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A policy-based sandbox for running AI agent tool calls with declarative rules, resource limits, and a tamper-evident audit log.

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Agent Sandbox

A policy-based sandbox for AI agent tool calls: declarative rules for commands, arguments, paths, environment, network, and resources, with explained decisions, OS-level enforcement where available, and a tamper-evident audit log.

CI Release Rust License: MIT


Motivation

agent-sandbox sits between an agent and the operating system. The agent asks to run rm -rf build/ or read ~/.ssh/id_ed25519; the sandbox evaluates the request against a policy file, returns allow or deny with the rule that decided and a reason, runs allowed commands under resource limits and an OS isolation backend, and appends the decision and outcome to a hash-chained JSON Lines audit log.

It ships as a CLI (agent-sandbox run | check | audit verify | serve | inspect), a Rust library, and a JSON Lines protocol over stdio so agents written in Python, TypeScript, or any other language can call it as a subprocess.

Agents that can run shell commands are useful and risky at the same time. The usual options are "trust the model" or "run everything in a VM". Between those sits a policy layer: a reviewed, versioned file that says what a given agent profile may do, checked on every call, with a record of what happened. This project builds that layer as a usable tool and states explicitly which parts are enforced by the kernel and which are enforced only by argument inspection.

Architecture

Architecture diagram

Legend: amber = entry points and external systems, indigo = core logic, green = data and state, blue = validation and control, grey = observability and outputs.

An agent reaches the sandbox through the CLI, the JSON Lines stdio protocol, or the Rust library, which all call the same Sandbox API. The decision engine evaluates each request against the compiled policy, resolving every path-like argument and matching argument patterns; a denial is written to the audit log with its rule and reason. Allowed file reads and writes happen in process with O_NOFOLLOW and size caps, and allowed commands run inside the child process boundary under rlimits, a timeout, output caps, and the OS backend. Every outcome is appended to a SHA-256 chained audit log that audit verify can check. Source: docs/architecture/architecture.mmd; the module walkthrough and request sequence diagram are in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

Two layers enforce the policy (ADR 0001):

  1. The decision engine checks a request before anything runs: executable allowlist (the binary is pinned to the one found on the policy PATH), per-executable argument allow and deny patterns, global denied arguments, filesystem rules on every argument that can name a path, and network heuristics. It returns the deciding rule.
  2. The child process boundary constrains what an allowed command can do: rlimits, wall-clock timeout with process-group kill, output caps, a scrubbed environment, and an OS backend (Seatbelt through sandbox-exec on macOS, Landlock on Linux) that confines writes and network access even inside sh -c.

Results

Headline numbers (details below):

  • Decision latency on an Apple M1: 7.9 us p50 for a denial at the allowlist, 29.8 us p50 for an allowed ls -la src, about 10 us per additional path argument.
  • Spawn overhead over a bare Command: about 0.8 ms without an OS backend; about 8.4 ms with sandbox-exec on macOS; no measurable extra cost for Landlock on Linux.
  • All 38 adversarial agent commands denied; with an interpreter allowed, writes outside scratch, reads of ~/.ssh, and TCP connects are blocked by the kernel on both CI platforms.
  • 92 tests pass on ubuntu-latest and macos-latest; line coverage 95.2 percent on macOS and 93.2 percent on Linux.

Benchmarks

make latency runs examples/latency.rs: a release build, warmup, then 20,000 decision samples and 500 spawn samples per row. make bench runs the equivalent Criterion suite in benches/sandbox.rs.

macOS, Apple M1 (8 cores, 8 GB), macOS 27.0.1, Rust 1.99.1. Three runs; p50 varied by under 1 percent between runs; the table shows the middle run.

Operation p50 p95 p99 mean
decide: allow ls -la src 29.8 us 37.5 us 73.0 us 31.7 us
decide: deny unlisted python3 7.9 us 8.5 us 17.0 us 8.3 us
decide: deny cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 24.9 us 29.7 us 68.0 us 26.7 us
decide: allow cat with 9 path args 113.4 us 127.6 us 184.8 us 116.8 us
spawn: bare Command::output of /bin/echo 1.12 ms 1.64 ms 1.87 ms 1.19 ms
spawn: sandbox run, isolation off 1.89 ms 2.69 ms 2.84 ms 2.02 ms
spawn: sandbox run, isolation auto (sandbox-exec) 10.27 ms 10.65 ms 10.87 ms 10.16 ms

Linux, GitHub Actions ubuntu-latest (Ubuntu 26.04, x86_64, shared runner). One run from the CI log with 10,000 decision and 250 spawn samples per row (latency 1000); shared runners are noisier than a dedicated machine.

Operation p50 p95 p99 mean
decide: allow ls -la src 46.3 us 55.3 us 67.5 us 47.2 us
decide: deny unlisted python3 12.8 us 13.6 us 21.5 us 13.1 us
decide: deny cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 36.4 us 38.4 us 46.4 us 36.9 us
decide: allow cat with 9 path args 188.0 us 198.7 us 215.0 us 190.7 us
spawn: bare Command::output of /bin/echo 2.23 ms 2.32 ms 2.37 ms 2.24 ms
spawn: sandbox run, isolation off 2.96 ms 3.07 ms 3.30 ms 2.96 ms
spawn: sandbox run, isolation auto (landlock-abi-8) 2.88 ms 2.98 ms 3.05 ms 2.89 ms

Reading the numbers:

  • Decision cost is dominated by filesystem syscalls, not pattern matching: the engine resolves the working directory, locates the binary on the policy PATH, and walks every path-like argument with lstat and readlink. A denial that stops at the allowlist costs 8 us on the M1; each path argument adds roughly 10 us.
  • Without an OS backend, the sandbox adds about 0.7 to 0.8 ms per spawn over a bare Command (decision, environment construction, rlimit planning including the process count for RLIMIT_NPROC, reader threads, and the process-group sweep).
  • Landlock adds no measurable spawn cost on Linux (the auto row is within noise of the off row): the ruleset is a handful of syscalls in the parent and two in the child.
  • sandbox-exec adds about 8.4 ms per spawn on macOS, because it compiles the profile and then execs the target. That is the price of kernel-enforced write and network confinement on macOS. isolation.mode = "off" removes it where engine-only enforcement is acceptable.

Enforcement per OS

This table is the contract. agent-sandbox inspect prints the same information for the current machine, and every execution records it in the audit log.

Control macOS (sandbox-exec available) Linux (Landlock available) Either OS, no backend
Executable allowlist, argument patterns engine engine engine
Path arguments vs. roots and denied paths engine engine engine
Writes outside writable roots, from any process (including sh -c) kernel (Seatbelt) kernel (Landlock) not enforced
Reads outside read roots, from any process not enforced (engine only) kernel not enforced
Reads of denied_paths, from any process kernel kernel only if outside every read root not enforced
Network kernel: all network operations denied kernel: TCP bind and connect denied (Landlock ABI 4+); UDP and raw sockets not covered engine heuristics only
Proxy variables (*_proxy) removed removed removed
Environment allowlist only allowlist only allowlist only
Wall-clock timeout process group SIGKILL process group SIGKILL same
CPU time RLIMIT_CPU RLIMIT_CPU same
Memory RSS watchdog over the process group, sampled every 5 ms (macOS rejects RLIMIT_AS with EINVAL) RLIMIT_AS per process same as the OS column
Process count RLIMIT_NPROC (per user, set to current count plus max_processes) RLIMIT_NPROC (counts threads) same
File size, open files RLIMIT_FSIZE, RLIMIT_NOFILE RLIMIT_FSIZE, RLIMIT_NOFILE same
Output size capped per stream; producer killed by default same same
Leftover background processes process group swept with SIGKILL after exit same same

Verified in CI: ubuntu-latest (Ubuntu 26.04) reports landlock-abi-8 and macos-latest reports sandbox-exec. The adversarial tests that need a backend ran on both; none were skipped.

Quickstart

Install

From source (Rust 1.99 or newer):

git clone https://github.com/adeoluo/agent-sandbox && cd agent-sandbox
cargo install --path .

Prebuilt binary for macOS on Apple silicon, from the v0.1.0 release:

curl -LO https://github.com/adeoluo/agent-sandbox/releases/download/v0.1.0/agent-sandbox-v0.1.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz
curl -LO https://github.com/adeoluo/agent-sandbox/releases/download/v0.1.0/SHA256SUMS
shasum -a 256 --ignore-missing -c SHA256SUMS
tar xzf agent-sandbox-v0.1.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && ./agent-sandbox --version

Linux users build from source; see Limitations for why no Linux binary is attached to v0.1.0.

First commands

# What does this machine enforce for the sample policy?
agent-sandbox inspect --policy policies/coding-agent.toml

# Ask before running.
agent-sandbox check --policy policies/coding-agent.toml -- rm -rf /
# DENY filesystem.writable_roots: / resolves to / which is outside every writable root

agent-sandbox check --policy policies/coding-agent.toml -- cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
# DENY filesystem.denied_paths[/Users/you/.ssh]: /Users/you/.ssh/id_ed25519 resolves to ... which is denied

agent-sandbox check --policy policies/coding-agent.toml -- curl https://example.com
# DENY network.deny: curl is a network client and the network policy is deny

# Run under the policy, with an audit log.
agent-sandbox run --policy policies/coding-agent.toml --audit audit.jsonl -- ls -la src
agent-sandbox audit verify audit.jsonl
# OK 1 records, head 4b6f43e6...

Usage

A real run: two requests denied by the coding-agent policy (a credential read and a network client), one allowed command run with an audit record, and the hash chain verified. Regenerate with vhs docs/demo/sandbox.tape.

agent-sandbox denying a credential read and a network call, running an allowed command, and verifying the audit chain

Policy reference

A policy is a TOML (or JSON) file. Unknown keys are rejected so a typo cannot silently weaken a rule. Paths accept ~, {workspace}, {scratch}, and {home}; relative paths are relative to the workspace (--workspace, default: current directory).

name = "coding-agent"

[filesystem]
read_roots     = ["{workspace}", "/usr", "/bin", "/lib", "/etc"]   # missing roots are skipped
writable_roots = []                                                 # scratch is added automatically
scratch_dir    = "{workspace}/.sandbox-scratch"                     # created if missing
denied_paths   = ["~/.ssh", "~/.aws", "{workspace}/.env"]           # never readable or writable

[network]
mode = "deny"              # deny (default) | allow
clients = ["my-uploader"]  # extra executables treated as network clients

[env]
allow = ["LANG", "LC_*", "TERM"]   # copied from the caller; everything else is dropped
path  = ["/usr/bin", "/bin"]       # where allowlisted binaries are found; exported as PATH
set   = { HOME = "{scratch}" }

[limits]
timeout_ms = 10000               # wall clock; kills the whole process group
cpu_seconds = 10                 # RLIMIT_CPU
memory_bytes = 1073741824        # RLIMIT_AS on Linux, RSS watchdog on macOS
max_output_bytes = 1048576       # per stream
kill_on_output_limit = true
max_processes = 64               # RLIMIT_NPROC headroom above the caller's current count
max_file_size_bytes = 104857600  # RLIMIT_FSIZE, and the cap for write_file
max_open_files = 256             # RLIMIT_NOFILE

[isolation]
mode = "auto"              # auto | required | off

[deny]
args = ["--no-preserve-root"]
executables = ["sudo", "su", "chmod"]

[[exec]]
name = "git"
args_allow = ["status", "diff", "log", "-*"]   # if set, every argument must match one
args_deny  = ["push", "-c", "--upload-pack*"]  # any match denies
max_args = 8

[[exec]]
name = "rm"
writes = true              # every non-flag operand must resolve inside a writable root

[[exec]]
name = "list"
path = "/bin/ls"           # pin a binary instead of searching env.path

Patterns are globs with *, ?, and \ escapes, matched in linear time. Full samples: policies/coding-agent.toml, policies/readonly.toml, policies/readonly.json.

How a request is decided

For Exec { argv, cwd }, in order (the first failing check is the reported rule):

Step Rule name Denies when
1 exec.argv, exec.text argv is empty, over 128 KiB, or contains NUL, control, bidi, or zero-width characters
2 filesystem.* the working directory resolves outside the readable roots or into a denied path
3 deny.executables[x] the program is explicitly denied
4 network.deny the network is denied and the program is a known network client (curl, wget, nc, ssh, ...)
5 default-deny no [[exec]] rule names the program
6 exec[x] the binary is not on the policy PATH, or an explicit path (./scratch/ls) is not the allowlisted binary
7 exec[x].max_args, deny.args[p], exec[x].args_deny[p], exec[x].args_allow argument count or patterns fail
8 network.deny the network is denied and an argument names a remote location (://, git@, /dev/tcp/)
9 filesystem.text, filesystem.resolve, filesystem.denied_paths[p], filesystem.read_roots, filesystem.writable_roots a path-like argument (including --opt=PATH, -oPATH, bare names that exist, and every operand of a writes command) fails the filesystem rules

Read { path } and Write { path } apply step 9 directly. Paths are resolved component by component with symlinks followed before .. is applied, so ../, absolute paths, symlinked directories, dangling links, and link loops cannot escape (ADR 0002).

CLI

Command Purpose Exit status
agent-sandbox run --policy P [--cwd D] [--dry-run] [--json] [--audit F] -- CMD ARGS decide and run child's status; 126 denied; 124 timeout; 128+N killed by signal N
agent-sandbox check --policy P [--json] -- CMD ARGS decide only 0 allow, 1 deny
agent-sandbox check --policy P --read PATH (or --write PATH) decide a file operation 0 allow, 1 deny
agent-sandbox audit verify LOG [--expect-head HASH] [--json] verify the hash chain 0 intact, 1 tampered
agent-sandbox serve --policy P [--audit F] JSON Lines over stdio 0 at EOF
agent-sandbox inspect --policy P resolved policy and what this OS enforces 0

All policy commands accept --workspace DIR. Usage errors exit 2.

JSON Lines over stdio

One request per line, one response per line, in order. Every request may carry an id that is echoed back.

-> {"id":1,"op":"check","argv":["rm","-rf","/"]}
<- {"id":1,"ok":true,"result":{"allowed":false,"rule":"filesystem.writable_roots","reason":"/ resolves to / which is outside every writable root"}}
-> {"id":2,"op":"run","argv":["ls","src"]}
<- {"id":2,"ok":true,"result":{"decision":{...},"executed":true,"exit_code":0,"stdout":"main.rs\n","timed_out":false,"enforcement":{"backend":"sandbox-exec",...},...}}
op Fields Result
check argv, cwd? decision
check_read, check_write path, cwd? decision
run argv, cwd?, stdin?, dry_run? run outcome (decision, exit code, signal, flags, capped output, enforcement)
read_file path, cwd? decision, content, bytes, truncated
write_file path, contents, cwd? decision, bytes
policy none resolved roots, executables, limits

Errors are {"id":..,"ok":false,"error":"..."}. A complete Python client is in examples/python_client.py (make demo). Its output on the development machine:

ALLOW ls src                           exec[ls]
DENY  curl https://example.com         network.deny
DENY  cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519            filesystem.denied_paths[/Users/ade/.ssh]
run ls src -> exit 0, 114 bytes
enforced by: sandbox-exec

Rust library

use agent_sandbox::{AuditLog, CompileOptions, CompiledPolicy, Request, RunOptions, Sandbox};

let opts = CompileOptions::from_env(None)?;
let policy = CompiledPolicy::load("policies/coding-agent.toml".as_ref(), &opts)?;
let sandbox = Sandbox::new(policy).with_audit(AuditLog::open("audit.jsonl")?);

let decision = sandbox.check(&Request::Read { path: "~/.ssh/id_ed25519".into(), cwd: None })?;
assert!(!decision.allowed);

let out = sandbox.run(&["git".into(), "status".into()], &RunOptions::default())?;
println!("{} -> {:?}", out.decision.rule, out.exit_code);

Engine::decide is available on its own for callers that only need decisions.

The audit log

Each line is {seq, ts_ms, prev_hash, event, hash} with hash = SHA-256(seq, ts_ms, prev_hash, canonical_json(event)). Events record the request, the decision, the policy name and SHA-256, and for executions the pid, exit status, flags, byte counts, SHA-256 of stdout and stderr, duration, and the enforcement report. Output itself is not stored. Appends take an flock, so several processes can share one log (ADR 0003).

Demos

Recorded from real runs with vhs; each tape is in docs/demo/.

The resolved policy and what this OS enforces for it.

The resolved policy and what this OS enforces for it

File-operation checks and a dry run with the full decision as JSON.

File-operation checks and a dry run with the full decision as JSON

Design decisions

  • ADR 0001: a decision engine for explainable denials plus an OS backend for what argv inspection cannot see.
  • ADR 0002: resolve paths one component at a time, following symlinks before applying ..; reject deceptive Unicode before resolving.
  • ADR 0003: JSON Lines with a SHA-256 hash chain and canonical JSON; anchored heads for truncation detection.
  • ADR 0004: Seatbelt on macOS, Landlock on Linux, and why namespaces are not the core in v0.1.

Other choices: the sandbox never invokes a shell (argv goes straight to execve, so ;, |, and $() in arguments are inert text); the binary an agent names is pinned to the one found on the policy PATH; the child gets its own process group so timeouts and cleanup reach grandchildren; unknown policy keys are errors.

Testing

make test        # cargo test --all-targets
make coverage    # cargo llvm-cov with an 85 percent line gate
make lint        # cargo fmt --check and cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings

92 tests (16 unit, 75 integration, 1 doc test), three of them property tests with 256 cases each. All pass on ubuntu-latest and macos-latest in CI.

Suite Tests What it covers
tests/policy_engine.rs 14 a 35-row allow/deny matrix with the expected rule for each row; binary pinning (a copy of ls in scratch is not ls); parsing and validation errors; JSON and TOML loading
tests/path_escape.rs 15 .. chains, absolute paths, symlinked files and directories, dangling links, link loops, symlink then .., tilde expansion, eight Unicode tricks (division slash, fullwidth solidus, one-dot leaders, fullwidth stops, RTL override, zero-width space, NUL, newline); property tests: the resolver equals realpath(3), no allowed write leaves scratch, the engine is total on arbitrary argv
tests/resource_limits.rs 12 timeout kills sleep 30 and its process group; background children reaped; yes stopped at the output cap; CPU limit stops a busy loop; a 1 GiB allocation is contained under a 128 MiB limit; a fork bomb is bounded and its group emptied; RLIMIT_FSIZE; stdin; environment scrubbing
tests/audit_chain.rs 12 intact chains verify; floating-point event values re-hash identically after a parse; modified, recomputed, deleted, reordered, inserted, and malformed records are detected at the right line; truncation is detected with --expect-head; four concurrent writers keep one chain
tests/adversarial.rs 7 38 known agent-misbehavior commands all denied (listed below); with sh and perl allowed, the OS backend blocks writes outside scratch, reads of ~/.ssh, and a TCP connect to a local listener (with a control run that connects when the network is allowed)
tests/interfaces.rs 11 CLI exit codes and messages, --json, --dry-run, audit verify on a tampered log, inspect, serve driven from another process, every stdio op, malformed input
tests/isolation.rs 4 backend selection for off, auto, required; generated Seatbelt profile content

The adversarial list includes rm -rf /, rm -rf ~, rm -rf scratch/../src, rm -r -- -rf ../outside, find / -delete, find . -exec rm, curl -d @/etc/passwd, wget ... payload.sh, nc, ssh, scp, git push https://..., cat /dev/tcp/..., cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, cat ~/.aws/credentials, grep -r KEY ~/.ssh, cat .env, cat /etc/shadow, sudo, bash -c ':(){ :|:& };:', python3 -c "os.system(...)", env rm -rf /, xargs rm, git -c core.sshCommand=sh, git --upload-pack=..., cat ..∕..∕etc∕passwd (U+2215), an RTL-override argument, /bin/sh -c id, and ./scratch/ls.

Line coverage (cargo llvm-cov): 95.2 percent on macOS (local) and 93.2 percent on Linux (CI, gate 85 percent). The lowest file is isolation/mod.rs at 76 to 79 percent, because each OS only executes its own backend branch.

Responsible AI

  • Threat model: docs/THREAT_MODEL.md lists the assets, trust boundaries, threats, mitigations and residual risk.
  • Standards: the threat model maps every threat to the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 (for example ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation, ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse and ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution), the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 (LLM03:2026 Excessive Agency, LLM06:2026 Unbounded Consumption) and MITRE ATLAS v2026.10 (for example AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation and AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation).
  • Inert tests: the adversarial suite uses reserved .example hosts, a local TCP listener and fixture directories; commands the engine denies are never executed.
  • Scope: the sandbox limits what a manipulated agent can do; it does not detect prompt injection and does not replace human review of consequential actions.

Limitations

Stated plainly, because a sandbox that overclaims is worse than none:

  • Allowing an interpreter delegates trust to the OS backend. If a policy allows sh, python3, node, make, git with hooks, or any tool that runs other programs, the engine cannot see what that tool does. Writes and network are still confined by the kernel when a backend is active (network only for TCP on Linux); reads outside the read roots are not confined on macOS. With no backend, an allowed interpreter can do anything the user can.
  • Argument inspection is heuristic. The engine treats arguments that look like paths, --opt=PATH, -oPATH, bare names that exist, and every operand of a writes command as paths. A tool that takes a path in an unusual form (for example tar -C dir) needs an args_deny or writes = true rule to be covered. Allowlist narrowly.
  • Network on Linux is enforced for TCP only (Landlock ABI 4, kernel 6.7 or newer). UDP, ICMP, and Unix sockets are not blocked by the kernel. On older kernels network enforcement is engine-only, and inspect says so. Clearing proxy variables is hygiene, not enforcement.
  • macOS sandbox-exec is deprecated by Apple (still shipped and functional on macOS 27). It cannot nest: if the caller is already sandboxed, the probe fails and auto mode falls back to engine-only enforcement (required mode refuses to run).
  • denied_paths on Linux are kernel-enforced only if they lie outside every read root, because Landlock rules can only grant access. Inside a read root they are engine-only.
  • Memory: RLIMIT_AS on Linux limits virtual address space per process, which is not resident memory and can break runtimes that reserve large address ranges. The macOS watchdog samples RSS every 5 ms and can be outrun by a very fast allocation.
  • RLIMIT_NPROC is per user, not per sandbox. The limit is set to the user's current process count plus max_processes, so concurrent activity by the same user shifts the headroom. It does not apply to root.
  • Fork-bomb cleanup on macOS: the group is SIGKILLed repeatedly for up to 5 seconds. On a loaded macOS runner, a few killed members have been observed to stay in the kernel exit path for several seconds after run returns. They no longer fork, and the test bounds their number; on Linux the group is empty when run returns.
  • Process-group escape: a child that calls setsid leaves the process group and is not killed by the timeout or the cleanup sweep. Landlock and Seatbelt still apply to it.
  • TOCTOU: a path checked by the engine can change before the child opens it. The file API opens the final component with O_NOFOLLOW; the OS backends re-check writes in the kernel. Hard links to files outside the roots are not detected by path checks.
  • Audit log: tamper-evident relative to a stored head hash, not tamper-proof; a writer with full access to the file can rewrite the entire chain. Heads are not signed.
  • Platforms: Unix only. No Windows support.
  • Release binaries: v0.1.0 ships a macOS arm64 binary and a source tarball only. The local toolchain is Homebrew Rust without rustup, so no Linux standard library was available for cross-compilation.

Roadmap

  • Optional Linux namespace backend (user, mount, network, PID) where unprivileged user namespaces are permitted, with bind-mounted read-only roots and an empty network namespace.
  • seccomp filter for socket families Landlock does not cover (UDP, raw).
  • Per-tool argument schemas (tar, git, find) instead of glob lists.
  • Signed audit heads and a streaming verifier.
  • Linux release binaries built in CI, and a Homebrew formula.
  • cgroup v2 memory and PID limits on Linux when delegated cgroups are available.

Contributing and security

See CONTRIBUTING.md and SECURITY.md.

License

Released under the MIT License.

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A policy-based sandbox for running AI agent tool calls with declarative rules, resource limits, and a tamper-evident audit log.

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