| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main and latest v* tag |
Yes |
| Older tags | No |
Please do not open a public issue for security problems. Use one of these channels:
- GitHub private vulnerability reporting (preferred). Open the repository
on GitHub, go to
Security>Advisories>Report a vulnerability. This opens a private thread with the maintainers. - GitHub Security Advisory for the affected repository if private reporting is disabled.
Please include:
- A description of the issue and the impact you expect.
- Steps to reproduce, ideally with a minimal request or command.
- The affected version, tag, or commit SHA.
- Any suggested mitigation.
You can expect an acknowledgement within a few business days. We will keep you updated as we investigate and will credit you in the advisory unless you prefer otherwise.
In scope:
- Authentication, authorization, and secret handling in the API and deployment workflows.
- Path traversal, arbitrary file read, and unsafe upload handling.
- Remote code execution or insecure deserialization in the ingestion path.
- Deployment workflows that could leak or misuse credentials.
Out of scope:
- Findings that require an already-compromised host or administrator account.
- Denial of service through deliberate resource exhaustion.
- Missing hardening headers on a demo-only local deployment.
- No secrets are committed.
.env,.env.*,*.pem, and*.keyare ignored and only.env.exampleis tracked. - The API binds to
127.0.0.1in the production compose file. Expose it through an authenticated TLS reverse proxy rather than a public port. - Uploads are size-capped and validated; filenames are sanitized and the page image route rejects unindexed or traversing paths.
- Error responses return generic messages plus a request ID. Tracebacks and backend exception text are not returned to clients.
- CORS is allowlisted through
CORS_ORIGINS. - CI runs untrusted code with least-privilege permissions and only the automatic
GITHUB_TOKEN. - Deployment uses a one-shot SSH key file,
0600permissions, strict host-key checking, and a temporary Docker config for registry login.
- Keep the API on loopback and front it with an authenticating reverse proxy.
- Set strong, unique
MINIO_ROOT_USERandMINIO_ROOT_PASSWORDvalues. - Store
HF_TOKENonly in the protected host env file referenced byDEPLOY_ENV_FILE. - Restrict the SSH key used by
GPU_SSH_KEYto a dedicated deploy account with no interactive shell beyonddocker. - Rotate any credential that has ever appeared in a log, a shell history, or a public commit.
- Keep the Milvus and MinIO ports unpublished outside the compose network.