Close billing and webhook gaps from the security audit - #153
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Fixes from a security audit of the gateway. Each fix has a regression test.
Billing
body.model, so a:freemodel with paidmodelsfallbacks ran on a $0 hold. Every model inmodelsmust now be listed, and the hold covers the priciest. Unpriced extras (:online,plugins,web_search_options, server-side tools) add the unknown-model hold./responsesnow reads onlymax_output_tokens. Chat Completions takes the larger ofmax_tokens/max_completion_tokens, and 0 means no cap. Previouslymax_tokens: 1could price a request that generated up to the model maximum.pending_reconciliation, so the expiry sweeper can't release a hold the request still owes.usage_source = fallback). These providers have no reconciliation lookup, so it used to be released uncharged.Other
node:crypto. WebCrypto's ECDSA verify rejected every real alert, so leaked keys were never revoked. The test now checks GitHub's published sample.frame-ancestors 'none'on pages, so/keyscan't be framed.bun run typecheckandbun test(327 pass) are clean.馃 Generated with Claude Code