Harden SecurityPolicy risk detection and fix git -C false positive - #852
Harden SecurityPolicy risk detection and fix git -C false positive#852yacosta738 wants to merge 1 commit into
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…lse positive - Update `is_medium_risk_command` to detect verbs anywhere in the argument list, preventing bypasses where global flags precede the verb (e.g., `git -C . commit`). - Update `command_risk_level` to de-quote arguments before risk classification, preventing bypasses like `git "commit"`. - Refine `is_args_safe` to use case-preserving arguments for `git`, implementing case-sensitive matching for the `-c` flag (detecting configuration injection) while allowing the safe, case-sensitive `-C` directory flag. - Add regression test `test_git_security_hardening_and_false_positives` to `policy.rs`. - Apply automated formatting to GitHub workflows. Security Impact: - Risk reduced: Prevents bypasses of risk-based approval gates using global flags or quotes. - Attack surface: Narrowed by blocking configuration injection via `git -c` and similar flags across package managers. - Why safe: Maintains existing allowlists and adds specific, low-regret hardening to known bypass vectors. Performance Impact: - Metric: Argument processing. - Before: $O(N)$ lowercasing of all arguments in `is_segment_valid`. - After: Case-preserving arguments are used directly, avoiding unnecessary allocations in `is_args_safe` for the common path of safe commands. - Expected: Negligible change in CPU usage, reduced allocation pressure in the validation hot path.
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This PR hardens the
SecurityPolicyin theagent-runtimeto prevent several classes of security bypasses while simultaneously fixing a common false positive.Key Changes
is_medium_risk_command, changed.first().is_some_and()to.iter().any(). This ensures that subcommands likecommitorinstallare detected even when preceded by global flags (e.g.,git -C . commitornpm --loglevel=silent install).command_risk_level, arguments are now de-quoted usingstrip_all_quotesbefore being checked against risk-bearing verbs. This prevents bypasses likegit "commit".is_segment_validto pass original-case arguments tois_args_safe.git -c(blocked) andgit -C(allowed). This fixes the false positive wheregit -Cwas incorrectly blocked while hardening againstgit -ccore.editor=cat.test_git_security_hardening_and_false_positivesto verify these improvements.Impact Summary
gitcommands with directory flags were being incorrectly blocked.PR created automatically by Jules for task 2145600012477397089 started by @yacosta738