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Security: MarsPain/agent_data_synthesis

Security

docs/SECURITY.md

Security and Trust Boundaries

Only local fixture or explicitly supplied local source files enter built-in Domains. They are normalized and frozen before task execution. Source paths and private rows are not exported in public Episode collections. A candidate task instruction is the only authority for state changes inside its isolated Domain state; the synthesis operator's configuration does not add task authority.

Remote model calls require explicit --authorize-live-provider, a non-secret --authorization-id, a validated configuration with physical-request limits, and environment-provided AGENT_DATA_LLM_BASE_URL, AGENT_DATA_API_KEY, and AGENT_DATA_LLM_MODEL or --remote-model. An earlier authorization does not cover a later run or resume. The API key is not written to public artifacts. The offline fixture path does not construct a provider client.

The engine bounds response bytes, output tokens, retries, steps, and total and per-role physical requests. It records sanitized error codes and hashes instead of raw provider payloads. A writer lock and private ledger protect resumption and prevent duplicate terminal work. Replay is provider-free.

Deterministic admission does not prove semantic quality. Shadow judgments are diagnostic, and AI review does not impersonate a human reviewer. Only imported direct-human pass labels identify human-approved Episodes. Optional enforced admission requires separate frozen, held-out judge eligibility.

There aren't any published security advisories