Outcome
An operator can restore or replace a single-node Registry Stack instance from approved backup history without weakening anti-rollback protection, reusing an old instance identity incorrectly, or requiring an ad hoc signing ceremony during an outage.
This complements #203 and does not expand the 1.0 adopter-runtime PR. High-availability and multi-replica recovery remain in #507.
Design checkpoint
Define the smallest authenticated proof that lets a fresh instance establish:
- the intended product lane and replacement instance identity;
- the accepted trust anchor and authenticated anchor history;
- the latest approved bundle sequence and hash;
- the matching database, audit, and correctness-state snapshot;
- the operator authorization for replacement rather than rollback or cloning.
Security invariants
- A stale, partial, cross-lane, or cross-instance backup cannot become current.
- Replacement cannot use AcceptUnsigned, AcceptRollback, or another silent break-glass path.
- Trust anchors are pinned independently of the closure they authorize.
- Audit evidence records the old identity, new identity, approved history, and recovery decision without secret values.
- Product-owned exact verification completes before traffic admission.
Definition of Done
Non-goals
- Automatic disaster-recovery orchestration.
- Multi-replica fencing or failover.
- Bypassing normal signed approval and anchor-rotation procedures.
Outcome
An operator can restore or replace a single-node Registry Stack instance from approved backup history without weakening anti-rollback protection, reusing an old instance identity incorrectly, or requiring an ad hoc signing ceremony during an outage.
This complements #203 and does not expand the 1.0 adopter-runtime PR. High-availability and multi-replica recovery remain in #507.
Design checkpoint
Define the smallest authenticated proof that lets a fresh instance establish:
Security invariants
Definition of Done
Non-goals