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Security: Execorn/wwal

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Security updates apply to the latest stable release branch and master:

Version Supported
1.0.x Yes
< 1.0 No

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please do not report security vulnerabilities in public GitHub issues.

Use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting to submit a report privately. Include a minimal reproduction command, input file (if applicable), and backtrace from an AddressSanitizer build (-Db_sanitize=address,undefined).

You can expect an initial response within 72 hours.

Security Architecture & Scope

wwald parses untrusted image, video, shader, and configuration files while running inside the user's graphical session. The daemon enforces several OS-level mitigations after startup:

  1. Seccomp-BPF Syscall Allowlist (src/daemon/security.c): Restricts wwald to the specific set of Linux syscalls required for Wayland sockets, io_uring, DRM/GBM/VA-API ioctl calls, memfd/shm, and filesystem reads.
  2. Landlock LSM (ABI v1..v3): Limits filesystem write access to $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, $XDG_CACHE_HOME/wwal, $XDG_STATE_HOME/wwal, and $XDG_STATE_HOME/caelestia.
  3. Process Hardening: Sets PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS and PR_SET_DUMPABLE(0), and enforces RLIMIT_CORE = 0.
  4. Zero-Allocation Demuxers & Bounds-Checked Parsers: demuxer.c (MP4/ISOBMFF and WebM/EBML), video_vaapi.c (H.264/HEVC/VP9/AV1 bitstream parsers), anim_engine.c (GIF/APNG/WebP), toml_parser.c, and ipc_proto.c are continuously tested with standalone fuzz targets (tests/fuzz/).

Reports covering memory corruption in media parsers, integer overflows in image allocation paths, UNIX socket IPC validation bypasses, or Seccomp/Landlock escapes are highest priority.

There aren't any published security advisories