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Update Claude Code permissions #31

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Update Claude Code permissions #31

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24 changes: 20 additions & 4 deletions .claude/settings.json
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,17 +1,33 @@
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"Bash(git status*)",
"Bash(git status)",
"Bash(git diff*)",
"Bash(git log*)",
"Bash(git branch*)",
"Bash(git push*)",
"Bash(./scripts/run.sh *)",
"Bash(./scripts/lint.sh *)"
],
"deny": [
"Bash(git push*)",
"Bash(git push* --force*)",
"Bash(git push* +*)",
"Bash(git push* -f*)",
"Bash(git push* -uf*)",
"Bash(git push* -vf*)",
"Bash(git push* -qf*)",
"Bash(git push* -nf*)",
"Bash(git push* -df*)",
Comment on lines +13 to +20

@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist Bot Aug 20, 2026

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security-critical critical

BLOCKER: Allowing git push* without restricting --exec and --receive-pack flags introduces a critical security vulnerability.

An agent can execute arbitrary local bash commands by running git push with the --exec or --receive-pack option pointing to a local repository path (e.g., git push --exec="id" .). Since git push* is in the allow list, this command would be executed automatically without user prompting.

Please add explicit deny rules for --exec and --receive-pack to prevent this command-injection vector.

      "Bash(git push* --force*)",
      "Bash(git push* +*)",
      "Bash(git push* -f*)",
      "Bash(git push* -uf*)",
      "Bash(git push* -vf*)",
      "Bash(git push* -qf*)",
      "Bash(git push* -nf*)",
      "Bash(git push* -df*)",
      "Bash(git push* --exec*)",
      "Bash(git push* --receive-pack*)"
References
  1. Section 2 (Security): Parameterized queries used, all user input validated/escaped before use, no hardcoded secrets. (link)

"Bash(git reset --hard*)",
"Bash(rm -rf*)"
"Bash(rm -rf*)",
"Bash(rm -fr*)",
"Bash(rm -Rf*)",
"Bash(rm -fR*)",
"Bash(rm -r -f*)",
"Bash(rm -f -r*)",
"Bash(rm -R -f*)",
"Bash(rm -f -R*)",
"Bash(rm --recursive*)"
Comment on lines +22 to +30

@gemini-code-assist gemini-code-assist Bot Aug 20, 2026

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medium

WARNING: The current rm deny list does not cover several common recursive/force delete combinations, such as using --force with -r/-R or --recursive. This allows Claude to potentially prompt for or execute destructive commands like rm -r --force or rm --force -r.

Additionally, please note that simple glob matching is sensitive to whitespace; extra spaces (e.g., rm -rf) can bypass these rules.

Let's expand the deny list to cover these additional --force combinations.

      "Bash(rm -rf*)",
      "Bash(rm -fr*)",
      "Bash(rm -Rf*)",
      "Bash(rm -fR*)",
      "Bash(rm -r -f*)",
      "Bash(rm -f -r*)",
      "Bash(rm -R -f*)",
      "Bash(rm -f -R*)",
      "Bash(rm --recursive*)",
      "Bash(rm -r --force*)",
      "Bash(rm -R --force*)",
      "Bash(rm --force -r*)",
      "Bash(rm --force -R*)",
      "Bash(rm --force --recursive*)",
      "Bash(rm --recursive --force*)"
References
  1. Section 4 (Code Quality): Naming is clear, self-documenting, and follows project conventions. (link)

]
}
}
}
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