DEETTY is an early source alpha. Security reports use GitHub private vulnerability reporting so sensitive details do not enter public issues.

No public stable version is supported yet. The current source tree is alpha work-in-progress.

Report privately through:

https://github.com/rufl/DEETTY/security/advisories/new

Repository maintainers must keep GitHub private vulnerability reporting enabled. If that form is unavailable, do not open a public fallback issue; retry after contacting the LichForge organization without vulnerability details. Do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities involving:

• command execution
• terminal escape handling that can read/write outside expected bounds
• unsafe URI/workspace activation
• local file overwrite/data loss
• credential exposure
• unexpected network behavior
• dependency-bundle or packaging trust issues

Include the affected commit/version, platform, impact, minimal reproduction, and suggested remediation when known. Remove credentials and unrelated private terminal content. Maintainers will acknowledge reports on a best-effort basis; no response-time SLA exists during alpha.

DEETTY should maintain these boundaries:

• no telemetry, analytics, update pings, crash uploaders, or remote feature flags
• no surprise network activity
• workspace URI activation must validate paths before creating PTYs
• terminal escape handling must keep bounded parser/string/reply limits
• OSC 52 clipboard behavior remains blocked unless a future explicit user-owned policy changes it
• launch profiles must avoid shell-string construction for structured actions
• PTY children must reject relative launch paths and close inherited descriptors before exec
• runtime shared libraries must not load from current-directory or caller-selected override paths; dependency-bundle and dogfood launchers may expose only their own trusted private runtime directory
• release temporary files and retained evidence must use private staging plus atomic replacement
• settings/session files must recover safely from malformed or oversized data; NoctEd dirty-buffer snapshots and encrypted .deettyhs history exports use atomic private (0600) storage
• agent resume references are opaque, bounded, and never inferred from terminal output; the only supported launchers are Pi, OMP, and local-only ZIPI, and restore actions require explicit user choice
• dependency bundles must keep ownership/license payload checks fail-closed
• the opt-in launcher qualification retains only bounded response/log/screenshot evidence; Pi and OMP own external-provider credentials and ZIPI is local-only
• session sharing opens network sockets only after an explicit pair, discover, share, or receive action; pairing-listener announcements are bounded to the LAN and stop with the listener, and discovery stops when its UI closes
• the protocol pins per-device X25519 identity keys, uses a Noise XX handshake for first pairing and Noise transport encryption, and requires matching six-digit confirmation on both devices
• remote terminal access is view-only by default; input requires a fresh host grant for the selected pane on the current connection, grants do not cross pane streams, and pane closure, resynchronization, disconnect, reconnect, or paired-device revocation ends the applicable grant and securely discards buffered input
• discovery announcements are unauthenticated hints; users must treat the endpoint and alias as untrusted until both devices show the same pairing code
• paired-device state uses private atomic storage on Linux and %LOCALAPPDATA% DPAPI protection on Windows; identity keys, terminal content, and control grants are never placed in discovery announcements
• encrypted peers must negotiate the complete bounded workspace capability set; per-pane sequence gaps trigger a fresh structured checkpoint, malformed lifecycle transitions fail closed, and idle links require authenticated keepalive responses

The alpha source tree does not yet claim:

• hardened sandboxing against a malicious local shell command
• independent security or cryptographic audit
• signed release artifact trust
• universal terminal escape security
• provider-owned agent session discovery or authentication outside the Pi, OMP, and ZIPI launcher boundary

Treat DEETTY as a local developer tool and run untrusted commands with the same care you would use in any terminal emulator.

The retained repository-owned static network/privacy gate is:

./scripts/check_no_surprise_network.sh

No repository Semgrep configuration is currently maintained. A future SAST configuration must be checked in and reviewed before its results are treated as release evidence; downloading an unpinned remote ruleset is not an equivalent gate.