An agent skill that audits Flutter & Dart apps the way an attacker sees them,
plus a zero-dependency scanner for your laptop and your CI.
Quick start Β· How it works Β· What it catches Β· Contribute Β· πΊπΏ O'zbekcha
One prompt. Real findings. Fixes in your own code style.
security audit this flutter app
Real output on the intentionally vulnerable test fixture in tests/fixtures/vuln_app.
Flutter apps leak in the same handful of ways, again and again:
- a Supabase
service_rolekey or a Telegram bot token shipped inside the APK - Firestore rules left in test mode β the whole database readable with
curl - refresh tokens in SharedPreferences, backups switched on
badCertificateCallback => trueleft over from a dev server- a deep link β WebView β JavaScript bridge chain that lets a link run code in your app
isPremium = trueset by the app, never checked by the server
Generic security tools don't know Flutter. Generic AI reviews report everything as "critical". This skill gives your agent a Flutter-specific playbook and forces it to prove each finding before reporting it.
npx skills add https://github.com/MBotirjonDev/flutter-audit-agent --skill flutter-security-audit --globalOr copy skills/flutter-security-audit/ into ~/.claude/skills/ (Claude Code) or your
agent's skills folder.
Then open your Flutter project in the agent and ask:
security audit this flutter app
are my firestore rules safe?
check lib/features/payment for security issues, output to ~/audits/shop
Node 18+ only. No npm install, no Flutter SDK needed.
git clone https://github.com/MBotirjonDev/flutter-audit-agent
node flutter-audit-agent/skills/flutter-security-audit/scripts/scan.cjs path/to/your_appCRITICAL FSA-BE-001 Firebase rules open to everyone
firestore.rules:5
allow read, write: if true;
CRITICAL FSA-NET-001 TLS certificate validation disabled
lib/core/api_client.dart:44
client.badCertificateCallback = (cert, host, port) => true;
HIGH FSA-STO-001 Sensitive value stored in SharedPreferences
lib/auth/session.dart:22
await prefs.setString('access_token', token);
...
Options: --out leads.json, --min-severity medium, --fail-on high,
--include-tests, --quiet.
# .github/workflows/security.yml
name: security
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
flutter-security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: MBotirjonDev/flutter-audit-agent@v0
with:
fail-on: high # info | low | medium | high | critical | noneThe scanner only finds patterns. The skill does the real audit in six phases:
| Phase | What happens | Output |
|---|---|---|
| 0. Setup | find every app/package in the repo, never run untrusted build scripts | β |
| 1. Recon | map assets, trust boundaries, deep links, backends, platform channels | architecture.md |
| 2. Triage | run the scanner, treat hits as questions | leads.json |
| 3. Hunt | area-by-area checklists (checks/*.md), parallel sub-agents if available |
candidates |
| 4. Validate | a fresh verifier tries to disprove each candidate | confirmed / needs_validation / rejected |
| 5. Record | structured findings, checked by validate-findings.cjs |
findings.json |
| 6. Report | developer-ready fixes in the project's own style | REPORT.md |
Principles:
- The client is not a security boundary. Obfuscation is not a fix for a leaked admin key or a missing server check.
- Leads are not findings. A confirmed finding needs a trace from attacker-controlled
input to impact, with
file:linefor every step. - The finder never confirms its own finding.
- No guessed severities. If the backend isn't in the repo, the finding is
needs_validationwith the exact missing fact.
| Area | Guide |
|---|---|
Secrets in the binary (admin keys, bot tokens, payment keys, .env assets) |
checks/SECRETS.md |
| Data at rest (SharedPreferences, Hive, sqflite, logs) | checks/STORAGE.md |
| Network (TLS, cleartext, ATS, pinning) | checks/NETWORK.md |
| Android & iOS platform (manifest, exported components, backups) | checks/PLATFORM.md |
| WebViews & deep links | checks/WEBVIEW-DEEPLINKS.md |
| Backend: Firebase rules, Supabase RLS, REST/IDOR, payments | checks/BACKEND.md |
| Crypto (hardcoded keys, weak hashes, randomness) | checks/CRYPTO.md |
| Build & release (obfuscation, signing, CI, Flutter web) | checks/BUILD.md |
| Rule | What it looks for | Severity hint | MASVS |
|---|---|---|---|
FSA-SEC-001 |
Google / Firebase API key in source | medium | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-SEC-002 |
Supabase service_role key referenced in the client | critical | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-SEC-003 |
Hardcoded secret-looking string | high | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-SEC-004 |
Private key material in the repository | critical | MASVS-CRYPTO-2 |
FSA-SEC-005 |
Live payment provider secret key | critical | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-SEC-006 |
Telegram bot token in source | high | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-SEC-007 |
.env file bundled as a Flutter asset | high | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-STO-001 |
Sensitive value stored in SharedPreferences | high | MASVS-STORAGE-1 |
FSA-STO-002 |
Hive box opened without encryption | low | MASVS-STORAGE-1 |
FSA-LOG-001 |
Sensitive value written to logs | medium | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-NET-001 |
TLS certificate validation disabled | critical | MASVS-NETWORK-1 |
FSA-NET-002 |
Cleartext HTTP endpoint | medium | MASVS-NETWORK-1 |
FSA-NET-003 |
Android allows cleartext traffic | medium | MASVS-NETWORK-1 |
FSA-IOS-001 |
iOS App Transport Security disabled | medium | MASVS-NETWORK-1 |
FSA-AND-001 |
Android app marked debuggable | high | MASVS-RESILIENCE-4 |
FSA-AND-002 |
Android backups enabled | low | MASVS-STORAGE-2 |
FSA-AND-003 |
Exported Android component (review) | info | MASVS-PLATFORM-1 |
FSA-BLD-001 |
Release build without code shrinking | low | MASVS-RESILIENCE-3 |
FSA-WEB-001 |
JavaScript bridge exposed to a WebView | medium | MASVS-PLATFORM-2 |
FSA-WEB-002 |
WebView loads a URL from a variable | medium | MASVS-PLATFORM-2 |
FSA-CRY-001 |
Weak hash (MD5/SHA-1) | medium | MASVS-CRYPTO-1 |
FSA-CRY-002 |
Non-cryptographic Random used | low | MASVS-CRYPTO-1 |
FSA-CRY-003 |
Hardcoded encryption key or IV | high | MASVS-CRYPTO-2 |
FSA-BE-001 |
Firebase rules open to everyone | critical | MASVS-AUTH-1 |
FSA-BE-002 |
Client-side authorization flag | medium | MASVS-AUTH-2 |
Suppress a reviewed line with // fsa-ignore: FSA-CRY-002 quiz shuffle only.
Tested against flutter/samples (1,266 files):
zero high or critical leads, only low/info hardening hints.
Good first contributions (each is a rule + a fixture + a test):
- Supabase migrations: table created without
enable row level security - Firestore rules:
if request.auth != nullwith no ownership check - Dio
LogInterceptor(requestHeader: true)outsidekDebugMode -
flutter_inappwebviewwithallowFileAccessFromFileURLs: true - Android
FileProvidersharingroot-path - iOS custom URL scheme without Universal Links
- Payme / Click / Uzum: payment success trusted from the client
- OAuth
client_secretin a mobile app -
releasebuild type usingsigningConfigs.debug - SARIF output for GitHub code scanning
See CONTRIBUTING.md β adding a rule takes about 15 minutes.
This is triage and a structured method, not a guarantee. The scanner cannot see authorization logic, server code that isn't in the repo, or runtime behaviour. Agent audits miss things, and repeated runs find more. Use it to catch the common, costly mistakes early β not as a replacement for a professional pentest of a high-risk app.
Only scan code you own or are authorized to test.
Four zero-dependency agent skills that share the same lead β validate β report workflow. They work well together on a typical Flutter + Supabase + Telegram stack.
| Skill | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Flutter Audit Agent (you are here) | Security audit for Flutter & Dart apps: secrets, storage, TLS, WebViews, Firebase rules |
| Telegram Mini App Audit | Security audit for Telegram bots and Mini Apps: initData, bot tokens, webhooks, payments |
| Supabase RLS Audit | Row Level Security audit: open tables, weak policies, definer views and functions, storage |
| Flutter Release Checker | Finds what gets Flutter apps rejected by Google Play and the App Store |
If this saved you from shipping a leaked key, a β helps other Flutter devs find it.
MIT Β© Botirjon (@MBotirjonDev)
Inspired by the multi-phase design of cloudflare/security-audit-skill.

