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Security: notinferred/keypaste

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Email security@keypaste.com with the affected version or commit, a description, reproduction steps or proof of concept, and the expected impact. Reports in any language and anonymous reports are welcome. Do not use public issues, discussions or pull requests for vulnerabilities.

Response Target
Acknowledgement Within 72 hours
Initial assessment Within 7 days
Fix or mitigation plan Communicated when available, with a timeline
Coordinated disclosure Up to 90 days, shortened by agreement or active exploitation

Security reports receive the highest priority. Credit in advisories and the changelog is optional; there is no bug bounty. Breaches and serious shipped bugs receive prompt, full disclosure covering the incident, exposure and changes, as required by PRODUCT §3.10. All security-relevant fixes are disclosed.

Reports cover this repository, its build and release pipeline, and dependencies on the secret path. The signup endpoint at site/src/worker.js is also in scope because it stores email addresses. Static site content and third-party deployments are outside this reporting scope. Report upstream dependency vulnerabilities upstream and here; vendored patches must be merged manually.

Supported versions

The published release is the CLI and MCP bridge v0.3.0. The desktop app has no release; the next public release, 1.0.0, is its first. RELEASE.md records distribution status.

Version Supported Status
main Yes Fixes land here first
0.3.x Yes Current release line
0.2.x No Superseded; affected by the defects below
0.1.x No Superseded; affected by the defects below

There is no long-term support line before 1.0. Fixes enter main and the next release; older tags remain unchanged. Published archives are immutable, so old downloads keep their defects.

If you installed v0.1.0 or v0.2.0, replace it with v0.3.0 (changelog). These are the recorded defects of the superseded versions:

Defect In Fixed in
env export can delete your vault by writing over it v0.1.0 v0.2.0
env rm and env set can act on the wrong entry when a path is ambiguous v0.1.0 v0.2.0
get can return the wrong password v0.1.0 v0.2.0
env pull can delete an edit it never imported v0.1.0 v0.2.0
moving the clock back can revive an expired approval v0.1.0 v0.2.0
an approved credential too large to send costs you every other grant v0.1.0 v0.2.0
listing a large vault costs you every other grant v0.1.0 v0.2.0
an agent can queue approval prompts v0.1.0 v0.2.0
entry names can render unescaped v0.1.0 v0.2.0
saving while another program saves the same vault can undo its change, with no history entry v0.1.0, v0.2.0 v0.3.0
on Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025, a save can fail when another keypaste or KeePass program is saving at the same time; nothing is lost v0.1.0, v0.2.0 v0.3.0
an agent asking for entry names on a loaded machine can be told to start keypaste agent for a process that is already running; nothing is lost v0.2.0 v0.3.0

Verifying a release

CLI/MCP downloads at https://dl.keypaste.com/v<version>/ include SHA256SUMS, per-asset .sha256 files and corresponding source; v0.3.0 adds a manifest, keypaste-0.3.0-manifest.json, and an attestation bundle, keypaste-0.3.0-provenance.sigstore.jsonl; v0.2.0 and earlier have neither. release.yml tests the NativeAOT binaries it uploads, including KeePassXC compatibility in both directions. ci.yml runs the unit suites against an ordinary build of the same commit.

The binaries are unsigned and un-notarized, so Gatekeeper and SmartScreen may warn; README documents the macOS quarantine workaround, and its install blocks preserve quarantine.

Checksums detect corrupted or truncated downloads. Because the archive and checksum share an origin, an attacker who replaces both defeats that check.

v0.3.0 also carries a GitHub build attestation, signed through Sigstore by release.yml running in notinferred/keypaste for the release tag, covering every asset and the manifest. v0.2.0 and earlier have none. Checking one needs GitHub CLI (established with 2.86.0) and no GitHub account:

v=<version>
curl -fLO "https://dl.keypaste.com/v$v/keypaste-$v-linux-x64.tar.gz"
curl -fLO "https://dl.keypaste.com/v$v/keypaste-$v-provenance.sigstore.jsonl"
gh attestation verify "keypaste-$v-linux-x64.tar.gz" \
  --bundle "keypaste-$v-provenance.sigstore.jsonl" \
  --repo notinferred/keypaste \
  --signer-workflow notinferred/keypaste/.github/workflows/release.yml \
  --source-ref "refs/tags/v$v"

Substitute any other asset name. A changed byte, another repository or another workflow fails the check. A version that publishes the desktop packages carries a second manifest and bundle, keypaste-app-<version>-manifest.json and keypaste-app-<version>-provenance.sigstore.jsonl, in the same prefix; an MSI or AppImage is checked with the same command against its own bundle, and the signer workflow is still release.yml, which attests what it publishes rather than what compiled it. The command fetches Sigstore's public trust root; to check offline, run gh attestation trusted-root > trusted_root.jsonl on a connected machine and add --custom-trusted-root trusted_root.jsonl. Without --bundle, gh fetches the attestation from GitHub and requires gh auth login. verify-provenance.sh <version> downloads a whole release and checks the manifest and every asset this way; --component app does the same for the desktop packages.

An attestation shows which repository, workflow, tag and commit produced the bytes. It does not show that the source is safe, that the build is reproducible (it is not) or that the release workflow was uncompromised (THREATS.md T-21). README documents building from source with dependencies pinned by content hash in packages.lock.json.

Guarantees and limits

PRODUCT §3 owns the security laws, and THREATS.md each guarantee's detail and tests. v0.3.0 marks what the published CLI and bridge have (the source build keeps it); unreleased marks the source build headed for 1.0.0, which includes all of the desktop app. A line with neither mark holds for both.

Agent access

  • A release needs a person's answer or a rule the person set: per-category Ask, Allow or Block, Ask by default, each Allow confirmed in the app (unreleased); a policy.toml rule (v0.3.0) T-12 T-15.
  • One approval releases one field or attachment to an agent (v0.3.0: one field), or a linked set of up to four fields the person allows together, asked every time and recorded one line per field (unreleased) [T-56]; a whole env set to a child process for keypaste run --session and the run tool, asked every time (unreleased) T-30 T-35.
  • A scoped token releases its sets to keypaste run --token with no prompt, except protected sets (unreleased) T-32.
  • An entry's title, group, tags and URL, and its username unless Settings hides it, reach agents unasked (unreleased) T-4.
  • The bridge holds no vault and makes no network request (v0.3.0) T-9.
  • Every answered request is recorded before the reply, and an unrecordable release is refused (v0.3.0) T-6.
  • An agent sees only what its bridge's --expose reaches (v0.3.0) T-4.
  • A search names at most 25 items it reaches, with their origins, usernames while Settings shows them and the links among them, never a value (unreleased) T-55.
  • An agent may ask the person to save a value at a place it names and never receives it (unreleased) T-54.
  • An agent may ask the person to move an item it sees whole to Trash, mark it expired or tag it needs-update, and to delete for good only an item it created through an approved save; each change is asked every time and made only once the person allows it (unreleased) T-57.
  • Names and reasons are sanitized, and the reason is shown as the agent's (v0.3.0) T-1 T-2.
  • One prompt at a time; 45-second expiry; 60-second hold after a refusal (v0.3.0) T-11.
  • No agent request can make a password prompt appear (v0.3.0) T-7.
  • The local pipe admits only the current user (v0.3.0) T-10.
  • One owner per vault; CLI edits go to it and wait for the person (unreleased) T-29 T-43.
  • Agent rules hold only while sealed; anything else asks about every value (unreleased) T-15.
  • Limit: client labels are unauthenticated, so whoever starts a bridge gets what an Allow gives, also under another agent's label T-3 T-14 T-36.
  • Limit: a rule covers the vault's current contents, so a new field or tag changes what an Allow releases T-13.
  • Limit: nobody reads the reason behind an unasked release, and timing reveals which categories are Allow T-12 T-17.
  • Limit: a run's command is the runner's claim, and a run can leak values its scrubber misses T-30 T-35.
  • Limit: a token bundle cannot be revoked; rotate its values T-32.
  • Limit: there is no prompt limit across entries T-11.
  • Limit: nothing recalls a client's copies or revokes a credential at its issuer T-12.

What unlocks a vault

  • A master password; unreleased, also a keyfile, with or without a password, in every KeePass form; keypaste never creates a keyfile that is any file at all T-27 T-28.
  • Unreleased: a YubiKey slot in the desktop T-37, and Windows Hello after a lock on Windows T-44.
  • New vaults are KDBX4 with Argon2d at 2 iterations, 64 MiB and parallelism 2, pinned in src/Keypaste.Core/KdbxFormat.cs rather than taken from KeePassLib's defaults; keypaste writes no cryptography of its own and reaches the format only through src/Keypaste.Core/Internal/KeePassInterop.cs.
  • Limit: a copied vault can be guessed offline without limit T-20.
  • Limit: after a password or keyfile change, older copies and backups still open with the old credentials; delete them.
  • Limit: a lost keyfile or YubiKey cannot be recovered T-27 T-37.
  • Limit: whoever passes Windows Hello as the person, PIN included, can reopen the vault while the app runs T-44.

The desktop app (unreleased)

  • Secret fields show automation only their length T-22; a revealed value shows at most 30 seconds T-25.
  • Copies clear after 20 seconds if unchanged, as keypaste get does in v0.3.0 T-19.
  • Idle lock after 30 minutes by default, at most 8 hours T-23.
  • Notifications carry fixed words only T-51.
  • Crash reports are sent only after consent, hold no value, name or path, and never come from the CLI or bridge T-9.
  • A save keeps the last five copies in <vault>.backups, restorable from the unlock screen T-26; deletion goes to the recycle bin (v0.3.0 deletes permanently).
  • Limit: screen capture and onlookers can read a revealed value T-25.
  • Limit: clipboard managers can ignore keypaste's markers T-19.
  • Limit: recent.toml shows where vaults and keyfiles are T-24.
  • Limit: an earlier master password and write access to the directory roll the vault back T-26; keep backups off the disk too.

Memory

  • Limit: no in-memory secrecy; immutable strings, swap, dumps and any process running as you can expose values, resolving a request reads passwords into memory, and keypaste cannot defend a compromised local account T-18.
  • Limit: v0.3.0 keeps an approved value for its --max-ttl; unreleased keeps none T-18.
  • Limit: keypaste approve has no idle lock T-7.

Plaintext and file limits

  • keypaste run passes values only in the child's environment and writes no environment file, which verify-run-injection.sh checks (v0.3.0) T-30.
  • Limit: the child keeps those values after a lock, and process inspection and logs can expose them.
  • Limit: env set project KEY=value puts the value in shell history; the command warns (v0.3.0).
  • Limit: a variable's earlier values stay in the vault's encrypted history, up to ten.
  • Limit: env export --dotenv writes plaintext, owner-only except on Windows, where it inherits directory permissions (founder decision, 2026-10-22) (v0.3.0).
  • Limit: attachment save writes an attachment unencrypted to a file keypaste cannot take back (unreleased).
  • Limit: deleting a file does not erase storage; rotate credentials that were committed or shared.
  • Limit: a share link opens for anyone holding it, and only a generated passphrase protects an intercepted link (unreleased) T-33.
  • Limit: a reference file chooses what a run injects T-31.

Audit

  • The log is hash-chained and appended to; keypaste log verify --expect <hash> checks it against an anchor you kept (v0.3.0) T-5.
  • Only the vault's owner rewrites it: lookups older than 30 days become one summary line per agent per day, days older than the period you keep it for (a year by default) are removed whole, every other line keeps its bytes, and a first line signed with the vault's key seals the result (unreleased) T-5.
  • The vault's owner signs the chain with a key the vault holds every 64 lines and when its session ends, and keypaste log verify --checkpoints checks those signatures, so a rewrite before the last one needs the unlocked vault (unreleased) T-5.
  • Each line the vault's owner writes for a connection names the program on it, its process id, executable path and code signature state, as advice it refuses nothing on (unreleased) T-10.
  • Entries are sanitized; a reason is kept as a 200-character excerpt, its length and hash (v0.3.0) T-2; v0.1.0 records the request argument, which can be an opaque handle.
  • Limit: lines after the last checkpoint are unsigned, and the tail can be deleted without trace unless you kept an anchor; keypaste keeps none (founder decision, 2026-10-22) T-5.
  • Limit: kept forever, the log grows until archived (archiving it); it can hold sensitive agent-written text.

Maintainer note

The reporting mailbox has been tested from an external address. GitHub private vulnerability reporting is currently disabled. KeePassLib provenance and local changes are recorded in UPSTREAM.md, and those of the BouncyCastle Twofish code it compiles in, which encrypts a Twofish vault, in its own. Reports to this project and upstream do not automatically reach one another.

There aren't any published security advisories