Security updates and cryptographic patches are actively maintained for the latest minor release series of NLTP-Arduino (and the underlying portable ANSI C99 nltp core):
| Version | Wire Protocol | Forward Secrecy (X25519+PSK) | Bounded Zero-Heap LZ4 | Supported |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.6.x | NLTP v1 / Session v2 | Yes | Yes | Supported |
| 1.5.x | NLTP v1 / Session v2 | Yes | No | Security fixes only |
| < 1.5.0 | Legacy Session v1 | Static PSK / early HKDF | No | Unsupported (upgrade to 1.6.0+) |
Please do NOT report undisclosed security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues, pull requests, or discussions.
Instead, report suspected vulnerabilities privately through either of the following channels:
- GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (Preferred): Submit a confidential advisory directly at: https://github.com/indian-aman/NLTP-Arduino/security/advisories/new
- Direct Maintainer Email:
Send a detailed report to Amandeep Singh Bains (
indianaman1.10.97@gmail.com) with the subject line[SECURITY][NLTP-Arduino] <brief summary>.
To help reproduce and triage the issue rapidly, please include:
- Affected file(s), function name(s), and version / commit SHA.
- Target environment (e.g.,
ESP32/ESP8266/STM32/ POSIX host,NLTP_TX_ONLY=0or1, encrypted vs. plaintext mode). - Minimal proof-of-concept C snippet or hex datagram input (such as a
libFuzzercrash reproducer forfuzz/fuzz_nltp_rx.c). - Impact assessment (e.g., out-of-bounds read/write, nonce reuse, replay bypass, DoS / state exhaustion).
| Milestone | Target SLA |
|---|---|
| Initial acknowledgment | Within 48 hours |
| Triage, reproduction & CVSS v3.1 severity rating | Within 5 business days |
Patch release & regression test (tests/test_kat_vectors.c) |
Within 7 days (Critical/High) / 30 days (Medium/Low) |
| Coordinated public GHSA disclosure | Upon patch availability (or mutually agreed embargo up to 90 days) |
Reporters who follow coordinated disclosure will be credited in the GitHub Security Advisory and release notes unless anonymity is requested.
NLTP is engineered for untrusted RF links (ESP-NOW v1/v2, long-range 802.11 LR) and Internet/CGNAT UDP paths:
-
1-RTT Forward-Secret Handshake (
NLTP_SESSION_VERSION = 2):- Mutual authentication and ephemeral key agreement combine RFC 7748 X25519 with a 256-bit pre-shared key (
K) and fresh 128-bit initiator/responder nonces (n_i,n_r), bound to both endpoints' 32-bit connection IDs (cid_i,cid_r):prk = HMAC-SHA256(K, "NLTP-1.5-X25519" || dh || n_i || n_r || LE32(cid_i) || LE32(cid_r))k_i2r = HMAC-SHA256(prk, "i2r"),k_r2i = HMAC-SHA256(prk, "r2i")
- All low-order Curve25519 points resulting in an all-zero shared secret (
dh == 0^32) are rejected per RFC 7748 Section 6.1. - Ephemeral private scalars (
sk_i,sk_r), raw Diffie-Hellman output (dh), and intermediateprkmaterial are scrubbed immediately viavolatilebyte zeroization (nltp_wipe_bytes).
- Mutual authentication and ephemeral key agreement combine RFC 7748 X25519 with a 256-bit pre-shared key (
-
Authenticate-Before-Decrypt AEAD & Anti-Replay:
- Every encrypted frame carries a 20-byte cleartext AAD header (
"NL",version_type,flags,conn_id,seq64,ts_ms) authenticated by a 128-bit RFC 8439 ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag under deterministic 96-bit nonceLE32(conn_id) || LE64(seq64). nltp_unpack_encrypted_frame_v()checks the RFC 6479 512-packet sliding anti-replay window non-destructively (nltp_replay_would_accept), verifies the 16-byte Poly1305 MAC in constant time (diff |= calc_tag[i] ^ rx_tag[i]), and commits the sequence bit (nltp_replay_accept) before ChaCha20 decryption ever touches the output plaintext buffer.- Legacy version-1 encrypted frames (
(version_type >> 4) != 2) and unauthenticated plaintext frames are strictly dropped (auth_drops++) whenever a key is configured.
- Every encrypted frame carries a 20-byte cleartext AAD header (
-
DoS & Session-Hijack Mitigations:
- Peer Address Pinning: UDP and ESP-NOW wrappers update peer IP/port/MAC state only when
ep->valid_rxincrements (requiring valid AEAD authentication in encrypted mode). - Candidate Session Staging (
sess[1]): While an active session (sess[0]) has received traffic withinSESS_TAKEOVER_MS(1000 ms), a newly arrivingPT_HELLOis staged insess[1]and cannot displacesess[0]until subsequent session-authenticated traffic arrives. - Rate-Limited Restart Hints (
PT_NO_SESSION): Unauthenticated restart hints are throttled toHINT_INTERVAL_MS(250 ms) and accepted only if the echoedconn_idmatches the local endpoint and0 < echoed_seq <= tx_seq. - Post-AEAD Bounded LZ4 & SHA-256:
nltp_lz4_decompress_inplace()enforces strict input/output bounds and read-before-write cursor invariants (dp + match_len <= sp), followed by full-payload NIST FIPS 180-4 SHA-256 verification beforesha_okis asserted.
- Peer Address Pinning: UDP and ESP-NOW wrappers update peer IP/port/MAC state only when
Every push and pull request in .github/workflows/tier1-compliance.yml executes:
- Official Cryptographic KATs (
tests/test_kat_vectors.c): RFC 7748, RFC 8439, RFC 4231, NIST FIPS 180-4, RFC 6479 anti-replay boundaries, and 30%-loss encrypted loopback underAddressSanitizer(ASan) andUndefinedBehaviorSanitizer(UBSan). - Continuous Fuzzing (
fuzz/fuzz_nltp_rx.c):500,000mutated adversarial frames per CI run viaclang -fsanitize=fuzzer,address,undefined. - MISRA C:2012 Static Analysis:
cppcheck+ MISRA C:2012 rule checking (docs/MISRA_C_2012_COMPLIANCE.md). - Supply-Chain Attestation: SPDX 2.3 (
sbom.spdx.json), CycloneDX 1.5 (sbom.cdx.json), OpenSSF Scorecard, and GitHub SLSA Build Provenance (actions/attest-build-provenance).