TTP is security-sensitive protocol work. The current repository contains a draft specification, examples, and a reference implementation scaffold. It is not recommended for production enforcement.
| Version / Branch | Security Support |
|---|---|
main |
Best-effort security review during active development |
@blocksifrdev/ttp-protocol@0.1.x |
Best-effort security review for pre-release protocol primitives |
@blocksifrdev/ttp-sdk@0.1.x |
Best-effort security review for pre-release SDK interfaces |
@blocksifrdev/ttp-trust-authority@0.1.x |
Best-effort security review for reference implementation pilots |
| Examples and demos | Documentation and test fixture support only |
Please do not open public GitHub issues for vulnerabilities.
Report privately to: maurice@blocksifr.com
Include:
- Affected component or path.
- Reproduction steps or proof of concept.
- Expected and actual behavior.
- Security impact and exploit conditions.
- Suggested mitigation, if available.
We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours and coordinate remediation before public disclosure.
Contributors should assume adversarial inputs and hostile runtime environments. Changes that affect parsing, trust scoring, expiration, issuer handling, proof modes, delegation, receipt handling, or runtime integration require extra review.
Security-sensitive changes should include tests for failure paths, malformed input, expired trust, insufficient thresholds, and unsafe defaults.
The MVP uses cleartext-dev proof evaluation. This mode is intended for local development, examples, and protocol review only.
Do not treat the current implementation as a cryptographic verifier. Signed claims, issuer registries, replay protection, key rotation, secure time, and advanced proof backends are future hardening work.
ZKP support is an advanced verification backend and is not required for the MVP.
TTP currently provides draft protocol semantics and a reference implementation in active development. It does not provide production-grade enforcement by itself.
Runtime enforcement must be implemented by RAP, Execution Exchange, FrontDesk-integrated gateways, API gateways, CI gates, or equivalent systems that fail closed when trust cannot be evaluated.
- Reporter submits a private report.
- Maintainers acknowledge receipt.
- Maintainers reproduce and classify impact.
- A fix or mitigation is prepared privately.
- Reporter validates where practical.
- Public disclosure is coordinated after remediation.
- Production ZKP verification.
- Distributed trust federation.
- Blockchain anchoring.
- Enterprise-grade issuer registry operation.
- Hosted governance control plane behavior.
- Full FrontDesk, VerifiedTrust, RAP, or Execution Exchange enforcement logic.
- Vulnerabilities in downstream deployments that modify or bypass the reference evaluator.