Use cryptographically secure randomness for OAuth values - #634
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Fixes #631.
What changed
Math.random()withcrypto.randomBytes()for OAuth 1.0a nonces.Math.random()withcrypto.randomBytes()for OAuth 2.0 state and PKCE code verifiers.Math.random().Why
RFC 7636 requires PKCE code verifiers to be generated from a high-entropy cryptographic random source. OAuth 2.0 state values used for CSRF protection must likewise be non-guessable.
For OAuth 1.0a, nonce uniqueness is the principal replay-protection property, but using the same cryptographically secure source is straightforward hardening and avoids weak randomness in security-related values.