USB Forge formats disks and updates itself, so we treat its supply chain as security-critical.
Please do not open a public issue. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead. We aim to reply within 7 days.
| Layer | Protection |
|---|---|
| Source | main only accepts changes through pull requests, which need code-owner approval, passing CI, no high-severity CodeQL alerts and resolved review threads. Force-pushes and branch deletion are blocked. |
| Secrets | Secret scanning with push protection blocks commits that contain known credential formats. |
| CI | Workflows run with a read-only token. PRs use pull_request (never pull_request_target), so fork code can't reach secrets. Workflow runs from outside contributors need approval. Actions are restricted to GitHub-owned ones and pinned to full commit SHAs. |
| Tags | Only repository admins can create, move or delete v* tags. |
| Releases | Releases are immutable: once published, their files and tag can't be changed or replaced. |
| Signing | The Ed25519 release key lives only in the protected release environment. That environment needs maintainer approval and only accepts deployments from v* tags. |
| Updates | The app installs an update only if the binary's signature verifies against the public key compiled into the app (keys/release-signing.pub). The signature covers the version and asset name, so tampered binaries, replayed old releases and cross-platform swaps are all rejected, even if the GitHub repository itself is compromised. |
| Downloads | Every ISO and the boot loader package are checked against the SHA-256 published by its own project before the drive is touched. |
| Dependencies | Cargo.lock is committed, builds use --locked, cargo audit runs on every PR, and Dependabot proposes updates as reviewable PRs. |
cargo run -p release-sign -- verify usb-forge-linux-x86_64 0.3.1 usb-forge-linux-x86_64 "$(cat keys/release-signing.pub)"The .sig file must sit next to the binary.
Only the latest release gets security fixes.