatterlist *request_sl; - unsigned int remaining_ahash_request_bytes; - unsigned int current_ahash_request_bytes; - struct work_struct sec1_ahash_process_remaining; }; struct talitos_export_state { @@ -1840,18 +1832,6 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *dev, free_edesc_list_from(areq, edesc); ahash_request_complete(areq, err); - - return; - - req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes -= - req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes; - - if (!req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes) { - ahash_request_complete(areq, 0); - return; - } - - schedule_work(&req_ctx->sec1_ahash_process_remaining); } /* @@ -2044,12 +2024,12 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes if (!req_ctx->last_request && (nbytes + req_ctx->nbuf <= blocksize)) { /* Buffer up to one whole block */ - nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, nbytes); + nents = sg_nents_for_len(areq->src, nbytes); if (nents < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n"); return nents; } - sg_copy_to_buffer(req_ctx->request_sl, nents, + sg_copy_to_buffer(areq->src, nents, ctx_buf + req_ctx->nbuf, nbytes); req_ctx->nbuf += nbytes; return 0; @@ -2076,18 +2056,18 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes sg_init_table(req_ctx->bufsl, nsg); sg_set_buf(req_ctx->bufsl, ctx_buf, req_ctx->nbuf); if (nsg > 1) - sg_chain(req_ctx->bufsl, 2, req_ctx->request_sl); + sg_chain(req_ctx->bufsl, 2, areq->src); req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->bufsl; } else - req_ctx->psrc = req_ctx->request_sl; + req_ctx->psrc = areq->src; if (to_hash_later) { - nents = sg_nents_for_len(req_ctx->request_sl, nbytes); + nents = sg_nents_for_len(areq->src, nbytes); if (nents < 0) { dev_err(dev, "Invalid number of src SG.\n"); return nents; } - sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req_ctx->request_sl, nents, + sg_pcopy_to_buffer(areq->src, nents, req_ctx->buf[(req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1], to_hash_later, nbytes - to_hash_later); @@ -2106,54 +2086,9 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes return ret; } -static void sec1_ahash_process_remaining(struct work_struct *work) -{ - struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = - container_of(work, struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx, - sec1_ahash_process_remaining); - int err = 0; - - req_ctx->request_sl = scatterwalk_ffwd(req_ctx->request_bufsl, - req_ctx->request_sl, TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN); - - if (req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes > TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN) - req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN; - else { - req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = - req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes; - - if (req_ctx->last_request) - req_ctx->last_desc = 1; - } - - err = ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq, - req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes); - - if (err != -EINPROGRESS) - ahash_request_complete(req_ctx->areq, err); -} - static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes) { - struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); - struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); - struct device *dev = ctx->dev; - struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); - struct talitos_private *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(priv); - - req_ctx->areq = areq; - req_ctx->request_sl = areq->src; - req_ctx->remaining_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes; - - if (is_sec1) { - if (req_ctx->last_request) - req_ctx->last_desc = 1; - } - - req_ctx->current_ahash_request_bytes = nbytes; - - return ahash_process_req_one(req_ctx->areq, nbytes); + return ahash_process_req_one(areq, nbytes); } static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq) @@ -2176,7 +2111,6 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq) req_ctx->hw_context_size = size; req_ctx->last_request = 0; req_ctx->last_desc = 0; - INIT_WORK(&req_ctx->sec1_ahash_process_remaining, sec1_ahash_process_remaining); dma = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, req_ctx->hw_context_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE); From 99cc3f5511d8ba9d39cc60c46e9f82cadac7dfeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 490/607] crypto: talitos/hash - rename first_desc/last_desc to first_request/last_request commit 8bcf00671400ac3b3a4cc3011e6c1496dbd880fd upstream. In talitos_ahash_req_ctx and talitos_export_state, the fields first_desc and last_desc describe request-level (not descriptor-level) state. Rename them to first_request and last_request for clarity. last_desc is also removed from talitos_ahash_req_ctx as it is no longer used. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 29 +++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 1f497930800b6..6be42935068a8 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -944,8 +944,7 @@ struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx { u8 buf[2][HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; int buf_idx; unsigned int swinit; - unsigned int first_desc; - unsigned int last_desc; + unsigned int first_request; unsigned int last_request; unsigned int to_hash_later; unsigned int nbuf; @@ -957,8 +956,8 @@ struct talitos_export_state { u32 hw_context[TALITOS_MDEU_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE / sizeof(u32)]; u8 buf[HASH_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned int swinit; - unsigned int first_desc; - unsigned int last_desc; + unsigned int first_request; + unsigned int last_request; unsigned int to_hash_later; unsigned int nbuf; }; @@ -1822,8 +1821,7 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *dev, container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); - - if (!req_ctx->last_desc && req_ctx->to_hash_later) { + if (!req_ctx->last_request && req_ctx->to_hash_later) { /* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */ req_ctx->buf_idx = (req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1; req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later; @@ -1872,7 +1870,7 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, /* first DWORD empty */ /* hash context in */ - if (!edesc->first || !req_ctx->first_desc || req_ctx->swinit) { + if (!edesc->first || !req_ctx->first_request || req_ctx->swinit) { map_single_talitos_ptr_nosync(dev, &desc->ptr[1], req_ctx->hw_context_size, req_ctx->hw_context, @@ -1880,7 +1878,7 @@ static void common_nonsnoop_hash(struct talitos_edesc *edesc, req_ctx->swinit = 0; } /* Indicate next op is not the first. */ - req_ctx->first_desc = 0; + req_ctx->first_request = 0; /* HMAC key */ if (ctx->keylen) @@ -1975,14 +1973,14 @@ ahash_process_req_prepare(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes, edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_CONT; /* request SEC to INIT hash. */ - if (req_ctx->first_desc && edesc->first && !req_ctx->swinit) + if (req_ctx->first_request && edesc->first && !req_ctx->swinit) edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_INIT; /* * When the tfm context has a keylen, it's an HMAC. * A first or last (ie. not middle) descriptor must request HMAC. */ - if (ctx->keylen && ((req_ctx->first_desc && edesc->first) || + if (ctx->keylen && ((req_ctx->first_request && edesc->first) || (req_ctx->last_request && edesc->last))) edesc->desc.hdr |= DESC_HDR_MODE0_MDEU_HMAC; @@ -2103,14 +2101,13 @@ static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq) /* Initialize the context */ req_ctx->buf_idx = 0; req_ctx->nbuf = 0; - req_ctx->first_desc = 1; /* first_desc indicates h/w must init its context */ + req_ctx->first_request = 1; req_ctx->swinit = 0; /* assume h/w init of context */ size = (crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm) <= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) ? TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_MD5_SHA1_SHA256 : TALITOS_MDEU_CONTEXT_SIZE_SHA384_SHA512; req_ctx->hw_context_size = size; req_ctx->last_request = 0; - req_ctx->last_desc = 0; dma = dma_map_single(dev, req_ctx->hw_context, req_ctx->hw_context_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE); @@ -2202,8 +2199,8 @@ static int ahash_export(struct ahash_request *areq, void *out) req_ctx->hw_context_size); memcpy(export->buf, req_ctx->buf[req_ctx->buf_idx], req_ctx->nbuf); export->swinit = req_ctx->swinit; - export->first_desc = req_ctx->first_desc; - export->last_desc = req_ctx->last_desc; + export->first_request = req_ctx->first_request; + export->last_request = req_ctx->last_request; export->to_hash_later = req_ctx->to_hash_later; export->nbuf = req_ctx->nbuf; @@ -2228,8 +2225,8 @@ static int ahash_import(struct ahash_request *areq, const void *in) memcpy(req_ctx->hw_context, export->hw_context, size); memcpy(req_ctx->buf[0], export->buf, export->nbuf); req_ctx->swinit = export->swinit; - req_ctx->first_desc = export->first_desc; - req_ctx->last_desc = export->last_desc; + req_ctx->first_request = export->first_request; + req_ctx->last_request = export->last_request; req_ctx->to_hash_later = export->to_hash_later; req_ctx->nbuf = export->nbuf; From fda9cb9b7191c981877ff7927aade2e26b841ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 491/607] crypto: talitos/hash - remove useless wrapper commit 907ae6088c82c9abae2d26477fddd60df6ad003b upstream. ahash_process_req() was a wrapper used in commit 655ef638a2bc ("crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation"). Rename ahash_process_req_one() to ahash_process_req() and remove the wrapper. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index 6be42935068a8..b4283b6c18ef6 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -2003,7 +2003,7 @@ ahash_process_req_prepare(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes, return first; } -static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes) +static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes) { struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); @@ -2084,11 +2084,6 @@ static int ahash_process_req_one(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes return ret; } -static int ahash_process_req(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes) -{ - return ahash_process_req_one(areq, nbytes); -} - static int ahash_init(struct ahash_request *areq) { struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); From 93f000e89976eb5cc55385d80516f247ca4a27a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Louvel Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:41:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 492/607] crypto: talitos/hash - fix SEC2 64k - 1 ahash request limitation commit 6e12daff6ec125102a6fdcafc5aa7199f7ce8933 upstream. The problem described in commit 655ef638a2bc ("crypto: talitos - fix SEC1 32k ahash request limitation") also apply for the SEC2 hardware, but with a limitation of 64k - 1 bytes. Split ahash_done() into SEC1 and SEC2 paths: SEC1 continues to free the whole descriptor list at once, while SEC2 now iterates through descriptors one by one, submitting the next only after the previous completes, which is required since SEC2 cannot chain descriptors in hardware. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c662b043cdca ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") Signed-off-by: Paul Louvel Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/talitos.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c index b4283b6c18ef6..4b53b13f96d9f 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/talitos.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/talitos.c @@ -1820,16 +1820,46 @@ static void ahash_done(struct device *dev, struct talitos_edesc *edesc = container_of(desc, struct talitos_edesc, desc); struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq); + bool is_sec1 = has_ftr_sec1(dev_get_drvdata(dev)); + struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + struct talitos_edesc *next; - if (!req_ctx->last_request && req_ctx->to_hash_later) { - /* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */ - req_ctx->buf_idx = (req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1; - req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later; - } + if (is_sec1) { + if (!req_ctx->last_request && req_ctx->to_hash_later) { + /* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */ + req_ctx->buf_idx = (req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1; + req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later; + } + + free_edesc_list_from(areq, edesc); + ahash_request_complete(areq, err); + } else { + next = edesc->next_desc; - free_edesc_list_from(areq, edesc); + common_nonsnoop_hash_unmap(dev, edesc, areq); + kfree(edesc); - ahash_request_complete(areq, err); + if (err) + goto out; + + if (next) { + err = talitos_submit(dev, ctx->ch, &next->desc, + ahash_done, areq); + if (err != -EINPROGRESS) + goto out; + return; + } +out: + if (!req_ctx->last_request && req_ctx->to_hash_later) { + /* Position any partial block for next update/final/finup */ + req_ctx->buf_idx = (req_ctx->buf_idx + 1) & 1; + req_ctx->nbuf = req_ctx->to_hash_later; + } + if (err && next) + free_edesc_list_from(areq, next); + ahash_request_complete(areq, err); + } } /* @@ -1940,7 +1970,8 @@ ahash_process_req_prepare(struct ahash_request *areq, unsigned int nbytes, struct talitos_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(areq)); struct talitos_ahash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(areq); struct talitos_edesc *first = NULL, *prev_edesc = NULL, *edesc; - size_t desc_max = is_sec1 ? TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN : SIZE_MAX; + size_t desc_max = is_sec1 ? TALITOS1_MAX_DATA_LEN : + TALITOS2_MAX_DATA_LEN; struct scatterlist tmp[2]; size_t to_hash_this_desc; struct scatterlist *src; From 75422f5e50222fa056cb8d0a837cd869892e7751 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Rutland Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 12:06:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 493/607] arm64: fpsimd: Fix type mismatch in sme_{save,load}_state() commit 247bd153905085c18ff9006cca1ccb96dfd18e7f upstream. The sme_save_state() and sme_load_state() functions take a 32-bit int argument that describes whether to save/restore ZT0. Their assembly implementations consume the entire 64-bit register containing this 32-bit value, and will attempt to save/restore ZT0 if any bit of that 64-bit register is non-zero. Per the AAPCS64 parameter passing rules, the callee is responsible for any necessary widening, and the upper 32-bits are permitted to contain arbitrary values. If the upper 32 bits are non-zero, this could result in an unexpected attempt to save/restore ZT0, and consequently could lead to unexpected traps/undefs/faults. In practice compilers are very unlikely to generate code where the upper 32-bits would be non-zero, but they are permitted to do so. Fix this by only consuming the low 32 bits of the register, and update comments accordingly. Fixes: 95fcec713259 ("arm64/sme: Implement context switching for ZT0") Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: Fuad Tabba Cc: James Morse Cc: Marc Zyngier Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Oliver Upton Cc: Vladimir Murzin Cc: Will Deacon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 6325db1a2179c..fb441702495fa 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -103,13 +103,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(sme_set_vq) * Save the ZA and ZT state * * x0 - pointer to buffer for state - * x1 - number of ZT registers to save + * w1 - number of ZT registers to save */ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_save_state) _sme_rdsvl 2, 1 // x2 = VL/8 sme_save_za 0, x2, 12 // Leaves x0 pointing to the end of ZA - cbz x1, 1f + cbz w1, 1f _str_zt 0 1: ret @@ -119,13 +119,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(sme_save_state) * Load the ZA and ZT state * * x0 - pointer to buffer for state - * x1 - number of ZT registers to save + * w1 - number of ZT registers to save */ SYM_FUNC_START(sme_load_state) _sme_rdsvl 2, 1 // x2 = VL/8 sme_load_za 0, x2, 12 // Leaves x0 pointing to the end of ZA - cbz x1, 1f + cbz w1, 1f _ldr_zt 0 1: ret From 18d6048b1b1b4bc37c8883a39289f4b5c9a6fd5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Song Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 14:23:56 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 494/607] spi: fsl-lpspi: replace dmaengine_terminate_all() with dmaengine_terminate_sync() commit e703ce47691b967fe9b4057fb1d062273211afa9 upstream. dmaengine_terminate_all() has been deprecated, so replace it with dmaengine_terminate_sync(). Fixes: 09c04466ce7e ("spi: lpspi: add dma mode support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Song Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260525062357.3191349-2-carlos.song@oss.nxp.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c index 47d372557e4f6..3e3d8ea56ad54 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer(struct spi_controller *controller, tx->sgl, tx->nents, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); if (!desc_tx) { - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_tx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_tx); return -EINVAL; } @@ -640,8 +640,8 @@ static int fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer(struct spi_controller *controller, transfer_timeout); if (!time_left) { dev_err(fsl_lpspi->dev, "I/O Error in DMA TX\n"); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_tx); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_rx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_tx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_rx); fsl_lpspi_reset(fsl_lpspi); return -ETIMEDOUT; } @@ -650,8 +650,8 @@ static int fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer(struct spi_controller *controller, transfer_timeout); if (!time_left) { dev_err(fsl_lpspi->dev, "I/O Error in DMA RX\n"); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_tx); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_rx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_tx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_rx); fsl_lpspi_reset(fsl_lpspi); return -ETIMEDOUT; } @@ -660,8 +660,8 @@ static int fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer(struct spi_controller *controller, fsl_lpspi->target_aborted) { dev_dbg(fsl_lpspi->dev, "I/O Error in DMA TX interrupted\n"); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_tx); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_rx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_tx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_rx); fsl_lpspi_reset(fsl_lpspi); return -EINTR; } @@ -670,8 +670,8 @@ static int fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer(struct spi_controller *controller, fsl_lpspi->target_aborted) { dev_dbg(fsl_lpspi->dev, "I/O Error in DMA RX interrupted\n"); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_tx); - dmaengine_terminate_all(controller->dma_rx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_tx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_rx); fsl_lpspi_reset(fsl_lpspi); return -EINTR; } From 808033d80d5c9f8adf7e8de9317389270ce13430 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Song Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 14:23:57 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 495/607] spi: fsl-lpspi: terminate the RX channel on TX prepare failure path commit 01980b5da56e573d62798d0ff6c86bcaa2b22cbe upstream. When dmaengine_prep_slave_sg() fails for the TX channel, the error path terminates the TX DMA channel but leaves the RX channel running. Since the RX channel was already submitted and issued prior to preparing the TX descriptor, returning -EINVAL causes the SPI core to unmap the DMA buffers while the RX DMA engine continues writing to them, leading to potential memory corruption or use-after-free. Terminate the RX channel before returning on the TX prepare failure path. Fixes: 09c04466ce7e ("spi: lpspi: add dma mode support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Song Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260525062357.3191349-3-carlos.song@oss.nxp.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c index 3e3d8ea56ad54..9fb2c1c18f62a 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-fsl-lpspi.c @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int fsl_lpspi_dma_transfer(struct spi_controller *controller, tx->sgl, tx->nents, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); if (!desc_tx) { - dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_tx); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(controller->dma_rx); return -EINVAL; } From add1e4112e00b619614784bf630aeebfdefa23e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2026 12:49:14 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 496/607] x86/mm: Fix freeing of PMD-sized vmemmap pages commit 39406c05f8f150f1685839acd38ffdd69ff92031 upstream. Commit bf9e4e30f353 ("x86/mm: use pagetable_free()"), switched from freeing non-boot page tables through __free_pages() to pagetable_free(). However, the function is also called to free vmemmap pages. Given that vmemmap pages are not page tables, already the page_ptdesc(page) is wrong. But worse, pagetable_free() calls: __free_pages(page, compound_order(page)); Since vmemmap pages are not compound pages (see vmemmap_alloc_block()) -- except for HVO, which doesn't apply here -- only first page of a PMD-sized vmemmap page is freed, leaking the other ones. Fix it by properly decoupling pagetable and vmemmap freeing. free_pagetable() no longer has to mess with SECTION_INFO, as only the vmemmap is marked like that in register_page_bootmem_memmap(). The indentation in remove_pmd_table() is messed up. Fix that while touching it. Bootmem info handling will soon be fixed up. For now, handle it similar to free_pagetable(), just avoiding the ifdef. [ dhansen: changelog munging. More imperative voice ] Fixes: bf9e4e30f353 ("x86/mm: use pagetable_free()") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) Tested-by: Lance Yang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260429-vmemmap-v2-1-8dfcacffd877@kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260429-vmemmap-v2-1-8dfcacffd877@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c index 3d9a5e4ccaa43..74eda988e0b02 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static void __meminit free_pagetable(struct page *page, int order) #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE enum bootmem_type type = bootmem_type(page); - if (type == SECTION_INFO || type == MIX_SECTION_INFO) { + if (type == MIX_SECTION_INFO) { while (nr_pages--) put_page_bootmem(page++); } else { @@ -1035,13 +1035,24 @@ static void __meminit free_pagetable(struct page *page, int order) } } -static void __meminit free_hugepage_table(struct page *page, +static void __meminit free_vmemmap_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, struct vmem_altmap *altmap) { - if (altmap) - vmem_altmap_free(altmap, PMD_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE); - else - free_pagetable(page, get_order(PMD_SIZE)); + unsigned long nr_pages = 1u << order; + + if (altmap) { + vmem_altmap_free(altmap, nr_pages); + } else if (PageReserved(page)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE) && + bootmem_type(page) == SECTION_INFO) { + while (nr_pages--) + put_page_bootmem(page++); + } else { + free_reserved_pages(page, nr_pages); + } + } else { + __free_pages(page, order); + } } static void __meminit free_pte_table(pte_t *pte_start, pmd_t *pmd) @@ -1125,7 +1136,8 @@ remove_pte_table(pte_t *pte_start, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, return; if (!direct) - free_pagetable(pte_page(*pte), 0); + /* We never populate base pages from the altmap. */ + free_vmemmap_pages(pte_page(*pte), 0, NULL); spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); pte_clear(&init_mm, addr, pte); @@ -1160,19 +1172,19 @@ remove_pmd_table(pmd_t *pmd_start, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, if (IS_ALIGNED(addr, PMD_SIZE) && IS_ALIGNED(next, PMD_SIZE)) { if (!direct) - free_hugepage_table(pmd_page(*pmd), - altmap); + free_vmemmap_pages(pmd_page(*pmd), + PMD_ORDER, altmap); spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); pmd_clear(pmd); spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); pages++; } else if (vmemmap_pmd_is_unused(addr, next)) { - free_hugepage_table(pmd_page(*pmd), - altmap); - spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); - pmd_clear(pmd); - spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); + free_vmemmap_pages(pmd_page(*pmd), PMD_ORDER, + altmap); + spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); + pmd_clear(pmd); + spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock); } continue; } From f4dd5621a6eefd16666352ce90ec46920aa0737e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vasily Khoruzhick Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2026 11:17:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 497/607] EDAC/i10nm: Don't fail probing if ADXL is missing commit e360a6d65bb46c527a5909430a31d640cdd5036e upstream. ADXL is not present in Coreboot- or Slimbootloader-based BIOSes and as result, the driver fails to probe there. Since commit 2738c69a8813 ("EDAC/i10nm: Add driver decoder for Ice Lake and Tremont CPUs"), i10nm_edac supports driver decoder. Switch to driver decoding when ADXL is not present. Signed-off-by: Vasily Khoruzhick Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414181735.87023-1-anarsoul@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c b/drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c index 2010a47149f44..dfd49412f3199 100644 --- a/drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c +++ b/drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static struct res_config *res_cfg; static int retry_rd_err_log; static int decoding_via_mca; static bool mem_cfg_2lm; +static bool no_adxl; static struct reg_rrl icx_reg_rrl_ddr = { .set_num = 2, @@ -1207,8 +1208,14 @@ static int __init i10nm_init(void) } rc = skx_adxl_get(); - if (rc) - goto fail; + if (rc) { + /* Decoding errors via MCA banks for 2LM isn't supported yet */ + if (rc != -ENODEV || mem_cfg_2lm) + goto fail; + i10nm_printk(KERN_INFO, "ADXL not found, falling back to MCA-based decoding.\n"); + no_adxl = true; + decoding_via_mca = true; + } opstate_init(); mce_register_decode_chain(&i10nm_mce_dec); @@ -1242,7 +1249,8 @@ static void __exit i10nm_exit(void) skx_teardown_debug(); mce_unregister_decode_chain(&i10nm_mce_dec); - skx_adxl_put(); + if (!no_adxl) + skx_adxl_put(); skx_remove(); } From 6b01ed165d2982a64ba75f86aa2cabac0b8697ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janne Grunau Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2025 13:07:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 498/607] watchdog: apple: Add "apple,t8103-wdt" compatible commit 14ca4868886f2188401fe06cd7bf01a330b3fb99 upstream. After discussion with the devicetree maintainers we agreed to not extend lists with the generic compatible "apple,wdt" anymore [1]. Use "apple,t8103-wdt" as base compatible as it is the SoC the driver and bindings were written for. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/asahi/12ab93b7-1fc2-4ce0-926e-c8141cfe81bf@kernel.org/ Fixes: 4ed224aeaf66 ("watchdog: Add Apple SoC watchdog driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa Signed-off-by: Janne Grunau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251231-watchdog-apple-t8103-base-compat-v1-1-1702a02e0c45@jannau.net Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/watchdog/apple_wdt.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/apple_wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/apple_wdt.c index 66a158f67a712..6b9b0f9b05ced 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/apple_wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/apple_wdt.c @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ static int apple_wdt_suspend(struct device *dev) static DEFINE_SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(apple_wdt_pm_ops, apple_wdt_suspend, apple_wdt_resume); static const struct of_device_id apple_wdt_of_match[] = { + { .compatible = "apple,t8103-wdt" }, { .compatible = "apple,wdt" }, {}, }; From 22cb337370e6539b0418832c6040e9b00c1b74ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wentao Liang Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 10:48:50 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 499/607] regulator: scmi: fix of_node refcount leak in scmi_regulator_probe() commit fa11039d6cdff84584a3ef8cc1f5e1b56e045da2 upstream. scmi_regulator_probe() calls of_find_node_by_name() which takes a reference on the returned device node. On the error path where process_scmi_regulator_of_node() fails, the function returns without calling of_node_put() on the child node, leaking the reference. Add of_node_put(np) on the error path to properly release the reference. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0fbeae70ee7c ("regulator: add SCMI driver") Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527104850.872415-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/regulator/scmi-regulator.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/regulator/scmi-regulator.c b/drivers/regulator/scmi-regulator.c index 6d609c42e4793..c005e65ba0ecb 100644 --- a/drivers/regulator/scmi-regulator.c +++ b/drivers/regulator/scmi-regulator.c @@ -345,8 +345,10 @@ static int scmi_regulator_probe(struct scmi_device *sdev) for_each_child_of_node_scoped(np, child) { ret = process_scmi_regulator_of_node(sdev, ph, child, rinfo); /* abort on any mem issue */ - if (ret == -ENOMEM) + if (ret == -ENOMEM) { + of_node_put(np); return ret; + } } of_node_put(np); /* From af6048e913052dd59a6faa59e7c53ce627360ebc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 500/607] i2c: core: fix hang on adapter registration failure commit 3c7e164344e5bcf6f274bbf59a3274f5caad9bc1 upstream. Clients may be registered from bus notifier callbacks when the adapter is registered. On a subsequent error during registration, the adapter references taken by such clients prevent the wait for the references to be released from ever completing. Fix this by refactoring client deregistration and deregistering also on late adapter registration failures. Fixes: f8756c67b3de ("i2c: core: call of_i2c_setup_smbus_alert in i2c_register_adapter") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15 Cc: Phil Reid Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index 05b315405639b..e0453f7b5d972 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(core_lock); static DEFINE_IDR(i2c_adapter_idr); +static void i2c_deregister_clients(struct i2c_adapter *adap); static int i2c_detect(struct i2c_adapter *adapter, struct i2c_driver *driver); static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(i2c_trace_msg_key); @@ -1609,6 +1610,7 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) return 0; out_reg: + i2c_deregister_clients(adap); debugfs_remove_recursive(adap->debugfs); init_completion(&adap->dev_released); device_unregister(&adap->dev); @@ -1748,29 +1750,10 @@ static int __process_removed_adapter(struct device_driver *d, void *data) return 0; } -/** - * i2c_del_adapter - unregister I2C adapter - * @adap: the adapter being unregistered - * Context: can sleep - * - * This unregisters an I2C adapter which was previously registered - * by @i2c_add_adapter or @i2c_add_numbered_adapter. - */ -void i2c_del_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) +static void i2c_deregister_clients(struct i2c_adapter *adap) { - struct i2c_adapter *found; struct i2c_client *client, *next; - /* First make sure that this adapter was ever added */ - mutex_lock(&core_lock); - found = idr_find(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap->nr); - mutex_unlock(&core_lock); - if (found != adap) { - pr_debug("attempting to delete unregistered adapter [%s]\n", adap->name); - return; - } - - i2c_acpi_remove_space_handler(adap); /* Tell drivers about this removal */ mutex_lock(&core_lock); bus_for_each_drv(&i2c_bus_type, NULL, adap, @@ -1796,6 +1779,32 @@ void i2c_del_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) * them up properly, so we give them a chance to do that first. */ device_for_each_child(&adap->dev, NULL, __unregister_client); device_for_each_child(&adap->dev, NULL, __unregister_dummy); +} + +/** + * i2c_del_adapter - unregister I2C adapter + * @adap: the adapter being unregistered + * Context: can sleep + * + * This unregisters an I2C adapter which was previously registered + * by @i2c_add_adapter or @i2c_add_numbered_adapter. + */ +void i2c_del_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) +{ + struct i2c_adapter *found; + + /* First make sure that this adapter was ever added */ + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + found = idr_find(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); + if (found != adap) { + pr_debug("attempting to delete unregistered adapter [%s]\n", adap->name); + return; + } + + i2c_acpi_remove_space_handler(adap); + + i2c_deregister_clients(adap); /* device name is gone after device_unregister */ dev_dbg(&adap->dev, "adapter [%s] unregistered\n", adap->name); From c8b7e113f7b61eef2f017e6329c27c2331058c5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lee Jia Jie Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 21:56:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 501/607] perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range() commit 5948aaf64f81f217a25dcc2bf6c0779bca19566c upstream. map_range() reads rb->aux_pages[], rb->aux_nr_pages and rb->aux_pgoff via perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event->mmap_mutex. Those fields are serialized by rb->aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event. Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 ===== ===== rb_alloc_aux() map_range() [1]: allocate rb->aux_pages[0] [2]: rb->aux_nr_pages++ [3]: perf_mmap_to_page() returns rb->aux_pages[0] [4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP [5]: rb->aux_pgoff = 1 munmap the page [6]: free rb->aux_pages[0] Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a mapping to a freed physical frame. Fix this by taking rb->aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range(). Fixes: b709eb872e19 ("perf: map pages in advance") Signed-off-by: Lee Jia Jie Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Namhyung Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 449550b3bb286..f3bd7c97c3aab 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -6879,6 +6879,8 @@ static int map_range(struct perf_buffer *rb, struct vm_area_struct *vma) int err = 0; unsigned long pagenum; + guard(mutex)(&rb->aux_mutex); + /* * We map this as a VM_PFNMAP VMA. * From 2dad64a97e1df47f5d9ccb17fa319aa348617226 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Huihui Huang Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2026 18:28:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 502/607] tracing: Prevent out-of-bounds read in glob matching commit 0a6070839b1ef276d5b05bedfb787743e140fb17 upstream. String event fields are not necessarily NUL-terminated, so the filter predicate functions (filter_pred_string(), filter_pred_strloc() and filter_pred_strrelloc()) pass the field length to the regex match callbacks, and the length-aware matchers honour it. regex_match_glob() was the exception: it ignored the length and called glob_match(), which scans the string until it hits a NUL byte. Some string fields are not NUL-terminated. One example is the dynamic char array of the xfs_* namespace tracepoints, which is copied without a trailing NUL. For such a field, glob matching reads past the end of the event field, causing a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read in glob_match(), reached via regex_match_glob() and filter_match_preds() from the xfs_lookup tracepoint. Add a length-bounded glob_match_len() and use it from regex_match_glob() so glob matching always stops at the field boundary. The matching loop is factored into a shared helper so glob_match() keeps its behaviour. Fixes: 60f1d5e3bac4 ("ftrace: Support full glob matching") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/da1aaf125fc3b63320b0c540fd6afa7c3d5b4f1a.1782836943.git.hhhuang@smu.edu.sg Reported-by: Yuan Tan Reported-by: Yifan Wu Reported-by: Juefei Pu Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang Reported-by: Xin Liu Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4 Signed-off-by: Huihui Huang Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/glob.h | 1 + kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 6 ++---- lib/glob.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/glob.h b/include/linux/glob.h index 861327b33e41d..91595e750936e 100644 --- a/include/linux/glob.h +++ b/include/linux/glob.h @@ -6,5 +6,6 @@ #include /* For __pure */ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str); +bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len); #endif /* _LINUX_GLOB_H */ diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c index 54226b48b2d16..c6679caf2e9b6 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c @@ -1056,11 +1056,9 @@ static int regex_match_end(char *str, struct regex *r, int len) return 0; } -static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len __maybe_unused) +static int regex_match_glob(char *str, struct regex *r, int len) { - if (glob_match(r->pattern, str)) - return 1; - return 0; + return glob_match_len(r->pattern, str, len) ? 1 : 0; } /** diff --git a/lib/glob.c b/lib/glob.c index aa57900d2062c..d3f36de9ab5a4 100644 --- a/lib/glob.c +++ b/lib/glob.c @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("glob(7) matching"); MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL"); +static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str, + char const *str_end); + /** * glob_match - Shell-style pattern matching, like !fnmatch(pat, str, 0) * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match, e.g. "*.[ch]". @@ -38,6 +41,29 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("Dual MIT/GPL"); * An opening bracket without a matching close is matched literally. */ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str) +{ + return glob_match_str(pat, str, NULL); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match); + +/** + * glob_match_len - glob match against a length-bounded string + * @pat: Shell-style pattern to match. + * @str: String to match. Need not be NUL-terminated. + * @len: Number of bytes of @str that may be read. + * + * Like glob_match(), but @str is only read up to @len bytes, so it can be + * used on buffers that are not NUL-terminated (e.g. trace event fields). + * A NUL byte within @len still terminates the string. + */ +bool __pure glob_match_len(char const *pat, char const *str, size_t len) +{ + return glob_match_str(pat, str, str + len); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match_len); + +static bool __pure glob_match_str(char const *pat, char const *str, + char const *str_end) { /* * Backtrack to previous * on mismatch and retry starting one @@ -53,9 +79,11 @@ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str) * on mismatch, or true after matching the trailing nul bytes. */ for (;;) { - unsigned char c = *str++; + unsigned char c = (str_end && str >= str_end) ? '\0' : *str; unsigned char d = *pat++; + str++; + switch (d) { case '?': /* Wildcard: anything but nul */ if (c == '\0') @@ -122,4 +150,3 @@ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str) } } } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(glob_match); From 75ca99875aa4e2241a0a3f5bfd2d03b44d93933d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ricardo Robaina Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 11:04:11 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 503/607] audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex() commit 65dfde57d1e29ce2b76fc23dd565eccd5c0bc0f0 upstream. The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len (declared as int) from the size_t calculation. Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings") Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina [PM: remove vertical whitspace noise] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/audit.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 0594897ce1595..db7868945a877 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -2075,7 +2076,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - int i, avail, new_len; + int avail; + size_t i, new_len; unsigned char *ptr; struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -2085,7 +2087,12 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, BUG_ON(!ab->skb); skb = ab->skb; avail = skb_tailroom(skb); - new_len = len<<1; + + if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) { + audit_log_format(ab, "?"); + return; + } + if (new_len >= avail) { /* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */ new_len = AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) + 1); From a937e92c1d00534b5c2e3e9f4381b7e988180797 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Benjamin Coddington Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 17:02:15 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 504/607] NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC commit 5140f099ecd8a2f2808b7f7b720ee1bad8468974 upstream. POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the O_ACCMODE access mode. nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid, which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics. POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES. Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local check matches the access the server would have enforced. Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust Fixes: af22f94ae02a ("NFSv4: Simplify _nfs4_do_access()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index a653a401b7970..31ca8bbfb9702 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -3302,6 +3302,8 @@ static int nfs_open_permission_mask(int openflags) mask |= MAY_READ; if ((openflags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) mask |= MAY_WRITE; + if (openflags & O_TRUNC) + mask |= MAY_WRITE; } return mask; From b883733302508be1c678ce90b63d6b403f849995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gabriele Monaco Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:04:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 505/607] rqspinlock: Fix order in raw_res_spin_(un)lock_irq to allow schedule commit b48bd16eb9fc57a463a337ca148516cdf3212d61 upstream. raw_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore() calls raw_res_spin_unlock() and then restores interrupts, this means preemption is enabled when interrupts are still disabled (as part of raw_res_spin_unlock()) so this cannot trigger an actual preemption. This is inconsistent with other spinlock implementations (raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() and bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore() itself). Adjust the macro to ensure interrupts are enabled before enabling preemption, allowing to schedule at that point. Make the same modification in the error path of raw_res_spin_lock_irqsave(). Fixes: 101acd2e78b1 ("rqspinlock: Add macros for rqspinlock usage") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann # asm-generic Acked-by: Waiman Long Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Signed-off-by: Gabriele Monaco Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610090431.32427-1-gmonaco@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/asm-generic/rqspinlock.h | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/asm-generic/rqspinlock.h b/include/asm-generic/rqspinlock.h index 5c5cf2f7fc395..780fdeb82f669 100644 --- a/include/asm-generic/rqspinlock.h +++ b/include/asm-generic/rqspinlock.h @@ -243,12 +243,20 @@ static __always_inline void res_spin_unlock(rqspinlock_t *lock) ({ \ int __ret; \ local_irq_save(flags); \ - __ret = raw_res_spin_lock(lock); \ - if (__ret) \ + preempt_disable(); \ + __ret = res_spin_lock(lock); \ + if (__ret) { \ local_irq_restore(flags); \ + preempt_enable(); \ + } \ __ret; \ }) -#define raw_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags) ({ raw_res_spin_unlock(lock); local_irq_restore(flags); }) +#define raw_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags) \ + ({ \ + res_spin_unlock(lock); \ + local_irq_restore(flags); \ + preempt_enable(); \ + }) #endif /* __ASM_GENERIC_RQSPINLOCK_H */ From a82e170637e050a803b4f37542371ef216bf66d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrii Kuchmenko Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 17:32:33 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 506/607] module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages() commit 786d2d84416a9a1c1a47b71a68d679d886284be2 upstream. module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns -ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked. If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page() will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel oops. Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path. Fixes: b1ae6dc41eaa ("module: add in-kernel support for decompressing") Cc: Dmitry Torokhov Cc: Luis Chamberlain Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrii Kuchmenko Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP) [Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.] Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/module/decompress.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/module/decompress.c b/kernel/module/decompress.c index 474e68f0f0634..ce9d90808d952 100644 --- a/kernel/module/decompress.c +++ b/kernel/module/decompress.c @@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ int module_decompress(struct load_info *info, const void *buf, size_t size) */ n_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, PAGE_SIZE) * 2; error = module_extend_max_pages(info, n_pages); + if (error) + return error; data_size = MODULE_DECOMPRESS_FN(info, buf, size); if (data_size < 0) { From 33c0b96d7e1672be1de0053786637ea46fb81507 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 14:29:06 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 507/607] exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry() commit 3a1230e7b043c62737b05a3e9275ca83a43ad20a upstream. In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the accumulated name length: if (++order == 2) uniname = p_uniname->name; else uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); name_len += len; unichar = *(uniname+len); *(uniname+len) = 0x0; uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is `name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short name fragments lets uniname run far past the p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small, causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len). The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer. Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/exfat/dir.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exfat/dir.c b/fs/exfat/dir.c index 97f2ff87220fe..e1b28c1a7e857 100644 --- a/fs/exfat/dir.c +++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c @@ -1083,6 +1083,7 @@ int exfat_find_dir_entry(struct super_block *sb, struct exfat_inode_info *ei, if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) { unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar; + unsigned int offset; if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME || name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { @@ -1091,13 +1092,15 @@ int exfat_find_dir_entry(struct super_block *sb, struct exfat_inode_info *ei, continue; } - if (++order == 2) - uniname = p_uniname->name; - else - uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; - + offset = (++order - 2) * EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); brelse(bh); + if (offset > MAX_NAME_LENGTH || + len > MAX_NAME_LENGTH - offset) { + step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE; + continue; + } + uniname = p_uniname->name + offset; name_len += len; unichar = *(uniname+len); From 1c8889e0db01fe5393e71c69cffddfe3f0f49d24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Koichiro Den Date: Wed, 4 Mar 2026 17:30:27 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 508/607] NTB: epf: Fix request_irq() unwind in ntb_epf_init_isr() commit fcba26efe5efc7441f5505f4ccc69791214b40be upstream. ntb_epf_init_isr() requests multiple MSI/MSI-X vectors in a loop. If request_irq() fails part-way through, it jumps straight to pci_free_irq_vectors() without freeing already requested IRQs. Fix the error path by freeing any successfully requested IRQs before releasing the vectors. Fixes: 812ce2f8d14e ("NTB: Add support for EPF PCI Non-Transparent Bridge") Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den Signed-off-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304083028.1391068-2-den@valinux.co.jp Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c index 8aaf8f9bc69c9..15d99d08f84f9 100644 --- a/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c +++ b/drivers/ntb/hw/epf/ntb_hw_epf.c @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static int ntb_epf_init_isr(struct ntb_epf_dev *ndev, int msi_min, int msi_max) 0, "ntb_epf", ndev); if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "Failed to request irq\n"); - goto err_request_irq; + goto err_free_irq; } } @@ -367,16 +367,14 @@ static int ntb_epf_init_isr(struct ntb_epf_dev *ndev, int msi_min, int msi_max) argument | irq); if (ret) { dev_err(dev, "Failed to configure doorbell\n"); - goto err_configure_db; + goto err_free_irq; } return 0; -err_configure_db: - for (i = 0; i < ndev->db_count + 1; i++) +err_free_irq: + while (i--) free_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, i), ndev); - -err_request_irq: pci_free_irq_vectors(pdev); return ret; From 90405c8822c5d45d4d546e94914a8e3f19f36768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vivian Wang Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2026 20:17:54 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 509/607] riscv: mm: Define DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END commit f3336b48cf9d3f2d1fc78e3289c0ded2f00876ee upstream. On RISC-V, the actual mappable range of physical address space is dependent on the current MMU mode i.e. satp_mode (See Documentation/arch/riscv/vm-layout.rst). Define the DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END macro based on the existing virtual address space layout macros to expose this information to get_free_mem_region(). Otherwise, it returns a region that couldn't be mapped, which breaks ZONE_DEVICE. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13+ Tested-by: Han Gao # SG2044 Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260309-riscv-sparsemem-vmemmap-limits-v1-2-f40efe18e3cd@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h index 30d1ea93dde34..9b2e967c9fe08 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -93,6 +93,16 @@ */ #define vmemmap ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - vmemmap_start_pfn) +/* Needed to limit get_free_mem_region() */ +#if defined(CONFIG_FLATMEM) +#define DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END (phys_ram_base + KERN_VIRT_SIZE - 1) +#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP) +#define DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END \ + ((vmemmap_start_pfn + VMEMMAP_SIZE / sizeof(struct page)) * PAGE_SIZE - 1) +#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM) +/* DIRECT_MAP_PHYSMEM_END is not limited by VA space assignment in this case */ +#endif + #define PCI_IO_SIZE SZ_16M #define PCI_IO_END VMEMMAP_START #define PCI_IO_START (PCI_IO_END - PCI_IO_SIZE) From 4d730cab96e6b75e4a07c4baf37294ebc07f795e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vivian Wang Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 13:29:49 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 510/607] riscv: mm: Unconditionally sfence.vma for spurious fault commit 1b2c6b56a9fa0dcbef461039937de22b1cbecc7d upstream. Svvptc does not guarantee that it's safe to just return here. Since we have already cleared our bit, if, theoretically, the bounded timeframe for the accessed page to become valid still hasn't happened after sret, we could fault again and actually crash. Hopefully, these spurious faults should be rare enough that this is an acceptable slowdown. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 503638e0babf ("riscv: Stop emitting preventive sfence.vma for new vmalloc mappings") Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303-handle-kfence-protect-spurious-fault-v2-5-f80d8354d79d@iscas.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S index e7bd03a9ced53..d9095b5718d12 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S @@ -75,8 +75,11 @@ /* Atomically reset the current cpu bit in new_vmalloc */ amoxor.d a0, a1, (a0) - /* Only emit a sfence.vma if the uarch caches invalid entries */ - ALTERNATIVE("sfence.vma", "nop", 0, RISCV_ISA_EXT_SVVPTC, 1) + /* + * A sfence.vma is required here. Even if we had Svvptc, there's no + * guarantee that after returning we wouldn't just fault again. + */ + sfence.vma REG_L a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp) REG_L a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp) From 279c2fa731122652ce9aace16dba1b575dbf5bc5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anthony Yznaga Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 20:39:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 511/607] mm: fix mmap errno value when MAP_DROPPABLE is not supported commit d86c9e971af2315119a78c564a802fafcebf1b6b upstream. Patch series "fix MAP_DROPPABLE not supported errno", v4. Mark Brown reported seeing a regression in -next on 32 bit arm with the mlock selftests. Before exiting and marking the tests failed, the following message was logged after an attempt to create a MAP_DROPPABLE mapping: Bail out! mmap error: Unknown error 524 It turns out error 524 is ENOTSUPP which is an error that userspace is not supposed to see, but it indicates in this instance that MAP_DROPPABLE is not supported. The first patch changes the errno returned to EOPNOTSUPP. The second patch is a second version of a prior patch to introduce selftests to verify locking behavior with droppable mappings with the additional change to skip the tests when MAP_DROPPABLE is not supported. The third patch fixes the MAP_DROPPABLE selftest so that it is run by the framework and skips if MAP_DROPPABLE is not supported. This patch (of 3): On configs where MAP_DROPPABLE is not supported (currently any 32-bit config except for PPC32), mmap fails with errno set to ENOTSUPP. However, ENOTSUPP is not a standard error value that userspace knows about. The acceptable userspace-visible errno to use is EOPNOTSUPP. checkpatch.pl has a warning to this effect. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260416033939.49981-1-anthony.yznaga@oracle.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260416033939.49981-2-anthony.yznaga@oracle.com Fixes: 9651fcedf7b9 ("mm: add MAP_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings") Signed-off-by: Anthony Yznaga Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) Reported-by: Mark Brown Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/mmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 5fd3b80fda1d5..b29b31a29ef66 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, break; case MAP_DROPPABLE: if (VM_DROPPABLE == VM_NONE) - return -ENOTSUPP; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* * A locked or stack area makes no sense to be droppable. * From 785ebd42b8b50dc13f3b705cd72352a82027ef38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:01:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 512/607] selftests: mm: fix and speedup "droppable" test commit cc13a7a618fe8354f16d74c06aaf9565a68e9ebd upstream. The droppable test currently relies on creating memory pressure in a child process to trigger dropping the droppable pages. That not only takes a long time on some machines (allocating and filling all that memory), on large machines this will not work as we hardcode the area size to 134217728 bytes. ... further, we rely on timeouts to detect that memory was not dropped, which is really suboptimal. Instead, let's just use MADV_PAGEOUT on a 2 MiB region. MADV_PAGEOUT works with droppable memory even without swap. There is the low chance of MADV_PAGEOUT failing to drop a page because of speculative references. We'll wait 1s and retry 10 times to rule that unlikely case out as best as we can. On a machine without swap: $ ./droppable TAP version 13 1..1 ok 1 madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) behavior # Totals: pass:1 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260611-droppable_test-v1-1-b6a73d99f658@kernel.org Fixes: 9651fcedf7b9 ("mm: add MAP_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV Tested-by: Sarthak Sharma Tested-by: Lance Yang Reviewed-by: Dev Jain Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park Tested-by: Lorenzo Stoakes Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Anthony Yznaga Cc: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Mark Brown Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/droppable.c | 46 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/droppable.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/droppable.c index f3d9ecf96890a..c1598fd394cad 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/droppable.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/droppable.c @@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { - size_t alloc_size = 134217728; - size_t page_size = getpagesize(); + const size_t alloc_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024; + int retry_count = 10; + bool dropped; void *alloc; - pid_t child; ksft_print_header(); ksft_set_plan(1); @@ -28,26 +28,32 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) alloc = mmap(0, alloc_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_DROPPABLE, -1, 0); assert(alloc != MAP_FAILED); memset(alloc, 'A', alloc_size); - for (size_t i = 0; i < alloc_size; i += page_size) - assert(*(uint8_t *)(alloc + i)); - - child = fork(); - assert(child >= 0); - if (!child) { - for (;;) - *(char *)malloc(page_size) = 'B'; - } - for (bool done = false; !done;) { - for (size_t i = 0; i < alloc_size; i += page_size) { - if (!*(uint8_t *)(alloc + i)) { - done = true; - break; + while (retry_count--) { + if (madvise(alloc, alloc_size, MADV_PAGEOUT)) { + if (errno == EINVAL) { + ksft_test_result_skip("madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) not supported\n"); + exit(KSFT_SKIP); } + ksft_test_result_fail("madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) error: %s\n", strerror(errno)); + exit(KSFT_FAIL); } + + dropped = memchr(alloc, 'A', alloc_size) == NULL; + + /* + * Speculative reference can temporarily prevent some + * pages from getting dropped. So sleep and retry. + * + * If a page is not droppable for 10s, something + * is seriously messed up and we want to fail. + */ + if (dropped) + break; + sleep(1); } - kill(child, SIGTERM); - ksft_test_result_pass("MAP_DROPPABLE: PASS\n"); - exit(KSFT_PASS); + ksft_test_result(dropped, "madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) behavior\n"); + + ksft_finished(); } From 8dcaa0f87a88d720d13106f3a306c6b61d189d86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ketan Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 02:48:04 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 513/607] mm: page_ext: add count limit to page_ext_iter_next to prevent invalid PFN access commit ffd017237cfe99e6e5602ab14179b0e6878a0840 upstream. The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a valid section while advancing the iterator. When dynamically adding memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when iterator count equals __pgcount. The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop increment. for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext = page_ext_iter_next(&__iter)" at the end. This causes page_ext_iter_next() to increment iter->index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn + __pgcount). During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn + __pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized, causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference. [ 14.555124][ T846] Call trace: [ 14.555125][ T846] lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P) [ 14.555127][ T846] page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c [ 14.555129][ T846] __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260 [ 14.571201][ T846] __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0 [ 14.571204][ T846] __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0 [ 14.571206][ T846] generic_online_page+0x14/0x24 [ 14.597782][ T846] online_pages+0x178/0x30c [ 14.597784][ T846] memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c [ 14.597787][ T846] memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64 [ 14.597789][ T846] device_online+0x88/0xb0 [ 14.597791][ T846] online_memory_block+0x30/0x40 [ 14.597793][ T846] walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8 [ 14.597794][ T846] add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298 [ 14.656161][ T846] add_memory+0x60/0x98 Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260623-page_ext-v3-1-a89799a5367c@oss.qualcomm.com Fixes: 9039b9096ea2 ("mm: page_ext: add an iteration API for page extensions") Signed-off-by: Ketan Kishore Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox Acked-by: Zi Yan Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Cc: Brendan Jackman Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Luiz Capitulino Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/page_ext.h | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/page_ext.h b/include/linux/page_ext.h index 76c817162d2fb..af2b6216c8e09 100644 --- a/include/linux/page_ext.h +++ b/include/linux/page_ext.h @@ -119,14 +119,18 @@ struct page_ext_iter { * page_ext_iter_begin() - Prepare for iterating through page extensions. * @iter: page extension iterator. * @pfn: PFN of the page we're interested in. + * @count: maximum number of page extensions to return. * * Must be called with RCU read lock taken. * * Return: NULL if no page_ext exists for this page. */ static inline struct page_ext *page_ext_iter_begin(struct page_ext_iter *iter, - unsigned long pfn) + unsigned long pfn, unsigned long count) { + if (!count) + return NULL; + iter->index = 0; iter->start_pfn = pfn; iter->page_ext = page_ext_lookup(pfn); @@ -137,19 +141,22 @@ static inline struct page_ext *page_ext_iter_begin(struct page_ext_iter *iter, /** * page_ext_iter_next() - Get next page extension * @iter: page extension iterator. + * @count: maximum number of page extensions to return. * * Must be called with RCU read lock taken. * * Return: NULL if no next page_ext exists. */ -static inline struct page_ext *page_ext_iter_next(struct page_ext_iter *iter) +static inline struct page_ext *page_ext_iter_next(struct page_ext_iter *iter, + unsigned long count) { unsigned long pfn; if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!iter->page_ext)) return NULL; - iter->index++; + if (++iter->index >= count) + return NULL; pfn = iter->start_pfn + iter->index; if (page_ext_iter_next_fast_possible(pfn)) @@ -182,9 +189,9 @@ static inline struct page_ext *page_ext_iter_get(const struct page_ext_iter *ite * IMPORTANT: must be called with RCU read lock taken. */ #define for_each_page_ext(__page, __pgcount, __page_ext, __iter) \ - for (__page_ext = page_ext_iter_begin(&__iter, page_to_pfn(__page));\ - __page_ext && __iter.index < __pgcount; \ - __page_ext = page_ext_iter_next(&__iter)) + for (__page_ext = page_ext_iter_begin(&__iter, page_to_pfn(__page), __pgcount); \ + __page_ext; \ + __page_ext = page_ext_iter_next(&__iter, __pgcount)) #else /* !CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION */ struct page_ext; From 5c942ad7df75925ee166e7f0fb36892d8dde376b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pedro Falcato Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 16:38:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 514/607] mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap commit e187bc02f8fa4226d62814592cf064ee4557c470 upstream. Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it. The issue was found by manual code inspection & an off-list discussion with Jan Kara. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260625153853.913949-1-pfalcato@suse.de Fixes: 9caccd41541a ("fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP") Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) Cc: Al Viro Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/fs.h | 5 +++++ mm/filemap.c | 2 +- mm/madvise.c | 3 +-- mm/mincore.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index f3e798184a58e..39269c7d167e6 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -2852,6 +2852,11 @@ static inline struct mnt_idmap *file_mnt_idmap(const struct file *file) return mnt_idmap(file->f_path.mnt); } +static inline bool file_owner_or_capable(const struct file *file) +{ + return inode_owner_or_capable(file_mnt_idmap(file), file_inode(file)); +} + /** * is_idmapped_mnt - check whether a mount is mapped * @mnt: the mount to check diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c index e3339cf37a1f0..7c26e3735f1bb 100644 --- a/mm/filemap.c +++ b/mm/filemap.c @@ -4620,7 +4620,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_cachestat(struct file *f) { if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) return true; - if (inode_owner_or_capable(file_mnt_idmap(f), file_inode(f))) + if (file_owner_or_capable(f)) return true; return file_permission(f, MAY_WRITE) == 0; } diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c index 5dbe40be7c650..588a809dac11d 100644 --- a/mm/madvise.c +++ b/mm/madvise.c @@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_file_pageout(struct vm_area_struct *vma) * otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive mappings, which * opens a side channel. */ - return inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, - file_inode(vma->vm_file)) || + return file_owner_or_capable(vma->vm_file) || file_permission(vma->vm_file, MAY_WRITE) == 0; } diff --git a/mm/mincore.c b/mm/mincore.c index 4a3d7aa911469..2cf2667bca7e5 100644 --- a/mm/mincore.c +++ b/mm/mincore.c @@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ static inline bool can_do_mincore(struct vm_area_struct *vma) * for writing; otherwise we'd be including shared non-exclusive * mappings, which opens a side channel. */ - return inode_owner_or_capable(&nop_mnt_idmap, - file_inode(vma->vm_file)) || + return file_owner_or_capable(vma->vm_file) || file_permission(vma->vm_file, MAY_WRITE) == 0; } From 6bbe2000d9f9ffb828764eb6356e8c82feec6e1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zenghui Yu Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2026 18:11:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 515/607] selftests/mm: pagemap_ioctl: use the correct page size for transact_test() commit dccf636bf1e68c3fda92f0c9e1018ab7e0ac8b2c upstream. There are several places in transact_test() where we use the hardcoded 0x1000 (4k) as page size, which is not always correct for architectures supporting multiple page sizes. Switch to use the correct page size. Otherwise ./ksft_pagemap.sh on a 16k-page-size arm64 box fails with $ ./ksft_pagemap.sh [...] # ok 96 mprotect_tests Both pages written after remap and mprotect # ok 97 mprotect_tests Clear and make the pages written # Bail out! ioctl failed # # Planned tests != run tests (117 != 97) # # Totals: pass:97 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0 # [FAIL] not ok 1 pagemap_ioctl # exit=1 # SUMMARY: PASS=0 SKIP=0 FAIL=1 1..1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260628101118.35861-1-zenghui.yu@linux.dev Fixes: 46fd75d4a3c9 ("selftests: mm: add pagemap ioctl tests") Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum Cc: David Hildenbrand Cc: Liam R. Howlett Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: Mike Rapoport Cc: Shuah Khan Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan Cc: Vlastimil Babka Cc: Zenghui Yu Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c index 4fc8e578ec7c3..8f42b9e5891bb 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/pagemap_ioctl.c @@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ void *thread_proc(void *mem) ksft_exit_fail_msg("pthread_barrier_wait\n"); for (i = 0; i < access_per_thread; ++i) - __atomic_add_fetch(m + i * (0x1000 / sizeof(*m)), 1, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); + __atomic_add_fetch(m + i * (page_size / sizeof(*m)), 1, __ATOMIC_SEQ_CST); ret = pthread_barrier_wait(&end_barrier); if (ret && ret != PTHREAD_BARRIER_SERIAL_THREAD) @@ -1402,15 +1402,15 @@ static void transact_test(int page_size) if (pthread_barrier_init(&end_barrier, NULL, nthreads + 1)) ksft_exit_fail_msg("pthread_barrier_init\n"); - mem = mmap(NULL, 0x1000 * nthreads * pages_per_thread, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + mem = mmap(NULL, page_size * nthreads * pages_per_thread, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0); if (mem == MAP_FAILED) ksft_exit_fail_msg("Error mmap %s.\n", strerror(errno)); - wp_init(mem, 0x1000 * nthreads * pages_per_thread); - wp_addr_range(mem, 0x1000 * nthreads * pages_per_thread); + wp_init(mem, page_size * nthreads * pages_per_thread); + wp_addr_range(mem, page_size * nthreads * pages_per_thread); - memset(mem, 0, 0x1000 * nthreads * pages_per_thread); + memset(mem, 0, page_size * nthreads * pages_per_thread); count = get_dirty_pages_reset(mem, nthreads * pages_per_thread, 1, page_size); ksft_test_result(count > 0, "%s count %u\n", __func__, count); @@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ static void transact_test(int page_size) finish = 0; for (i = 0; i < nthreads; ++i) - pthread_create(&th, NULL, thread_proc, mem + 0x1000 * i * pages_per_thread); + pthread_create(&th, NULL, thread_proc, mem + page_size * i * pages_per_thread); extra_pages = 0; for (i = 0; i < iter_count; ++i) { From 037ec8353711c79353b12d5634e0c9ff363a9efa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 16:32:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 516/607] crypto: loongson - Remove broken and unused loongson-rng commit af3d1bb9a09daf928fc3f173689fb7904d6a6d4f upstream. The loongson-rng rng_alg has several vulnerabilities, including not providing forward security, and a use-after-free bug due to the use of wait_for_completion_interruptible(). Meanwhile, the rng_alg framework doesn't really have any purpose in the first place other than to access the software algorithms crypto/drbg.c and crypto/jitterentropy.c. Hardware-specific rng_algs have no in-kernel user, and unlike hwrng there's no feed into the actual Linux RNG. As such, there's really no point to this code. There are of course other rng_alg drivers that are similarly unused, but they're similarly in the process of being phased out, e.g. https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529193648.18172-1-ebiggers@kernel.org and https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529220430.34135-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Given that, there's no point in fixing forward these vulnerabilities, and it makes much more sense to simply roll back the addition of this driver. If this platform provides TRNG (not PRNG) functionality, it could make sense to add a hwrng driver, but it would be quite different. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20260525145939.GC2018@quark/ Fixes: 766b2d724c8d ("crypto: loongson - add Loongson RNG driver support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/crypto/Makefile | 1 - drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig | 6 - drivers/crypto/loongson/Makefile | 1 - drivers/crypto/loongson/loongson-rng.c | 209 ------------------------- 6 files changed, 219 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/loongson/Makefile delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/loongson/loongson-rng.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 554e881b05bea..cbfe2a7dd993f 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14617,7 +14617,6 @@ M: Qunqin Zhao L: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: drivers/char/tpm/tpm_loongson.c -F: drivers/crypto/loongson/ F: drivers/mfd/loongson-se.c F: include/linux/mfd/loongson-se.h diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig index a6688d54984c4..e121d6929cf19 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig @@ -852,7 +852,6 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_CCREE If unsure say Y. source "drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig" -source "drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig" source "drivers/crypto/amlogic/Kconfig" diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/Makefile index 322ae8854e3ea..170e10b18f9b8 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/Makefile +++ b/drivers/crypto/Makefile @@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ obj-y += inside-secure/ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ARTPEC6) += axis/ obj-y += xilinx/ obj-y += hisilicon/ -obj-y += loongson/ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_AMLOGIC_GXL) += amlogic/ obj-y += intel/ obj-y += starfive/ diff --git a/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig deleted file mode 100644 index f4e1544ffbb49..0000000000000 --- a/drivers/crypto/loongson/Kconfig +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -config CRYPTO_DEV_LOONGSON_RNG - tristate "Support for Loongson RNG Driver" - depends on MFD_LOONGSON_SE - select CRYPTO_RNG - help - Support for Loongson RNG Driver. diff --git a/drivers/crypto/loongson/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/loongson/Makefile deleted file mode 100644 index 1ce5ec32b5534..0000000000000 --- a/drivers/crypto/loongson/Makefile +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_LOONGSON_RNG) += loongson-rng.o diff --git a/drivers/crypto/loongson/loongson-rng.c b/drivers/crypto/loongson/loongson-rng.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3a4940260f9e5..0000000000000 --- a/drivers/crypto/loongson/loongson-rng.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,209 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* Copyright (c) 2019 HiSilicon Limited. */ -/* Copyright (c) 2025 Loongson Technology Corporation Limited. */ - -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#define SE_SEED_SIZE 32 - -struct loongson_rng_list { - struct mutex lock; - struct list_head list; - int registered; -}; - -struct loongson_rng { - u32 used; - struct loongson_se_engine *engine; - struct list_head list; - struct mutex lock; -}; - -struct loongson_rng_ctx { - struct loongson_rng *rng; -}; - -struct loongson_rng_cmd { - u32 cmd_id; - union { - u32 len; - u32 ret; - } u; - u32 seed_off; - u32 out_off; - u32 pad[4]; -}; - -static struct loongson_rng_list rng_devices = { - .lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(rng_devices.lock), - .list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(rng_devices.list), -}; - -static int loongson_rng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *src, - unsigned int slen, u8 *dstn, unsigned int dlen) -{ - struct loongson_rng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); - struct loongson_rng *rng = ctx->rng; - struct loongson_rng_cmd *cmd = rng->engine->command; - int err, len; - - mutex_lock(&rng->lock); - cmd->seed_off = 0; - do { - len = min(dlen, rng->engine->buffer_size); - cmd = rng->engine->command; - cmd->u.len = len; - err = loongson_se_send_engine_cmd(rng->engine); - if (err) - break; - - cmd = rng->engine->command_ret; - if (cmd->u.ret) { - err = -EIO; - break; - } - - memcpy(dstn, rng->engine->data_buffer, len); - dlen -= len; - dstn += len; - } while (dlen > 0); - mutex_unlock(&rng->lock); - - return err; -} - -static int loongson_rng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) -{ - struct loongson_rng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - struct loongson_rng *rng; - u32 min_used = U32_MAX; - - mutex_lock(&rng_devices.lock); - list_for_each_entry(rng, &rng_devices.list, list) { - if (rng->used < min_used) { - ctx->rng = rng; - min_used = rng->used; - } - } - ctx->rng->used++; - mutex_unlock(&rng_devices.lock); - - return 0; -} - -static void loongson_rng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) -{ - struct loongson_rng_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - - mutex_lock(&rng_devices.lock); - ctx->rng->used--; - mutex_unlock(&rng_devices.lock); -} - -static int loongson_rng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, - unsigned int slen) -{ - struct loongson_rng_ctx *ctx = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); - struct loongson_rng *rng = ctx->rng; - struct loongson_rng_cmd *cmd; - int err; - - if (slen < SE_SEED_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - - slen = min(slen, rng->engine->buffer_size); - - mutex_lock(&rng->lock); - cmd = rng->engine->command; - cmd->u.len = slen; - cmd->seed_off = rng->engine->buffer_off; - memcpy(rng->engine->data_buffer, seed, slen); - err = loongson_se_send_engine_cmd(rng->engine); - if (err) - goto out; - - cmd = rng->engine->command_ret; - if (cmd->u.ret) - err = -EIO; -out: - mutex_unlock(&rng->lock); - - return err; -} - -static struct rng_alg loongson_rng_alg = { - .generate = loongson_rng_generate, - .seed = loongson_rng_seed, - .seedsize = SE_SEED_SIZE, - .base = { - .cra_name = "stdrng", - .cra_driver_name = "loongson_stdrng", - .cra_priority = 300, - .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct loongson_rng_ctx), - .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, - .cra_init = loongson_rng_init, - .cra_exit = loongson_rng_exit, - }, -}; - -static int loongson_rng_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) -{ - struct loongson_rng_cmd *cmd; - struct loongson_rng *rng; - int ret = 0; - - rng = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*rng), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rng) - return -ENOMEM; - - rng->engine = loongson_se_init_engine(pdev->dev.parent, SE_ENGINE_RNG); - if (!rng->engine) - return -ENODEV; - cmd = rng->engine->command; - cmd->cmd_id = SE_CMD_RNG; - cmd->out_off = rng->engine->buffer_off; - mutex_init(&rng->lock); - - mutex_lock(&rng_devices.lock); - - if (!rng_devices.registered) { - ret = crypto_register_rng(&loongson_rng_alg); - if (ret) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register crypto(%d)\n", ret); - goto out; - } - rng_devices.registered = 1; - } - - list_add_tail(&rng->list, &rng_devices.list); -out: - mutex_unlock(&rng_devices.lock); - - return ret; -} - -static struct platform_driver loongson_rng_driver = { - .probe = loongson_rng_probe, - .driver = { - .name = "loongson-rng", - }, -}; -module_platform_driver(loongson_rng_driver); - -MODULE_ALIAS("platform:loongson-rng"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Yinggang Gu "); -MODULE_AUTHOR("Qunqin Zhao "); -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Loongson Random Number Generator driver"); From bb354384f40bb087e7c44f0f0743a23fc945f91d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lu Baolu Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 14:03:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 517/607] iommu/vt-d: Avoid WARNING in sva unbind path commit 534b5f98ab7319d8004bbc7dab6481462243e883 upstream. The Intel IOMMU driver allows SVA on devices even if they do not support PCI/PRI. Commit 39c20c4e83b9 ("iommu/vt-d: Only handle IOPF for SVA when PRI is supported") modified the SVA bind path to allow this configuration by skipping IOPF enablement when PRI is missing. However, it failed to update the unbind path. This creates an imbalance: the unbind path attempts to disable IOPF for a device that never had it enabled, triggering a WARNING in intel_iommu_disable_iopf(): WARNING: drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c:3475 at intel_iommu_disable_iopf+0x4f/0x90d Call Trace: blocking_domain_set_dev_pasid+0x50/0x70 iommu_detach_device_pasid+0x89/0xc0 iommu_sva_unbind_device+0x73/0x150 xe_vm_close_and_put+0x4d2/0x1200 [xe] Fix this by bypassing IOPF operations for SVA domains on non-PRI hardware in both the bind and unbind paths. Fixes: 39c20c4e83b9 ("iommu/vt-d: Only handle IOPF for SVA when PRI is supported") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Nareshkumar Gollakoti Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519052917.3729796-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h | 11 +++++++++++ drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 12 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h index 9198ac7f6bbab..6b11081e690fe 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h @@ -1334,18 +1334,29 @@ void intel_iommu_disable_iopf(struct device *dev); static inline int iopf_for_domain_set(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev) { + struct device_domain_info *info = dev_iommu_priv_get(dev); + if (!domain || !domain->iopf_handler) return 0; + /* SVA with non-IOMMU/PRI IOPF handling is allowed. */ + if (domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_SVA && !info->pri_supported) + return 0; + return intel_iommu_enable_iopf(dev); } static inline void iopf_for_domain_remove(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev) { + struct device_domain_info *info = dev_iommu_priv_get(dev); + if (!domain || !domain->iopf_handler) return; + if (domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_SVA && !info->pri_supported) + return; + intel_iommu_disable_iopf(dev); } diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c index 4cbbebc027496..e147f71f91b72 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c @@ -164,12 +164,9 @@ static int intel_svm_set_dev_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, if (IS_ERR(dev_pasid)) return PTR_ERR(dev_pasid); - /* SVA with non-IOMMU/PRI IOPF handling is allowed. */ - if (info->pri_supported) { - ret = iopf_for_domain_replace(domain, old, dev); - if (ret) - goto out_remove_dev_pasid; - } + ret = iopf_for_domain_replace(domain, old, dev); + if (ret) + goto out_remove_dev_pasid; /* Setup the pasid table: */ sflags = cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57) ? PASID_FLAG_FL5LP : 0; @@ -183,8 +180,7 @@ static int intel_svm_set_dev_pasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, return 0; out_unwind_iopf: - if (info->pri_supported) - iopf_for_domain_replace(old, domain, dev); + iopf_for_domain_replace(old, domain, dev); out_remove_dev_pasid: domain_remove_dev_pasid(domain, dev, pasid); return ret; From 50612ce318b1c156e920c69e5571897f9bedb49e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Weinan Liu Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 22:31:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 518/607] iommu/amd: Don't split flush for amd_iommu_domain_flush_all() commit 69fe699afe1afcb730164b86c228483c2da05f94 upstream. We have observed multiple full invalidations occurring during device detach when we are done using the vfio-device. blocked_domain_attach_device() -> detach_device() -> amd_iommu_domain_flush_all() -> amd_iommu_domain_flush_pages(..., CMD_INV_IOMMU_ALL_PAGES_ADDRESS) while (size != 0) { -> __domain_flush_pages( flush_size /* power of 2 flush_size */) -> domain_flush_pages_v1() -> build_inv_iommu_pages() -> build_inv_address() } build_inv_address() will trigger a full invalidation if the chunk size > (1 << 51). Consequently, the guest will issue multiple full invalidations for a single call to amd_iommu_domain_flush_all() Without this patch, we will see 10 time instead of 1 time full invalidations for every amd_iommu_domain_flush_all(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a270be1b3fdf ("iommu/amd: Use only natural aligned flushes in a VM") Suggested-by: Josef Bacik Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Weinan Liu Reviewed-by: Wei Wang Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Reviewed-by: Samiullah Khawaja Reviewed-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c index dfbd09e2e0ca5..5fef68797fdab 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c @@ -1689,7 +1689,8 @@ void amd_iommu_domain_flush_pages(struct protection_domain *domain, { lockdep_assert_held(&domain->lock); - if (likely(!amd_iommu_np_cache)) { + if (likely(!amd_iommu_np_cache) || + size >= (1ULL<<52)) { __domain_flush_pages(domain, address, size); /* Wait until IOMMU TLB and all device IOTLB flushes are complete */ From 04a177f91160ee18da98f5689482cf0f589ec869 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai Aizen Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 20:56:30 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 519/607] iommufd: Use sizeof(*hdr) instead of sizeof(hdr) in veventq read commit be93d186ae88a92e7aa77e122d4e661fa57b1e39 upstream. The bound-check in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() for the normal vEVENT path uses sizeof(hdr) where the surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr): if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) && sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) { hdr is declared as struct iommufd_vevent_header *, so sizeof(hdr) evaluates to the size of the pointer. Surrounding code uses sizeof(*hdr) consistently: if (done >= count || sizeof(*hdr) > count - done) { ... if (copy_to_user(buf + done, hdr, sizeof(*hdr))) { ... done += sizeof(*hdr); struct iommufd_vevent_header is currently 8 bytes (two __u32 fields, flags and sequence), so on 64-bit (sizeof(void *) == 8) the two expressions happen to be equal and the check works as intended. On 32-bit (sizeof(void *) == 4) the check under-counts the header by 4 bytes: a vEVENT whose data_len causes 8 + cur->data_len to exceed count - done while 4 + cur->data_len does not will pass the check, then the loop will copy_to_user 8 bytes of header followed by data_len bytes of payload, writing past the user-supplied buffer. It is also a latent bug for any future expansion of struct iommufd_vevent_header beyond sizeof(void *) on 64-bit; the check should not depend on the type happening to match the host pointer width. Use sizeof(*hdr) to match the rest of the function and the actual amount that will be copied. Fixes: e36ba5ab808e ("iommufd: Add IOMMUFD_OBJ_VEVENTQ and IOMMUFD_CMD_VEVENTQ_ALLOC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260430175630.67078-1-kai.aizen.dev@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Kai Aizen Signed-off-by: Kai Aizen Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Reviewed-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index 8e45752f500e7..d66d5e27bc74e 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_veventq_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, /* If being a normal vEVENT, validate against the full size */ if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) && - sizeof(hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) { + sizeof(*hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) { iommufd_veventq_deliver_restore(veventq, cur); break; } From 5c5f1b5184f7d9786bd7d9646bdbbcdcee3c05f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 17:36:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 520/607] iommufd: Fix data_len byte-count vs element-count mismatch commit 85345becfead3255a5f875d4b4d82ea01d926239 upstream. kzalloc_flex() computes the allocation size. With event_data typed as u64, data_len is interpreted as a u64 element count. Yet, every caller and the read path treat data_len as a byte count. The current code over-allocates by sizeof(u64) and the __counted_by() annotation overstates the length by the same factor. Re-type event_data as u8. No functional change in user-visible behavior. Fixes: e36ba5ab808e ("iommufd: Add IOMMUFD_OBJ_VEVENTQ and IOMMUFD_CMD_VEVENTQ_ALLOC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/f7665f839b9dce917d6bd394375a1cf56568d86b.1779408671.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h index 85d0843ed07b0..53d37e77c4b98 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/iommufd_private.h @@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ struct iommufd_vevent { struct iommufd_vevent_header header; struct list_head node; /* for iommufd_eventq::deliver */ ssize_t data_len; - u64 event_data[] __counted_by(data_len); + u8 event_data[] __counted_by(data_len); }; #define vevent_for_lost_events_header(vevent) \ From f565297edf316016be4a1a9e2eb9f39359313f43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Thu, 21 May 2026 17:36:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 521/607] iommufd: Set veventq_depth upper bound commit 6ebf2eb46fbd5b40393ff8fbb847ba96925beaff upstream. iommufd_veventq_alloc() accepts any !0 veventq_depth from userspace, with an upper bound at U32_MAX. This leaves a vulnerability where userspace can allocate excessively large queues to exhaust kernel memory reserves. Cap the veventq_depth (maximum number of entries) to 1 << 19, matching the maximum number of entries in the SMMUv3 EVTQ (the largest use case today). Fixes: e36ba5ab808e ("iommufd: Add IOMMUFD_OBJ_VEVENTQ and IOMMUFD_CMD_VEVENTQ_ALLOC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/8426cbaa5e8294472ec7f076ef427cc473be5985.1779408671.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index d66d5e27bc74e..3cd7d6d15bbdb 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -473,6 +473,9 @@ int iommufd_fault_iopf_handler(struct iopf_group *group) static const struct file_operations iommufd_veventq_fops = INIT_EVENTQ_FOPS(iommufd_veventq_fops_read, NULL); +/* An arbitrary upper bound for veventq_depth that fits all existing HWs */ +#define VEVENTQ_MAX_DEPTH (1U << 19) + int iommufd_veventq_alloc(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd) { struct iommu_veventq_alloc *cmd = ucmd->cmd; @@ -484,7 +487,7 @@ int iommufd_veventq_alloc(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd) if (cmd->flags || cmd->__reserved || cmd->type == IOMMU_VEVENTQ_TYPE_DEFAULT) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (!cmd->veventq_depth) + if (!cmd->veventq_depth || cmd->veventq_depth > VEVENTQ_MAX_DEPTH) return -EINVAL; viommu = iommufd_get_viommu(ucmd, cmd->viommu_id); From 64011399d881966926b1e79e69d54d2c81010754 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 13:42:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 522/607] iommufd: Rewind header length in done if iommufd_veventq_fops_read() fails commit 01e41ad76c12ae5c49ab4ef4fc7dd54e9b8784d6 upstream. When the first event copy fails, rc = -EFAULT will not be reported as done is set to the length of the copied header. Rewind it to report rc correctly. Fixes: e36ba5ab808e ("iommufd: Add IOMMUFD_OBJ_VEVENTQ and IOMMUFD_CMD_VEVENTQ_ALLOC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/78f8caeb6a5d667a26b870e3068cec47dd4b5be1.1780343944.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Pranjal Shrivastava Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index 3cd7d6d15bbdb..0584fdac6b7ac 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_veventq_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, if (cur->data_len && copy_to_user(buf + done, cur->event_data, cur->data_len)) { iommufd_veventq_deliver_restore(veventq, cur); + done -= sizeof(*hdr); rc = -EFAULT; break; } From f549a749b6255e6932d58c26a023adacb8049c9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 13:42:33 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 523/607] iommufd: Reject invalid read count in iommufd_veventq_fops_read() commit 00203ca8323f9714630408c19a209b52397975e6 upstream. The read count must be large enough to hold a vEVENT header. For a normal vEVENT, it must also hold the trailing data following the header. iommufd_veventq_fops_read() does not validate the count, but returns 0 as if the read had succeeded while leaving the pending event in the queue. Return -EINVAL in both undersize cases. Fixes: e36ba5ab808e ("iommufd: Add IOMMUFD_OBJ_VEVENTQ and IOMMUFD_CMD_VEVENTQ_ALLOC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/e1111adcc8a8882fbfd84accd6674dc846dc5689.1780343944.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Pranjal Shrivastava Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index 0584fdac6b7ac..b6123de99dc09 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -310,6 +310,9 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_veventq_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, if (*ppos) return -ESPIPE; + /* Minimum read count is a vEVENT header */ + if (count < sizeof(*hdr)) + return -EINVAL; while ((cur = iommufd_veventq_deliver_fetch(veventq))) { /* Validate the remaining bytes against the header size */ @@ -323,6 +326,9 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_veventq_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, if (!vevent_for_lost_events_header(cur) && sizeof(*hdr) + cur->data_len > count - done) { iommufd_veventq_deliver_restore(veventq, cur); + /* Read count doesn't fit a single normal vEVENT */ + if (done == 0) + rc = -EINVAL; break; } From f2dbe1dba01e6639731042b23d2e74cb773f8760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 13:42:35 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 524/607] iommufd: Reject invalid read count in iommufd_fault_fops_read() commit 47916a54eeb2a9e654512ee609f71bd5b29db702 upstream. The read count must be large enough to hold one fault or a group's faults. iommufd_fault_fops_read() does not validate the count, but returns 0 as if the read had succeeded while leaving the pending fault in the queue. Return -EINVAL in the undersize cases. Fixes: 07838f7fd529 ("iommufd: Add iommufd fault object") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/85c118a606fbedc5c132a1f5ec223a5ba23b92d2.1780343944.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Pranjal Shrivastava Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index b6123de99dc09..82796236bcf4c 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_fault_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, if (done >= count || group->fault_count * fault_size > count - done) { iommufd_fault_deliver_restore(fault, group); + /* Read count doesn't fit the first fault group */ + if (done == 0) + rc = -EINVAL; break; } From 5539da127d03c1f6c2e2a49fdfbe331a0ccbdea8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 13:42:36 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 525/607] iommufd: Break the loop on failure in iommufd_fault_fops_read() commit 172fc8b19825a0f5884c38f2289188284e2d45ee upstream. On a copy_to_user() failure inside the inner list_for_each_entry, only the inner loop breaks; the outer while re-fetches the just-restored fault group and retries the failing copy_to_user() forever, spinning the reader at 100% CPU with fault->mutex held. Check rc after the inner loop and break the outer while as well. Fixes: 07838f7fd529 ("iommufd: Add iommufd fault object") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/336a9b6e44fe66a24199d3be777c405c85c98622.1780343944.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Pranjal Shrivastava Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index 82796236bcf4c..38e04d8064bc3 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_fault_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, } done += fault_size; } + if (rc) + break; } mutex_unlock(&fault->mutex); From 67daea4c09351467d08c408e6cd23f62501df262 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Mon, 1 Jun 2026 13:42:37 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 526/607] iommufd: Avoid partial fault group delivery in iommufd_fault_fops_read() commit 091ab6d70dc444f56ed14faedbcacfc979f4c613 upstream. The cookie returned by xa_alloc() in iommufd_fault_fops_read() is per fault group, but the inner copy_to_user() runs per fault inside the group. If a copy fails mid-group, xa_erase clears the cookie and the group is restored to the deliver list, yet done is not rolled back. The function returns the partial byte count, with the successfully copied faults sitting at offsets below done carrying the now-erased cookie. The next read() then re-fetches the group, allocates a fresh cookie, and re-delivers every fault including the ones already copied; userspace sees duplicates carrying the new cookie, and a stale cookie that can never be responded to. Use a local group_done variable that tracks the per-group progress inside the inner loop, and only commit done = group_done after the inner loop has finished successfully. On a copy_to_user failure the outer break skips the commit, so done remains at its prior start-of-group baseline; the partial bytes already written past done are undefined to userspace per the read(2) contract, and the next read re-delivers the whole group atomically. Fixes: 07838f7fd529 ("iommufd: Add iommufd fault object") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/360cab4d4aeccb0bae275a970e2b3c340a71e0e0.1780343944.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Pranjal Shrivastava Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c index 38e04d8064bc3..617e20b67bf2a 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/eventq.c @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_fault_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, mutex_lock(&fault->mutex); while ((group = iommufd_fault_deliver_fetch(fault))) { + size_t group_done = done; + if (done >= count || group->fault_count * fault_size > count - done) { iommufd_fault_deliver_restore(fault, group); @@ -160,16 +162,17 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_fault_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, iommufd_compose_fault_message(&iopf->fault, &data, idev, group->cookie); - if (copy_to_user(buf + done, &data, fault_size)) { + if (copy_to_user(buf + group_done, &data, fault_size)) { xa_erase(&fault->response, group->cookie); iommufd_fault_deliver_restore(fault, group); rc = -EFAULT; break; } - done += fault_size; + group_done += fault_size; } if (rc) break; + done = group_done; } mutex_unlock(&fault->mutex); From 32ca4aed2a66205b072fcfecabe220289a8149ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicolin Chen Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 14:26:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 527/607] iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len commit 4d70986002f2f3eaaed89124fb2522bded38b016 upstream. iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len, each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory trips the soft-lockup watchdog. A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel. Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length. Fixes: 8c6eabae3807 ("iommufd: Add IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/447fa93663f7526eb361719e83fa8b649464483d.1780521606.git.nicolinc@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen Reviewed-by: Lu Baolu Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/hw_pagetable.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/hw_pagetable.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/hw_pagetable.c index fe789c2dc0c97..623cc608ca0cd 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/hw_pagetable.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/hw_pagetable.c @@ -489,6 +489,9 @@ int iommufd_hwpt_get_dirty_bitmap(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd) return rc; } +/* An arbitrary entry_num cap, far above any realistic invalidation batch */ +#define IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE_ENTRY_NUM_MAX (1U << 19) + int iommufd_hwpt_invalidate(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd) { struct iommu_hwpt_invalidate *cmd = ucmd->cmd; @@ -507,7 +510,13 @@ int iommufd_hwpt_invalidate(struct iommufd_ucmd *ucmd) goto out; } - if (cmd->entry_num && (!cmd->data_uptr || !cmd->entry_len)) { + /* + * Bound entry_num and entry_len so a single call cannot pin the CPU; + * entry_len also caps the copy_struct_from_user() trailing-zero scan. + */ + if (cmd->entry_num && + (!cmd->data_uptr || !cmd->entry_len || cmd->entry_len > PAGE_SIZE || + cmd->entry_num > IOMMU_HWPT_INVALIDATE_ENTRY_NUM_MAX)) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } From e4427c19554b56bb38408fba3c3e10e11e3d7f92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ricardo Robaina Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 18:47:59 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 528/607] audit: fix removal of dangling executable rules commit 888a0396e154524f4027f27da84bdbec9eb68916 upstream. When an audited executable is deleted from the disk, its dentry becomes negative. Any later attempt to delete the associated audit rule will lead to audit_alloc_mark() encountering this negative dentry and immediately aborting, returning -ENOENT. This early abort prevents the subsystem from allocating the temporary fsnotify mark needed to construct the search key, meaning the kernel cannot find the existing rule in its own lists to delete it. This leaves a dangling rule in memory, resulting in the following error while attempting to delete the rule: # ./audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh No rules Error deleting rule (No such file or directory) There was an error while processing parameters # auditctl -l -a always,exit -S all -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -F key=dr # auditctl -D Error deleting rule (No such file or directory) There was an error while processing parameters This patch fixes this issue by removing the d_really_is_negative() check. By doing so, a dummy mark can be successfully generated for the deleted path, which allows the audit subsystem to properly match and flush the dangling rule. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 76a53de6f7ff ("VFS/audit: introduce kern_path_parent() for audit") Acked-by: Waiman Long Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c index b92805b317a2d..0046f93ae9144 100644 --- a/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c +++ b/kernel/audit_fsnotify.c @@ -84,10 +84,6 @@ struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_alloc_mark(struct audit_krule *krule, char *pa dentry = kern_path_parent(pathname, &path); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) return ERR_CAST(dentry); /* returning an error */ - if (d_really_is_negative(dentry)) { - audit_mark = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); - goto out; - } audit_mark = kzalloc(sizeof(*audit_mark), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!audit_mark)) { From 859fef2c3d40aa3c6297bba9f15bb95716550ddc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 19:27:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 529/607] landlock: Set audit_net.sk for socket access checks MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit d936e1a9170f9cadaa5f37586b1dfe6f20f98799 upstream. Set audit_net.sk in current_check_access_socket() to provide the socket object to audit_log_lsm_data(). This makes Landlock consistent with AppArmor, which always sets .sk for socket operations, and with SELinux's generic socket permission checks. The socket's local and foreign address information (laddr, lport, faddr, fport) is logged by the shared lsm_audit.c infrastructure when the socket has bound or connected state. Fields with zero values are suppressed by print_ipv4_addr()/print_ipv6_addr(), so the audit output is unchanged for the common case of bind denials on unbound sockets. For connect denials after a prior bind, the bound local address (laddr, lport) appears before the existing sockaddr fields (daddr, dest). No existing fields are removed or reordered, and the new field names (laddr, lport, faddr, fport) are standard audit fields already emitted by other LSMs through the same lsm_audit.c code path. Add a connect_tcp_bound audit test that binds to an allowed port and then connects to a denied one, verifying that the denial record reports laddr/lport from the bound socket in addition to the connect destination. Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Tingmao Wang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9f74411a40ce ("landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612172757.1003481-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- security/landlock/net.c | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c index e6367e30e5b0e..f309ee2def32a 100644 --- a/security/landlock/net.c +++ b/security/landlock/net.c @@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock, return 0; audit_net.family = address->sa_family; + audit_net.sk = sock->sk; landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request){ .type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS, diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c index 957a06fde5924..6fecd36f74c63 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c @@ -2014,4 +2014,66 @@ TEST_F(audit, connect) EXPECT_EQ(0, close(sock_fd)); } +static int matches_log_tcp_bound(int audit_fd, const char *const addr, + __u16 lport, __u16 dport) +{ + static const char log_template[] = REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX + " blockers=net\\.connect_tcp laddr=%s lport=%u daddr=%s dest=%u$"; + /* Slack for two addresses and two port numbers. */ + char log_match[sizeof(log_template) + 40]; + int log_match_len; + + log_match_len = snprintf(log_match, sizeof(log_match), log_template, + addr, lport, addr, dport); + if (log_match_len > sizeof(log_match)) + return -E2BIG; + + return audit_match_record(audit_fd, AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS, log_match, + NULL); +} + +/* + * After a bind() to an allowed port, a denied connect must report laddr/lport + * from the bound socket (made available through audit_net.sk) in addition to + * the connect sockaddr's daddr/dest. + */ +TEST_F(audit, connect_tcp_bound) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, + }; + const struct landlock_net_port_attr rule_bind = { + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP, + .port = self->srv0.port, + }; + struct service_fixture srv_remote; + struct audit_records records; + int ruleset_fd, sock_fd; + + /* Uses a second port as the denied connect target. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, set_service(&srv_remote, variant->prot, 1)); + + ruleset_fd = + landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT, + &rule_bind, 0)); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + sock_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0); + ASSERT_LE(0, sock_fd); + EXPECT_EQ(0, bind_variant(sock_fd, &self->srv0)); + EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, connect_variant(sock_fd, &srv_remote)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_tcp_bound(self->audit_fd, variant->addr, + self->srv0.port, srv_remote.port)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access); + EXPECT_EQ(1, records.domain); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(sock_fd)); +} + TEST_HARNESS_MAIN From b51a7439c166aab2061ae6a7dff6f679fe6b11a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 12:51:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 530/607] selftests/landlock: Filter dealloc records in audit_count_records() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 26679fad81a471428707d2dd7b0418204c52b7e4 upstream. audit_count_records() counts both AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN allocation and deallocation records in records.domain . Domain deallocation is tied to asynchronous credential freeing via kworker threads (landlock_put_ruleset_deferred), so the dealloc record can arrive after the drain in audit_init() and after the preceding audit_match_record() call. This causes flaky failures in tests that assert an exact records.domain count: a stale dealloc record from a previous test's domain inflates the count by one. Observed on x86_64 under build configurations that delay the kworker firing the dealloc callback (e.g. coverage instrumentation): the audit_layout1 tests in fs_test.c intermittently saw records.domain == 2 where 1 was expected. The fix is in the shared helper, so those existing checks become robust without needing a fs_test.c edit. Filter audit_count_records() with a regex to skip records containing deallocation status. The remaining domain records (allocation, emitted synchronously during landlock_log_denial()) are deterministic. Deallocation records are already tested explicitly via matches_log_domain_deallocated() in audit_test.c, which uses its own domain-ID-based filtering and longer timeout. With this filter in place, re-add the records.domain == 0 checks that were removed in commit 3647a4977fb7 ("selftests/landlock: Drain stale audit records on init") as a workaround for this race. Cc: Günther Noack Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Depends-on: 07c2572a8757 ("selftests/landlock: Skip stale records in audit_match_record()") Fixes: 6a500b22971c ("selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit flags and domain IDs") Tested-by: Günther Noack Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260513105112.140137-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h | 39 ++++++++++++------- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c | 2 + .../testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 1 + .../landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h index c0c7e8a66edc1..d6d6f5116dc96 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit.h @@ -381,18 +381,24 @@ struct audit_records { }; /* - * WARNING: Do not assert records.domain == 0 without a preceding - * audit_match_record() call. Domain deallocation records are emitted - * asynchronously from kworker threads and can arrive after the drain in - * audit_init(), corrupting the domain count. A preceding audit_match_record() - * call consumes stale records while scanning, making the assertion safe in - * practice because stale deallocation records arrive before the expected access - * records. + * Counts remaining audit records by type, skipping domain deallocation records. + * Deallocation records are emitted asynchronously from kworker threads after a + * previous test's child has exited, so they can arrive after the drain in + * audit_init() and after the preceding audit_match_record() call. Allocation + * records are emitted synchronously during landlock_log_denial() in the current + * test's syscall context, so only those are counted in records->domain. */ static int audit_count_records(int audit_fd, struct audit_records *records) { + static const char dealloc_pattern[] = REGEX_LANDLOCK_PREFIX + " status=deallocated "; struct audit_message msg; - int err; + regex_t dealloc_re; + int ret, err = 0; + + ret = regcomp(&dealloc_re, dealloc_pattern, 0); + if (ret) + return -ENOMEM; records->access = 0; records->domain = 0; @@ -402,9 +408,8 @@ static int audit_count_records(int audit_fd, struct audit_records *records) err = audit_recv(audit_fd, &msg); if (err) { if (err == -EAGAIN) - return 0; - else - return err; + err = 0; + break; } switch (msg.header.nlmsg_type) { @@ -412,12 +417,20 @@ static int audit_count_records(int audit_fd, struct audit_records *records) records->access++; break; case AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN: - records->domain++; + ret = regexec(&dealloc_re, msg.data, 0, NULL, 0); + if (ret == REG_NOMATCH) { + records->domain++; + } else if (ret != 0) { + err = -EIO; + goto out; + } break; } } while (true); - return 0; +out: + regfree(&dealloc_re); + return err; } static int audit_init(void) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c index 08d4c70e015bb..67ab175ef5e3f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/audit_test.c @@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_flags, signal) } else { EXPECT_EQ(1, records.access); } + EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain); /* Updates filter rules to match the drop record. */ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL); @@ -684,6 +685,7 @@ TEST_F(audit_exec, signal_and_open) /* Tests that there was no denial until now. */ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records)); EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access); + EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain); /* * Wait for the child to do a first denied action by layer1 and diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c index 84ccdb8f594af..4e356334ecb74 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c @@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ TEST_F(audit, trace) /* Makes sure there is no superfluous logged records. */ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records)); EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access); + EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain); yama_ptrace_scope = get_yama_ptrace_scope(); ASSERT_LE(0, yama_ptrace_scope); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c index 5a1afc640c770..6825082c079c0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_abstract_unix_test.c @@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ TEST_F(scoped_audit, connect_to_child) /* Makes sure there is no superfluous logged records. */ EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_count_records(self->audit_fd, &records)); EXPECT_EQ(0, records.access); + EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain); ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC)); ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC)); From 7c73a269a880b1399baacfb9d521415e6ef7ecc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 18:57:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 531/607] KVM: arm64: nv: Avoid dereferencing NULL VNCR pseudo-TLB commit 4be6cbeb93d26994bd1827ddbce391e3c4395c8f upstream. VNCR TLB invalidation occurs from MMU notifiers or TLBI instructions, and either can race against a vcpu not being onlined yet (no pseudo-TLB allocated). Similarly, the TLB might be invalid, and the invalidation should be skipped in this case. Both kvm_invalidate_vncr_ipa() and kvm_invalidate_vncr_va() are expected to perform the same checks, except that the latter doesn't check for the allocation and blindly dereferences the pointer. Solve this by introducing a new iterator built on top of the usual kvm_for_each_vcpu() that checks for both of the above conditions, and convert the two users to it. Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aiUvSbrWndQeUPc8@v4bel Fixes: 4ffa72ad8f37 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Add S1 TLB invalidation primitive for VNCR_EL2") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260607175745.297793-1-maz@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 36 +++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c index df956559fd064..4aa86582d8790 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c @@ -824,9 +824,21 @@ static void invalidate_vncr(struct vncr_tlb *vt) clear_fixmap(vncr_fixmap(vt->cpu)); } +/* + * VNCR TLB invalidation occurs from MMU notifiers or TLBI instructions, and + * either can race against a vcpu not being onlined yet (no pseudo-TLB + * allocated). Similarly, the TLB might be invalid. Skip those, as they + * obviously don't participate in the invalidation at this stage. + */ +#define kvm_for_each_vncr_tlb(idx, vcpup, tlbp, kvm) \ + kvm_for_each_vcpu(idx, vcpup, kvm) \ + if (((tlbp) = vcpup->arch.vncr_tlb) && \ + (tlbp)->valid) + static void kvm_invalidate_vncr_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, u64 start, u64 end) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + struct vncr_tlb *vt; unsigned long i; lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock); @@ -834,24 +846,9 @@ static void kvm_invalidate_vncr_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, u64 start, u64 end) if (!kvm_has_feat(kvm, ID_AA64MMFR4_EL1, NV_frac, NV2_ONLY)) return; - kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { - struct vncr_tlb *vt = vcpu->arch.vncr_tlb; + kvm_for_each_vncr_tlb(i, vcpu, vt, kvm) { u64 ipa_start, ipa_end, ipa_size; - /* - * Careful here: We end-up here from an MMU notifier, - * and this can race against a vcpu not being onlined - * yet, without the pseudo-TLB being allocated. - * - * Skip those, as they obviously don't participate in - * the invalidation at this stage. - */ - if (!vt) - continue; - - if (!vt->valid) - continue; - ipa_size = ttl_to_size(pgshift_level_to_ttl(vt->wi.pgshift, vt->wr.level)); ipa_start = vt->wr.pa & ~(ipa_size - 1); @@ -881,17 +878,14 @@ static void invalidate_vncr_va(struct kvm *kvm, struct s1e2_tlbi_scope *scope) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; + struct vncr_tlb *vt; unsigned long i; lockdep_assert_held_write(&kvm->mmu_lock); - kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) { - struct vncr_tlb *vt = vcpu->arch.vncr_tlb; + kvm_for_each_vncr_tlb(i, vcpu, vt, kvm) { u64 va_start, va_end, va_size; - if (!vt->valid) - continue; - va_size = ttl_to_size(pgshift_level_to_ttl(vt->wi.pgshift, vt->wr.level)); va_start = vt->gva & ~(va_size - 1); From 2d710d4fcd2cd24f25df61f6fc68b02c034d079f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zeng Chi Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 20:46:44 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 532/607] LoongArch: KVM: Add missing slots_lock for device register/unregister commit aeded601d6aceb57cdda4b2701d2ee00c43a8b69 upstream. kvm_io_bus_register_dev() and kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev() should be called under kvm->slots_lock. The unregister calls in ipi.c, eiointc.c and pch_pic.c were also missing this protection. Add it to match the register side. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Bibo Mao Signed-off-by: Zeng Chi Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/eiointc.c | 6 ++++++ arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/ipi.c | 2 ++ arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/pch_pic.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/eiointc.c b/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/eiointc.c index 78510fce1a47b..1380186fd5aed 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/eiointc.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/eiointc.c @@ -654,10 +654,14 @@ static int kvm_eiointc_create(struct kvm_device *dev, u32 type) device = &s->device_vext; kvm_iodevice_init(device, &kvm_eiointc_virt_ops); + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); ret = kvm_io_bus_register_dev(kvm, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, EIOINTC_VIRT_BASE, EIOINTC_VIRT_SIZE, device); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); if (ret < 0) { + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, &s->device); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); kfree(s); return ret; } @@ -676,8 +680,10 @@ static void kvm_eiointc_destroy(struct kvm_device *dev) kvm = dev->kvm; eiointc = kvm->arch.eiointc; + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, &eiointc->device); kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, &eiointc->device_vext); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); kfree(eiointc); kfree(dev); } diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/ipi.c b/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/ipi.c index 1058c13dba7f4..0e2840f75673f 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/ipi.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/ipi.c @@ -457,7 +457,9 @@ static void kvm_ipi_destroy(struct kvm_device *dev) kvm = dev->kvm; ipi = kvm->arch.ipi; + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_IOCSR_BUS, &ipi->device); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); kfree(ipi); kfree(dev); } diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/pch_pic.c b/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/pch_pic.c index 4addb34bf432b..c0adabfd50793 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/pch_pic.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/kvm/intc/pch_pic.c @@ -473,7 +473,9 @@ static void kvm_pch_pic_destroy(struct kvm_device *dev) kvm = dev->kvm; s = kvm->arch.pch_pic; /* unregister pch pic device and free it's memory */ + mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock); kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_MMIO_BUS, &s->device); + mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock); kfree(s); kfree(dev); } From 6bea2f8becdb20d34378493c3b77a9b9cf8c6cfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunwoo Kim Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2026 02:56:10 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 533/607] KVM: arm64: Clear __hyp_running_vcpu when flushing the pKVM hyp vCPU commit e8042f6e1d7befb2fb6b10a75918642bcd0acf9a upstream. flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the host vCPU context into the hyp's private vCPU on every run. ctxt_to_vcpu() expects a guest context to have a NULL __hyp_running_vcpu, which is only ever set on the host context, so that it resolves the vCPU via container_of(). While this is generally the case, flush_hyp_vcpu() copies the context verbatim and does not enforce this, so a value provided by the host is dereferenced at EL2 (host -> EL2). Fix by clearing __hyp_running_vcpu after the copy. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: be66e67f1750 ("KVM: arm64: Use the pKVM hyp vCPU structure in handle___kvm_vcpu_run()") Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba Tested-by: Fuad Tabba Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260606175614.83273-2-imv4bel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c index 29430c031095a..3dda50391446d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c @@ -126,6 +126,9 @@ static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu) hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt = host_vcpu->arch.ctxt; + /* __hyp_running_vcpu must be NULL in a guest context. */ + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.ctxt.__hyp_running_vcpu = NULL; + hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2; hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_TWI | HCR_TWE); hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.hcr_el2 |= READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.hcr_el2) & From 4b200e0c9c339cfb9385e548cabcfdf52845717c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 14:31:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 534/607] KVM: x86: Add dedicated API for getting mask of accelerated x2APIC MSRs commit 8ba621f335a519b47cb7d3e3f4f15b5101b3a56f upstream. Add a dedicated local APIC API, kvm_x2apic_disable_intercept_reg_mask(), to provide the mask of x2APIC registers whose MSRs can and should be passed through to the guest when x2APIC virtualization is enable, and use it in lieu of the open-coded equivalent VMX logic. Providing a common helper will allow sharing the logic with SVM (x2AVIC), and as a bonus eliminates the somewhat confusing code where KVM enables interception for MSR_TYPE_RW, even though only the READ case actually needs to be updated. No functional change intended. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514213115.1637082-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index fe2806348c94a..9448d34af51ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -1745,7 +1745,7 @@ static inline struct kvm_lapic *to_lapic(struct kvm_io_device *dev) #define APIC_REGS_MASK(first, count) \ (APIC_REG_MASK(first) * ((1ull << (count)) - 1)) -u64 kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(struct kvm_lapic *apic) +static u64 kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(struct kvm_lapic *apic) { /* Leave bits '0' for reserved and write-only registers. */ u64 valid_reg_mask = @@ -1781,7 +1781,24 @@ u64 kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(struct kvm_lapic *apic) return valid_reg_mask; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask); + +u64 kvm_x2apic_disable_read_intercept_reg_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +{ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))) + return 0; + + /* + * TMMCT, a.k.a. the current APIC timer count, reads aren't accelerated + * by hardware (Intel or AMD) as the timer is emulated in software (by + * KVM), i.e. reads from the virtual APIC page would return garbage. + * Intercept RDMSR, as handling the fault-like APIC-access VM-Exit is + * more expensive than handling a RDMSR VM-Exit (the APIC-access exit + * requires slow emulation of the code stream). + */ + return kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(vcpu->arch.apic) & + ~APIC_REG_MASK(APIC_TMCCT); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_x2apic_disable_read_intercept_reg_mask); static int kvm_lapic_reg_read(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 offset, int len, void *data) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h index 959380b4c067f..7bcf6877c0bc5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ int kvm_hv_vapic_msr_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *data); int kvm_lapic_set_pv_eoi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data, unsigned long len); void kvm_lapic_exit(void); -u64 kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(struct kvm_lapic *apic); +u64 kvm_x2apic_disable_read_intercept_reg_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); static inline void kvm_lapic_set_irr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index d7a2b75b6c915..1a6489e4a8d95 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -4062,7 +4062,7 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * mode, only the current timer count needs on-demand emulation by KVM. */ if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) - msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~kvm_lapic_readable_reg_mask(vcpu->arch.apic); + msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~kvm_x2apic_disable_read_intercept_reg_mask(vcpu); else msr_bitmap[read_idx] = ~0ull; msr_bitmap[write_idx] = ~0ull; @@ -4075,7 +4075,6 @@ static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) !(mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC)); if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) { - vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_RW); vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W); vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W); if (enable_ipiv) From 7949aa38e1094fc6da05cefcf7932e186086099a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 14:31:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 535/607] KVM: SVM: Disable x2AVIC RDMSR interception for MSRs KVM actually supports commit 7f4b7092d9a173a4271e28c0ed1fc235994e309b upstream. When toggling x2AVIC on/off, use KVM's curated mask of x2APIC MSRs that can/should be passed through to the guest (or not) when 2AVIC is enabled. Using the effective list provided by the local APIC emulation fixes multiple (classes of) bugs, as the existing hand-coded list of MSRs is wrong on multiple fronts: - ARBPRI isn't supported by KVM, isn't accelerated by AVIC (for read or write), and its #VMEXIT is fault-like, i.e. requires decoding the instruction. Disabling interception is nonsensical and suboptimal. - DFR and ICR2 aren't supported by x2APIC and so don't need their intercepts disabled for performance reasons. While the #GP due to x2APIC being abled has higher priority than the trap-like #VMEXIT, disabling interception of unsupported MSRs is confusing and unnecessary. - RRR is completely unsupported. - AVIC currently fails to pass through the "range of vectors" registers, IRR, ISR, and TMR, as e.g. X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR) only affects IRR0, and thus only disables intercept for vectors 31:0 (which are the *least* interesting registers). - TMCCT (the current APIC timer count) isn't accelerated by hardware, and generates a fault-like AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS #VMEXIT, i.e. requires KVM to decode the instruction to figure out what the guest was trying to access. Note, the only reason this isn't a fatal bug is that the AVIC architecture had the foresight to guard against buggy hypervisors. E.g. if hardware simply read from the virtual APIC page, the guest would get garbage (because the timer is emulated in software). Fixes: 4d1d7942e36a ("KVM: SVM: Introduce logic to (de)activate x2AVIC mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514213115.1637082-3-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c index d7531e7aff4d6..d9261d780d2e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c @@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ static bool x2avic_enabled; static void avic_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool intercept) { + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; + u64 rd_regs; + static const u32 x2avic_passthrough_msrs[] = { X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ID), X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVR), @@ -151,9 +154,15 @@ static void avic_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, if (!x2avic_enabled) return; + rd_regs = kvm_x2apic_disable_read_intercept_reg_mask(vcpu); + + for_each_set_bit(i, (unsigned long *)&rd_regs, BITS_PER_TYPE(rd_regs)) + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, APIC_BASE_MSR + i, + MSR_TYPE_R, intercept); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x2avic_passthrough_msrs); i++) - svm_set_intercept_for_msr(&svm->vcpu, x2avic_passthrough_msrs[i], - MSR_TYPE_RW, intercept); + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, x2avic_passthrough_msrs[i], + MSR_TYPE_W, intercept); svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = intercept; } From 35f3ea7e49a373ed982ff6fa62f96cd090c3bfa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 14:31:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 536/607] KVM: SVM: Only disable x2AVIC WRMSR interception for MSRs that are accelerated commit 8c63179d975f2029c948ecce622f72af616dbff7 upstream. When x2AVIC is enabled, disable WRMSR interception only for MSRs that are actually accelerated by hardware. Disabling interception for MSRs that aren't accelerated is functionally "fine", and in some cases a weird "win" for performance, but only for cases that should never be triggered by a well-behaved VM (writes to read-only registers; the #GP will typically occur in the guest without taking a #VMEXIT, even for fault-like exits). But overall, disabling interception for MSRs that aren't accelerated is at best confusing and unintuitive, and at worst introduces avoidable risk, as the APM's documentation is imperfect and contradictory. The table in "15.29.3.1 Virtual APIC Register Accesses" of simply states that such writes generate exits, where as "Section 15.29.10 x2AVIC" says: x2APIC MSR intercept checks and access checks have higher priority than AVIC access permission checks. CPU behavior follows the latter (which makes perfect sense), but all in all there's simply no reason to disable interception just to make a #GP faster. Note, the set of MSRs that are passed through for write is identical to VMX's set when IPI virtualization is enabled. This is not a coincidence, and is another motiviating factor for cleaning up the intercepts, as x2AVIC is functionally equivalent to APICv+IPIv. Fixes: 4d1d7942e36a ("KVM: SVM: Introduce logic to (de)activate x2AVIC mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514213115.1637082-4-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c | 40 ++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c index d9261d780d2e7..a700f3795c176 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c @@ -113,39 +113,6 @@ static void avic_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu; u64 rd_regs; - - static const u32 x2avic_passthrough_msrs[] = { - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ID), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ARBPRI), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_RRR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LDR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_DFR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SPIV), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ESR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR2), - - /* - * Note! Always intercept LVTT, as TSC-deadline timer mode - * isn't virtualized by hardware, and the CPU will generate a - * #GP instead of a #VMEXIT. - */ - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTTHMR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTPC), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT0), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT1), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTERR), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), - X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR), - }; int i; if (intercept == svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted) @@ -160,9 +127,10 @@ static void avic_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, APIC_BASE_MSR + i, MSR_TYPE_R, intercept); - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x2avic_passthrough_msrs); i++) - svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, x2avic_passthrough_msrs[i], - MSR_TYPE_W, intercept); + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_W, intercept); + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W, intercept); + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W, intercept); + svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR), MSR_TYPE_W, intercept); svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = intercept; } From eeb456eb355650963c3b8b1581bfd0c413742c23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 15:26:29 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 537/607] KVM: VMX: Refresh GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS on all injected #DBs commit c5bad4fa2d5dfd8c25140051a9807eba387a19b8 upstream. Move KVM's stuffing of GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS when RFLAGS.TF=1 and MOV/POP SS or STI blocking is active into the exception injection code so that KVM fixes up the VMCS for all injected #DBs, not only those that are reflected back into the guest after #DB interception. E.g. if KVM queues a #DB in the emulator, or more importantly if userspace does save/restore exactly on the #DB+shadow boundary, then KVM needs to massage the VMCS to avoid the VM-Entry consistency check. Opportunistically update the wording of the comment to describe the behavior as a workaround of flawed CPU behavior/architecture, to make it clear that the *only* thing KVM is doing is fudging around a consistency check. Per the SDM: There are no pending debug exceptions after VM entry if any of the following are true: * The VM entry is vectoring with one of the following interruption types: external interrupt, non-maskable interrupt (NMI), hardware exception, or privileged software exception. I.e. forcing GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS does *not* impact guest- visible behavior. Fixes: b9bed78e2fa9 ("KVM: VMX: Set vmcs.PENDING_DBG.BS on #DB in STI/MOVSS blocking shadow") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Hou Wenlong Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b1a294bc9ed4dae532474a5dc6c8cb6e5962de7c.1757416809.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com Reviewed-by: Hou Wenlong Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515222638.1949982-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 1a6489e4a8d95..2a9d165d5c33f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1790,6 +1790,24 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK; struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu); + /* + * When injecting a #DB, single-stepping is enabled in RFLAGS, and STI + * or MOV-SS blocking is active, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS to + * prevent a false positive from VM-Entry consistency check. VM-Entry + * asserts that a single-step #DB _must_ be pending in this scenario, + * as the previous instruction cannot have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 + * (because STI and POP/MOV don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one + * instruction delay when activating single-step breakpoints must have + * already expired. However, the CPU isn't smart enough to peek at + * vmcs.VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD and so doesn't realize that yes, there + * is indeed a #DB pending/imminent. + */ + if (ex->vector == DB_VECTOR && + (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) && + vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu)) + vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, + vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS); + kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex); if (ex->has_error_code) { @@ -5286,26 +5304,9 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * avoid single-step #DB and MTF updates, as ICEBP is * higher priority. Note, skipping ICEBP still clears * STI and MOVSS blocking. - * - * For all other #DBs, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS - * if single-step is enabled in RFLAGS and STI or MOVSS - * blocking is active, as the CPU doesn't set the bit - * on VM-Exit due to #DB interception. VM-Entry has a - * consistency check that a single-step #DB is pending - * in this scenario as the previous instruction cannot - * have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 (because STI and POP/MOV - * don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one instruction - * delay when activating single-step breakpoints must - * have already expired. Note, the CPU sets/clears BS - * as appropriate for all other VM-Exits types. */ if (is_icebp(intr_info)) WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu)); - else if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) && - (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & - (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS))) - vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, - vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS); kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6); return 1; From ab253cf6e11189d1c709494588736b3c194a1de5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xuanqing Shi <1356292400@qq.com> Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 19:26:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 538/607] KVM: VMX: Handle bad values on proxied writes to LBR MSRs commit ca674df13b195eb6d124ab059799d4e03fa40624 upstream. Use the "safe" WRMSR API when writing LBRs on behalf of the guest (or host userspace), and propagate any errors back to the instigator, as the value being written is untrusted. E.g. if the guest (or host userspace) attempts to set reserved bits in LBR_SELECT, then KVM needs to return an error, and not WARN on the bad value. Continue using the "unsafe" version of RDMSR, as it should be impossible to reach the helper with a completely bogus MSR, i.e. WARNing on RDMSR failure is very desirable, e.g. to make KVM bugs more visible. unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x1c8 (tried to write 0x0000000000004000) Call Trace: intel_pmu_set_msr+0x4e0/0x7f0 [kvm_intel] kvm_pmu_set_msr+0x17e/0x1c0 [kvm] kvm_set_msr_common+0xc76/0x1440 [kvm] vmx_set_msr+0x5e6/0x1570 [kvm_intel] kvm_emulate_wrmsr+0x54/0x1d0 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x7fc/0x970 [kvm_intel] Fixes: 1b5ac3226a1a ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Pass-through LBR msrs when the guest LBR event is ACTIVE") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xuanqing Shi <1356292400@qq.com> [sean: rework changelog, only modify WRMSR path, tag for stable@] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527022617.3973884-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c index de1d9785c01ff..333d7c573d40a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c @@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ static bool intel_pmu_handle_lbr_msrs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, */ local_irq_disable(); if (lbr_desc->event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) { + int err = 0; + if (read) rdmsrq(index, msr_info->data); else - wrmsrq(index, msr_info->data); + err = wrmsrq_safe(index, msr_info->data); __set_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->pmc_in_use); local_irq_enable(); - return true; + return !err; } clear_bit(INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED_VLBR, vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->pmc_in_use); local_irq_enable(); From 4ad73ef0e7966ecfe67de0060537b4cb14d9acd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sean Christopherson Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 09:26:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 539/607] KVM: x86: Ensure vendor's exit handler runs before fastpath userspace exits commit 0ffedf43910e44b76c2c1db4e9fbf12b268190c1 upstream. Move the handling of fastpath userspace exits into vendor code to ensure KVM runs vendor specific operations that need to run before userspace gains control of the vCPU. E.g. for VMX (and soon to be for SVM as well), KVM needs to flush the PML buffer prior to exiting to userspace, otherwise any memory written by the final KVM_RUN might never be flagged as dirty. Note, waiting to snapshot CR0 and CR3 until svm_handle_exit() is flawed in general, as that risks consuming stale state in a fastpath handler. That will be addressed in a future change. Fixes: f7f39c50edb9 ("KVM: x86: Exit to userspace if fastpath triggers one on instruction skip") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nikunj A. Dadhania Reviewed-by: Nikunj A. Dadhania Reviewed-by: Kai Huang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423162628.490962-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 --- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index fc22d106a3141..bb034896bf6df 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -3569,6 +3569,9 @@ static int svm_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) vcpu->arch.cr3 = svm->vmcb->save.cr3; } + if (unlikely(exit_fastpath == EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_USERSPACE)) + return 0; + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { int vmexit; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 2a9d165d5c33f..f65081330c8a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -6498,6 +6498,9 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath) if (enable_pml && !is_guest_mode(vcpu)) vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu); + if (unlikely(exit_fastpath == EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_USERSPACE)) + return 0; + /* * KVM should never reach this point with a pending nested VM-Enter. * More specifically, short-circuiting VM-Entry to emulate L2 due to diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 7be3ed9e2c7dc..f2708419f7870 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -11498,9 +11498,6 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (vcpu->arch.apic_attention) kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu); - if (unlikely(exit_fastpath == EXIT_FASTPATH_EXIT_USERSPACE)) - return 0; - r = kvm_x86_call(handle_exit)(vcpu, exit_fastpath); return r; From 0c93681aea0a1b8be14730a88abe77c840272e41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Upton Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 16:54:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 540/607] KVM: arm64: Don't leak PFN when kvm_translate_vncr() races MMU notifier commit 9f76b039a72d7e06374aa96862f0232ed53f7787 upstream. In the case that kvm_translate_vncr() races with an MMU notifier the early return does not release a reference on the faulted in PFN. Add the necessary call to kvm_release_faultin_page() for the unused PFN. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 069a05e535496 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults") Reported-by: Sashiko (local):gemini-3.1-pro Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602235450.103057-2-oupton@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c index 4aa86582d8790..b1f52f82c9ef6 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c @@ -1238,8 +1238,10 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool *is_gmem) } scoped_guard(write_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) { - if (mmu_invalidate_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq)) + if (mmu_invalidate_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq)) { + kvm_release_faultin_page(vcpu->kvm, page, true, false); return -EAGAIN; + } vt->gva = va; vt->hpa = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; From f8e1dc70efe4820c271de49a2ed2c7d5e10f445c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Gavrilov Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 04:27:22 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 541/607] udmabuf: fix DMA direction mismatch in release_udmabuf() commit fb7b1a0ab25a6077d26cb3829e31743972d4f31d upstream. begin_cpu_udmabuf() maps the sg_table with the caller-provided direction (e.g., DMA_TO_DEVICE for a write-only sync), and caches it in ubuf->sg for reuse. However, release_udmabuf() always unmaps this sg_table with a hardcoded DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL, regardless of the direction that was originally used for the mapping. With CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG=y this produces: DMA-API: misc udmabuf: device driver frees DMA memory with different direction [device address=0x000000044a123000] [size=4096 bytes] [mapped with DMA_TO_DEVICE] [unmapped with DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL] The issue was found during video playback when GStreamer performed a write-only DMA_BUF_IOCTL_SYNC on a udmabuf. It can be reproduced with CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG=y by creating a udmabuf from a memfd, performing a write-only sync (DMA_BUF_SYNC_WRITE without DMA_BUF_SYNC_READ), and closing the file descriptor. Fix this by storing the DMA direction used when the sg_table is first created in begin_cpu_udmabuf(), and passing that same direction to put_sg_table() in release_udmabuf(). Fixes: 284562e1f348 ("udmabuf: implement begin_cpu_access/end_cpu_access hooks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Reviewed-by: Vivek Kasireddy Signed-off-by: Vivek Kasireddy Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260314232722.15555-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c index 40399c26e6be6..7717b8ccf59df 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ struct udmabuf { struct folio **pinned_folios; struct sg_table *sg; + enum dma_data_direction sg_dir; struct miscdevice *device; pgoff_t *offsets; }; @@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ static void release_udmabuf(struct dma_buf *buf) struct device *dev = ubuf->device->this_device; if (ubuf->sg) - put_sg_table(dev, ubuf->sg, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL); + put_sg_table(dev, ubuf->sg, ubuf->sg_dir); deinit_udmabuf(ubuf); kfree(ubuf); @@ -255,6 +256,8 @@ static int begin_cpu_udmabuf(struct dma_buf *buf, if (IS_ERR(ubuf->sg)) { ret = PTR_ERR(ubuf->sg); ubuf->sg = NULL; + } else { + ubuf->sg_dir = direction; } } else { dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu(dev, ubuf->sg, direction); From 34696563461c9a23177feb6d8aff43f4c0510278 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Gavrilov Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 11:16:57 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 542/607] dma-buf/udmabuf: skip redundant cpu sync to fix cacheline EEXIST warning commit 504e2b4ab97a51d56d966cd36d0997ad30b65b2d upstream. When CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG_SG is enabled, importing a udmabuf into a DRM driver (e.g. amdgpu for video playback in GNOME Videos / Showtime) triggers a spurious warning: DMA-API: amdgpu 0000:03:00.0: cacheline tracking EEXIST, \ overlapping mappings aren't supported WARNING: kernel/dma/debug.c:619 at add_dma_entry+0x473/0x5f0 The call chain is: amdgpu_cs_ioctl -> amdgpu_ttm_backend_bind -> dma_buf_map_attachment -> [udmabuf] map_udmabuf -> get_sg_table -> dma_map_sgtable(dev, sg, direction, 0) // attrs=0 -> debug_dma_map_sg -> add_dma_entry -> EEXIST This happens because udmabuf builds a per-page scatter-gather list via sg_set_folio(). When begin_cpu_udmabuf() has already created an sg table mapped for the misc device, and an importer such as amdgpu maps the same pages for its own device via map_udmabuf(), the DMA debug infrastructure sees two active mappings whose physical addresses share cacheline boundaries and warns about the overlap. The DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC flag suppresses this check in add_dma_entry() because it signals that no CPU cache maintenance is performed at map/unmap time, making the cacheline overlap harmless. All other major dma-buf exporters already pass this flag: - drm_gem_map_dma_buf() passes DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC - amdgpu_dma_buf_map() passes DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC The CPU sync at map/unmap time is also redundant for udmabuf: begin_cpu_udmabuf() and end_cpu_udmabuf() already perform explicit cache synchronization via dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu/device() when CPU access is requested through the dma-buf interface. Pass DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC to dma_map_sgtable() and dma_unmap_sgtable() in udmabuf to suppress the spurious warning and skip the redundant sync. Fixes: 284562e1f348 ("udmabuf: implement begin_cpu_access/end_cpu_access hooks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Acked-by: Vivek Kasireddy Signed-off-by: Vivek Kasireddy Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260331061657.79983-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c index 7717b8ccf59df..be47d1ff6c508 100644 --- a/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static struct sg_table *get_sg_table(struct device *dev, struct dma_buf *buf, sg_set_folio(sgl, ubuf->folios[i], PAGE_SIZE, ubuf->offsets[i]); - ret = dma_map_sgtable(dev, sg, direction, 0); + ret = dma_map_sgtable(dev, sg, direction, DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC); if (ret < 0) goto err_map; return sg; @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static struct sg_table *get_sg_table(struct device *dev, struct dma_buf *buf, static void put_sg_table(struct device *dev, struct sg_table *sg, enum dma_data_direction direction) { - dma_unmap_sgtable(dev, sg, direction, 0); + dma_unmap_sgtable(dev, sg, direction, DMA_ATTR_SKIP_CPU_SYNC); sg_free_table(sg); kfree(sg); } From 59070040fd12e0b78d7b4d341d9f9a183237c5ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Alba Vives Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 13:07:41 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 543/607] fpga: dfl-afu: validate DMA mapping length in afu_dma_map_region() commit fc3b071a7c8dc0f5d56defddf6e6fd5aaa3e1e27 upstream. afu_ioctl_dma_map() accepts a 64-bit length from userspace via DFL_FPGA_PORT_DMA_MAP ioctl without an upper bound check. The value is passed to afu_dma_pin_pages() where npages is derived as length >> PAGE_SHIFT and passed to pin_user_pages_fast() which takes int nr_pages, causing implicit truncation if length is very large. Validate map.length at the ioctl entry point before calling afu_dma_map_region(), rejecting values whose page count exceeds INT_MAX. Fixes: fa8dda1edef9 ("fpga: dfl: afu: add DFL_FPGA_PORT_DMA_MAP/UNMAP ioctls support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sebastian Alba Vives Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260518190742.61426-3-sebasjosue84@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-main.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-main.c b/drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-main.c index 3bf8e7338dbef..097a97eeea66c 100644 --- a/drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-main.c +++ b/drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-main.c @@ -723,6 +723,9 @@ afu_ioctl_dma_map(struct dfl_feature_dev_data *fdata, void __user *arg) if (map.argsz < minsz || map.flags) return -EINVAL; + if (map.length >> PAGE_SHIFT > (u64)INT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + ret = afu_dma_map_region(fdata, map.user_addr, map.length, &map.iova); if (ret) return ret; From 9ec02cc9a04e502847a8313ea690001ae2051a27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 544/607] i2c: core: fix irq domain leak on adapter registration failure commit 8ce19524e4cc2462685f596a6402fbd8fb984ab2 upstream. Make sure to tear down the host notify irq domain on adapter registration failure to avoid leaking it. This issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing another adapter registration fix. Fixes: 4d5538f5882a ("i2c: use an IRQ to report Host Notify events, not alert") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10 Cc: Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index e0453f7b5d972..8638e4afc216b 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1579,7 +1579,7 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); put_device(&adap->dev); - goto out_list; + goto err_remove_irq_domain; } adap->debugfs = debugfs_create_dir(dev_name(&adap->dev), i2c_debugfs_root); @@ -1615,6 +1615,8 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) init_completion(&adap->dev_released); device_unregister(&adap->dev); wait_for_completion(&adap->dev_released); +err_remove_irq_domain: + i2c_host_notify_irq_teardown(adap); out_list: mutex_lock(&core_lock); idr_remove(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap->nr); From 3351c5e77749a0c8a1e252b95420c143ebcf07ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 545/607] i2c: core: fix NULL-deref on adapter registration failure commit 2295d2bb101faa663fbc45fadbb3fec45f107441 upstream. If adapter registration ever fails the release callback would trigger a NULL-pointer dereference as the completion struct has not been initialised. Note that before the offending commit this would instead have resulted in a minor memory leak of the adapter name. Fixes: 3f8c4f5e9a57 ("i2c: core: fix reference leak in i2c_register_adapter()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Joe Hattori Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index 8638e4afc216b..62ab4fc793479 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1578,8 +1578,7 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) res = device_add(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); - put_device(&adap->dev); - goto err_remove_irq_domain; + goto err_put_adap; } adap->debugfs = debugfs_create_dir(dev_name(&adap->dev), i2c_debugfs_root); @@ -1612,10 +1611,12 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) out_reg: i2c_deregister_clients(adap); debugfs_remove_recursive(adap->debugfs); + device_del(&adap->dev); +err_put_adap: init_completion(&adap->dev_released); - device_unregister(&adap->dev); + put_device(&adap->dev); wait_for_completion(&adap->dev_released); -err_remove_irq_domain: + i2c_host_notify_irq_teardown(adap); out_list: mutex_lock(&core_lock); From 0345994d64761c73e1df23f075c7d6cc2dbc4cfb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 546/607] i2c: core: fix adapter probe deferral loop commit 158efa411c57111d87bf265a3776614f32d70007 upstream. Drivers must not probe defer after having registered devices as that will trigger a probe loop if the devices bind to a driver (cf. commit fbc35b45f9f6 ("Add documentation on meaning of -EPROBE_DEFER")). Move the recovery initialisation, where the GPIO lookup may fail, before registering the adapter to prevent this. Fixes: 75820314de26 ("i2c: core: add generic I2C GPIO recovery") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.9 Cc: Codrin Ciubotariu Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index 62ab4fc793479..d068f089fe0a1 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1562,6 +1562,10 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) adap->dev.type = &i2c_adapter_type; device_initialize(&adap->dev); + res = i2c_init_recovery(adap); + if (res == -EPROBE_DEFER) + goto err_put_adap; + /* * This adapter can be used as a parent immediately after device_add(), * setup runtime-pm (especially ignore-children) before hand. @@ -1587,10 +1591,6 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) if (res) goto out_reg; - res = i2c_init_recovery(adap); - if (res == -EPROBE_DEFER) - goto out_reg; - dev_dbg(&adap->dev, "adapter [%s] registered\n", adap->name); /* create pre-declared device nodes */ From 71b7da959031f1cb216e6871cfd84ee82cd50c39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 547/607] i2c: core: fix adapter debugfs creation commit 07d5fb537928aad4369aaff0cbae73ba38a719af upstream. Clients can be registered from bus notifier callbacks so the debugfs directory needs to be created before registering the adapter as clients use that directory as their debugfs parent. Move debugfs creation before adapter registration to avoid having clients create their debugfs directories in the debugfs root (which is also more likely to fail due to name collisions). Note that failure to allocate the adapter name must now be handled explicitly as debugfs_create_dir() cannot handle a NULL name (unlike device_add() which returns an error). Fixes: 73febd775bdb ("i2c: create debugfs entry per adapter") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.8 Cc: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index d068f089fe0a1..ea111822b7da5 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1557,7 +1557,10 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) goto out_list; } - dev_set_name(&adap->dev, "i2c-%d", adap->nr); + res = dev_set_name(&adap->dev, "i2c-%d", adap->nr); + if (res) + goto err_remove_irq_domain; + adap->dev.bus = &i2c_bus_type; adap->dev.type = &i2c_adapter_type; device_initialize(&adap->dev); @@ -1579,14 +1582,14 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap, adap->nr); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); + adap->debugfs = debugfs_create_dir(dev_name(&adap->dev), i2c_debugfs_root); + res = device_add(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); - goto err_put_adap; + goto err_remove_debugfs; } - adap->debugfs = debugfs_create_dir(dev_name(&adap->dev), i2c_debugfs_root); - res = i2c_setup_smbus_alert(adap); if (res) goto out_reg; @@ -1610,13 +1613,14 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) out_reg: i2c_deregister_clients(adap); - debugfs_remove_recursive(adap->debugfs); device_del(&adap->dev); +err_remove_debugfs: + debugfs_remove_recursive(adap->debugfs); err_put_adap: init_completion(&adap->dev_released); put_device(&adap->dev); wait_for_completion(&adap->dev_released); - +err_remove_irq_domain: i2c_host_notify_irq_teardown(adap); out_list: mutex_lock(&core_lock); From b6d2af6fe9c1f5ec0484536753c979cbd40a8ac3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johan Hovold Date: Mon, 11 May 2026 16:37:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 548/607] i2c: core: fix adapter deregistration race commit b1a58ed9eab146b36f41a55db8f5d7ce9fdedf3f upstream. Adapters can be looked up by their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Remove the adapter from the IDR before tearing it down during deregistration (and on registration failure) to make sure its resources are not accessed after having been freed (e.g. the device name). Fixes: 35fc37f81881 ("i2c: Limit core locking to the necessary sections") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.31 Cc: Jean Delvare Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index ea111822b7da5..e049fa908231e 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1587,7 +1587,7 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) res = device_add(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); - goto err_remove_debugfs; + goto err_replace_id; } res = i2c_setup_smbus_alert(adap); @@ -1614,7 +1614,10 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) out_reg: i2c_deregister_clients(adap); device_del(&adap->dev); -err_remove_debugfs: +err_replace_id: + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); debugfs_remove_recursive(adap->debugfs); err_put_adap: init_completion(&adap->dev_released); @@ -1803,6 +1806,8 @@ void i2c_del_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) /* First make sure that this adapter was ever added */ mutex_lock(&core_lock); found = idr_find(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap->nr); + if (found == adap) + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (found != adap) { pr_debug("attempting to delete unregistered adapter [%s]\n", adap->name); From 56945871123e2b6de1c5231e2a60da65b36391bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Shevchenko Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 16:49:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 549/607] i2c: mpc: Fix timeout calculations commit 2e9a7f68329be41792c0b123c28e6c53c2fa2249 upstream. At first glance the harmless cleanup of the driver does nothing bad. However, as the operator precedence list states the '*' (multiplication) and '/' division operators have order 5 with left-to-right associativity the *= has order 17 and associativity right-to-left. It wouldn't be a problem to replace foo = foo * HZ / 1000000; with foo *= HZ / 1000000; if HZ constant is in Hertz. The problem is that in the Linux kernel HZ is defined in jiffy units, which is order of magnitude smaller than a million. That's why operator precedence has a crucial role here. Fix the regression by reverting pre-optimized calculations. Fixes: be40a3ae719f ("i2c: mpc: Use of_property_read_u32 instead of of_get_property") Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko Cc: # v6.4+ Reviewed-by: Chris Packham Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260618144934.3249950-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c index 28c5c5c1fb7a6..a21fa45bd64c4 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c @@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ static int fsl_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *op) "fsl,timeout", &mpc_ops.timeout); if (!result) { - mpc_ops.timeout *= HZ / 1000000; + mpc_ops.timeout = mpc_ops.timeout * HZ / 1000000; if (mpc_ops.timeout < 5) mpc_ops.timeout = 5; } else { From b65667ec5e9a90b259f68f1cec559a983098bae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoxiang Li Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:05:13 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 550/607] i2c: davinci: Unregister cpufreq notifier on probe failure commit e43f32816a1b1fe5a86279411626fe3a9be56d45 upstream. davinci_i2c_probe() registers a cpufreq transition notifier before adding the I2C adapter. If i2c_add_numbered_adapter() fails, the probe error path releases the device resources without unregistering the notifier. Add a dedicated error path to unregister the cpufreq notifier after i2c_add_numbered_adapter() fails. Fixes: 82c0de11b734 ("i2c: davinci: Add cpufreq support") Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li Cc: # v2.6.36+ Reviewed-by: Bartosz Golaszewski Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610030513.2651018-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c index 66c23535656b5..0617f416cb0b5 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-davinci.c @@ -818,12 +818,14 @@ static int davinci_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) adap->nr = pdev->id; r = i2c_add_numbered_adapter(adap); if (r) - goto err_unuse_clocks; + goto err_cpufreq; pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(dev->dev); return 0; +err_cpufreq: + i2c_davinci_cpufreq_deregister(dev); err_unuse_clocks: pm_runtime_dont_use_autosuspend(dev->dev); pm_runtime_put_sync(dev->dev); From 369635fbcf7f3b5cfffde92469d6c8349dbcc810 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Guillermo=20Rodr=C3=ADguez?= Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:48:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 551/607] i2c: stm32f7: truncate clock period instead of rounding it MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 111bb7f9f4a90b32e495d70a607c67b137f3074a upstream. stm32f7_i2c_compute_timing() derives the I2C clock source period (i2cclk) with DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST, which may round it up. When the period is overestimated, all timings computed from it (SCLDEL, SDADEL, SCLL, SCLH) come out shorter on the wire than calculated, and the resulting bus rate can exceed the requested speed, violating the I2C specification minimums for tLOW and tHIGH. For example, with a 104.45 MHz clock source (e.g. PCLK1, the reset-default I2C clock source on STM32MP1), i2cclk is rounded from 9.574 ns up to 10 ns. Requesting a 400 kHz fast mode bus with 72/27 ns rise/fall times and no analog/digital filters then produces an actual bus rate of 415.6 kHz with tLOW = 1254 ns, violating both the 400 kHz maximum rate and the 1300 ns tLOW minimum of the specification. Truncate the period instead, so that it can only be underestimated. The error then falls on the safe side: the programmed timings come out slightly longer than computed and the bus runs marginally below the target rate (375.3 kHz in the example above) while meeting the specification. i2cbus is left rounded-to-closest: it is only used as the target of the clk_error comparison and is never multiplied into the programmed timings, so nearest rounding remains accurate there. Fixes: aeb068c57214 ("i2c: i2c-stm32f7: add driver") Signed-off-by: Guillermo Rodríguez Cc: # v4.14+ Acked-by: Alain Volmat Reviewed-by: Pierre-Yves MORDRET Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260611104857.242153-1-guille.rodriguez@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c index 905aa9ab64e12..c57dda9866cf4 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32f7.c @@ -464,8 +464,13 @@ static int stm32f7_i2c_compute_timing(struct stm32f7_i2c_dev *i2c_dev, { struct stm32f7_i2c_spec *specs; u32 p_prev = STM32F7_PRESC_MAX; - u32 i2cclk = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(NSEC_PER_SEC, - setup->clock_src); + /* + * Truncate instead of rounding to closest: if the clock period is + * overestimated, the computed SCL timings will come out shorter on + * the wire, which can push the bus above the target rate and below + * the spec's tLOW/tHIGH minimums. + */ + u32 i2cclk = NSEC_PER_SEC / setup->clock_src; u32 i2cbus = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(NSEC_PER_SEC, setup->speed_freq); u32 clk_error_prev = i2cbus; From b2523f26979e0b5bd1422772176b2233fcd1f6d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Song Date: Mon, 25 May 2026 11:14:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 552/607] i2c: imx-lpi2c: mark I2C adapter when hardware is powered down commit 218cfe364b55b2768221629bd4a69ad190b7fbbc upstream. On some i.MX platforms, certain I2C client drivers keep a periodic workqueue which continues to trigger I2C transfers. During system suspend/resume, there exists a time window between: - suspend_noirq and the system entering suspend - the system starting to resume and resume_noirq In this window, the I2C controller resources such as clock and pinctrl may already be disabled or not yet restored. If a workqueue triggers an I2C transfer in this period, the driver attempts to access I2C registers while the hardware resources are unavailable, which may lead to system hang. Mark the I2C adapter as suspended during noirq suspend and block new transfers until resume, ensuring that I2C transfers are only issued when hardware resources are available. Fixes: 1ee867e465c1 ("i2c: imx-lpi2c: add target mode support") Signed-off-by: Carlos Song Cc: # v6.14+ Acked-by: Mukesh Savaliya Reviewed-by: Frank Li Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260525031450.3183421-1-carlos.song@oss.nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx-lpi2c.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx-lpi2c.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx-lpi2c.c index 3bf138eba04c9..24c70ea371bb9 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx-lpi2c.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx-lpi2c.c @@ -1588,7 +1588,18 @@ static int __maybe_unused lpi2c_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) static int __maybe_unused lpi2c_suspend_noirq(struct device *dev) { - return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev); + struct lpi2c_imx_struct *lpi2c_imx = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + int ret; + + i2c_mark_adapter_suspended(&lpi2c_imx->adapter); + + ret = pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev); + if (ret) { + i2c_mark_adapter_resumed(&lpi2c_imx->adapter); + return ret; + } + + return 0; } static int __maybe_unused lpi2c_resume_noirq(struct device *dev) @@ -1608,6 +1619,8 @@ static int __maybe_unused lpi2c_resume_noirq(struct device *dev) if (lpi2c_imx->target) lpi2c_imx_target_init(lpi2c_imx); + i2c_mark_adapter_resumed(&lpi2c_imx->adapter); + return 0; } From bb5133a7d5f3fe5c387770e25f2e00e682ce11ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn> Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 17:35:34 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 553/607] i2c: i801: fix hardware state machine corruption in error path commit 10dd1a736d557e310a77117832874729a0175d57 upstream. A severe livelock and subsequent Hung Task panic were observed in the i2c-i801 driver during concurrent Fuzzing. The crash is caused by an unconditional hardware register cleanup in the error handling path of i801_access(). When i801_check_pre() fails (e.g., returning -EBUSY because the SMBus controller is actively used by BIOS/ACPI), the kernel does not actually acquire the hardware ownership. However, the code jumps to the 'out' label and executes: iowrite8(SMBHSTSTS_INUSE_STS | STATUS_FLAGS, SMBHSTSTS(priv)); This forcefully clears the INUSE_STS lock and resets the hardware status flags without owning the controller. Doing so interrupts ongoing BIOS/ACPI transactions and totally corrupts the SMBus hardware state machine. Consequently, all subsequent i801_access() calls fail at the pre-check stage, triggering an endless stream of "SMBus is busy, can't use it!" error logs. Over a slow serial console, this printk flood monopolizes the CPU (Console Livelock), starving other processes trying to acquire the mmap_lock down_read semaphore, ultimately triggering the hung task watchdog. Fix this by moving the 'out' label below the hardware register cleanup. If i801_check_pre() fails, we safely bypass the iowrite8() and only release the software locks (pm_runtime and mutex), strictly adhering to the rule of not releasing resources that were never acquired. Fixes: 1f760b87e54c ("i2c: i801: Call i801_check_pre() from i801_access()") Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn> Cc: # v6.3+ Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260512093534.348655-1-w15303746062@163.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c index 506d69b156f7c..217dea2743e8a 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-i801.c @@ -927,13 +927,13 @@ static s32 i801_access(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr, */ if (hwpec) iowrite8(ioread8(SMBAUXCTL(priv)) & ~SMBAUXCTL_CRC, SMBAUXCTL(priv)); -out: /* * Unlock the SMBus device for use by BIOS/ACPI, * and clear status flags if not done already. */ iowrite8(SMBHSTSTS_INUSE_STS | STATUS_FLAGS, SMBHSTSTS(priv)); +out: pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(&priv->pci_dev->dev); mutex_unlock(&priv->acpi_lock); return ret; From 11f275f01c46ba8aaf9ce224f00e241d2d655193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Haoxiang Li Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:41:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 554/607] Input: synaptics-rmi4 - unregister function handlers on physical driver registration failure commit 6251f7d3472c0409e30f8d6a24f10d33d12e3f9a upstream. If rmi_register_physical_driver() fails, the current error path unregisters only the RMI bus. The function handlers registered earlier remain registered with the driver core. Add a separate error path to unregister the function handlers before unregistering the bus in this failure case. Fixes: 2b6a321da9a2 ("Input: synaptics-rmi4 - add support for Synaptics RMI4 devices") Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610064633.2837084-1-haoxiang_li2024@163.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_bus.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_bus.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_bus.c index b85ee9db87b00..1e0532a944fbc 100644 --- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_bus.c +++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_bus.c @@ -455,11 +455,13 @@ static int __init rmi_bus_init(void) if (error) { pr_err("%s: error registering the RMI physical driver: %d\n", __func__, error); - goto err_unregister_bus; + goto err_unregister_function_handlers; } return 0; +err_unregister_function_handlers: + rmi_unregister_function_handlers(); err_unregister_bus: bus_unregister(&rmi_bus_type); return error; From 8db211aed83733073b0814adaeeab61d4521474e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 00:36:11 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 555/607] Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F3A keymap to the GPIO count commit 57c10915f2c16c90e0d46ad00876bf39ece40fc2 upstream. rmi_f3a_initialize() takes the GPIO count from the device query register (f3a->gpio_count = buf & RMI_F3A_GPIO_COUNT, range 0..127). rmi_f3a_map_gpios() then allocates gpio_key_map with min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but rmi_f3a_attention() iterates the full gpio_count and dereferences gpio_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpio_count while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation. A device that reports gpio_count > 6 therefore causes an out-of-bounds read of gpio_key_map[] on every attention interrupt, and out-of-bounds accesses through the input core's default keymap ioctls: EVIOCGKEYCODE reads past the buffer (leaking adjacent slab memory to user space) and EVIOCSKEYCODE writes a caller-controlled value past it, for any process able to open the evdev node, since input_default_getkeycode() and input_default_setkeycode() only bound the index against keycodemax. Size the keymap for the full gpio_count. The mapping loop is unchanged: it still assigns only the first min(gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) entries; the remaining slots stay KEY_RESERVED (devm_kcalloc zero-fills) and are skipped when reporting. Fixes: 9e4c596bfd00 ("Input: synaptics-rmi4 - add support for F3A") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260614-b4-disp-818d6bda-v1-1-cf39a3615085@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f3a.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f3a.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f3a.c index 0e8baed84dbb5..a0777644eef07 100644 --- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f3a.c +++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f3a.c @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int rmi_f3a_map_gpios(struct rmi_function *fn, struct f3a_data *f3a, int button_count = min_t(u8, f3a->gpio_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END); f3a->gpio_key_map = devm_kcalloc(&fn->dev, - button_count, + f3a->gpio_count, sizeof(f3a->gpio_key_map[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (!f3a->gpio_key_map) { From e849c6f51e6877104c765da084e001ec37c8e119 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 00:36:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 556/607] Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F30 keymap to the GPIO/LED count commit d577e46785d45484b2ab7e7309c49b18764bf56c upstream. rmi_f30_map_gpios() allocates gpioled_key_map with min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) == at most 6 entries, but rmi_f30_attention() iterates the full f30->gpioled_count (device query register, range 0..31) and dereferences gpioled_key_map[i], and input->keycodemax is set to the full gpioled_count while input->keycode points at the 6-entry allocation. A device that reports gpioled_count > 6 with GPIO support enabled therefore causes an out-of-bounds read on the attention interrupt and out-of-bounds read/write through the EVIOCGKEYCODE/EVIOCSKEYCODE ioctls, which bound the index only against keycodemax. This is the same defect as the F3A handler, which was copied from F30. Size the keymap for the full gpioled_count; the mapping loop still assigns only the first min(gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END) entries. Fixes: 3e64fcbdbd10 ("Input: synaptics-rmi4 - limit the range of what GPIOs are buttons") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260614-b4-disp-818d6bda-v1-2-cf39a3615085@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f30.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f30.c b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f30.c index 35045f161dc2f..b2155c8e20e75 100644 --- a/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f30.c +++ b/drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_f30.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static int rmi_f30_map_gpios(struct rmi_function *fn, int button_count = min_t(u8, f30->gpioled_count, TRACKSTICK_RANGE_END); f30->gpioled_key_map = devm_kcalloc(&fn->dev, - button_count, + f30->gpioled_count, sizeof(f30->gpioled_key_map[0]), GFP_KERNEL); if (!f30->gpioled_key_map) { From 01e0317c256c560d8dcce2e9825eb6142ee34611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ranjan Kumar Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 22:31:05 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 557/607] Input: elan_i2c - prevent division by zero and arithmetic underflow commit df2b818fa009c10ff6ba875a1663ff001cda9558 upstream. The Elan I2C touchpad driver queries the device for its physical dimensions and trace counts to calculate the device resolution and width. However, if the device firmware or device tree provides invalid zero values for x_traces or y_traces, it results in a fatal division-by-zero exception leading to a kernel panic during device probe. Add checks to ensure these parameters are non-zero before performing the division. If invalid trace values are detected, fall back to a safe default of 1. Additionally, prevent an arithmetic underflow in the touch reporting logic. Previously, if the calculated or fallback width was smaller than ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE (90), the subtraction would underflow, resulting in a massive unsigned integer being reported to userspace. Clamp the adjusted width to a minimum of 0 to safely handle small physical dimensions and fallback scenarios. Completing the probe with safe fallback values ensures the sysfs nodes are created, keeping the firmware update path intact so a recovery firmware can be flashed to the device. Fixes: 6696777c6506 ("Input: add driver for Elan I2C/SMbus touchpad") Fixes: e3a9a1290688 ("Input: elan_i2c - do not query the info if they are provided") Signed-off-by: Ranjan Kumar Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612060339.3829666-1-kumarranja@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c index 74f822cd87746..caffcf755f914 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_core.c @@ -425,8 +425,17 @@ static int elan_query_device_parameters(struct elan_tp_data *data) if (error) return error; } - data->width_x = data->max_x / x_traces; - data->width_y = data->max_y / y_traces; + + if (!x_traces || !y_traces) { + dev_warn(&client->dev, + "invalid trace numbers: x=%u, y=%u\n", + x_traces, y_traces); + data->width_x = 1; + data->width_y = 1; + } else { + data->width_x = data->max_x / x_traces; + data->width_y = data->max_y / y_traces; + } if (device_property_read_u32(&client->dev, "touchscreen-x-mm", &x_mm) || @@ -440,8 +449,16 @@ static int elan_query_device_parameters(struct elan_tp_data *data) data->x_res = elan_convert_resolution(hw_x_res, data->pattern); data->y_res = elan_convert_resolution(hw_y_res, data->pattern); } else { - data->x_res = (data->max_x + 1) / x_mm; - data->y_res = (data->max_y + 1) / y_mm; + if (unlikely(x_mm == 0 || y_mm == 0)) { + dev_warn(&client->dev, + "invalid physical dimensions: x_mm=%u, y_mm=%u\n", + x_mm, y_mm); + data->x_res = 1; + data->y_res = 1; + } else { + data->x_res = (data->max_x + 1) / x_mm; + data->y_res = (data->max_y + 1) / y_mm; + } } if (device_property_read_bool(&client->dev, "elan,clickpad")) @@ -953,6 +970,7 @@ static void elan_report_contact(struct elan_tp_data *data, int contact_num, if (data->report_features & ETP_FEATURE_REPORT_MK) { unsigned int mk_x, mk_y, area_x, area_y; + int adj_width_x, adj_width_y; u8 mk_data = high_precision ? packet[ETP_MK_DATA_OFFSET + contact_num] : finger_data[3]; @@ -964,8 +982,14 @@ static void elan_report_contact(struct elan_tp_data *data, int contact_num, * To avoid treating large finger as palm, let's reduce * the width x and y per trace. */ - area_x = mk_x * (data->width_x - ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE); - area_y = mk_y * (data->width_y - ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE); + + adj_width_x = data->width_x > ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE ? + data->width_x - ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE : 0; + adj_width_y = data->width_y > ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE ? + data->width_y - ETP_FWIDTH_REDUCE : 0; + + area_x = mk_x * adj_width_x; + area_y = mk_y * adj_width_y; input_report_abs(input, ABS_TOOL_WIDTH, mk_x); input_report_abs(input, ABS_MT_TOUCH_MAJOR, From 3b32303460155603d25444274856013d211d5e1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 21:10:33 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 558/607] Input: goodix - clamp the device-reported contact count commit 5ed62a96e06be4e94b8296b7932afee550a70e04 upstream. goodix_ts_read_input_report() copies the number of touch points reported by the device into an on-stack buffer u8 point_data[2 + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACT_SIZE * GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS]; which is sized for at most GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS (10) contacts. The only runtime check bounds the per-interrupt count against ts->max_touch_num, but that value is taken verbatim from a 4-bit field of the device configuration block and is never clamped: ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; The nibble can be 0..15, so a malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can advertise up to 15 contacts. goodix_ts_read_input_report() then accepts a touch_num of up to 15 and the second goodix_i2c_read() writes ts->contact_size * (touch_num - 1) bytes past the one-contact header into point_data - up to 30 bytes (45 with the 9-byte report format) beyond the 92-byte buffer: a stack out-of-bounds write. Clamp max_touch_num to GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS, the number of contacts point_data[] is sized for, when reading it from the configuration. Fixes: a7ac7c95d468 ("Input: goodix - use max touch number from device config") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-6844625d-v1-1-df0aed080c9d@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/touchscreen/goodix.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/goodix.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/goodix.c index f8798d11ec030..17fcfe45988c2 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/goodix.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/goodix.c @@ -1057,7 +1057,8 @@ static void goodix_read_config(struct goodix_ts_data *ts) } ts->int_trigger_type = ts->config[TRIGGER_LOC] & 0x03; - ts->max_touch_num = ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f; + ts->max_touch_num = min(ts->config[MAX_CONTACTS_LOC] & 0x0f, + GOODIX_MAX_CONTACTS); x_max = get_unaligned_le16(&ts->config[RESOLUTION_LOC]); y_max = get_unaligned_le16(&ts->config[RESOLUTION_LOC + 2]); From 70019779325f2bb5f5a4098e91e79c655f50fcef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 20:47:50 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 559/607] Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index commit 0e9943d2e4c63496b6ca84bc66fd3c71d40558e2 upstream. iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-4828d263-v1-1-02320e1a89dd@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/joystick/iforce/iforce-packets.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/iforce/iforce-packets.c b/drivers/input/joystick/iforce/iforce-packets.c index fd1cd731d781a..effa76bfd8f9a 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/iforce/iforce-packets.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/iforce/iforce-packets.c @@ -186,14 +186,18 @@ void iforce_process_packet(struct iforce *iforce, /* Check if an effect was just started or stopped */ i = data[1] & 0x7f; - if (data[1] & 0x80) { - if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { - /* Report play event */ - input_report_ff_status(dev, i, FF_STATUS_PLAYING); + if (i < IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX) { + if (data[1] & 0x80) { + if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, + iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { + /* Report play event */ + input_report_ff_status(dev, i, FF_STATUS_PLAYING); + } + } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, + iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { + /* Report stop event */ + input_report_ff_status(dev, i, FF_STATUS_STOPPED); } - } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { - /* Report stop event */ - input_report_ff_status(dev, i, FF_STATUS_STOPPED); } for (j = 3; j < len; j += 2) From 75b12874b4172533b9efc349db328cb1a59c3981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 22:35:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 560/607] Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136 commit a6ac4e24c1a8a533bb61035184fdcc7eede4cc8d upstream. The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and parsed improperly. Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event based on the device's specific event size. Fixes: 53fefdd1d3a3 ("Input: mms114 - support MMS136") Fixes: ab108678195f ("Input: mms114 - support MMS134S") Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Reviewed-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616050912.1531241-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c index 9f947044c4d9b..7f01a5a5520a6 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c @@ -218,7 +218,9 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) struct i2c_client *client = data->client; struct input_dev *input_dev = data->input_dev; struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; + struct mms114_touch *t; int packet_size; + int event_size; int touch_size; int index; int error; @@ -236,9 +238,11 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) /* MMS136 has slightly different event size */ if (data->type == TYPE_MMS134S || data->type == TYPE_MMS136) - touch_size = packet_size / MMS136_EVENT_SIZE; + event_size = MMS136_EVENT_SIZE; else - touch_size = packet_size / MMS114_EVENT_SIZE; + event_size = MMS114_EVENT_SIZE; + + touch_size = packet_size / event_size; error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); @@ -246,18 +250,20 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) goto out; for (index = 0; index < touch_size; index++) { - switch (touch[index].type) { + t = (struct mms114_touch *)((u8 *)touch + index * event_size); + + switch (t->type) { case MMS114_TYPE_TOUCHSCREEN: - mms114_process_mt(data, touch + index); + mms114_process_mt(data, t); break; case MMS114_TYPE_TOUCHKEY: - mms114_process_touchkey(data, touch + index); + mms114_process_touchkey(data, t); break; default: dev_err(&client->dev, "Wrong touch type (%d)\n", - touch[index].type); + t->type); break; } } From 05dee4007cf3029163ac6c09f2b313b7cd177cff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kris Bahnsen Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 16:49:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 561/607] Input: ads7846 - don't use scratch for tx_buf when clearing register commit 856668312685d9a8f32d49a135a89c429d309f81 upstream. The workaround for XPT2046 clears the command register, giving the touchscreen controller a NOP. The change incorrectly re-uses the req->scratch variable which is used as rx_buf for xfer[5], so by the time xfer[6] occurs, the contents of req->scratch may not be 0. It was found that the touchscreen controller can end up in a completely unresponsive state due to it being given a command the driver does not expect. Instead, rely on the spi_transfer behavior of tx_buf being NULL to transmit all 0 bits and use the scratch variable for the rx_buf for both the 1 byte command to and 2 byte response from the controller. Also relocates the scratch member of struct ser_req to force it into a different cache line to prevent any potential issues of DMA stepping on unrelated data in other struct members due to sharing the same cache line. This change was tested on real TSC2046 and ADS7843 controllers, but not the XPT2046 the workaround was originally created for. Confirming that the original modification to clear the command register does not impact either real controller. Fixes: 781a07da9bb94 ("Input: ads7846 - add dummy command register clearing cycle") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Mark Featherston Signed-off-by: Mark Featherston Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507164943.760009-1-kris@embeddedTS.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/touchscreen/ads7846.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/ads7846.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/ads7846.c index 67264c5b49cb4..4d3df2fe0b6de 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/ads7846.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/ads7846.c @@ -329,7 +329,6 @@ struct ser_req { u8 ref_on; u8 command; u8 ref_off; - u16 scratch; struct spi_message msg; struct spi_transfer xfer[8]; /* @@ -337,6 +336,7 @@ struct ser_req { * transfer buffers to live in their own cache lines. */ __be16 sample ____cacheline_aligned; + u16 scratch; }; struct ads7845_ser_req { @@ -408,8 +408,7 @@ static int ads7846_read12_ser(struct device *dev, unsigned command) spi_message_add_tail(&req->xfer[5], &req->msg); /* clear the command register */ - req->scratch = 0; - req->xfer[6].tx_buf = &req->scratch; + req->xfer[6].rx_buf = &req->scratch; req->xfer[6].len = 1; spi_message_add_tail(&req->xfer[6], &req->msg); From 3e6f007b43e2fc6546e21fa74ee62c38984a6672 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 20:07:20 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 562/607] Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet commit 478cdd736f2ce3114f90e775d7358136d3977b94 upstream. tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do. Fixes: 11ea3173d5f2 ("Input: add driver for Touchwin serial touchscreens") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260613-b4-disp-69921bfd-v1-1-82c036899959@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/touchscreen/touchwin.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/touchwin.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/touchwin.c index fbd72789ea809..aeb26f7a91d44 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/touchwin.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/touchwin.c @@ -63,12 +63,15 @@ static irqreturn_t tw_interrupt(struct serio *serio, if (data) { /* touch */ tw->touched = 1; tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; - /* verify length and that the two Y's are the same */ - if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { - input_report_abs(dev, ABS_X, tw->data[0]); - input_report_abs(dev, ABS_Y, tw->data[1]); - input_report_key(dev, BTN_TOUCH, 1); - input_sync(dev); + /* a full packet ends the accumulation, valid or not */ + if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH) { + /* report only if the two Y's are the same */ + if (tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { + input_report_abs(dev, ABS_X, tw->data[0]); + input_report_abs(dev, ABS_Y, tw->data[1]); + input_report_key(dev, BTN_TOUCH, 1); + input_sync(dev); + } tw->idx = 0; } } else if (tw->touched) { /* untouch */ From 8301c335305344d4da4ab9442b6a399dacfe5b8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryam Vargas Date: Sun, 14 Jun 2026 14:19:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 563/607] Input: mms114 - reject an oversized device packet size commit 66725039f7090afe14c31bd259e2059a68f04023 upstream. mms114_interrupt() reads a packet of touch data from the device into a fixed-size on-stack buffer struct mms114_touch touch[MMS114_MAX_TOUCH]; which holds MMS114_MAX_TOUCH (10) events of MMS114_EVENT_SIZE (8) bytes, i.e. 80 bytes. The length of the I2C read into it is taken verbatim from the device: packet_size = mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_PACKET_SIZE); if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; ... error = __mms114_read_reg(data, MMS114_INFORMATION, packet_size, (u8 *)touch); packet_size is a single device register byte (0x0F) and the only check is the lower bound packet_size <= 0; it is never bounded against the size of touch[]. A malfunctioning, malicious or counterfeit controller (or an attacker tampering with the I2C bus) can report a packet_size of up to 255, so __mms114_read_reg() writes up to 175 bytes past the end of touch[] on the IRQ-thread stack: a stack out-of-bounds write that can overwrite the stack canary, saved registers and the return address. A well-formed device never reports more than the buffer holds, so reject an oversized packet and drop the report, consistent with the handler's other error paths, rather than reading past the buffer. Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612-b4-disp-dc4b8dc4-v1-1-d7cb0a828d92@proton.me Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c index 7f01a5a5520a6..b467c601e3fcc 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c @@ -236,6 +236,12 @@ static irqreturn_t mms114_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) if (packet_size <= 0) goto out; + if (packet_size > sizeof(touch)) { + dev_err(&client->dev, "Invalid packet size %d (max %zu)\n", + packet_size, sizeof(touch)); + goto out; + } + /* MMS136 has slightly different event size */ if (data->type == TYPE_MMS134S || data->type == TYPE_MMS136) event_size = MMS136_EVENT_SIZE; From 37fbe63bccf21e3b98636f6ed4f9bd7891baaefd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Rao Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 17:47:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 564/607] Input: gscps2 - advance receive buffer write index commit d86d4f8cbb5a55a3b9b86f7b5ab8c4cdda600a3f upstream. Commit 44f920069911 ("Input: gscps2 - use guard notation when acquiring spinlock") moved the receive loop into gscps2_read_data() and gscps2_report_data(). While moving the code, it preserved the writes to buffer[ps2port->append], but omitted the following producer index update from the original loop: ps2port->append = (ps2port->append + 1) & BUFFER_SIZE; As a result, append never advances. Since gscps2_report_data() only reports bytes while act != append, the receive buffer always appears empty and no keyboard or mouse data reaches the serio core. Restore the omitted index update. Fixes: 44f920069911 ("Input: gscps2 - use guard notation when acquiring spinlock") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.13+ Signed-off-by: Xu Rao Link: https://patch.msgid.link/460B5655BA580C60+20260624094739.850306-1-raoxu@uniontech.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/serio/gscps2.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/input/serio/gscps2.c b/drivers/input/serio/gscps2.c index 9c6ff04c46cf9..d05c5b02ac332 100644 --- a/drivers/input/serio/gscps2.c +++ b/drivers/input/serio/gscps2.c @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ static void gscps2_read_data(struct gscps2port *ps2port) ps2port->buffer[ps2port->append].str = status; ps2port->buffer[ps2port->append].data = gscps2_readb_input(ps2port->addr); + ps2port->append = (ps2port->append + 1) & BUFFER_SIZE; } while (true); } From 1b4cb75f254fb0224db1b65a1bb1f735a87df01d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Fuchs Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 18:33:42 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 565/607] Input: maplemouse - fix NULL pointer dereference in open() commit ee89db004238bd0b034f2a6176e175561658750b upstream. Commit 555c765b0cc2 ("Input: mouse - drop unnecessary calls to input_set_drvdata") dropped the input_set_drvdata() call in probe because the data appeared to be unused. However, dc_mouse_open() and dc_mouse_close() were using maple_get_drvdata(to_maple_dev(&dev->dev)). This appears to be accessing the data attached to an instance of maple_device structure, while in reality this actually retrieves driver data from the input device's embedded struct device (doing invalid conversion of input device structure to maple device). After input_set_drvdata() was removed, that lookup started returning NULL and opening the input device dereferences mse->mdev. Restore input_set_drvdata() and convert open() and close() to use input_get_drvdata() so the dependency is no longer hidden. Fixes: 6b3480855aad ("maple: input: fix up maple mouse driver") Fixes: 555c765b0cc2 ("Input: mouse - drop unnecessary calls to input_set_drvdata") Signed-off-by: Florian Fuchs Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260628230715.2982552-1-fuchsfl@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c b/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c index baef4be14b54d..bbef6da638f23 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static void dc_mouse_callback(struct mapleq *mq) static int dc_mouse_open(struct input_dev *dev) { - struct dc_mouse *mse = maple_get_drvdata(to_maple_dev(&dev->dev)); + struct dc_mouse *mse = input_get_drvdata(dev); maple_getcond_callback(mse->mdev, dc_mouse_callback, HZ/50, MAPLE_FUNC_MOUSE); @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int dc_mouse_open(struct input_dev *dev) static void dc_mouse_close(struct input_dev *dev) { - struct dc_mouse *mse = maple_get_drvdata(to_maple_dev(&dev->dev)); + struct dc_mouse *mse = input_get_drvdata(dev); maple_getcond_callback(mse->mdev, dc_mouse_callback, 0, MAPLE_FUNC_MOUSE); @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static int probe_maple_mouse(struct device *dev) mse->dev = input_dev; mse->mdev = mdev; + input_set_drvdata(input_dev, mse); input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL); input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_MOUSE)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_LEFT) | BIT_MASK(BTN_RIGHT) | BIT_MASK(BTN_MIDDLE); From d7f66fbab5d212840d81b410ddc63780a8d54c4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 23:01:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 566/607] Input: mms114 - fix multi-touch slot corruption commit adea84ee6cdea611146c4251d3c1616f5a09feca upstream. If the touchscreen controller reports a touch ID of 0, the driver calculates the slot ID as touch->id - 1, which underflows to UINT_MAX. This is passed to input_mt_slot() as -1. Since the input core ignores negative slot values, the active slot remains unchanged. The driver then reports the touch coordinates for the previously active slot, corrupting its state. Fix this by rejecting touch reports with ID 0. Fixes: 07b8481d4aff ("Input: add MELFAS mms114 touchscreen driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704060115.353049-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c index b467c601e3fcc..e703d6cc54d2e 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/mms114.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static void mms114_process_mt(struct mms114_data *data, struct mms114_touch *tou unsigned int x; unsigned int y; - if (touch->id > MMS114_MAX_TOUCH) { + if (touch->id == 0 || touch->id > MMS114_MAX_TOUCH) { dev_err(&client->dev, "Wrong touch id (%d)\n", touch->id); return; } From 699e3abac02de62080c9a95c26b38aec694e415c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 18:44:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 567/607] Input: maple_keyb - set driver data before registering input device commit 536394ec81419b67d9f4f0028812c4372397be1b upstream. Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and the callback is triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/keyboard/maple_keyb.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/keyboard/maple_keyb.c b/drivers/input/keyboard/maple_keyb.c index 1a8f1fa53fbb4..9246e5a745746 100644 --- a/drivers/input/keyboard/maple_keyb.c +++ b/drivers/input/keyboard/maple_keyb.c @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ static int probe_maple_kbd(struct device *dev) kbd->dev = idev; memcpy(kbd->keycode, dc_kbd_keycode, sizeof(kbd->keycode)); + maple_set_drvdata(mdev, kbd); + idev->name = mdev->product_name; idev->evbit[0] = BIT(EV_KEY) | BIT(EV_REP); idev->keycode = kbd->keycode; @@ -190,8 +192,6 @@ static int probe_maple_kbd(struct device *dev) mdev->driver = mdrv; - maple_set_drvdata(mdev, kbd); - return error; fail_register: From 9376c744bea2c1fc759443802a3a4dad14cf4498 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 22:47:34 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 568/607] Input: maplemouse - set driver data before registering input device commit 738f24bbbc95dd50cb4229d1ed62a05f29db2bda upstream. Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and the callback is triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Tested-by: Florian Fuchs Link: https://patch.msgid.link/akNXw45L_8bxD6QV@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c b/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c index bbef6da638f23..2c71e0716d672 100644 --- a/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c +++ b/drivers/input/mouse/maplemouse.c @@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ static int probe_maple_mouse(struct device *dev) mse->dev = input_dev; mse->mdev = mdev; + maple_set_drvdata(mdev, mse); + input_set_drvdata(input_dev, mse); input_dev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_REL); input_dev->keybit[BIT_WORD(BTN_MOUSE)] = BIT_MASK(BTN_LEFT) | @@ -103,12 +105,12 @@ static int probe_maple_mouse(struct device *dev) goto fail_register; mdev->driver = mdrv; - maple_set_drvdata(mdev, mse); return error; fail_register: input_free_device(input_dev); + maple_set_drvdata(mdev, NULL); fail_nomem: kfree(mse); fail: From 95de76f6ad4743dc6c350e170522c74ef93e62bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Torokhov Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 22:49:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 569/607] Input: maplecontrol - set driver data before registering input device commit fe938ee497d58c644f6910cfe6ae155f6fb3e523 upstream. Set maple driver data before calling input_register_device() to ensure that it is available if the device is opened immediately and the callback is triggered. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.5-flash Tested-by: Florian Fuchs Link: https://patch.msgid.link/akNYib9hQFNN1fA9@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/input/joystick/maplecontrol.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/joystick/maplecontrol.c b/drivers/input/joystick/maplecontrol.c index 8b54f9b18e7c0..1534640268f30 100644 --- a/drivers/input/joystick/maplecontrol.c +++ b/drivers/input/joystick/maplecontrol.c @@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static int probe_maple_controller(struct device *dev) pad->dev = idev; pad->mdev = mdev; + maple_set_drvdata(mdev, pad); + idev->open = dc_pad_open; idev->close = dc_pad_close; @@ -146,7 +148,6 @@ static int probe_maple_controller(struct device *dev) goto fail; mdev->driver = mdrv; - maple_set_drvdata(mdev, pad); return 0; From 5a45d0aa1fa50a333ce5763ade744e2d89838667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhenhao Wan Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 01:15:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 570/607] RDMA/rtrs-srv: Bound RDMA-Write length to chunk size in rdma_write_sg commit 963af8d97a8c6a117134a8d0db1415e0489200b1 upstream. When the server answers an RTRS READ, rdma_write_sg() builds the source scatter/gather entry for the IB_WR_RDMA_WRITE that returns data to the peer. Its length is taken directly from the wire descriptor: plist->length = le32_to_cpu(id->rd_msg->desc[0].len); rd_msg points into the chunk buffer that the remote peer filled via RDMA-WRITE-WITH-IMM (rtrs_srv_rdma_done() -> process_io_req() -> process_read()), so desc[0].len is attacker-controlled and, before this change, was only rejected when zero. The source address is the fixed chunk start (dma_addr[msg_id]) and the source lkey is the PD-wide local_dma_lkey, which is not tied to the chunk's MR mapping, so the verbs layer does not constrain the transfer length to max_chunk_size. msg_id and off are bounded against queue_depth and max_chunk_size in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(), but desc[0].len is a separate field that was not checked against the chunk size. A peer that advertises desc[0].len larger than max_chunk_size can make the posted RDMA write read past the chunk's mapped region. The resulting behaviour depends on the IOMMU configuration: with no IOMMU or in passthrough mode the read may extend into memory adjacent to the chunk and be returned to the peer, which can disclose host memory; with a translating IOMMU the out-of-range access is expected to fault and abort the connection. In either case the transfer exceeds what the protocol permits and is driven by a remote peer. Reject a descriptor length above max_chunk_size, mirroring the existing off >= max_chunk_size bound in rtrs_srv_rdma_done(). Legitimate clients do not exceed it: the client sets desc[0].len to its MR length, which is capped at the negotiated max_io_size (max_chunk_size - MAX_HDR_SIZE). Fixes: 9cb837480424 ("RDMA/rtrs: server: main functionality") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260612-master-v1-1-70cde5c6fdc9@gmail.com Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zhenhao Wan Reviewed-by: Md Haris Iqbal Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c index adb798e2a54ae..1fc67fdff9fc2 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/rtrs-srv.c @@ -227,8 +227,9 @@ static int rdma_write_sg(struct rtrs_srv_op *id) /* WR will fail with length error * if this is 0 */ - if (plist->length == 0) { - rtrs_err(s, "Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length 0\n"); + if (plist->length == 0 || plist->length > max_chunk_size) { + rtrs_err(s, "Invalid RDMA-Write sg list length %u\n", + plist->length); return -EINVAL; } From ab45808c141a3b1e04e37aeced7c180ef77449ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maher Sanalla Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 14:16:38 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 571/607] RDMA/core: Fix broadcast address falsely detected as local commit 942cd47faa2047b46dfd85745603eba9006973e6 upstream. When rdma_resolve_addr() is invoked with a broadcast destination on an IPoIB interface, is_dst_local() inspects the resolved route and incorrectly concludes that the address is local. As a result, the resolution fails with -ENODEV. The issue stems from using '&' to compare rt_type with RTN_LOCAL. The RTN_* values form a sequential enum, not a bitmask (RTN_LOCAL=2, RTN_BROADCAST=3). Thus, "rt_type & RTN_LOCAL" yields a non-zero result for a broadcast route as well. Replace '&' with '==' when comparing rt_type against RTN_LOCAL. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260609-fix-rdma-resolve-addr-v1-1-449b8b4e6c09@nvidia.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c31e4038c97f ("RDMA/core: Use route entry flag to decide on loopback traffic") Signed-off-by: Maher Sanalla Reviewed-by: Vlad Dumitrescu Signed-off-by: Edward Srouji Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c index d2a075a781ce6..e73c9d8333f70 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int addr6_resolve(struct sockaddr *src_sock, static bool is_dst_local(const struct dst_entry *dst) { if (dst->ops->family == AF_INET) - return !!(dst_rtable(dst)->rt_type & RTN_LOCAL); + return dst_rtable(dst)->rt_type == RTN_LOCAL; else if (dst->ops->family == AF_INET6) return !!(dst_rt6_info(dst)->rt6i_flags & RTF_LOCAL); else From 423a78ff7928c2601013f73ec6d896f5597d0df5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Bommarito Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 15:47:00 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 572/607] RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length commit 7d29f7e9dbd844cae4d3e559cf78324b9642fd6b upstream. In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem) branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard). A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP, so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs no local privilege. Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the Read Response would overrun the sink buffer. This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case, because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer. Fixes: 8b6a361b8c48 ("rdma/siw: receive path") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260602194700.2273758-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c index 34d03584160c2..b566d163c5aab 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c @@ -844,6 +844,15 @@ int siw_proc_rresp(struct siw_qp *qp) } mem_p = *mem; + if (unlikely(wqe->processed + srx->fpdu_part_rem > wqe->bytes)) { + siw_dbg_qp(qp, "rresp len: %d + %d > %d\n", + wqe->processed, srx->fpdu_part_rem, wqe->bytes); + wqe->wc_status = SIW_WC_LOC_LEN_ERR; + siw_init_terminate(qp, TERM_ERROR_LAYER_DDP, + DDP_ETYPE_TAGGED_BUF, + DDP_ECODE_T_BASE_BOUNDS, 0); + return -EINVAL; + } bytes = min(srx->fpdu_part_rem, srx->skb_new); rv = siw_rx_data(mem_p, srx, &frx->pbl_idx, sge->laddr + wqe->processed, bytes); From 69cfae58b9a3282d832dd83377323bab36f69c5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Matthew R. Ochs" Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 08:20:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 573/607] fuse: back uncached readdir buffers with pages commit 4dd6f6d3085a84e74b0a1efec3a05ed0b5125dce upstream. Commit dabb90391028 ("fuse: increase readdir buffer size") changed fuse_readdir_uncached() to size its temporary buffer from ctx->count. This is useful for overlayfs and other in-kernel callers that use INT_MAX to indicate an unlimited directory read. The larger buffer is currently supplied as a kvec output argument. For virtiofs, kvec arguments are copied through req->argbuf, which is allocated with kmalloc(..., GFP_ATOMIC). A large uncached readdir buffer can therefore require a multi-megabyte contiguous atomic allocation before the request is queued. Avoid the large bounce-buffer allocation by backing uncached readdir output with pages and setting out_pages. Transports such as virtiofs can then pass the pages as scatter-gather entries instead of copying the output through argbuf. Map the pages with vm_map_ram() only while parsing the returned dirents. The existing parser can then continue to use a linear kernel mapping. [SzM: separate allocation of pages into a helper function] Fixes: dabb90391028 ("fuse: increase readdir buffer size") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Matthew R. Ochs Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/readdir.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/readdir.c b/fs/fuse/readdir.c index aae657fd56c0e..57a4d6254bc98 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/readdir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/readdir.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static bool fuse_use_readdirplus(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx) { @@ -335,6 +336,43 @@ static int parse_dirplusfile(char *buf, size_t nbytes, struct file *file, return 0; } +static struct page **fuse_readdir_alloc_buf(struct fuse_args_pages *ap, size_t *bufsize) +{ + unsigned int i, nr_alloc, nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(*bufsize, PAGE_SIZE); + struct page **pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(*pages), GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!pages) + return NULL; + + nr_alloc = alloc_pages_bulk(GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages, pages); + if (!nr_alloc) + goto free_array; + + if (nr_alloc < nr_pages) { + nr_pages = nr_alloc; + *bufsize = (size_t) nr_pages << PAGE_SHIFT; + } + + ap->folios = fuse_folios_alloc(nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL, &ap->descs); + if (!ap->folios) + goto release_pages; + + for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) { + ap->folios[i] = page_folio(pages[i]); + ap->descs[i].length = min_t(size_t, *bufsize - (size_t)i * PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); + } + ap->num_folios = nr_pages; + ap->args.out_pages = true; + + return pages; + +release_pages: + release_pages(pages, nr_pages); +free_array: + kfree(pages); + return NULL; +} + static int fuse_readdir_uncached(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) { int plus; @@ -343,18 +381,16 @@ static int fuse_readdir_uncached(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct fuse_mount *fm = get_fuse_mount(inode); struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc; struct fuse_io_args ia = {}; - struct fuse_args *args = &ia.ap.args; + struct fuse_args_pages *ap = &ia.ap; void *buf; size_t bufsize = clamp((unsigned int) ctx->count, PAGE_SIZE, fc->max_pages << PAGE_SHIFT); u64 attr_version = 0, evict_ctr = 0; bool locked; + struct page **pages = fuse_readdir_alloc_buf(ap, &bufsize); - buf = kvmalloc(bufsize, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) + if (!pages) return -ENOMEM; - args->out_args[0].value = buf; - plus = fuse_use_readdirplus(inode, ctx); if (plus) { attr_version = fuse_get_attr_version(fm->fc); @@ -364,24 +400,37 @@ static int fuse_readdir_uncached(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) fuse_read_args_fill(&ia, file, ctx->pos, bufsize, FUSE_READDIR); } locked = fuse_lock_inode(inode); - res = fuse_simple_request(fm, args); + res = fuse_simple_request(fm, &ap->args); fuse_unlock_inode(inode, locked); - if (res >= 0) { - if (!res) { - struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; - - if (ff->open_flags & FOPEN_CACHE_DIR) - fuse_readdir_cache_end(file, ctx->pos); - } else if (plus) { - res = parse_dirplusfile(buf, res, file, ctx, attr_version, - evict_ctr); - } else { + if (res < 0) + goto out; + + if (!res) { + struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data; + + if (ff->open_flags & FOPEN_CACHE_DIR) + fuse_readdir_cache_end(file, ctx->pos); + goto out; + } + + buf = vm_map_ram(pages, ap->num_folios, -1); + if (!buf) { + res = -ENOMEM; + } else { + if (plus) + res = parse_dirplusfile(buf, res, file, ctx, attr_version, evict_ctr); + else res = parse_dirfile(buf, res, file, ctx); - } + + vm_unmap_ram(buf, ap->num_folios); } +out: + kfree(ap->folios); + release_pages(pages, ap->num_folios); + kfree(pages); - kvfree(buf); fuse_invalidate_atime(inode); + return res; } From 6e2d84fdeac05bfd858e84a76353fdb84f23a43e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Samuel Moelius Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2026 00:37:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 574/607] fuse: avoid 32-bit prune notification count wrap commit 54243797cedf55447b4c5d560e8cd709900061ae upstream. FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE validates the nodeid payload length with: size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64) On 32-bit kernels, size_t is also 32 bits, so the daemon-controlled count multiplication can wrap. A prune notification with count 0x20000000 and no nodeid payload passes the check, enters the copy loop, and asks the device copy path to read nodeids that are not present in the userspace write buffer. In QEMU this reaches the fuse_copy_fill() BUG_ON(!err) path. Validate the payload length with array_size() instead. That accepts exactly the same valid messages, but avoids wrapping arithmetic before the copy loop consumes the count. Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber-preview Fixes: 3f29d59e92a9 ("fuse: add prune notification") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Samuel Moelius Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 +- fs/fuse/notify.c | 434 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 435 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 fs/fuse/notify.c diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index 527f60f7ad7be..403fc18ee3627 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ static int fuse_notify_prune(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, if (err) return err; - if (size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64)) + if (size - sizeof(outarg) != array_size(outarg.count, sizeof(u64))) return -EINVAL; for (; outarg.count; outarg.count -= num) { diff --git a/fs/fuse/notify.c b/fs/fuse/notify.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..7cd63502e124b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/fuse/notify.c @@ -0,0 +1,434 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include "dev.h" +#include "fuse_i.h" +#include + +static int fuse_notify_poll(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_poll_wakeup_out outarg; + int err; + + if (size != sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + + fuse_copy_finish(cs); + return fuse_notify_poll_wakeup(fc, &outarg); +} + +static int fuse_notify_inval_inode(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_inval_inode_out outarg; + int err; + + if (size != sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + fuse_copy_finish(cs); + + down_read(&fc->killsb); + err = fuse_reverse_inval_inode(fc, outarg.ino, + outarg.off, outarg.len); + up_read(&fc->killsb); + return err; +} + +static int fuse_notify_inval_entry(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_inval_entry_out outarg; + int err; + char *buf; + struct qstr name; + + if (size < sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + + if (outarg.namelen > fc->name_max) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + + err = -EINVAL; + if (size != sizeof(outarg) + outarg.namelen + 1) + return -EINVAL; + + buf = kzalloc(outarg.namelen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + name.name = buf; + name.len = outarg.namelen; + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1); + if (err) + goto err; + fuse_copy_finish(cs); + buf[outarg.namelen] = 0; + + down_read(&fc->killsb); + err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc, outarg.parent, 0, &name, outarg.flags); + up_read(&fc->killsb); +err: + kfree(buf); + return err; +} + +static int fuse_notify_delete(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_delete_out outarg; + int err; + char *buf; + struct qstr name; + + if (size < sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + + if (outarg.namelen > fc->name_max) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + + if (size != sizeof(outarg) + outarg.namelen + 1) + return -EINVAL; + + buf = kzalloc(outarg.namelen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + name.name = buf; + name.len = outarg.namelen; + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, buf, outarg.namelen + 1); + if (err) + goto err; + fuse_copy_finish(cs); + buf[outarg.namelen] = 0; + + down_read(&fc->killsb); + err = fuse_reverse_inval_entry(fc, outarg.parent, outarg.child, &name, 0); + up_read(&fc->killsb); +err: + kfree(buf); + return err; +} + +static int fuse_notify_store(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_store_out outarg; + struct inode *inode; + struct address_space *mapping; + u64 nodeid; + int err; + unsigned int num; + loff_t file_size; + loff_t pos; + loff_t end; + + if (size < sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + + if (size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.size) + return -EINVAL; + + if (outarg.offset >= MAX_LFS_FILESIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + nodeid = outarg.nodeid; + pos = outarg.offset; + num = min(outarg.size, MAX_LFS_FILESIZE - pos); + + down_read(&fc->killsb); + + err = -ENOENT; + inode = fuse_ilookup(fc, nodeid, NULL); + if (!inode) + goto out_up_killsb; + + mapping = inode->i_mapping; + file_size = i_size_read(inode); + end = pos + num; + if (end > file_size) { + file_size = end; + fuse_write_update_attr(inode, file_size, num); + } + + while (num) { + struct folio *folio; + unsigned int folio_offset; + unsigned int nr_bytes; + pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + folio = filemap_grab_folio(mapping, index); + err = PTR_ERR(folio); + if (IS_ERR(folio)) + goto out_iput; + + folio_offset = offset_in_folio(folio, pos); + nr_bytes = min(num, folio_size(folio) - folio_offset); + + err = fuse_copy_folio(cs, &folio, folio_offset, nr_bytes, 0); + if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio) && !err && folio_offset == 0 && + (nr_bytes == folio_size(folio) || file_size == end)) { + folio_zero_segment(folio, nr_bytes, folio_size(folio)); + folio_mark_uptodate(folio); + } + folio_unlock(folio); + folio_put(folio); + + if (err) + goto out_iput; + + pos += nr_bytes; + num -= nr_bytes; + } + + err = 0; + +out_iput: + iput(inode); +out_up_killsb: + up_read(&fc->killsb); + return err; +} + +struct fuse_retrieve_args { + struct fuse_args_pages ap; + struct fuse_notify_retrieve_in inarg; +}; + +static void fuse_retrieve_end(struct fuse_args *args, int error) +{ + struct fuse_retrieve_args *ra = + container_of(args, typeof(*ra), ap.args); + + release_pages(ra->ap.folios, ra->ap.num_folios); + kfree(ra); +} + +static int fuse_retrieve(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct inode *inode, + struct fuse_notify_retrieve_out *outarg) +{ + int err; + struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping; + loff_t file_size; + unsigned int num; + unsigned int offset; + size_t total_len = 0; + unsigned int num_pages; + struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc; + struct fuse_retrieve_args *ra; + size_t args_size = sizeof(*ra); + struct fuse_args_pages *ap; + struct fuse_args *args; + loff_t pos = outarg->offset; + + offset = offset_in_page(pos); + file_size = i_size_read(inode); + + num = min(outarg->size, fc->max_write); + if (pos > file_size) + num = 0; + else if (num > file_size - pos) + num = file_size - pos; + + num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(num + offset, PAGE_SIZE); + num_pages = min(num_pages, fc->max_pages); + num = min(num, num_pages << PAGE_SHIFT); + + args_size += num_pages * (sizeof(ap->folios[0]) + sizeof(ap->descs[0])); + + ra = kzalloc(args_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ra) + return -ENOMEM; + + ap = &ra->ap; + ap->folios = (void *) (ra + 1); + ap->descs = (void *) (ap->folios + num_pages); + + args = &ap->args; + args->nodeid = outarg->nodeid; + args->opcode = FUSE_NOTIFY_REPLY; + args->in_numargs = 3; + args->in_pages = true; + args->end = fuse_retrieve_end; + + while (num && ap->num_folios < num_pages) { + struct folio *folio; + unsigned int folio_offset; + unsigned int nr_bytes; + pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + folio = filemap_get_folio(mapping, index); + if (IS_ERR(folio)) + break; + + folio_offset = offset_in_folio(folio, pos); + nr_bytes = min(folio_size(folio) - folio_offset, num); + + ap->folios[ap->num_folios] = folio; + ap->descs[ap->num_folios].offset = folio_offset; + ap->descs[ap->num_folios].length = nr_bytes; + ap->num_folios++; + + pos += nr_bytes; + num -= nr_bytes; + total_len += nr_bytes; + } + ra->inarg.offset = outarg->offset; + ra->inarg.size = total_len; + fuse_set_zero_arg0(args); + args->in_args[1].size = sizeof(ra->inarg); + args->in_args[1].value = &ra->inarg; + args->in_args[2].size = total_len; + + err = fuse_simple_notify_reply(fm, args, outarg->notify_unique); + if (err) + fuse_retrieve_end(args, err); + + return err; +} + +static int fuse_notify_retrieve(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_retrieve_out outarg; + struct fuse_mount *fm; + struct inode *inode; + u64 nodeid; + int err; + + if (size != sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + + fuse_copy_finish(cs); + + if (outarg.offset >= MAX_LFS_FILESIZE) + return -EINVAL; + + down_read(&fc->killsb); + err = -ENOENT; + nodeid = outarg.nodeid; + + inode = fuse_ilookup(fc, nodeid, &fm); + if (inode) { + err = fuse_retrieve(fm, inode, &outarg); + iput(inode); + } + up_read(&fc->killsb); + + return err; +} + +static int fuse_notify_resend(struct fuse_conn *fc) +{ + fuse_chan_resend(fc->chan); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Increments the fuse connection epoch. This will result of dentries from + * previous epochs to be invalidated. Additionally, if inval_wq is set, a work + * queue is scheduled to trigger the invalidation. + */ +static int fuse_notify_inc_epoch(struct fuse_conn *fc) +{ + atomic_inc(&fc->epoch); + if (inval_wq) + schedule_work(&fc->epoch_work); + + return 0; +} + +static int fuse_notify_prune(struct fuse_conn *fc, unsigned int size, + struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + struct fuse_notify_prune_out outarg; + const unsigned int batch = 512; + u64 *nodeids __free(kfree) = kmalloc(sizeof(u64) * batch, GFP_KERNEL); + unsigned int num, i; + int err; + + if (!nodeids) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (size < sizeof(outarg)) + return -EINVAL; + + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &outarg, sizeof(outarg)); + if (err) + return err; + + if (size - sizeof(outarg) != array_size(outarg.count, sizeof(u64))) + return -EINVAL; + + for (; outarg.count; outarg.count -= num) { + num = min(batch, outarg.count); + err = fuse_copy_one(cs, nodeids, num * sizeof(u64)); + if (err) + return err; + + scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &fc->killsb) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) + fuse_try_prune_one_inode(fc, nodeids[i]); + } + } + return 0; +} + +int fuse_notify(struct fuse_conn *fc, enum fuse_notify_code code, + unsigned int size, struct fuse_copy_state *cs) +{ + switch (code) { + case FUSE_NOTIFY_POLL: + return fuse_notify_poll(fc, size, cs); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_INODE: + return fuse_notify_inval_inode(fc, size, cs); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY: + return fuse_notify_inval_entry(fc, size, cs); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_STORE: + return fuse_notify_store(fc, size, cs); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE: + return fuse_notify_retrieve(fc, size, cs); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_DELETE: + return fuse_notify_delete(fc, size, cs); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_RESEND: + return fuse_notify_resend(fc); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_INC_EPOCH: + return fuse_notify_inc_epoch(fc); + + case FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE: + return fuse_notify_prune(fc, size, cs); + + default: + return -EINVAL; + } +} From e6620208bdd346a01262ef68b76aaf4e8f1667a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alberto Ruiz Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 17:23:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 575/607] fuse: fix device node leak in cuse_process_init_reply() commit 9fa4f7a53406430ee9982f2f636a15b338185122 upstream. If device_add() succeeds during CUSE initialization but a subsequent step (cdev_alloc() or cdev_add()) fails, the error path calls put_device() without first calling device_del(). This leaks the devtmpfs entry created by device_add(), leaving a stale /dev/ node that persists until reboot. Since the cuse_conn is never linked into cuse_conntbl on the failure path, cuse_channel_release() sees cc->dev == NULL and skips device_unregister(), so no other code path cleans up the node. This has several consequences: - The device name is permanently poisoned: any subsequent attempt to create a CUSE device with the same name hits the stale sysfs entry, device_add() fails, and the new device is aborted. - The collision manifests as ENODEV returned to userspace with no dmesg diagnostic, making it very difficult to debug. - The failure is self-perpetuating: once a name is leaked, all future attempts with that name fail identically. Fix this by introducing an err_dev label that calls device_del() to undo device_add() before falling through to err_unlock. The existing err_unlock path from a device_add() failure correctly skips device_del() since the device was never added. Testing instructions can be found at the lore link below. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260408-wip-cuse-leak-fix-v1-0-1c028d575e97@redhat.com/ Signed-off-by: Alberto Ruiz Fixes: 151060ac1314 ("CUSE: implement CUSE - Character device in Userspace") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/cuse.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/cuse.c b/fs/fuse/cuse.c index 28c96961e85d1..2bb98bf81b079 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/cuse.c +++ b/fs/fuse/cuse.c @@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ static void cuse_process_init_reply(struct fuse_mount *fm, rc = -ENOMEM; cdev = cdev_alloc(); if (!cdev) - goto err_unlock; + goto err_dev; cdev->owner = THIS_MODULE; cdev->ops = &cuse_frontend_fops; @@ -417,6 +417,8 @@ static void cuse_process_init_reply(struct fuse_mount *fm, err_cdev: cdev_del(cdev); +err_dev: + device_del(dev); err_unlock: mutex_unlock(&cuse_lock); put_device(dev); From be353caffa8640f5e25fb3714ce8b0cef5e410e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joanne Koong Date: Mon, 18 May 2026 22:28:07 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 576/607] fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio() commit b5befa80fdbe287a98480effed9564712924add5 upstream. fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them, leading to use-after-free issues. Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning. Fixes: c3021629a0d8 ("fuse: support splice() reading from fuse device") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index 403fc18ee3627..cdaa50ac49ae6 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static int fuse_ref_folio(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct folio *folio, cs->nr_segs++; cs->len = 0; - return 0; + return lock_request(cs->req); } /* From 096cb2e58a6db23015f25b3b95e8d0e1bf112020 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joanne Koong Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 10:25:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 577/607] fuse: fix io-uring background queue dispatch on request completion commit 31da059891bd3be9c6e59280b8e1777ead90db34 upstream. When a background request completes via the io_uring path, the background queue gets flushed to dispatch pending background requests, but this is done before the connection-level background counters (fc->num_background, fc->active_background) are properly accounted, which may reduce effective queue depth to one. The connection-level counters are decremented in fuse_request_end(), but flush_bg_queue() flushes the /dev/fuse path queue (fc->bg_queue), not the io_uring per-queue bg one, which means pending uring background requests on the queue are never dispatched in this path. Fix this by accounting the connection-level background counters first before flushing the queue's background queue. Since fuse_request_bg_finish() clears FR_BACKGROUND, fuse_request_end() will skip the background cleanup branch entirely, which avoids any double-decrements; it will call the wake_up(&req->waitq) branch but this is effectively a no-op as background requests have no waiters on req->waitq. Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert Fixes: 857b0263f30e ("fuse: Allow to queue bg requests through io-uring") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 1 + fs/fuse/fuse_dev_i.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index cdaa50ac49ae6..e6d366f6b95d6 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -447,6 +447,29 @@ static void flush_bg_queue(struct fuse_conn *fc) } } +void fuse_request_bg_finish(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&fc->bg_lock); + + clear_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags); + if (fc->num_background == fc->max_background) { + fc->blocked = 0; + wake_up(&fc->blocked_waitq); + } else if (!fc->blocked) { + /* + * Wake up next waiter, if any. It's okay to use + * waitqueue_active(), as we've already synced up + * fc->blocked with waiters with the wake_up() call + * above. + */ + if (waitqueue_active(&fc->blocked_waitq)) + wake_up(&fc->blocked_waitq); + } + + fc->num_background--; + fc->active_background--; +} + /* * This function is called when a request is finished. Either a reply * has arrived or it was aborted (and not yet sent) or some error @@ -479,23 +502,7 @@ void fuse_request_end(struct fuse_req *req) WARN_ON(test_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags)); if (test_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags)) { spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock); - clear_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags); - if (fc->num_background == fc->max_background) { - fc->blocked = 0; - wake_up(&fc->blocked_waitq); - } else if (!fc->blocked) { - /* - * Wake up next waiter, if any. It's okay to use - * waitqueue_active(), as we've already synced up - * fc->blocked with waiters with the wake_up() call - * above. - */ - if (waitqueue_active(&fc->blocked_waitq)) - wake_up(&fc->blocked_waitq); - } - - fc->num_background--; - fc->active_background--; + fuse_request_bg_finish(fc, req); flush_bg_queue(fc); spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock); } else { diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index f0846694822dd..b63892a548108 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static void fuse_uring_req_end(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, struct fuse_req *req, if (test_bit(FR_BACKGROUND, &req->flags)) { queue->active_background--; spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock); + fuse_request_bg_finish(fc, req); fuse_uring_flush_bg(queue); spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock); } diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_dev_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_dev_i.h index 134bf44aff0d3..7da505af6d35e 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/fuse_dev_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_dev_i.h @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ unsigned int fuse_req_hash(u64 unique); struct fuse_req *fuse_request_find(struct fuse_pqueue *fpq, u64 unique); void fuse_dev_end_requests(struct list_head *head); +void fuse_request_bg_finish(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req); void fuse_copy_init(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, bool write, struct iov_iter *iter); From 7366e6f4d2b4c7002b13fb01219e83679dad4127 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ji'an Zhou Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 09:58:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 578/607] fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req commit f8fce75fedf73ac72aa09163deb8f4291fdcaad2 upstream. When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt() iterates fiq->interrupts: - list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab - req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending. Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction. Fixes: 760eac73f9f6 ("fuse: Introduce a new notification type for resend pending requests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9 Signed-off-by: Ji'an Zhou Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c index e6d366f6b95d6..77c3982bca3d7 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static struct fuse_req *fuse_request_alloc(struct fuse_mount *fm, gfp_t flags) static void fuse_request_free(struct fuse_req *req) { + WARN_ON(!list_empty(&req->intr_entry)); kmem_cache_free(fuse_req_cachep, req); } @@ -2046,6 +2047,14 @@ static void fuse_resend(struct fuse_conn *fc) fuse_dev_end_requests(&to_queue); return; } + /* + * Remove interrupt entries for resent requests to prevent stale + * intr_entry on fiq->interrupts after the request is re-queued. + */ + list_for_each_entry(req, &to_queue, list) { + if (test_bit(FR_INTERRUPTED, &req->flags)) + list_del_init(&req->intr_entry); + } /* iq and pq requests are both oldest to newest */ list_splice(&to_queue, &fiq->pending); fuse_dev_wake_and_unlock(fiq); From 0483fffdeeb363f320e6bf5fc0f0306007507306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Mason Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 12:27:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 579/607] fuse-uring: fix EFAULT clobber in fuse_uring_commit commit 3a0a8bc51a13951c5141262bf770eeea3e0b6228 upstream. copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied as an unsigned residual on failure (1..sizeof(struct fuse_out_header)). fuse_uring_commit stores that residual in ssize_t err, sets req->out.h.error to -EFAULT, then jumps to out: with err still holding the positive residual. err = copy_from_user(&req->out.h, &ent->headers->in_out, sizeof(req->out.h)); if (err) { req->out.h.error = -EFAULT; goto out; /* err is the positive residual */ } ... out: fuse_uring_req_end(ent, req, err); fuse_uring_req_end() then runs if (error) req->out.h.error = error; which overwrites the just-assigned -EFAULT with the positive residual. FUSE callers such as fuse_simple_request() test err < 0 to detect failure, so the positive value is interpreted as success and the caller proceeds with an uninitialised or partial req->out.args. Fix by assigning err = -EFAULT in the failure branch before jumping to out, so fuse_uring_req_end() receives a negative errno and sets req->out.h.error to -EFAULT. Fixes: c090c8abae4b ("fuse: Add io-uring sqe commit and fetch support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7) Signed-off-by: Chris Mason Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index b63892a548108..7d04fcf40a2ba 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -818,14 +818,11 @@ static void fuse_uring_commit(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, struct fuse_req *req, { struct fuse_ring *ring = ent->queue->ring; struct fuse_conn *fc = ring->fc; - ssize_t err = 0; + ssize_t err = -EFAULT; - err = copy_from_user(&req->out.h, &ent->headers->in_out, - sizeof(req->out.h)); - if (err) { - req->out.h.error = -EFAULT; + if (copy_from_user(&req->out.h, &ent->headers->in_out, + sizeof(req->out.h))) goto out; - } err = fuse_uring_out_header_has_err(&req->out.h, req, fc); if (err) { From b156bb9966972122b148acab8bdf415cdb8176a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Mason Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 12:27:07 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 580/607] fuse-uring: fix data races on ring->ready commit 46725a0056c884cf58a6897f222892807327d82d upstream. On weakly-ordered architectures, the store to fiq->ops can be reordered past the store to ring->ready, allowing a CPU that sees ring->ready == true via fuse_uring_ready() to dispatch requests through a stale fiq->ops pointer. Upgrade the store to smp_store_release() and the load in fuse_uring_ready() to smp_load_acquire() so that the preceding WRITE_ONCE(fiq->ops, ...) is visible to any CPU that observes ring->ready == true. Additionally, fuse_uring_do_register() publishes ring->ready with WRITE_ONCE() but the fast-path check reads it with a plain load. This is a marked-vs-unmarked access that KCSAN will flag. Wrap it in READ_ONCE() to mark it without adding unnecessary ordering. Also wrap the fc->ring load in fuse_uring_ready() in READ_ONCE() to prevent the compiler from reloading it between the NULL check and the dereference. Fixes: c2c9af9a0b13 ("fuse: Allow to queue fg requests through io-uring") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7) Signed-off-by: Chris Mason Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 4 ++-- fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 7d04fcf40a2ba..3b6dd10732c33 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -992,12 +992,12 @@ static void fuse_uring_do_register(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, fuse_uring_ent_avail(ent, queue); spin_unlock(&queue->lock); - if (!ring->ready) { + if (!READ_ONCE(ring->ready)) { bool ready = is_ring_ready(ring, queue->qid); if (ready) { WRITE_ONCE(fiq->ops, &fuse_io_uring_ops); - WRITE_ONCE(ring->ready, true); + smp_store_release(&ring->ready, true); wake_up_all(&fc->blocked_waitq); } } diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h b/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h index 51a563922ce14..531233e03e546 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h @@ -169,7 +169,9 @@ static inline void fuse_uring_wait_stopped_queues(struct fuse_conn *fc) static inline bool fuse_uring_ready(struct fuse_conn *fc) { - return fc->ring && fc->ring->ready; + struct fuse_ring *ring = READ_ONCE(fc->ring); + + return ring && smp_load_acquire(&ring->ready); } #else /* CONFIG_FUSE_IO_URING */ From 50f3e03db823cabc41fe35c27d77c2bdb112baad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joanne Koong Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 12:21:49 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 581/607] fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list commit 198f45eeb9f78b2a2d6d8be95e4e43468eb2c6bc upstream. fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired() checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry that was moved to this list. Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock. Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops queues. Reported-by: Heechan Kang Tested-by: Heechan Kang Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert Fixes: 4fea593e625c ("fuse: optimize over-io-uring request expiration check") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Jian Huang Li Suggested-by: Horst Birthelmer Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 6 ++++-- fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 3b6dd10732c33..500b6bb5b4dd9 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -512,8 +512,7 @@ static void fuse_uring_cancel(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, queue = ent->queue; spin_lock(&queue->lock); if (ent->state == FRRS_AVAILABLE) { - ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE; - list_move_tail(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace); + list_del_init(&ent->list); need_cmd_done = true; ent->cmd = NULL; } @@ -522,6 +521,9 @@ static void fuse_uring_cancel(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, if (need_cmd_done) { /* no queue lock to avoid lock order issues */ io_uring_cmd_done(cmd, -ENOTCONN, issue_flags); + kfree(ent); + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&queue->ring->queue_refs)) + wake_up_all(&queue->ring->stop_waitq); } } diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h b/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h index 531233e03e546..054ad4fdd7491 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring_i.h @@ -152,10 +152,10 @@ static inline void fuse_uring_abort(struct fuse_conn *fc) if (ring == NULL) return; - if (atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) > 0) { - fuse_uring_abort_end_requests(ring); + fuse_uring_abort_end_requests(ring); + + if (atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) > 0) fuse_uring_stop_queues(ring); - } } static inline void fuse_uring_wait_stopped_queues(struct fuse_conn *fc) From bb476ef8e1027a9d509fbaaf81f5061a07e9e5a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Mason Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 17:28:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 582/607] fuse-uring: end fuse_req on io-uring cancel task work commit bea4fe98204b6ce7eb8e29f7bf867dd7619b3ddd upstream. When io_uring delivers task work with tw.cancel set (PF_EXITING, PF_KTHREAD fallback, or percpu_ref_is_dying on the ring context), fuse_uring_send_in_task() takes the cancel branch, assigns -ECANCELED, and falls through to fuse_uring_send(). That path only flips the entry to FRRS_USERSPACE and completes the io_uring cmd; it never discharges the ring entry's owning reference to the fuse_req that fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent() handed it at dispatch time. fuse_uring_send_in_task() tw.cancel == true err = -ECANCELED fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags) ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE list_move(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace) ent->cmd = NULL io_uring_cmd_done(-ECANCELED) /* ent->fuse_req still set, req still hashed */ The fuse_req stays linked on fpq->processing[hash] and fuse_request_end() is never invoked. The originating syscall thread blocks in D-state in request_wait_answer() until fuse_abort_conn() runs, which can be the entire connection lifetime. For FR_BACKGROUND requests fc->num_background is never decremented either, so repeated cancels inflate the counter until max_background is hit and all later background ops stall. tw.cancel does not imply a connection abort (e.g. a single io_uring worker thread exits while the fuse connection stays up), so this cannot be left for fuse_abort_conn() to clean up. Ending the req but still routing the entry through fuse_uring_send() is not enough: that leaves a req-less entry on ent_in_userspace, and ent_list_request_expired() dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally on the head of that list, which would then NULL-deref. Fix the cancel branch to release the entry directly. Remove it from the queue, complete the io_uring cmd, end the fuse_req, free the entry, and drop its queue_refs (waking the teardown waiter if it was the last). Fixes: c2c9af9a0b13 ("fuse: Allow to queue fg requests through io-uring") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7) Signed-off-by: Chris Mason Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 500b6bb5b4dd9..21989f9b4d0d6 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -1226,11 +1226,21 @@ static void fuse_uring_send_in_task(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, fuse_uring_next_fuse_req(ent, queue, issue_flags); return; } + fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags); } else { err = -ECANCELED; - } - fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags); + spin_lock(&queue->lock); + list_del_init(&ent->list); + spin_unlock(&queue->lock); + + io_uring_cmd_done(cmd, err, issue_flags); + + fuse_uring_req_end(ent, ent->fuse_req, err); + kfree(ent); + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&queue->ring->queue_refs)) + wake_up_all(&queue->ring->stop_waitq); + } } static struct fuse_ring_queue *fuse_uring_task_to_queue(struct fuse_ring *ring) From 23a356e0bd96c8d5fb3ddff069f692bf10cab5c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bernd Schubert Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 23:03:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 583/607] fuse-uring: Avoid use-after-free in fuse_uring_async_stop_queues commit d351da75066955144515cb2f9aa959f24a04287a upstream. fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() might run when the last reference on ring->queue_refs was already dropped. In order to avoid an early destruction a reference on struct fuse_conn is now taken before starting fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() and that reference is only released when that delayed work queue terminates. Fixes: 4a9bfb9b6850 ("fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.14 Reported-by: Berkant Koc Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 21989f9b4d0d6..3b76f9c36cb0e 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ static void fuse_uring_async_stop_queues(struct work_struct *work) FUSE_URING_TEARDOWN_INTERVAL); } else { wake_up_all(&ring->stop_waitq); + fuse_conn_put(ring->chan->conn); } } @@ -482,6 +483,7 @@ void fuse_uring_stop_queues(struct fuse_ring *ring) } if (atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) > 0) { + fuse_conn_get(ring->chan->conn); ring->teardown_time = jiffies; INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ring->async_teardown_work, fuse_uring_async_stop_queues); From 39c8e925b207afceffaa5382416ed405e0223a03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bernd Schubert Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 23:03:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 584/607] fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock commit b70a3aca16934c196f92abb17b01c1647b9bb63c upstream. There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req' might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu might already do teardown work. Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.14 Fixes: 4a9bfb9b6850fec ("fuse: {io-uring} Handle teardown of ring entries") Reported-by: Berkant Koc Reported-by: xlabai Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 3b76f9c36cb0e..7118280ccb1fa 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -131,10 +131,9 @@ void fuse_uring_abort_end_requests(struct fuse_ring *ring) if (!queue) continue; - queue->stopped = true; - WARN_ON_ONCE(ring->fc->max_background != UINT_MAX); spin_lock(&queue->lock); + queue->stopped = true; spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock); fuse_uring_flush_bg(queue); spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock); @@ -462,7 +461,7 @@ static void fuse_uring_async_stop_queues(struct work_struct *work) FUSE_URING_TEARDOWN_INTERVAL); } else { wake_up_all(&ring->stop_waitq); - fuse_conn_put(ring->chan->conn); + fuse_conn_put(ring->fc); } } @@ -483,7 +482,7 @@ void fuse_uring_stop_queues(struct fuse_ring *ring) } if (atomic_read(&ring->queue_refs) > 0) { - fuse_conn_get(ring->chan->conn); + fuse_conn_get(ring->fc); ring->teardown_time = jiffies; INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ring->async_teardown_work, fuse_uring_async_stop_queues); @@ -903,10 +902,15 @@ static int fuse_uring_commit_fetch(struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, int issue_flags, return err; fpq = &queue->fpq; - if (!READ_ONCE(fc->connected) || READ_ONCE(queue->stopped)) + if (!READ_ONCE(fc->connected)) return err; spin_lock(&queue->lock); + if (unlikely(queue->stopped)) { + spin_unlock(&queue->lock); + return err; + } + /* Find a request based on the unique ID of the fuse request * This should get revised, as it needs a hash calculation and list * search. And full struct fuse_pqueue is needed (memory overhead). From e1711479e9068ea31b31353a702a51e639c3d059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bernd Schubert Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 23:03:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 585/607] fuse-uring: make a fuse_req on SQE commit only findable after memcpy commit 1efd3d474fc0ba74dfd984249bca78807d739812 upstream. Bad userspace might try to trick us and send commit SQEs request unique / commit-id of requests that are not even send to fuse-server (io_uring_cmd_done() not called) yet. fuse_uring_commit_fetch() ends the fuse request when the ring entry has a wrong state, but that could have caused a use-after-free with the memcpy operations in fuse_uring_send_in_task(). In order to avoid such races the call of fuse_uring_add_to_pq() is moved after the copy operations and just before completing the io-uring request - malicious userspace cannot find the request anymore until all prepration work in fuse-client/kernel is completed. This also moves fuse_uring_add_to_pq() a bit up in the code to avoid a forward declaration. Also not with a preparation commit, to make it easier to back port to older kernels. Reported-by: xlabai Reported-by: Berkant Koc Fixes: c090c8abae4b6b ("fuse: Add io-uring sqe commit and fetch support") Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.14 Signed-off-by: Bernd Schubert Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 7118280ccb1fa..78a840dd7b9f2 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -718,6 +718,19 @@ static int fuse_uring_prepare_send(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, return err; } +/* Used to find the request on SQE commit */ +static void fuse_uring_add_to_pq(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent) +{ + struct fuse_ring_queue *queue = ent->queue; + struct fuse_pqueue *fpq = &queue->fpq; + unsigned int hash; + struct fuse_req *req = ent->fuse_req; + + req->ring_entry = ent; + hash = fuse_req_hash(req->in.h.unique); + list_move_tail(&req->list, &fpq->processing[hash]); +} + /* * Write data to the ring buffer and send the request to userspace, * userspace will read it @@ -740,6 +753,7 @@ static int fuse_uring_send_next_to_ring(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, ent->cmd = NULL; ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE; list_move_tail(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace); + fuse_uring_add_to_pq(ent); spin_unlock(&queue->lock); io_uring_cmd_done(cmd, 0, issue_flags); @@ -757,19 +771,6 @@ static void fuse_uring_ent_avail(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, ent->state = FRRS_AVAILABLE; } -/* Used to find the request on SQE commit */ -static void fuse_uring_add_to_pq(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, - struct fuse_req *req) -{ - struct fuse_ring_queue *queue = ent->queue; - struct fuse_pqueue *fpq = &queue->fpq; - unsigned int hash; - - req->ring_entry = ent; - hash = fuse_req_hash(req->in.h.unique); - list_move_tail(&req->list, &fpq->processing[hash]); -} - /* * Assign a fuse queue entry to the given entry */ @@ -787,10 +788,13 @@ static void fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, } clear_bit(FR_PENDING, &req->flags); + + /* Until fuse_uring_add_to_pq() the req is not attached to any list */ + list_del_init(&req->list); + ent->fuse_req = req; ent->state = FRRS_FUSE_REQ; list_move_tail(&ent->list, &queue->ent_w_req_queue); - fuse_uring_add_to_pq(ent, req); } /* Fetch the next fuse request if available */ @@ -1209,6 +1213,7 @@ static void fuse_uring_send(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, struct io_uring_cmd *cmd, ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE; list_move_tail(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace); ent->cmd = NULL; + fuse_uring_add_to_pq(ent); spin_unlock(&queue->lock); io_uring_cmd_done(cmd, ret, issue_flags); From 0b466cf1b96e191b06b496c4de79da15315c3a9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joanne Koong Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 14:36:58 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 586/607] fuse-uring: remove request-less entries from ent_w_req_queue to fix NULL deref commit 1c57a69be962d459c5e705f5cb4355b841b3461c upstream. If a copy into the userspace ring buffer fails, a request will be terminated and fuse_uring_req_end() will set ent->fuse_req to NULL but it will leave the entry on ent_w_req_queue in FRRS_FUSE_REQ state. This can lead to a NULL deref if the request expiration logic scans ent_w_req_queue in the window before the entry is moved off it. Fix this by taking the entry off ent_w_req_queue and changing its state from FRRS_FUSE_REQ to FRRS_INVALID before terminating the request. Fixes: 4fea593e625c ("fuse: optimize over-io-uring request expiration check") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/fuse/dev_uring.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c index 78a840dd7b9f2..42c82b5476593 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dev_uring.c @@ -710,10 +710,20 @@ static int fuse_uring_prepare_send(struct fuse_ring_ent *ent, int err; err = fuse_uring_copy_to_ring(ent, req); - if (!err) + if (!err) { set_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags); - else + } else { + /* + * Copying the request failed. Remove the entry from the + * ent_w_req_queue list and terminate the request + */ + spin_lock(&ent->queue->lock); + list_del_init(&ent->list); + ent->state = FRRS_INVALID; + spin_unlock(&ent->queue->lock); + fuse_uring_req_end(ent, req, err); + } return err; } From 75e1d2787005d0bb6ea9dd2ed41a41f2bdceb957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Li Date: Sat, 11 Oct 2025 06:43:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 587/607] sched/fair: Only update stats for allowed CPUs when looking for dst group commit 82d6e01a0699800efd8b048eb584c907ccb47b7a upstream. Load imbalance is observed when the workload frequently forks new threads. Due to CPU affinity, the workload can run on CPU 0-7 in the first group, and only on CPU 8-11 in the second group. CPU 12-15 are always idle. { 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 } {8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15} * * * * * * * * * * * * When looking for dst group for newly forked threads, in many times update_sg_wakeup_stats() reports the second group has more idle CPUs than the first group. The scheduler thinks the second group is less busy. Then it selects least busy CPUs among CPU 8-11. Therefore CPU 8-11 can be crowded with newly forked threads, at the same time CPU 0-7 can be idle. A task may not use all the CPUs in a schedule group due to CPU affinity. Only update schedule group statistics for allowed CPUs. Signed-off-by: Adam Li Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: Erwan Velu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index 7e0e2044d840b..b2f569d6c022d 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -10847,7 +10847,7 @@ static inline void update_sg_wakeup_stats(struct sched_domain *sd, if (sd->flags & SD_ASYM_CPUCAPACITY) sgs->group_misfit_task_load = 1; - for_each_cpu(i, sched_group_span(group)) { + for_each_cpu_and(i, sched_group_span(group), p->cpus_ptr) { struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(i); unsigned int local; From 9e04055ab5fc0470a0031ee6934739f9aa8f34a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Neill Kapron Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 04:06:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 588/607] usb: gadget: f_fs: Initialize epfile->in early to fix endpoint direction checks commit 82cfd4739011bdc7e87b5d585703427e89ddfaa5 upstream. When parsing endpoint descriptors, ffs_data_got_descs() generates the eps_addrmap which contains the endpoint direction. However, epfile->in was previously only populated in ffs_func_eps_enable() which executes upon USB host connection. As a result, early userspace ioctls like FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_ATTACH that run before the host connects would see epfile->in as 0, leading to incorrect DMA directions. By moving the initialization to ffs_epfiles_create(), epfile->in is accurate before userspace opens the endpoint files. Fixes: 7b07a2a7ca02 ("usb: gadget: functionfs: Add DMABUF import interface") Cc: stable Assisted-by: Antigravity:gemini-3.1-pro Signed-off-by: Neill Kapron Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260619040609.4010746-2-nkapron@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c index 7cddf88589335..5ef9a7a7f3bc3 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -2354,6 +2354,7 @@ static int ffs_epfiles_create(struct ffs_data *ffs) sprintf(epfile->name, "ep%02x", ffs->eps_addrmap[i]); else sprintf(epfile->name, "ep%u", i); + epfile->in = (ffs->eps_addrmap[i] & USB_ENDPOINT_DIR_MASK) ? 1 : 0; epfile->dentry = ffs_sb_create_file(ffs->sb, epfile->name, epfile, &ffs_epfile_operations); @@ -2440,7 +2441,6 @@ static int ffs_func_eps_enable(struct ffs_function *func) ret = usb_ep_enable(ep->ep); if (!ret) { epfile->ep = ep; - epfile->in = usb_endpoint_dir_in(ep->ep->desc); epfile->isoc = usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(ep->ep->desc); } else { break; From e697df336662b5b14e10a3419d5d8967acdc7977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikhail Gavrilov Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:09:14 +0500 Subject: [PATCH 589/607] timekeeping: Register default clocksource before taking tk_core.lock commit 8fa30821180a9a19e78e9f4df1c0ba710252801e upstream. Commit f24df84cbe05 ("time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage") moved the jiffies clocksource registration into clocksource_default_clock(), so that it is registered lazily on the first call. __clocksource_register() acquires clocksource_mutex, but the first caller is timekeeping_init(), which invokes clocksource_default_clock() while holding tk_core.lock, a raw spinlock. Acquiring a sleeping mutex while holding a raw spinlock is invalid. The default clocksource only has to be registered before tk_setup_internals() consumes its mult/shift/maxadj. Neither clocksource_default_clock(), the ->enable() callback, nor the registration itself need tk_core.lock, so fetch and enable the clock before acquiring the lock. This preserves the "register before usage" ordering while keeping clocksource_mutex out of the raw spinlock section. clocksource_default_clock() has a second caller, clocksource_done_booting(), which invokes it with clocksource_mutex already held. That path avoids a recursive lock because timekeeping_init() has already run and set cs_jiffies_registered, so the registration is skipped there. This change does not alter that; it only fixes the invalid wait context in timekeeping_init(). Fixes: f24df84cbe05 ("time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage") Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reported-by: Breno Leitao Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616070914.65818-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c index c7dcccc5f3d6b..889a8de3fc204 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c +++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c @@ -1825,13 +1825,14 @@ void __init timekeeping_init(void) */ wall_to_mono = timespec64_sub(boot_offset, wall_time); + clock = clocksource_default_clock(); + if (clock->enable) + clock->enable(clock); + guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&tk_core.lock); ntp_init(); - clock = clocksource_default_clock(); - if (clock->enable) - clock->enable(clock); tk_setup_internals(tks, clock); tk_set_xtime(tks, &wall_time); From 1c56c46519353112005c248982a7074c63da4926 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 10:21:09 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 590/607] Bluetooth: 6lowpan: Fix using chan->conn as indication to no remote netdev commit d38eaf611839b85ade3dd3db309dbc8aaaaf0095 upstream. b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref") don't reset the chan->conn to NULL anymore making the bt# netdev not be remove once the last l2cap_chan_del is removed. Instead of restoring the original behavior this remove the logic of keeping the interface after the last channel is removed because it never worked as intended and the l2cap_chan_del always detach its l2cap_conn which results in always removing the channel anyway. Fixes: b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c | 18 +++--------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c index 038f01600eeba..5325c1b8dcd8b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/6lowpan.c @@ -777,20 +777,10 @@ static void chan_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) struct lowpan_btle_dev *dev = NULL; struct lowpan_peer *peer; int err = -ENOENT; - bool last = false, remove = true; + bool last = false; BT_DBG("chan %p conn %p", chan, chan->conn); - if (chan->conn && chan->conn->hcon) { - if (!is_bt_6lowpan(chan->conn->hcon)) - return; - - /* If conn is set, then the netdev is also there and we should - * not remove it. - */ - remove = false; - } - spin_lock(&devices_lock); list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, &bt_6lowpan_devices, list) { @@ -817,10 +807,8 @@ static void chan_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) ifdown(dev->netdev); - if (remove) { - INIT_WORK(&entry->delete_netdev, delete_netdev); - schedule_work(&entry->delete_netdev); - } + INIT_WORK(&entry->delete_netdev, delete_netdev); + schedule_work(&entry->delete_netdev); } else { spin_unlock(&devices_lock); } From 1991d49433e90b2202de2fe90be3c24161873d7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhaoyang Huang Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 17:09:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 591/607] Revert "f2fs: remove non-uptodate folio from the page cache in move_data_block" commit ccaba785821970f422c47770331c7e3271763f17 upstream. This reverts commit 9609dd704725a40cd63d915f2ab6c44248a44598. The kernel panics are keeping to be reported especially when the f2fs partition get almost full. By investigation, we find that the reason is one f2fs page got freed to buddy without being deleted from LRU and the root cause is the race happened in [2] which is enrolled by this commit. There are 3 race processes in this scenario, please find below for their main activities. The changed code in move_data_block() lets the GC path evict the tail-end folio from the page cache through folio_end_dropbehind(). Once folio_unmap_invalidate() removes the folio from mapping->i_pages, the page-cache references for all pages in the folio are dropped. The folio is then kept alive only by temporary external references, which allows a later split to operate on a folio whose subpages are no longer protected by page-cache references. After the page-cache references are gone, split_folio_to_order() can split the big folio into individual pages and put the resulting subpages back on the LRU. For tail pages beyond EOF, split removes them from the page cache and drops their page-cache references. A tail page can then remain on the LRU with PG_lru set while holding only the split caller's temporary reference. When free_folio_and_swap_cache() drops that final reference, the page enters the final folio_put() release path. In parallel, folio_isolate_lru() can observe the same tail page with a non-zero refcount and PG_lru set. It clears PG_lru before taking its own reference. If this races with the final folio_put() from the split path, __folio_put() sees PG_lru already cleared and skips lruvec_del_folio(). The page is then freed back to the allocator while its lru links are still present in the LRU list. A later LRU operation on a neighboring page detects the stale link and reports list corruption. [1] [ 22.486082] list_del corruption. next->prev should be fffffffec10e0ac8, but was dead000000000122. (next=fffffffec10e0a88) [ 22.486130] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 22.486134] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67! [ 22.486141] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP [ 22.488502] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE [ 22.488506] Hardware name: Spreadtrum UMS9230 1H10 SoC (DT) [ 22.488511] pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 22.488517] pc : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154 [ 22.488531] lr : __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154 [ 22.488539] sp : ffffffc08006b830 [ 22.488542] x29: ffffffc08006b868 x28: 0000000000003020 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 22.488553] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000004 x24: fffffffec10e0ac0 [ 22.488564] x23: 00000000000000e8 x22: 0000000000000024 x21: dead000000000122 [ 22.488574] x20: fffffffec10e0a88 x19: fffffffec10e0ac8 x18: ffffffc080061060 [ 22.488585] x17: 20747562202c3863 x16: 6130653031636566 x15: 0000000000000058 [ 22.488595] x14: 0000000000000004 x13: ffffff80f91e0000 x12: 0000000000000003 [ 22.488605] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : ffe85721f0e25f00 [ 22.488615] x8 : ffe85721f0e25f00 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 6c65645f7473696c [ 22.488625] x5 : ffffffed39b23026 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000010 [ 22.488636] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 000000000000006d [ 22.488647] Call trace: [ 22.488651] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x14c/0x154 (P) [ 22.488661] __folio_put+0x2bc/0x434 [ 22.488670] folio_put+0x28/0x58 [ 22.488678] do_garbage_collect+0x1a34/0x2584 [ 22.488689] f2fs_gc+0x230/0x9b4 [ 22.488697] f2fs_fallocate+0xb90/0xdf4 [ 22.488706] vfs_fallocate+0x1b4/0x2bc [ 22.488716] __arm64_sys_fallocate+0x44/0x78 [ 22.488725] invoke_syscall+0x58/0xe4 [ 22.488732] do_el0_svc+0x48/0xdc [ 22.488739] el0_svc+0x3c/0x98 [ 22.488747] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x20/0x130 [ 22.488754] el0t_64_sync+0x1c4/0x1c8 [2] CPU0 (f2fs GC) CPU1 (split_folio_to_order) CPU2 (folio_isolate_lru) F: pagecache refs = n F: extra refs = GC + split F: PG_lru set move_data_block() folio = f2fs_grab_cache_folio(F) ... __folio_set_dropbehind(F) folio_unlock(F) folio_end_dropbehind(F) folio_unmap_invalidate(F) __filemap_remove_folio(F) folio_put_refs(F, n) folio_put(F) split_folio_to_order(F) folio_ref_freeze(F, 1) ... lru_add_split_folio(T) list_add_tail(&T->lru, &F->lru) folio_set_lru(T) __filemap_remove_folio(T) folio_put_refs(T, 1) /* T refcount == 1, PageLRU set */ folio_isolate_lru(T) folio_test_clear_lru(T) free_folio_and_swap_cache(T) folio_put(T) /* refcount: 1 -> 0 */ __folio_put(T) __page_cache_release(T) folio_test_lru(T) == false /* skip lruvec_del_folio(T) */ free_frozen_pages(T) folio_get(T) lruvec_del_folio(T) later: list_del(adjacent->lru) next == &T->lru next->prev == LIST_POISON / PCP freelist BUG Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9609dd704725 ("f2fs: remove non-uptodate folio from the page cache in move_data_block") Signed-off-by: Zhaoyang Huang Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/gc.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/gc.c b/fs/f2fs/gc.c index 7219a87955b20..3d41c6348b3c1 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/gc.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/gc.c @@ -1487,11 +1487,7 @@ static int move_data_block(struct inode *inode, block_t bidx, put_out: f2fs_put_dnode(&dn); out: - if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio)) - __folio_set_dropbehind(folio); - folio_unlock(folio); - folio_end_dropbehind(folio); - folio_put(folio); + f2fs_folio_put(folio, true); out_iput: if (atomic_inode) iput(atomic_inode); From fdafa1e68dc75045b7b617e6e7d2854950804d83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shoichiro Miyamoto Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2026 22:33:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 592/607] smb: client: reject overlapping data areas in SMB2 responses commit 8986c932905ea508d66da421eb2eb6e676ace1fe upstream. Commit 53b7c271f06b ("smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area") restricted the implied bcc[0] length exception to responses without a data area. However, the overlap handling in __smb2_calc_size() clears data_length, which can make an invalid response appear to have no data area and so qualify for the exception. Track data area overlap separately and reject such responses before applying the length compatibility exceptions. Fixes: 53b7c271f06b ("smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Shoichiro Miyamoto Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c index 005a820946da1..c0c0ac3342570 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c @@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ #include "nterr.h" #include "cached_dir.h" -static unsigned int __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data); +static unsigned int __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data, + bool *data_area_overlap); static int check_smb2_hdr(struct smb2_hdr *shdr, __u64 mid) @@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int len, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) __u32 calc_len; /* calculated length */ __u64 mid; bool have_data; + bool data_area_overlap; /* If server is a channel, select the primary channel */ pserver = SERVER_IS_CHAN(server) ? server->primary_server : server; @@ -231,7 +233,12 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int len, struct TCP_Server_Info *server) } have_data = false; - calc_len = __smb2_calc_size(buf, &have_data); + data_area_overlap = false; + calc_len = __smb2_calc_size(buf, &have_data, &data_area_overlap); + + /* Reject responses whose data area overlaps the fixed area. */ + if (data_area_overlap) + return 1; /* For SMB2_IOCTL, OutputOffset and OutputLength are optional, so might * be 0, and not a real miscalculation */ @@ -415,14 +422,15 @@ smb2_get_data_area_len(int *off, int *len, struct smb2_hdr *shdr) } /* - * Calculate the size of the SMB message based on the fixed header - * portion, the number of word parameters and the data portion of the message. - * If have_data is non-NULL, it is set to true when a non-empty data area was - * found (data_length > 0), allowing callers to distinguish the implied bcc[0] - * case (no data area) from an overreported data length. + * Calculate the size of the SMB message based on the fixed header, fixed + * parameter area, and variable data area. + * + * If have_data is not NULL, it is set when a non-empty data area is found. + * If data_area_overlap is not NULL, it is set when the data area overlaps + * the fixed area. */ static unsigned int -__smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data) +__smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data, bool *data_area_overlap) { struct smb2_pdu *pdu = buf; struct smb2_hdr *shdr = &pdu->hdr; @@ -431,6 +439,11 @@ __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data) /* Structure Size has already been checked to make sure it is 64 */ int len = le16_to_cpu(shdr->StructureSize); + if (have_data) + *have_data = false; + if (data_area_overlap) + *data_area_overlap = false; + /* * StructureSize2, ie length of fixed parameter area has already * been checked to make sure it is the correct length. @@ -453,7 +466,10 @@ __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data) if (offset + 1 < len) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "data area offset %d overlaps SMB2 header %d\n", offset + 1, len); + if (data_area_overlap) + *data_area_overlap = true; data_length = 0; + goto calc_size_exit; } else { len = offset + data_length; } @@ -468,7 +484,7 @@ __smb2_calc_size(void *buf, bool *have_data) unsigned int smb2_calc_size(void *buf) { - return __smb2_calc_size(buf, NULL); + return __smb2_calc_size(buf, NULL, NULL); } /* Note: caller must free return buffer */ From dca861f2cc9e6fe991dd23567601d112ca2ccc4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Albershteyn Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 17:24:07 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 593/607] xfs: fix null pointer dereference in tracepoint commit 9202ee546b0cd71004eed7598546efe4660097da upstream. If dfp is not NULL we exit early here, when dfp is NULL it's allocated in xfs_defer_alloc() but not assigned. The tracepoint tries to dereference members of dfp struct. Signed-off-by: Andrey Albershteyn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8 Fixes: 3f3cec031099c3 ("xfs: force small EFIs for reaping btree extents") Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c index e8db2f6149e07..43f352d89172f 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_defer.c @@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ xfs_defer_add_barrier( if (dfp) return; - xfs_defer_alloc(&tp->t_dfops, &xfs_barrier_defer_type); + dfp = xfs_defer_alloc(&tp->t_dfops, &xfs_barrier_defer_type); trace_xfs_defer_add_item(tp->t_mountp, dfp, NULL); } From d98f22d2e11e0a36493aeb25b2933571ee90d9a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Weiming Shi Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 09:20:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 594/607] xfs: fail recovery on a committed log item with no regions commit 2094dab19d45c487285617b7b68913d0cc0c1211 upstream. If the first op of a transaction is a bare transaction header (len == sizeof(struct xfs_trans_header)), xlog_recover_add_to_trans() adds an item but no region, leaving it on r_itemq with ri_cnt == 0 and ri_buf == NULL. The header can be split across op records, so later ops may still add regions; the item is only invalid if the transaction commits with none. The runtime commit path never emits such a transaction, so this only happens on a crafted log. It came from an AI-assisted code audit of the recovery parser. xlog_recover_reorder_trans() calls ITEM_TYPE() on the item, which reads *(unsigned short *)item->ri_buf[0].iov_base and faults on the NULL ri_buf. Reject it there, before the commit handlers that also read ri_buf[0]. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: 0010:xlog_recover_reorder_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:1836) xlog_recover_commit_trans (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2043) xlog_recover_process_data (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:2501) xlog_do_recovery_pass (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3244) xlog_recover (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3493) xfs_log_mount (fs/xfs/xfs_log.c:618) xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1034) xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1938) vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1695) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161) __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367) Fixes: 89cebc847729 ("xfs: validate transaction header length on log recovery") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.3 Reported-by: Xiang Mei Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c index cc5ffa8e4bc2a..33cf2a31780c4 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c @@ -1907,6 +1907,15 @@ xlog_recover_reorder_trans( list_for_each_entry_safe(item, n, &sort_list, ri_list) { enum xlog_recover_reorder fate = XLOG_REORDER_ITEM_LIST; + /* a committed item with no regions has a NULL ri_buf[0] */ + if (!item->ri_cnt || !item->ri_buf) { + xfs_warn(log->l_mp, + "%s: committed log item has no regions", + __func__); + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + break; + } + item->ri_ops = xlog_find_item_ops(item); if (!item->ri_ops) { xfs_warn(log->l_mp, From 206c09b04dc5469c7ff14d8aceff2d47c88078d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:03:44 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 595/607] xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK commit 2f4acd0fcd862e22eab45690ec2c08c80b6ef2e7 upstream. xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode, a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the wrong physical blocks and returns an inaccurate value in *shared. If *shared is now false, the directio write proceeds with a stale data fork mapping. Fix this by querying the data fork mapping if the sequence counter changes across the ILOCK cycle. Cc: hch@lst.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.11 Fixes: 3c68d44a2b49a0 ("xfs: allocate direct I/O COW blocks in iomap_begin") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c index 3f177b4ec131d..d6cd7c1f00ff8 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ xfs_reflink_fill_cow_hole( struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount; struct xfs_trans *tp; xfs_filblks_t resaligned; + unsigned int seq_before = READ_ONCE(ip->i_df.if_seq); unsigned int dblocks = 0, rblocks = 0; int nimaps; int error; @@ -465,6 +466,22 @@ xfs_reflink_fill_cow_hole( *lockmode = XFS_ILOCK_EXCL; + /* + * The data fork mapping may have changed while we dropped the ILOCK + * (a racing O_DIRECT writer under IOLOCK_SHARED can complete a full + * CoW cycle including xfs_reflink_end_cow(), which remaps this offset + * and drops the refcount of the old shared block). Re-read it so the + * shared-status recheck below and the caller's in-place iomap both + * operate on the current mapping rather than a stale physical block. + */ + if (seq_before != READ_ONCE(ip->i_df.if_seq)) { + nimaps = 1; + error = xfs_bmapi_read(ip, imap->br_startoff, + imap->br_blockcount, imap, &nimaps, 0); + if (error) + goto out_trans_cancel; + } + error = xfs_find_trim_cow_extent(ip, imap, cmap, shared, &found); if (error || !*shared) goto out_trans_cancel; @@ -511,6 +528,8 @@ xfs_reflink_fill_delalloc( bool found; do { + unsigned int seq_before = READ_ONCE(ip->i_df.if_seq); + xfs_iunlock(ip, *lockmode); *lockmode = 0; @@ -521,6 +540,23 @@ xfs_reflink_fill_delalloc( *lockmode = XFS_ILOCK_EXCL; + /* + * The data fork mapping may have changed while we dropped the + * ILOCK (a racing O_DIRECT writer under IOLOCK_SHARED can + * complete a full CoW cycle including xfs_reflink_end_cow(), + * which remaps this offset and drops the refcount of the old + * shared block). Re-read it so the shared-status recheck + * below and the caller's in-place iomap both operate on the + * current mapping rather than a stale physical block. + */ + if (seq_before != READ_ONCE(ip->i_df.if_seq)) { + nimaps = 1; + error = xfs_bmapi_read(ip, imap->br_startoff, + imap->br_blockcount, imap, &nimaps, 0); + if (error) + goto out_trans_cancel; + } + error = xfs_find_trim_cow_extent(ip, imap, cmap, shared, &found); if (error || !*shared) From d1c4c40599c376aeb0c93068a2ae344e79ee4b90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:04:55 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 596/607] xfs: don't wrap around quota ids in dqiterate commit d766e4e5e85d829629c3ba503802fe1303d7b591 upstream. LOLLM noticed that q_id is an unsigned 32-bit variable. If it happens to be set to XFS_DQ_ID_MAX due to a filesystem that actually has a dquot for ID_MAX, then this addition will truncate to zero and the iteration starts over. Fix this by casting to u64. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8 Fixes: 21d7500929c8a0 ("xfs: improve dquot iteration for scrub") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/dqiterate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/dqiterate.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/dqiterate.c index 20c4daedd48df..998b0d640d613 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/dqiterate.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/dqiterate.c @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ xchk_dquot_iter( if (error) return error; - cursor->id = dq->q_id + 1; + cursor->id = (uint64_t)dq->q_id + 1; *dqpp = dq; return 1; } From 104584477883b0fdb220f2c2892907394453da43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:05:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 597/607] xfs: grab rtrmap btree when checking rgsuper commit ea6e2d9de25d2095845e0cdf2274e581fd40d636 upstream. LOLLM noticed that we aren't grabbing the rtrmap btree when we check the realtime group superblock. As a result, none of the cross-referencing checks have ever run. Fix this. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14 Fixes: 428e4884656db9 ("xfs: allow queued realtime intents to drain before scrubbing") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c index d189732d0e24f..fa72b9d44d4dc 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ int xchk_setup_rgsuperblock( struct xfs_scrub *sc) { + if (xchk_need_intent_drain(sc)) + xchk_fsgates_enable(sc, XCHK_FSGATES_DRAIN); return xchk_trans_alloc(sc, 0); } @@ -43,6 +45,7 @@ xchk_rgsuperblock( struct xfs_scrub *sc) { xfs_rgnumber_t rgno = sc->sm->sm_agno; + unsigned int flags; int error; /* @@ -63,7 +66,12 @@ xchk_rgsuperblock( if (!xchk_xref_process_error(sc, 0, 0, &error)) return error; - error = xchk_rtgroup_lock(sc, &sc->sr, XFS_RTGLOCK_BITMAP_SHARED); + if (xfs_has_rtrmapbt(sc->mp)) + flags = XFS_RTGLOCK_BITMAP | XFS_RTGLOCK_RMAP; + else + flags = XFS_RTGLOCK_BITMAP_SHARED; + + error = xchk_rtgroup_lock(sc, &sc->sr, flags); if (error) return error; From 08b191ae64659cc3c4006352827b78f0d48d1e33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:05:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 598/607] xfs: use the rt version of the cow staging checker commit 881f2eb0fcdea2f46a50fa6a892fe9e3ccf19e01 upstream. LOLLM also noticed that xchk_rtrmapbt_xref ought to be using the rtdev version of the "is this a cow extent?" helper function, not the datadev one. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14 Fixes: 91683bb3f264c0 ("xfs: cross-reference checks with the rt refcount btree") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c index 12989fe80e8bd..a84347828fccb 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ xchk_rtrmapbt_xref( xfs_rgbno_to_rtb(sc->sr.rtg, irec->rm_startblock), irec->rm_blockcount); if (irec->rm_owner == XFS_RMAP_OWN_COW) - xchk_xref_is_cow_staging(sc, irec->rm_startblock, + xchk_xref_is_rt_cow_staging(sc, irec->rm_startblock, irec->rm_blockcount); else xchk_rtrmapbt_xref_rtrefc(sc, irec); From d399b026a6b34228bf6d8258acbf7bb6b8e17c56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:06:12 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 599/607] xfs: set xfarray killable sort correctly commit 540ddc626245f12f56326ee0c1601f71ebb41d64 upstream. LOLLM noticed that we *disable* interruptible sorts when the KILLABLE flag is set. This is backwards. Fix the incorrect logic, and rename the variable to make the connection more obvious. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10 Fixes: 271557de7cbfde ("xfs: reduce the rate of cond_resched calls inside scrub") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/scrub.h | 6 +++--- fs/xfs/scrub/xfarray.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/scrub.h b/fs/xfs/scrub/scrub.h index a3f1abc913903..6d7d3523b71f2 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/scrub.h +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/scrub.h @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ struct xfs_scrub; struct xchk_relax { unsigned long next_resched; unsigned int resched_nr; - bool interruptible; + bool killable; }; /* Yield to the scheduler at most 10x per second. */ @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct xchk_relax { (struct xchk_relax){ \ .next_resched = XCHK_RELAX_NEXT, \ .resched_nr = 0, \ - .interruptible = true, \ + .killable = true, \ } /* @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ static inline int xchk_maybe_relax(struct xchk_relax *widget) widget->next_resched = XCHK_RELAX_NEXT; } - if (widget->interruptible && fatal_signal_pending(current)) + if (widget->killable && fatal_signal_pending(current)) return -EINTR; return 0; diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/xfarray.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/xfarray.c index cdd13ed9c569a..a3ad0b3235761 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/xfarray.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/xfarray.c @@ -487,8 +487,7 @@ xfarray_sortinfo_alloc( xfarray_sortinfo_lo(si)[0] = 0; xfarray_sortinfo_hi(si)[0] = array->nr - 1; si->relax = INIT_XCHK_RELAX; - if (flags & XFARRAY_SORT_KILLABLE) - si->relax.interruptible = false; + si->relax.killable = !!(flags & XFARRAY_SORT_KILLABLE); trace_xfarray_sort(si, nr_bytes); *infop = si; From 424be21ed8cd4251f015f01fde8e4ec1bfc2e445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:06:43 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 600/607] xfs: handle non-inode owners for rtrmap record checking commit 353a5900bc85234e7df05caac37698042dc26348 upstream. LOLLM noticed that two helper functions in the rtrmapbt scrub code don't actually handle non-inode owners correctly -- CoW staging extents and rgsuperblock extents are not shareable, but they are mergeable. Fix these two helpers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14 Fixes: 2d9a3e98053e8c ("xfs: allow overlapping rtrmapbt records for shared data extents") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c index a84347828fccb..e75fa9c095e0b 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrmap.c @@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ xchk_rtrmapbt_is_shareable( return false; if (irec->rm_flags & XFS_RMAP_UNWRITTEN) return false; + if (irec->rm_owner == XFS_RMAP_OWN_COW || + irec->rm_owner == XFS_RMAP_OWN_FS) + return false; return true; } @@ -146,6 +149,9 @@ xchk_rtrmap_mergeable( return false; if (r1->rm_flags != r2->rm_flags) return false; + if (r1->rm_owner == XFS_RMAP_OWN_COW || + r1->rm_owner == XFS_RMAP_OWN_FS) + return true; return r1->rm_offset + r1->rm_blockcount == r2->rm_offset; } From c9662ffd62c4e1b701a4076e9181732e3c09da37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:07:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 601/607] xfs: clamp timestamp nanoseconds correctly commit 15e38a9366b31d3d61081ead115f1dff59379e24 upstream. LOLLM noticed an off-by-one error in the nsec clamping; fix that so that we never have tv_nsec == 1e9. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8 Fixes: 2d295fe65776d1 ("xfs: repair inode records") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c index a90a011c7e5f8..5043fc52c19b7 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c @@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ xrep_clamp_timestamp( struct xfs_inode *ip, struct timespec64 *ts) { - ts->tv_nsec = clamp_t(long, ts->tv_nsec, 0, NSEC_PER_SEC); + ts->tv_nsec = clamp_t(long, ts->tv_nsec, 0, NSEC_PER_SEC - 1); *ts = timestamp_truncate(*ts, VFS_I(ip)); } From 1ea0868a477b78d1b6a7ca043231ae6c0c5ea5cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:06:59 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 602/607] xfs: fully check the parent handle when it points to the rootdir commit ba150ce63453ccd74bae1404c1dfedbd01ecfd55 upstream. LOLLM noticed that the directory tree path checking declares the path to be ok if the inumber in the parent pointer reaches the root directory. Unfortunately, it neglects to check that the generation is correct. Fix that by moving the generation check up. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10 Fixes: 928b721a11789a ("xfs: teach online scrub to find directory tree structure problems") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c index 3e0bbe75c44cf..7301e9cbdab91 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/dirtree.c @@ -383,6 +383,14 @@ xchk_dirpath_step_up( goto out_scanlock; } + /* The handle encoded in the parent pointer must match. */ + if (VFS_I(dp)->i_generation != be32_to_cpu(dl->pptr_rec.p_gen)) { + trace_xchk_dirpath_badgen(dl->sc, dp, path->path_nr, + path->nr_steps, &dl->xname, &dl->pptr_rec); + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto out_scanlock; + } + /* We've reached the root directory; the path is ok. */ if (parent_ino == dl->root_ino) { xchk_dirpath_set_outcome(dl, path, XCHK_DIRPATH_OK); @@ -411,14 +419,6 @@ xchk_dirpath_step_up( goto out_scanlock; } - /* The handle encoded in the parent pointer must match. */ - if (VFS_I(dp)->i_generation != be32_to_cpu(dl->pptr_rec.p_gen)) { - trace_xchk_dirpath_badgen(dl->sc, dp, path->path_nr, - path->nr_steps, &dl->xname, &dl->pptr_rec); - error = -EFSCORRUPTED; - goto out_scanlock; - } - /* Parent pointer must point up to a directory. */ if (!S_ISDIR(VFS_I(dp)->i_mode)) { trace_xchk_dirpath_nondir_parent(dl->sc, dp, path->path_nr, From 6403ef9a81e6c27e9e77c1a4d8df29331c41089c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:07:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 603/607] xfs: don't zap bmbt forks if they are MAXLEVELS tall commit 59c462b0f5cfa107794228051724b34ae9334168 upstream. LOLLM noticed a discrepancy between the bmbt level checks in the libxfs bmbt code vs. the inode repair code. We do actually allow a bmbt root that proclaims to have a height of XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8 Fixes: e744cef2060559 ("xfs: zap broken inode forks") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c index 5043fc52c19b7..5c45a68793d03 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/inode_repair.c @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ xrep_dinode_bad_bmbt_fork( if (nrecs == 0 || xfs_bmdr_space_calc(nrecs) > dfork_size) return true; - if (level == 0 || level >= XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS(sc->mp, whichfork)) + if (level == 0 || level > XFS_BM_MAXLEVELS(sc->mp, whichfork)) return true; dmxr = xfs_bmdr_maxrecs(dfork_size, 0); From e696ef088f557d1c82b564f0d3a61bf568025412 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:06:28 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 604/607] xfs: fix off-by-one error when calling xchk_xref_has_rt_owner commit 5d72a68f2007ba2a968d6bf47dba3f4620bd182e upstream. LOLLM noticed an off-by-one error when computing the length of the rtrmap to cross-check. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14 Fixes: 037a44d8277adf ("xfs: cross-reference the realtime rmapbt") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/rtbitmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtbitmap.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtbitmap.c index d5ff8609dbfb4..8efde8c26e619 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtbitmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtbitmap.c @@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ xchk_rtbitmap( * the last free extent we saw and the last possible extent in the rt * group. */ - last_rgbno = rtg->rtg_extents * mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize - 1; + last_rgbno = rtg->rtg_extents * mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize; if (rtb->next_free_rgbno < last_rgbno) xchk_xref_has_rt_owner(sc, rtb->next_free_rgbno, last_rgbno - rtb->next_free_rgbno); From 457a93a233bd78ade8531d65b5a13d9727af9c85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:05:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 605/607] xfs: write the rg superblock when fixing it commit 9af789fa274bc14b907f811f79fa988a6fc6d4e7 upstream. The rtgroup superblock fixer should write the rtgroup superblock. LOLLM noticed this, oops. :/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.13 Fixes: 1433f8f9cead37 ("xfs: repair realtime group superblock") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c index fa72b9d44d4dc..7b962890a8941 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/rgsuper.c @@ -88,9 +88,13 @@ int xrep_rgsuperblock( struct xfs_scrub *sc) { + struct xfs_buf *sb_bp; + ASSERT(rtg_rgno(sc->sr.rtg) == 0); + sb_bp = xfs_trans_getsb(sc->tp); xfs_log_sb(sc->tp); + xfs_log_rtsb(sc->tp, sb_bp); return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_XFS_ONLINE_REPAIR */ From 06b1729436efc1d2b3866b50825bece3d18355f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 23:05:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 606/607] xfs: use rtrefcount btree cursor in xchk_xref_is_rt_cow_staging commit ee248157da501f0c02688fb64e5359f2832b0b01 upstream. LOLLM points out that we pass the wrong btree cursor here. We want the rtrefcount btree cursor, not the non-rt one. This is fairly benign since it only affects tracing data. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14 Fixes: 91683bb3f264c0 ("xfs: cross-reference checks with the rt refcount btree") Signed-off-by: "Darrick J. Wong" Assisted-by: LOLLM # finding obvious bugs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/xfs/scrub/rtrefcount.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrefcount.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrefcount.c index 4c5dffc73641b..24eb2a664aab8 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrefcount.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/rtrefcount.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ xchk_xref_is_rt_cow_staging( /* CoW lookup returned a shared extent record? */ if (rc.rc_domain != XFS_REFC_DOMAIN_COW) - xchk_btree_xref_set_corrupt(sc, sc->sa.refc_cur, 0); + xchk_btree_xref_set_corrupt(sc, sc->sr.refc_cur, 0); /* Must be at least as long as what was passed in */ if (rc.rc_blockcount < len) From f89c296854b755a66657065c35b05406fc18264d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2026 16:53:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 607/607] Linux 6.18.39 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260716133044.672218725@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Peter Schneider Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda Tested-by: Ron Economos Tested-by: Wentao Guan Tested-by: Shuah Khan Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260717101904.922623678@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield Tested-by: Florian Fainelli Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) Tested-by: Peter Schneider Tested-by: Mark Brown Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 9c602286d8e19..f4eef2d694db7 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 6 PATCHLEVEL = 18 -SUBLEVEL = 38 +SUBLEVEL = 39 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = Baby Opossum Posse