GNOME Web Display controls an already logged-in desktop. Treat access to its password, browser session, or host account as access to that desktop. This release has automated tests, not an independent security audit.

curl | bash executes a downloaded script. Use only the trusted repository, or download and inspect install.sh first. A URL on main can change; a version-tagged URL pins a ref name, but Git tags can still be moved by a repository administrator.

The installer compares the remote tag object and peeled commit discovered at the start with the fetched checkout, checks Git objects, and refuses dirty existing checkouts. v2 source checks also verify the bundled SHA-256 manifest. These checks detect inconsistency/corruption; they are not an independent publisher signature and do not protect against a compromised repository publishing matching hashes. No claim of signed-release verification is made.

Clone-only never executes downloaded project scripts. Verify-only runs the selected release's read-only diagnostics and therefore still requires trusting its code. No automatic cross-version configuration/password copying, git reset --hard, system-service installation or Docker-group membership change is performed. Privileged package/service actions retain explicit consent; do not run the entire bootstrap with sudo. Do not put credentials in installer URLs or command arguments.

Use it on your own GNOME Wayland host with devices and people you trust. It is not a multi-tenant remote-desktop service. Everyone who signs in has the same ability to view and control the virtual monitor, select host audio sources, and affect the shared desktop. Pausing Control is a local UI convenience, not a read-only role. Keep confidential windows off the shared monitor and inspect the audio source.

The default web listener is HTTP on 0.0.0.0:8090. HTTP does not protect the password, session cookie, keyboard input, or signaling from network observers or modification. Use a trusted certificate with native HTTPS, or a correctly configured HTTPS reverse proxy / encrypted VPN. WebRTC media encryption does not secure an HTTP login. Do not put this default setup directly on the public Internet.

The launcher publishes the MediaMTX RTSP and HTTP listeners to 127.0.0.1:8554 and 127.0.0.1:8889. It requires Docker Engine 28.0.0 or newer because older versions have a documented localhost-publishing exposure to other LAN hosts. This check applies to the daemon/server, including when invoked through sudo, not just the CLI. See Docker's port-publishing documentation.

Local processes and other containers on the same Docker bridge can still reach MediaMTX. They are inside the trust boundary. MediaMTX's internal endpoints do not use this application's password; do not expose them to untrusted clients or attach untrusted containers to that bridge. Custom Docker direct-routing or firewall settings can change exposure and must be reviewed separately.

UDP 8189 is published for WebRTC media. Docker creates NAT/publishing firewall rules. The project does not run UFW/iptables commands, change router forwarding, or silently tune the kernel. Validate actual reachability from another device; a local bind check is not a network security assessment.

The application uses a password chosen at startup or supplied in a private file; there is no bundled default password. Tokens are independent per sign-in, kept in memory, expire after the configured lifetime, and are removed by sign-out. Cookies are HttpOnly and SameSite=Strict; Secure is set for native HTTPS or an explicitly configured HTTPS public origin. Restarting the process invalidates all sessions.

Login attempts are limited per direct network peer. By default, eight attempts in one minute are allowed. The limiter is bounded and in-memory; it is not protection against distributed denial of service. Behind a reverse proxy, clients share the proxy's peer bucket. Forwarded address/protocol headers are not trusted implicitly.

State-changing requests and input WebSocket connections require the expected Origin. The stream proxy only serves the configured reader/WHEP paths and strips application credentials before forwarding to MediaMTX. Input messages have size, rate, shape, and value checks. Tracked keys/buttons are released on disconnect, blur, pause, and sign-out where the transport/session can deliver cleanup.

The app limits stored sessions to 32, simultaneous input sockets to 16, individual WebSocket messages to 8 KiB, and HTTP request bodies to 64 KiB. These limits are not a comprehensive resource-exhaustion defense. Avoid unattended deployment to untrusted networks.

Signing out revokes the application's cookie and closes its input WebSockets. The normal UI removes the embedded player. This does not guarantee immediate termination of a previously established WebRTC peer maintained by a modified or malicious client: media sessions are not cryptographically bound to the web cookie. Stop the host application / its MediaMTX container to terminate all media access. A strict per-user media revocation design requires additional MediaMTX session authorization/control integration and is not implemented here.

A password file must be owned by the launching user, with no group/other access. VSCREEN_PASSWORD and the process's in-memory password can be visible to sufficiently privileged local processes. This is not a password vault. Never commit passwords, TLS private keys, session cookies, or real .env / config.toml files.

Normal launching must not use sudo: Mutter and PipeWire belong to the logged-in user. Installation and Docker operations can request explicit administrator consent. The installer does not add users to the root-equivalent Docker group. APT may change packages or start services as part of its transaction; review it before approving. The installer does not automatically change Docker repositories to perform an upgrade.

The Docker image receives no home-directory mount or password. It receives the read-only MediaMTX configuration and advertised host address, with all Linux capabilities dropped and no-new-privileges. This is defense in depth, not a claim that arbitrary configured container images are safe. Only use an image you trust.

GStreamer logs may contain local device names and operational details. The app disables aiohttp request access logging, but reverse proxies and Docker can have their own logs. Inspect and redact logs before sharing them.

No maintainer contact or support SLA was supplied with the original archive. Before publishing, the repository owner should enable private vulnerability reporting and provide a contact in this file. Do not open a public issue containing credentials, private screenshots, or a working exploit against a live deployment. Keep Python, the distribution, Docker, browsers, and the pinned MediaMTX image maintained; test protocol compatibility before changing the image version.