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Security: YuZh98/notebuilder

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Open a private security advisory on this repository (Security → Report a vulnerability). Please do not file public issues for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within a few days.

Threat model

NoteBuilder is local-first: there is no server and no account. The only runtime network requests are theme webfonts and remote images a notebook may embed. The desktop app (v2/) persists to a local SQLite database; the legacy web prototype (repository root) persists to localStorage. The main attack surface in both is rendering untrusted notebook content — an imported JSON file or a shared Reader .html may contain attacker-authored text and formulas.

Mitigations in the code:

  • No eval / new Function on user content. Formulas run through a small custom expression evaluator (v2/src/lib/expr.ts; EXPR in the prototype) that resolves identifiers from own scope keys only — never prototype properties.
  • Escape-first rendering. All user text is HTML-escaped before markdown/KaTeX markup is applied and before it reaches any {@html} / innerHTML sink (v2/src/lib/markdown.ts).
  • No remote code. KaTeX is bundled at build time; rendered markdown links carry rel="noopener noreferrer". Notebook images may load from remote URLs, but nothing remote executes.
  • Parameterized SQL for all database access; ids are sanitized on import.
  • Slim export. A shared file embeds only the exported notebook — never other notebooks, the card-type library, or the reader's local state.

There aren't any published security advisories