Security updates apply to the latest stable release branch and master:
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
1.0.x |
Yes |
< 1.0 |
No |
Please do not report security vulnerabilities in public GitHub issues.
Use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting to submit a report privately. Include a minimal reproduction command, input file (if applicable), and backtrace from an AddressSanitizer build (-Db_sanitize=address,undefined).
You can expect an initial response within 72 hours.
wwald parses untrusted image, video, shader, and configuration files while running inside the user's graphical session. The daemon enforces several OS-level mitigations after startup:
- Seccomp-BPF Syscall Allowlist (
src/daemon/security.c): Restrictswwaldto the specific set of Linux syscalls required for Wayland sockets,io_uring, DRM/GBM/VA-APIioctlcalls,memfd/shm, and filesystem reads. - Landlock LSM (
ABI v1..v3): Limits filesystem write access to$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR,$XDG_CACHE_HOME/wwal,$XDG_STATE_HOME/wwal, and$XDG_STATE_HOME/caelestia. - Process Hardening: Sets
PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVSandPR_SET_DUMPABLE(0), and enforcesRLIMIT_CORE = 0. - Zero-Allocation Demuxers & Bounds-Checked Parsers:
demuxer.c(MP4/ISOBMFF and WebM/EBML),video_vaapi.c(H.264/HEVC/VP9/AV1 bitstream parsers),anim_engine.c(GIF/APNG/WebP),toml_parser.c, andipc_proto.care continuously tested with standalone fuzz targets (tests/fuzz/).
Reports covering memory corruption in media parsers, integer overflows in image allocation paths, UNIX socket IPC validation bypasses, or Seccomp/Landlock escapes are highest priority.