CodexNet deliberately touches two sensitive surfaces: process launch environment and Windows Firewall rules. This file states what it does and does not protect against.
- Environment variables of the process it launches (
HTTP_PROXY,HTTPS_PROXY,ALL_PROXY,NO_PROXYand their lowercase forms). They are set inside the launcher/GUI process only and are inherited by the started child. Closing the launcher ends their lifetime. Nothing is written to the user or machine environment. - Firewall rules named
AppNet-<tag>-Block-<exe>, outbound, blocking every remote address outside127.0.0.0/8, for the executables you listed. They require administrator rights and are removable withLock-AppNet.ps1 -Action Unlock -Tag <tag>or the 解锁 button.
Nothing else is modified: no system proxy registry keys, no routes, no network adapters, no services, no drivers.
- A local administrator can undo everything. Firewall rules and elevated steps are not a security boundary against someone with admin rights on the same machine.
- Child processes are not covered by firewall rules. Rules are per executable. A program that spawns
curl --noproxy '*'can still reach the network directly. - IPv6 is not blocked by the firewall rules, which only list IPv4 address ranges.
- Traffic is not inspected or decrypted. The tool only decides routing; it does not read payloads.
- It does not hide traffic from the network operator, and it is not a circumvention guarantee.
The whole project is plain-text PowerShell plus a VBScript launcher, with no binaries and no dependencies. Read the scripts before running them — that is the point of shipping them as text.
CodexNet.vbs starts powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File CodexNet-GUI.ps1. The
-ExecutionPolicy Bypass flag exists because downloaded .ps1 files are refused by default; it applies
to that single invocation only and does not change machine policy.
Open a GitHub issue for anything that looks like unintended network exposure, an incomplete unlock, or a rule that survives uninstall.