Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: open a security advisory. The form is encrypted in transit, scoped to project maintainers, and keeps the report private until coordinated disclosure. Do not open a public GitHub issue or pull request for an unpatched vulnerability.
The project is maintained by a small team and the security process is best-effort. We aim to confirm receipt within seven calendar days and post an initial severity assessment within fourteen, but a single-maintainer escalation can push either window out — we say so on the advisory thread when it happens. We coordinate disclosure with the reporter; the default embargo is 90 days from the assessment reply, shortened by mutual agreement when a fix is staged sooner.
In scope:
- The kernel (
core/) and the SDK (sdk/). - The bundled link plugins (TCP, UDP, IPC, WS, TLS, ICE, QUIC) — these now
live in their own repos under the GoodNet-io org; paths like
plugins/links/{tcp,udp,...}are historical / in-tree shim layer only. - The bundled security plugins (
plugins/security/{noise,null}). - The bundled handler plugins
(
plugins/handlers/{heartbeat,store,dns}). - The bundled strategy plugin
(
plugins/strategies/float_send_rtt). - The mandatory protocol layer (
plugins/protocols/gnet) and the opt-in passthrough (plugins/protocols/raw).
Out of scope:
- Third-party plugins outside this repository — report to their
maintainers. The GoodNet kernel's plugin manifest (
plugin-manifest.en.md) pins SHA-256 hashes of every loaded.so; an unverified plugin cannot reach the kernel address space, so a third-party plugin's vulnerability is bounded by the operator's manifest. - Operator misconfiguration (e.g. running with an empty manifest in production, exposing IPC sockets without filesystem ACLs, weak passphrases on operator-owned key files).
- Side channels in plugin code that the kernel has no visibility into —
TLS server cert handling beneath Noise (
security-trust.en.md§3 covers the link-layer policy indocs/contracts/security-trust.en.md), application-level message contents.
docs/threat-model.en.md is authoritative. Summary:
- The kernel enforces envelope authentication (Noise XX / IK
handshake binds peer pk to connection), replay window per session,
TrustClass policy (loopback / IntraNode / Untrusted / Peer per
security-trust.en.md), bridge identity binding (attestation.en.md). - The kernel does not enforce denial-of-service resistance against
a peer-privileged attacker (the attacker can flood the link layer;
per-source rate limits live in
host_api->injectand the link plugins' own backpressure paths, not at L1), traffic-pattern obscuring, anonymity at the link layer (a peer pk is the address by design), or guarantees about a plugin author's code.
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| T+0 | Report received via GitHub Security Advisory. |
| T+7d | Confirmation reply, triage owner assigned. |
| T+14d | Initial severity assessment, embargo proposed. |
| T+90d | Public advisory + release note. |
Embargo can be shortened with reporter consent if a fix lands sooner; extension only with reporter consent. The 7d / 14d shape is the small-team best-effort envelope; the maintainer thread surfaces slips on the advisory itself.
We credit reporters in the GitHub Security Advisory and the
corresponding CHANGELOG.md entry unless the reporter requests
otherwise. We do not run a paid bounty programme; we cover
coordinated-disclosure cases responsibly and on the public record.
The kernel and bundled security plugin use libsodium primitives through Noise's IK / XX patterns:
- X25519 for the DH leg.
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 IETF for cipherstate.
- BLAKE2b-512 hash, BLAKE2b-MAC, Noise HKDF.
- Ed25519 for static identity keys (kernel-side
NodeIdentity).
The TLS link plugin (plugins/links/tls) additionally uses the
OpenSSL-provided TLS 1.3 stack for the underlying transport
encryption when an operator runs over an untrusted network without
the application-layer Noise handshake. OpenSSL CVEs are in scope
for the TLS plugin; the rest of the kernel does not depend on
OpenSSL.
Cryptographic agility is intentionally limited: the wire protocol
ships one Noise pattern selection per connection (the operator's
config or link.tls.verify_peer flag does not affect the Noise
side). A vulnerability in any of the above means a kernel security
patch and a Noise-handshake version bump.
We never request credentials, key material, or remote execution through any GoodNet channel; a request claiming to be from the maintainers that asks for any of the above is adversarial — report it through the same security advisory form.