Please report it privately through GitHub: the repository's Security tab, then Report a vulnerability. Don't open a public issue. You'll get an answer within a week, and a fixed release as soon as the fix is verified.
Fixes go into the latest release only.
- Constant-time check. The computed hash is compared with the stored one using
CryptographicOperations.FixedTimeEquals; a test times it against an early-exit comparison. - No silent truncation. bcrypt reads at most 72 bytes of a password. A longer password is refused (
Hashthrows,Verifyreturns false) instead of being cut, so two passwords that share their first 72 bytes never match each other.EnhancedHashdigests the password with SHA-2 first and takes any length. - No lossy text. A password that isn't valid UTF-16 (a lone surrogate) is refused rather than turned into U+FFFD, which would make different passwords hash alike.
- Strict parsing. Only
$2a$,$2b$,$2y$and$2$hashes with a cost of 4 to 31 are accepted.$2x$(PHP's buggy hashes from before 5.3.7) is refused. A malformed hash never matches and never throws. - Wiped buffers. Key material, the expanded Blowfish state and the queue's pooled requests are zeroed after use.
- Random salts come from
RandomNumberGenerator.
- Check a hash even when the account doesn't exist (against a fixed dummy hash), so response times don't reveal which accounts exist.
- Use a cost of at least 10; raise it over time and use
PasswordNeedsRehashto upgrade hashes at sign-in. - Check only hashes you made or imported deliberately. A hash's cost decides the work: a cost-31 hash takes days to
check. When hashes come from elsewhere, read the cost with
InterrogateHashfirst and refuse ones above your limit. - Limit sign-in attempts. With
BcryptQueue, setMaxQueuedso a flood of sign-ins is refused quickly instead of queueing minutes of work.