| title | Security & Privacy |
|---|---|
| permalink | /security |
| parent | Deep Dives |
| nav_order | 11 |
The mounted volume is strictly read-only:
- Every write/create/delete/rename operation is refused at the filesystem layer (
ACCESS_DENIED). - The volume advertises
ReadOnlyVolume,CasePreservedNames,UnicodeOnDisk; the filesystem name isZipFS. - The source archive is opened with
FileShare.ReadWritebut never written to.
- Both executables run with
asInvoker— they never request elevation and never relaunch themselves as admin. - The Dokan variant logs a warning when not elevated; mounting may still work depending on your system configuration.
- The WinFsp variant detects elevation and reacts: when running as Administrator it forces a cross-integrity folder mount so that standard-user processes can also access the mount (Mounting).
When cross-integrity mode is active, the mounted volume carries the security descriptor D:P(A;;FA;;;WD) — a protected DACL granting Everyone → Full Access:
- Why: UAC integrity isolation otherwise makes a mount created by an elevated process invisible/inaccessible to standard processes (and vice versa).
- Trade-off: any local process can read the mounted content. Only enable it when that is acceptable, and only for content you would share with every local user anyway.
- Drive letters are not usable for this purpose (they cannot bypass UAC isolation), hence the folder mount under
%LOCALAPPDATA%\SimpleZipDrive\Mounts(configurable).
| Location | Contents | Lifetime |
|---|---|---|
%LOCALAPPDATA%\SimpleZipDrive\settings.dat |
Your settings (JSON) | Until you delete it |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\SimpleZipDrive\Temp\<pid>_<guid>\ |
Disk-cached entries extracted from the archive | Deleted on unmount/exit; orphan-swept at next startup |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\SimpleZipDrive\Temp\Logs\ |
Session + driver debug logs | Old logs deleted at startup; current session kept |
%LOCALAPPDATA%\SimpleZipDrive\Mounts\<name>\ |
Empty mount-point folders (cross-integrity) | Not auto-deleted |
Temp files are created with an ACL restricted to the current user.
Three outbound calls, none of which include your file paths or archive contents:
| Call | When | Payload |
|---|---|---|
Update check → api.github.com/repos/purelogiccode/SimpleZipDrive/releases/latest |
Once at startup | Standard GitHub API GET; nothing sent beyond HTTP headers |
Statistics → www.purelogiccode.com/ApplicationStats/stats |
Once at startup | { applicationId, version } only |
Bug report → www.purelogiccode.com/bugreport/api/send-bug-report |
On warnings/unhandled errors | message (error details), applicationName, version, userInfo (context), environment (OS + bitness, ≤ 50 chars), stackTrace |
Offline machines fail all three silently.
- Serilog events at Warning level and above are forwarded to the bug API automatically — there is no consent prompt.
- A filter (
IsUserError) suppresses expected errors so they do not spam the tracker: user cancellations, wrong passwords, corrupt archives, missing drivers, mount points in use (specific NTSTATUS codes), file-not-found/IO errors, and similar. Only genuine defects reach the API. - Reports never intentionally include archive names, mounted paths, or file contents; the stack trace and environment summary describe the failure only.
If you prefer no telemetry, a firewall rule blocking www.purelogiccode.com for the app is sufficient — all calls are fire-and-forget with timeouts.
Because disk-cache files contain the decrypted content of archive entries, avoid mounting confidential encrypted archives on shared machines, or unmount promptly (which deletes the temp files immediately).