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Malware-analysis fork of VirtualBox, hardened against the standard VM-detection suite (SMBIOS/ACPI/PCI/USB/NVMe/BIOS tells + hypervisor CPUID bit). Defensive, open-source, GPLv2. Not "undetectable" — timing side channels remain.

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NotVirtualBox

A VirtualBox fork for malware analysis, with source changes to guest-visible device and firmware identities.

Status: experimental. The fingerprint changes require a full build and clean-guest validation. They do not establish malware containment or make a VM undetectable. See HARDENING.md for implementation details and remaining limitations.

Prepare an analysis VM

Start with ANALYSIS-SAFETY.md. Use a dedicated lab host, verify a clean recovery snapshot, and review network and host integration settings before introducing samples. Changing device identities does not isolate a guest.

The operator helper requires a fully powered-off VM. It checks every command, preserves existing DMI settings, and fills missing identities on the first run. Rerunning it does not rotate the guest identity. Preview the plan first:

./harden-vm.ps1 -VM "Win10-Analysis" -WhatIf
./harden-vm.ps1 -VM "Win10-Analysis"
./Test-AnalysisVM.ps1 -VM "Win10-Analysis"

Use -VBoxManagePath on either script to select the executable from your fork's build. The audit is read-only; it checks an offline configuration baseline and does not start the VM or change its settings. -Json produces an automation report:

./Test-AnalysisVM.ps1 -VM "Win10-Analysis" -Json
# Exit 0: baseline passed; 2: configuration findings; 1: inspection failed.

Source changes

The fork modifies SMBIOS/DMI, ACPI identifiers, storage identities, the default network MAC prefix, selected PCI/USB identities, firmware strings, and the default paravirtualization provider. These changes have compatibility implications, including guest driver selection and firmware rebuild requirements.

The source service tag derives from a configured DmiSystemUuid; absent that setting it uses a shared fallback. The operator helper supplies a per-VM identity and preserves it on later runs. Detector output and guest behavior, rather than source inspection alone, must establish which changes work in a particular build.

Build

This is the VirtualBox source tree, with host-specific compiler, SDK, firmware, and signing requirements. Read the upstream build instructions before configuring your host. configure.py is the external-developer entry point.

git clone --recurse-submodules https://github.com/ArjunShuklaCSE/NotVirtualBox.git
cd NotVirtualBox
# For an existing checkout:
git submodule update --init --recursive
python3 configure.py --with-kbuild-path="$PWD/kBuild/kBuild"
# On Linux/macOS, after successful configuration:
. ./env.sh
kmk

On Windows, use a short checkout path and enable Git's core.longpaths when necessary. Use configure.ps1 and the generated env.bat with the required Windows toolchain. LocalConfig.kmk holds local build overrides.

Building without the required legacy BIOS compiler uses checked-in alternative ROMs; it does not regenerate all firmware from the modified C sources. EFI and BIOS changes need their respective toolchains and separate boot verification. Do not hand-edit generated ROM images.

Tests and CI

Fast regression tests do not require VirtualBox or malware samples:

pwsh -NoProfile -File tests/harden-vm.Tests.ps1
pwsh -NoProfile -File tests/Test-AnalysisVM.Tests.ps1
cc -std=c99 -Wall -Wextra -Werror -pedantic tst-nvb-dmi-strings.c -o /tmp/tst-nvb-dmi-strings
/tmp/tst-nvb-dmi-strings

Pull-request CI checks the operator scripts on Windows PowerShell 5.1 and PowerShell 7 on Windows/Linux, the bounded DMI string helper, and Linux configure self-tests. These are targeted checks; a full host build and guest boot remain necessary. See CONTRIBUTING.md for validation expectations.

The build workflow produces a Linux amd64 headless binary archive with host process hardening enabled. It includes checksums and build metadata. Manual runs upload artifacts; v* tags create a draft release for validation before publication. The archive is not an installer. It excludes the Qt GUI and Guest Additions and does not rebuild the legacy BIOS source patches. Host kernel-module setup, installation, guest operation, and containment are not validated by that workflow. Windows/macOS packages require separate toolchains and signing setup.

Upstream and licensing

Keep changes small enough to review and rebase onto upstream security updates. The base package uses GPL version 3, with component-specific licenses and exceptions described in COPYING, LICENSE.txt, and THIRD_PARTY_LICENSES.txt. Earlier fork documentation incorrectly described this tree as GPLv2; the existing license files are unchanged. The proprietary Oracle Extension Pack is not part of this fork.

Use this project for authorized analysis. Report vulnerabilities through SECURITY.md, without publishing sensitive details in public issues.

About

Malware-analysis fork of VirtualBox, hardened against the standard VM-detection suite (SMBIOS/ACPI/PCI/USB/NVMe/BIOS tells + hypervisor CPUID bit). Defensive, open-source, GPLv2. Not "undetectable" — timing side channels remain.

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