fix(token): enforce PULSE supply cap - #112
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Cap lives in pulse_token::mint() (DataKey::MaxSupply, instance storage) so every authorized minter - leaderboard reward/reward_bonus or any future minter - shares one global ceiling. Result is computed via i128::checked_add before any write; over-cap or overflow mints reject with MaxSupplyExceeded (SPulse-Org#7) leaving balance and total_supply untouched. No authoritative tokenomics value exists in the repo, so the cap is deployer-supplied via initialize(_, max_supply); legacy instances fail closed until admin declares a cap through set_max_supply, an admin-only one-way ratchet (cannot raise, cannot go below current supply). Closes issue SPulse-Org#34.
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##close #90
Summary
Enforces a global PULSE maximum supply at the token contract's
mint()boundary so every authorized minting path shares the same hard ceiling.Changes
total_supply.Security
The cap is enforced in the token contract itself rather than relying on individual callers. Therefore
reward,reward_bonus, and other authorized minters cannot bypass the global supply ceiling.An attempted mint that would exceed the remaining supply fails atomically.
Validation
cargo fmt --all -- --checkcargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningscargo test --workspaceIssue
Closes #[ISSUE_NUMBER]