Contact Bilal through his website privately with the affected component, version, impact and steps to reproduce. Avoid terminal contents, pairing secrets, private keys or access tokens. Please do not open a public issue with exploit details.
Shellbell is a solo project maintained by Bilal. Disclosure timing and credit can be coordinated privately; there is no guaranteed response or fix schedule. The contact route must be checked before public launch.
The following first-party code is in scope:
- Shared protocol and cryptography in
packages/protocol. - Relay policy in
packages/relay-core, Cloudflare adapters inapps/relayand Node adapters inapps/relay-node. - Computer service and terminal integration in
apps/agent. - Mobile client and native notification handlers in
apps/mobile. - Mac controller, helper and packaging in
apps/macos, and Linux packaging inapps/linux.
Reports about authentication, revocation, bounded resource use or privacy in a self-hosted adapter are relevant. Hosting-account compromise and unrelated operator infrastructure are outside the application's trust boundary. A compromised computer OS account or unlocked, physically accessible phone is an accepted endpoint trust boundary. Report dependency vulnerabilities upstream; include a Shellbell-specific impact when reporting them here.
No public supported-version schedule has been announced yet. Current mobile source negotiates secure-v2 WebRTC in normal connections and pauses terminal traffic until the direct route is ready. The relay never carries terminal data; relay coordination and direct retries remain active. Independent security review and wider device/network qualification remain required before public release. See release readiness and version compatibility.
Design and security boundaries define endpoint trust, network/relay adversaries, replay, availability and resource limits. PRIVACY.md owns the relay and notification data inventory. Self hosting changes the operator; it does not qualify an independent security audit.