fix(security): reject remote image destinations in imported MDX pages

scripts/lib/mdx-active-content.mjs

@@ -19,14 +19,29 @@
  * MDX evaluates a braced expression as JavaScript, so any expression node is a
  * finding unless it is one of the inert string-literal attributes the importer
  * emits itself.
+ *
+ * The scan answers the second of the two questions `uri-safety.mjs` states
+ * both gates must answer -- does the value make a visitor's browser contact
+ * another host -- only for destinations the browser fetches with no user
+ * action, which on this surface means images. An imported page is written
+ * verbatim from a repository this project does not control, so a remote `<img>`
+ * in one is a third-party beacon that sees every visitor's IP, User-Agent and
+ * Referer on page load. `rewriteImages()` already demotes such a destination at
+ * import time, but that is a gate on what is *imported*; this is the gate on
+ * what is *published*, and it has to hold when a page reaches `docs/` without
+ * passing the importer.
+ *
+ * Ordinary links are deliberately left alone. A link is followed only when a
+ * reader clicks it, and `rewriteImages()` demotes a remote image *to* a remote
+ * link, so rejecting them would reject every imported page.
  */
 
 import { fromMarkdown } from 'mdast-util-from-markdown';
 import { mdxjs } from 'micromark-extension-mdxjs';
 import { mdxFromMarkdown } from 'mdast-util-mdx';
 import { gfm } from 'micromark-extension-gfm';
 import { gfmFromMarkdown } from 'mdast-util-gfm';
-import { activeScheme } from './uri-safety.mjs';
+import { activeScheme, describeTarget, remoteTarget } from './uri-safety.mjs';
 
 /** Inert inline elements that carry no script, network or layout capability. */
 const ALLOWED_ELEMENTS = new Set([
@@ -65,6 +80,18 @@ const EVENT_HANDLER_ATTRIBUTE = /^on[a-z]+$/i;
 /** Link-like nodes whose `url` a browser navigates to or loads. */
 const URL_NODES = new Set(['link', 'definition', 'image']);
 
+/**
+ * The only attribute of the only allowed component that reaches an `<img src>`.
+ *
+ * `CNCFProjectCard` renders `logo` through `useBaseUrl()`, which returns a
+ * value carrying a protocol unchanged, so an absolute URL there is loaded
+ * off-origin exactly as a Markdown image destination is. `href` on the same
+ * card is remote by contract (`https://www.cncf.io/projects/...`) and is
+ * followed only on a click, so attributes are checked by name rather than as a
+ * class.
+ */
+const REMOTE_IMAGE_ATTRIBUTES = new Set(['logo']);
+
 const parserOptions = {
   extensions: [mdxjs(), gfm()],
   mdastExtensions: [mdxFromMarkdown(), gfmFromMarkdown()],
@@ -118,6 +145,24 @@ export function findActiveContent(markdown) {
     return findings;
   }
 
+  // Collected before the scan: a definition may be written after the
+  // reference that uses it, and an `imageReference` carries only an
+  // identifier. The definition node itself is never reported as remote --
+  // `linkReference` resolves through the same map, and an imported page
+  // legitimately carries remote link definitions.
+  const definitions = new Map();
+  eachNode(tree, (node) => {
+    if (node.type === 'definition') definitions.set(node.identifier, node.url);
+  });
+
+  // Every caller passes a string: an image node's `url`, a definition `url`
+  // resolved from the map, or an attribute value already narrowed to a string.
+  const reportRemoteImage = (line, url) => {
+    const target = remoteTarget(url);
+    if (target)
+      report(line, `remote image destination ${describeTarget(target)}`);
+  };
+
   eachNode(tree, (node) => {
     const line = node.position.start.line;
 
@@ -143,8 +188,13 @@ export function findActiveContent(markdown) {
           value = literalValue(value.value);
           if (value === null) report(line, 'MDX expression');
         }
-        if (typeof value === 'string' && activeScheme(value)) {
-          report(line, 'script-capable URL scheme');
+        if (typeof value === 'string') {
+          if (activeScheme(value)) {
+            report(line, 'script-capable URL scheme');
+          }
+          if (REMOTE_IMAGE_ATTRIBUTES.has(attribute.name)) {
+            reportRemoteImage(line, value);
+          }
         }
       }
     } else if (
@@ -156,8 +206,13 @@ export function findActiveContent(markdown) {
       if (node.value.trim() !== ALLOWED_IMPORT) {
         report(line, 'unexpected ESM statement');
       }
-    } else if (URL_NODES.has(node.type) && activeScheme(node.url)) {
-      report(line, 'script-capable URL scheme');
+    } else if (node.type === 'imageReference') {
+      const url = definitions.get(node.identifier);
+      // An unresolved reference renders as literal text and loads nothing.
+      if (url !== undefined) reportRemoteImage(line, url);
+    } else if (URL_NODES.has(node.type)) {
+      if (activeScheme(node.url)) report(line, 'script-capable URL scheme');
+      if (node.type === 'image') reportRemoteImage(line, node.url);
     }
   });
 

tests/mdx-active-content.test.mjs

@@ -419,3 +419,71 @@ test('reports a parse error on the line it occurs', () => {
   assert.equal(finding.line, 1);
   assert.equal(findActiveContent('<img src=x>')[0].line, 1);
 });
+
+// The second half of the invariant stated in scripts/lib/uri-safety.mjs: an
+// imported page is third-party content, and every <img> in one is fetched by
+// a visitor's browser with no user action, so a remote image destination is a
+// beacon for their IP, User-Agent and Referer.
+test('flags a remote image destination', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p](https://evil.example/p.png)'), [
+    'remote image destination https://evil.example/p.png',
+  ]);
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p](HTTP://Evil.Example/p.png)'), [
+    'remote image destination http://evil.example/p.png',
+  ]);
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p](//evil.example/p.png)'), [
+    'remote image destination //evil.example/p.png',
+  ]);
+});
+
+test('resolves an image reference through its definition', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p][x]\n\n[x]: https://evil.example/p.png'), [
+    'remote image destination https://evil.example/p.png',
+  ]);
+  // The definition may be written before the reference that uses it.
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('[x]: https://evil.example/p.png\n\n![p][x]'), [
+    'remote image destination https://evil.example/p.png',
+  ]);
+  // A collapsed reference carries the label as its identifier.
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![evil][]\n\n[evil]: https://evil.example/p.png'), [
+    'remote image destination https://evil.example/p.png',
+  ]);
+});
+
+test('leaves an unresolved image reference alone', () => {
+  // Nothing resolves it, so it renders as literal text and loads nothing.
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p][missing]'), []);
+});
+
+test('leaves links, link definitions and local images alone', () => {
+  // rewriteImages() demotes a remote image *to* a remote link, and
+  // docs/architectures/colopl.md carries remote link definitions, so a gate on
+  // either would reject every imported page.
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('[x](https://good.example/)'), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('[x][d]\n\n[d]: https://good.example/'), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p](/img/architectures/acme/p.png)'), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p](images/p.png)'), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(reasons('![p]()'), []);
+});
+
+test('flags a remote logo on the allowed component but not its remote href', () => {
+  const card = (attributes) =>
+    reasons(`<CNCFProjectCard name={"K"} ${attributes} />`);
+  assert.deepEqual(card('logo={"https://evil.example/l.svg"}'), [
+    'remote image destination https://evil.example/l.svg',
+  ]);
+  assert.deepEqual(card('logo="https://evil.example/l.svg"'), [
+    'remote image destination https://evil.example/l.svg',
+  ]);
+  assert.deepEqual(card('logo={"/img/cncf-projects/k.svg"}'), []);
+  assert.deepEqual(card('href={"https://www.cncf.io/projects/k/"}'), []);
+});
+
+test('truncates a long remote image destination in the reason', () => {
+  const url = `https://evil.example/${'a'.repeat(200)}.png`;
+  const [finding] = findActiveContent(`![p](${url})`);
+  assert.equal(
+    finding.reason,
+    `remote image destination ${url.slice(0, 117)}...`,
+  );
+});