EVProfile is the component that actually writes to the car. It holds no credentials; the stable channel contacts no server, while unstable contacts GitHub only for OTA. It runs with system privilege and owns the gate that every other vehicle-writing app has to go through — so security reports are welcome and taken seriously.

Please do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead.

Include what you were able to do, on which firmware generation, and whether the vehicle was moving. A proof of concept helps; a working exploit is not required.

• Anything that lets another application on the head unit bind the EVProfile bridge without holding the signature permission.
• Anything that gets a road-behaviour write past the speed gate — including a code path that reaches a vehicle property without consulting it.
• Anything that lets a caller reach a vehicle property not exposed by the action catalogue, or pass a raw property id through the IPC surface.
• Privilege escalation through the profile store: a crafted profile that makes EVProfile write something no user could have asked for from its own UI.
• Anything that causes EVProfile to destabilise the head unit — an unhandled exception in a system-privileged service is a vehicle availability problem, not just a crash.
• Any way for stable to gain network access, or for unstable OTA to accept an unapproved host, redirect downgrade, oversized APK, or certificate mismatch.

• Requiring physical access to an unlocked head unit with developer mode enabled.
• A write being refused because the car was moving. That is the safety gate working.
• Vulnerabilities in the OEM firmware itself. Those belong to SAIC.
• A setting not being supported on your firmware generation. That is a compatibility gap, not a vulnerability — open a normal issue.

• Fail closed. When the vehicle speed cannot be read, a road-behaviour write is refused, not attempted. The one exception is an explicit park-state check: if the gear reads park, the write is allowed even though speed was unreadable. That exception is narrow and deliberate, and it is documented where it is implemented.
• The IPC surface takes no raw property ids. Callers name catalogue actions. Widening the catalogue does not widen the contract, and a compromised caller can only ask for something a user could already do from the UI.
• VEHICLE_POWER_OFF is deliberately unreachable. Cutting the vehicle stays a human gesture.
• Stable is offline by construction. It has neither updater classes nor network permissions and is updated manually. Unstable keeps OTA in a separate source set, validates every redirect, caps download size, verifies the APK against the running certificate before copying it to Downloads, and still requires a manual installation. Neither channel exposes remote vehicle control.

See also DISCLAIMER.md, which covers the safety envelope rather than the threat model.