Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub (Security, then "Report a vulnerability") or by email to the maintainer at adeoluo@hotmail.com. Do not open public issues for sandbox escapes.
A useful report includes the policy file, the request (argv or file operation), the OS and
kernel version, the output of agent-sandbox inspect --policy <file>, and what the request
achieved that the policy should have prevented.
In scope:
- A request the engine allows that the policy, as documented, should deny.
- A path, symlink, or Unicode form that escapes the filesystem rules.
- A way for a command running under an active OS backend to write outside the writable roots, or (macOS) use the network, or (Linux, Landlock ABI 4+) open a TCP connection.
- Audit log modifications that
audit verifydoes not detect, other than tail truncation without--expect-headand full-chain rewrites (both documented). - Resource limits that do not apply as documented.
Out of scope, because they are documented limitations: anything an allowed interpreter can
do that the per-OS table in the README lists as not enforced; behavior with no OS backend;
setsid escapes from the process group; running as root.
- SAST: CodeQL for Rust (
.github/workflows/codeql.yml). - Dependencies: versions are pinned in
Cargo.lock; updates are reviewed and applied by hand. - Lints:
cargo clippy --all-targets -D warningson Linux and macOS. - Unsafe code: limited to libc and syscall wrappers in
limits.rs,audit.rs,sandbox.rs, andisolation/linux.rs, each with aSAFETYcomment.