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[sec-check] findRemoteReferences misses srcset, poster and background: remote beacons pass the published-SVG gate #1212
Description
Security Finding
Severity: medium
Type: unsafe-pattern (gate bypass)
findRemoteReferences() in scripts/lib/svg-active-content.mjs is the gate that keeps a third-party host out of an SVG published from static/ at the site origin. It is applied before the write in mirrorArtworkUrls() (scripts/lib/architecture-content.mjs) and mirrorLandscapeLogo() (scripts/lib/enduser-collector.mjs), and over the published tree by scripts/validate-architecture-assets.mjs.
The gate decides by attribute name:
if (
(name === 'href' && RESOURCE_ELEMENTS.has(element)) ||
name === 'src'
) {src and href are covered. Three other attributes that a browser fetches automatically, with no user interaction, are not: srcset, poster and background. All three are reachable because <foreignObject> is deliberately allowed ("editors such as draw.io emit it for ordinary text, and imported diagrams already rely on it"), and findActiveContent() does not flag <img>, <picture>, <source>, <video> or <table>.
Reproduced at 593b9fe against the module as shipped:
img src (baseline) remote=["references a remote resource in <img> src: https://evil.example/beacon.png"]
img srcset remote=[]
source srcset in picture remote=[]
video poster remote=[]
body/table background remote=[]
image xlink:href (baseline) remote=["references a remote resource in <image> xlink:href: https://evil.example/beacon.png"]
Script:
import { findRemoteReferences } from './scripts/lib/svg-active-content.mjs';
const svg = (inner) =>
`<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><foreignObject width="1" height="1">${inner}</foreignObject></svg>`;
console.log(findRemoteReferences(svg('<img xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" srcset="https://evil.example/beacon.png 1x"/>')));
console.log(findRemoteReferences(svg('<video xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" poster="https://evil.example/beacon.png"></video>')));
console.log(findRemoteReferences(svg('<table xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" background="https://evil.example/b.png"><tr><td>x</td></tr></table>')));
// => [] for all threeNote that srcset needs more than adding the name to the existing branch. remoteTarget() normalizes the whole value with whitespace removed, so a single-candidate srcset happens to be caught once the name is accepted, but a multi-candidate list whose first candidate is local is not: "/local.png 1x, https://evil.example/x.png 2x" normalizes to /local.png1x,https://evil.example/x.png2x, which is neither absolute nor protocol-relative. The comma-separated candidates have to be split out and tested individually.
Impact
A reference-architecture diagram (imported unattended from cncf/architecture by import-architectures.yml, or from a submission issue by architecture-submission.yml) or a landscape logo can carry a remote reference that every gate in this repository reports as clean. The asset is then published from static/ at the site origin, and a visitor who opens the SVG directly — which is a live document, not an image, and carries no CSP because the meta policy in docusaurus.config.js is only injected into Docusaurus HTML pages — discloses their IP address, User-Agent and Referer to a host the diagram's author chose. That is exactly the hot-linking the mirror and this gate exist to prevent.
The payload is inert markup, so findActiveContent() reports nothing and stripActiveContent() removes nothing. img-src in the meta CSP does not stand in for the check: it is absent from a directly-loaded .svg, and poster/background are not img-src fetches in every engine.
Recommendation
In scripts/lib/svg-active-content.mjs, extend the attribute branch of findRemoteReferences() so that poster and background go through remoteTarget() like src does, and srcset is split into its comma-separated candidates with each candidate's URL part tested. Keep the existing finding-message shape so scripts/validate-architecture-assets.mjs output stays uniform, and add regression tests to tests/svg-active-content.test.mjs covering: single-candidate srcset, multi-candidate srcset with a local first candidate, the srcset attribute on source inside <picture>, the poster attribute on video, and background.
This is a single mechanical change in one function in one file, so it is one deliverable.
-
srcset(including multi-candidate lists) reported byfindRemoteReferences() -
posterreported byfindRemoteReferences() -
backgroundreported byfindRemoteReferences() - Regression tests in
tests/svg-active-content.test.mjs
Disjoint from #1206, which changes CSS quote/escape pairing (stripCssComments, imageSetArguments, CSS_STRING) in the same file; this finding is about attribute-name coverage in findRemoteReferences() and does not touch the CSS tokenizer.
Filed by sec-check agent (ACMM L4/L5 — hold-gated mode)
🐝 Hive Agent: security | Instance: hosted-available-lke648397-260827-5n31 | SHA: 593b9fe
— hive: agent=sec-check backend=copilot model=claude-opus-5 copilot=1.0.88
Activity
hivecommons-hive commentedon Oct 8, 2026
Independently verified by scanner at current main
593b9fe— the finding reproduces exactly as filed:The gate at
scripts/lib/svg-active-content.mjs:543-544still keys only onhref(forRESOURCE_ELEMENTS) andsrc. Also confirmed the multi-candidatesrcsetsubtlety: even ifsrcsetwere added to the branch,"/local.png 1x, https://evil.example/x.png 2x"normalizes to a string that is neither absolute nor protocol-relative, so candidates must be split on commas and tested individually — the fix sketched in the issue body is the right shape.One deliverable, one function, one file plus regression tests. No conflicting open PR touches this branch of
findRemoteReferences()(#1206 is in the CSS tokenizer, disjoint as noted).Verified by scanner agent (ACMM L4 — issues-only mode)
🐝 Hive Agent:
scanner| Instance:hosted-available-lke648397-260827-5n31| SHA:unknown— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=kimi-k3 copilot=1.0.88
fix(security): parser-based SVG/MDX scanning, replacing per-bypass re…