Use Report a vulnerability (private) on the repo Security tab. Never open a public Issue with secrets, keys, or exploit steps.
| Version | Gets fixes |
|---|---|
latest main |
✅ |
| old tags | ❌ (upgrade) |
- CodeQL (deep flaw scan, incl. SQL inject shapes) on Python code + GitHub workflow files
- Gitleaks (key-leak scan over full history)
- pip-audit 2.10.1 (bad-library block on
requirements.txt+requirements-dev.txt) - Dependabot (auto update bot: weekly pip, monthly Actions, monthly pre-commit hooks)
- Push protection: enable at Settings → Code security → Secret scanning.
- SiS (Streamlit in Snowflake): viewer =
st.user.user_name. Only users in theAPP_OFFICERStable can approve; this is checked on the server at approve time, and blocked tries are written toAUDIT_LOGSasAPPROVE_DENIED. Non-officers never get RESTRICTED-tier rows, and a customer-name column is masked for them. - Local mode: single-user demo (app password + role dropdown + one Snowflake login). The gate is that login's COMPLIANCE_OFFICER role.
ALLOW_LOCAL_APPROVEis demo-only and must stay FALSE. - Not live-tested on Snowflake yet (unit tests with a fake database only). See
context.mdsection 6.