Pre-1.0, only the most recent release receives security fixes.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability disclosure:

https://github.com/suradet-ps/encryptman/security/advisories/new

Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

Please include the affected version, a minimal reproducer (ciphertext or code), and what you expected to happen. If the issue involves key or plaintext handling, describe the threat model you had in mind.

• Acknowledgment within 48 hours.
• An assessment and fix plan within 7 days.
• A coordinated fix released within 90 days where feasible.
• Credit in the GitHub advisory and CHANGELOG, unless you prefer to stay anonymous.

In scope: the crate's cryptographic behavior (AES-256-GCM usage, HKDF derivation, nonce generation, ciphertext parsing), panic-freedom on hostile input, zeroization of key material, and error-path leakage.

Out of scope: where the caller stores the master key (OS keychain, file, environment), side channels of the host hardware, and applications built on top of the crate. The threat model is written down in docs/security.md.

• No panics on hostile input. unwrap/expect/panic! are banned from library code by a CI grep gate.
• Authenticate before returning plaintext. Tampered or truncated ciphertexts fail with a generic error; no partial plaintext is ever returned.
• Key material is zeroized on drop. HKDF output and reencrypt intermediates are zeroized explicitly.
• The wire format is versioned. A format change requires a new version byte and a documented migration (roadmap Phase 5).