Please report privately, not through a public issue: jasur.rakhmatov03@gmail.com. Include the version, a description and — if you have one — a reproducing snippet. You will get an acknowledgement within a few days.

The package's job is connections and their state. That shapes what it can and cannot promise.

Credentials do not leak into diagnostics. getDsn() is built from host, port and database only; neither the password nor the ACL user appears in it, and that is the string the pool logs. Nothing else in the package writes credentials anywhere.

A connection carries no state between borrowers. The database is fixed by the config and never switched at runtime, so a connection cannot arrive at the next request pointing somewhere else. Driver errors are cleared on both sides of the calls that read them, so one request's failure is not visible to the next.

Concurrent requests never share a socket. Under Swoole each coroutine borrows its own connection and returns it; two requests cannot read each other's replies.

The key prefix is isolation, not a boundary. Two stores on one database do not collide, but nothing stops either of them from reaching the other's keys through raw(). If two parts of a system must not see each other's data, separate them with an ACL user or a server — not with a prefix.

SERIALIZER_PHP deserializes whatever is in the value. With that serializer the value on the wire is PHP's own format (a:1:{s:1:"a";i:1;}), and reading it calls unserialize(). Anyone able to write those keys can therefore hand your process arbitrary objects to instantiate — the classic object-injection route to code execution. Use it only where every writer is your own code; prefer SERIALIZER_JSON when that is not certain, and never point it at a Redis shared with something you do not control.

Dedicated connections are outside the pool's ceiling. RedisPool::dedicated() and the blocking APIs built on it (consume(), follow()) open connections the pool neither counts nor bounds. A consumer started per request rather than per worker will exhaust the server's maxclients — a self-inflicted denial of service that the pool cannot prevent because it never sees those connections. Take one per loop, close it when the loop ends.

A blocking read with no timeout waits forever. consume() and follow() with timeout: 0 set the connection's read timeout to unlimited, by necessity. A server that accepts the connection and then goes silent will hold that consumer indefinitely. Give long-running consumers a timeout and let the loop decide.

Untrusted input is still untrusted. The package passes values through unchanged. Key names built from user input can collide with your own namespace or with another store's; validate them where they enter, as you would with a filesystem path.

Transport security is the config's business. TLS is available through the host scheme and $context, but a failed handshake arrives from the driver as a PHP warning while the connection may still be considered established. Verify TLS with an explicit ping() when deploying, rather than concluding from the absence of exceptions.

Not a trust boundary, not an authorisation layer, not an audit log. It authenticates as whoever the config says and executes what the caller asks. Access control belongs in Redis ACLs and in the network between the application and the server.